In re E.T. CA2/8

CourtListener 9401692CalctappMay 24, 2023

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Filed 5/24/23 In re E.T. CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re E.T. et al., Persons Coming B319682
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. Nos. 21CCJP03836A–D)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Tara L. Newman, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
Patricia K. Saucier, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Kelly G. Emling, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
INTRODUCTION
A.G. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order
terminating dependency jurisdiction over her four children,
granting sole custody to their father, D.T. (Father), and ordering
monitored visitation for Mother with the children’s consent.
Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in
making her visitation subject to the children’s consent, and in
terminating jurisdiction when Father was not cooperating with
the visitation orders. We conclude the juvenile court improperly
delegated judicial authority over visitation to the children and
Father. We accordingly reverse the portion of the juvenile court’s
order regarding Mother’s visitation with the children, and
remand for the court to conduct a new hearing on the issue of
visitation. In all other respects, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Dependency Petition
Mother and Father are the parents of four minor children:
11-year-old Ed.T., nine-year-old El.T., five-year-old S.T., and
three-year-old A.T. In June 2021, the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a
referral alleging physical abuse, emotional abuse, and neglect of
the children by Mother. At that time, the parents were no longer
living together, and the children primarily resided with Mother
under an informal custody arrangement. According to the
referral, while Ed.T. and El.T. were staying with Father, they
disclosed that Mother physically abused them, called them
derogatory names and told them to kill themselves, and did not
provide for their basic needs. Although Mother was demanding
that Ed.T. and El.T. be returned to her, Father was refusing to do
so because the children were afraid to be in her care.

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In July 2021, a social worker met with Ed.T. and El.T. at
Father’s home. Ed.T. reported that Mother would hit him and
his siblings with an open hand all over their bodies. She also
choked the children. When Ed.T. was five or six years old,
Mother struck his head with a hot sauce bottle, bit him on the
arm, and tried to scratch him with a knife. When the child was
six or seven years old, she hit him with a broom stick and tied
him up as a form of discipline. On one occasion, Mother hit
El.T.’s head so hard that it caused her to bleed. Ed.T. further
disclosed that Mother called him names such as “dumb fuck,”
“stupid,” and “crazy,” and told him “to jump out the window” and
“to kill himself.” In addition, she solely fed the children junk food
or old food, and allowed Ed.T. to shower only once a week.
Mother expected Ed.T. to clean and take care of his siblings
because she would sleep most days.
In her interview, El.T. disclosed that Mother would slap,
hit, punch, bite, and tie up the children. When El.T. was six or
seven years old, Mother hit her with a broom stick on multiple
occasions, leaving bruises. Mother also bit El.T., slapped her in
the face with an open hand, and punched her in the face and
stomach with a closed fist. When the child was six years old,
Mother got upset and slammed El.T.’s head against the
refrigerator, causing significant bleeding. Mother repeatedly tied
up El.T. and Ed.T. with tape, and she choked and hit their
younger siblings when they did not listen. El.T. further reported
that Mother called the children names such as “bitch,” and told
El.T. to “jump out of the window” and “to hit herself with a car.”
Mother did not provide the children with healthy food, and did
not allow El.T. to bathe on a regular basis. She also relied on
El.T. and Ed.T. to clean and care for their siblings while she slept

