Ray v. Avila CA6

CourtListener 9429039CalctappSep 28, 2023

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Filed 9/28/23 Ray v. Avila CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

CHARLENE RAY, H050296
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 21CV000532)

v.

CARMEN AVILA,

Defendant and Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Charlene Ray, representing herself, appeals from an order denying her request for
a civil harassment restraining order against respondent Carmen Avila.2 Because Ms. Ray

1
We resolve this case by memorandum opinion under California Standards of
Judicial Administration, section 8.1. (See People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847,
852-855.)
2
In her opening brief, Ms. Ray seeks review of several orders issued in different
trial court actions. The notice of appeal filed in the instant action seeks review of a
May 5, 2022 order issued in Monterey County Superior Court case No. 21CV000532.
The record designated—but not cited (see discussion, post)—by Ms. Ray confirms that
the only defendant in the referenced trial court action was Ms. Avila. Ms. Ray filed a
separate notice of appeal in trial court case No. 21CV000881, Sanchez v. Ray, which this
court designated as appeal No. H050386. On its own motion, this court takes judicial
notice of the docket in appeal No. H050386, as well as the record filed therein. Ms. Ray
addresses trial court case No. 21CV000881 in the opening brief she filed here, but appeal
No. H050386 was dismissed by this court when Ms. Ray failed to pay the filing fee
required by California Rules of Court, rule 8.100(b). Prior to dismissal, this court denied
Ms. Ray’s request to strike the notice of appeal filed in case No. H050386 and instead file
the notice in the instant appeal. We did so without prejudice to Ms. Ray filing a request
to consolidate the appeals. She did not make such a request. Nor has she filed notices of
has not provided an adequate opening brief to enable meaningful appellate review, we
affirm.
We appreciate Ms. Ray’s respectful expression of her disappointment with the
justice system, and the effort she made to appear before us. From oral argument, we
recognize that Ms. Ray’s experience of the justice system has been a source of great
distress to her. It was apparent from her presentation that she feels that law enforcement,
the trial court, and others in positions of authority have not afforded her a proper hearing,
and that they have taken no action to redress the wrongs she perceives she has suffered.
However, as we mentioned at oral argument, there are strict rules that govern our
review of trial court orders. We are required to presume that the trial court’s order is
correct. The appellant, here Ms. Ray, bears the burden of affirmatively showing an error
based on the record presented to the trial court. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594,
609 (Jameson).) The appellant’s opening brief must provide a summary of significant
facts limited to matters in the record, include record citations in support of factual
assertions, identify the relief sought, and explain why the order appealed from is
appealable. (Cal. Rules Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C), (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(C).) The appellant
must also include in the brief argument and legal authority to support their contentions.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) “This burden requires more than a mere
assertion that the judgment is wrong. ‘Issues do not have a life of their own: If they are
not raised or supported by argument or citation to authority, [they are] . . . waived.’
[Citation.] It is not our place to construct theories or arguments to undermine the
judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness. When an appellant fails to raise a
point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to

appeal in the other trial court matters referenced in her opening brief: case Nos.
21CR000495, 22CV000862, and 22CV000994. This opinion will address only the order
issued in trial court case No. 21CV000532.

2
authority, we treat the point as waived. [Citation.]” (Benach v. County of Los Angeles
(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852.)
Ms. Ray’s brief does not comply with these requirements. Her opening brief
consists of factual assertions that do not cite the record on appeal. Aside from fleeting
references to her constitutional rights, Ms. Ray does not cite any legal authority in her
brief, or otherwise provide reasoned legal argument. These limitations make it
impossible for us to determine the nature of any alleged error in the trial court’s order
denying her request for a restraining order against Ms. Avila, particularly given the
standard of review this court must apply.
We note that the trial court denied the protective order based on “inconclusive
evidence.” Generally we would apply the substantial evidence standard to review the
order. (See Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 497.) But here we are
hampered because Ms. Ray has not identified in what way substantial evidence does not
support the trial court’s decision to deny her request for a civil harassment restraining
order, or in what way the trial court made a legal error. “ ‘It is incumbent upon
appellants to state fully, with transcript references, the evidence which is claimed to be
insufficient to support the findings.’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Fink (1979) 25
Cal.3d 877, 887.) Without citations to the record and reasoned legal argument, we cannot
evaluate either the sufficiency of the evidence, or whether the trial court abused its
discretion in denying Ms. Ray’s request. As a result, we presume that the court’s order
denying the civil harassment restraining order was correct. This presumption is “ ‘not
only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional
doctrine of reversible error.’ ” (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609, quoting Denham v.
Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
We are mindful of the fact that Ms. Ray is self-represented, but we cannot exempt
her from compliance with the general rules we discuss above. We must treat a party who
acts as her own attorney like any other party and hold her to the rules of procedure.

3
(Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247 [failure by self-represented litigant to
cite to record and support contentions with appropriate discussion waives claims of
insufficiency of the evidence].) Although we may exercise our discretion to construe a
self-represented litigant’s brief liberally in an effort to determine the nature of her
arguments, Ms. Ray has not provided us with a brief that makes meaningful review
possible.
DISPOSITION
The May 5, 2022 order is affirmed. In the interests of justice, no costs are
awarded. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)

4
_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_______________________________
Grover, J.

_______________________________
Lie, J.

H050296
Ray v. Avila

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