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throughout the day. Both El.T. and Ed.T. related that they felt
safe with Father, but not with Mother, and that they wanted to
remain in Father’s home.
The social worker also met with Father and his live-in
girlfriend, L.A. Father typically would have custody of all four
children on the weekends. More recently, however, Mother had
agreed to allow both Ed.T. and El.T. to reside at Father’s home
for a period of time. While Ed.T. and El.T. were staying with
Father and L.A., they disclosed that Mother was physically
abusing them. They further disclosed that Mother called them
vulgar names and told them to kill themselves, which caused
Ed.T. to have suicidal thoughts. Both Father and L.A. also
reported that Mother was neglecting the children. She refused to
take them for necessary medical and dental care, or to provide
Father with the proper paperwork so that he could do so. She
had not enrolled El.T. in school, and she expected Ed.T. to care
for his siblings during the day while she slept. Although Father
had not witnessed any abuse firsthand, he did once find Ed.T.
and El.T. tied together inside Mother’s home. Mother was no
longer allowing Father to have contact with S.T. and A.T., and he
was concerned about their safety in her care. Father stated that
he intended to seek full custody of all four children.
After several attempts, the social worker was able to
interview Mother. Mother reported that S.T. and A.T. were
currently residing with her. Ed.T. and El.T. had been out of her
care for a few weeks because Father and his girlfriend had
offered to take the children to dinner one day and then refused to
return them. Mother denied she physically abused the children,
or ever used a broom or any other object to discipline them. On
one occasion, she disciplined Ed.T. by hitting him on the palm of

4
his hand. On another occasion, she grabbed El.T.’s hand and
acted like she was going to hit it, but never did. She once tied up
Ed.T. and El.T. in a playful manner, but Father walked in and
assumed she was punishing the children so he pushed her and
called her names. Mother denied she called the children
inappropriate names or told them to kill themselves. She further
denied she neglected the children, or forced Ed.T. or El.T. to take
care of their younger siblings. Mother disclosed that she had a
history of mental health issues, and that she and Father had a
history of domestic violence. She believed Father was
manipulating the children into making up the allegations against
her. While S.T. and A.T. were too young to make a statement,
the social worker did not observe any signs of abuse or neglect in
either of them.
A forensic medical examination was later conducted for
each of the four children. El.T. had linear scalp lacerations, a
scar on her chin, and a scar on her eyebrow, all of which she
attributed to physical abuse by Mother. El.T. also had linear
markings on both sides of her neck, which she reported were the
result of self-inflicted wounds after Mother told her to kill herself.
Ed.T. had a cluster of linear markings on his thigh, linear
markings on his forearm, and scars on his scalp and head, which
he claimed were inflicted by Mother. Ed.T. also disclosed that he
had suicidal thoughts in the past because Mother had told him to
kill himself. The doctor who performed the exams noted that
there were no external findings of acute physical abuse for the
two youngest children, S.T. and A.T., but that the absence of such
findings did not exclude prior abuse. The doctor further stated,
that based on exams of El.T. and Ed.T. and the information that

5
they provided, there were significant concerns about the safety of
all four children if left in Mother’s care.
In August 2021, the social worker conducted follow-up
interviews with Ed.T. and El.T. Both children stated that they
were doing well in Father’s home, and that they did not wish to
see or talk to Mother. On August 13, 2021, DCFS removed S.T.
and A.T. from Mother’s home and placed them with Father.
When Mother asked about visitation with the children, the social
worker responded that DCFS would try to arrange a visit, but
would respect the children’s wishes if they did not want to see
her.
On August 17, 2021, DCFS filed a dependency petition on
behalf of the children under Welfare and Institutions Code1
section 300. The petition alleged that all four children were at
substantial risk of serious physical harm under section 300,
subdivisions (a), (b), and (j), based on Mother’s physical abuse of
each of them. It further alleged that Ed.T. and El.T. were at
substantial risk of serious emotional damage under section 300,
subdivision (c), based on Mother’s emotional abuse of them. At a
detention hearing held on August 20, 2021, the juvenile court
detained the children from Mother and released them to Father
under DCFS’s supervision. Mother was granted weekly
monitored visitation with the children in a therapeutic setting.
II. Jurisdictional and Dispositional Hearing
DCFS conducted additional interviews with the family for
its jurisdictional and dispositional report. In their respective
interviews with the social worker, Ed.T. and El.T. confirmed

1 Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references
are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

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their prior statements regarding severe physical and emotional
abuse by Mother. According to both children, Mother hit them
with an open hand, a closed fist, and a broom stick on a regular
basis. She also bit the children and tied them up with tape as a
form of discipline. On one occasion, she hit Ed.T.’s head with a
glass bottle and slammed El.T.’s head against the refrigerator.
She physically abused S.T. and A.T. by choking them, hitting
them with an open hand, and pulling their hair and ears. In
addition, Mother emotionally abused Ed.T. and El.T. by cursing
at the children and telling them that she wished they were dead
and that they should kill themselves. This led to Ed.T.
contemplating suicide on many occasions, and to El.T. once
attempting to stab herself with a knife. The social worker noted
that both Ed.T. and El.T. provided prompt and detailed answers
throughout the interview and did not appear to be coached.
In her interview with the social worker, Mother continued
to deny the physical and emotional abuse allegations. She also
questioned how she could have inflicted such extreme acts of
physical abuse on Ed.T. and El.T. without the children’s doctor or
school ever noticing. According to Mother, Ed.T. had a history of
suicidal thoughts and behavior because Father had abandoned
the family. Mother reported that the marks and scars on Ed.T.’s
body were self-inflicted, and that the ones on El.T.’s body were
the result of accidental injuries on the playground or while in
Father’s care. Mother denied that she called the children names
or talked to them in a degrading manner, and she claimed that
they learned vulgar language at Father’s home. She believed the
children were being coached into making up the allegations
because Ed.T. wanted Father to love and accept him, and El.T.
wanted to be with Ed.T. and was willing to lie for him. In their

7
respective interviews, both Father and his girlfriend confirmed
that they had never witnessed Mother abusing the children, but
that Ed.T. and El.T. recently had disclosed the abuse to them.
Although the juvenile court had ordered monitored visits
between Mother and the children, the visitation plan was still
pending because DCFS had not secured a therapeutic setting for
the visits. Additionally, both Ed.T. and El.T. were refusing to
participate in any visits because they were fearful of Mother and
did not want to be in her presence. Both children also indicated
that they felt safe in Father’s care and wished to stay with him
indefinitely. DCFS recommended the juvenile court assume
jurisdiction over all four children and order that they remain in
Father’s home with enhancement services provided to Mother.
On October 6, 2021, the juvenile court held the
jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. The court sustained the
petition as pled under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (c), and
(j), and declared each of the children a dependent of the court.
The court removed the children from Mother, released them to
Father, and ordered family maintenance services for Father and
enhancement services for Mother. Mother’s case plan included
anger management, parenting education, individual counseling
to address case issues, and conjoint counseling with the children
if deemed appropriate. Mother was granted monitored visitation
with the children once per week, but the visits with Ed.T. and
El.T. were subject to the children’s consent.
III. Six-Month Review Hearing
In its March 2022 status review report, DCFS stated that
the children remained placed in Father’s home. The children
were safe and happy in Father’s care, and he was continuing to
meet all of their needs. Both Father and his girlfriend, L.A., had

8
expressed concern, however, about the eating habits of S.T. and
A.T. They reported that S.T. and A.T. appeared to know when a
visit with Mother was upcoming, and that the younger children’s
appetites would decrease significantly around that time with S.T.
often refusing to eat his food.
Prior to February 15, 2022, Mother had been having
consistent visitation with S.T. and A.T. The visits generally went
well and Mother acted appropriately, although the children
would reject affection from Mother at times. During one visit,
however, a conflict arose between Mother and L.A. when Mother
wanted to take the children to the restroom on her own. Mother
also was upset because Father was nearby throughout the visit.
When the social worker later reminded Father that Mother’s
visits were being monitored by DCFS, he responded that he
would not disturb the visits, but he wanted to see what occurred.
Father also stated that he believed the visits were negatively
affecting the children, and that he was willing to go to jail for not
complying with the visitation schedule.
After February 15, 2022, Father refused to allow S.T. and
A.T. to visit with Mother. Once the visits stopped, both S.T. and
A.T. began to eat well and gain weight. Following a home visit
with the family, the social worker determined that it was not in
the best interests of S.T. or A.T. to continue visiting with Mother.
Ed.T. and El.T. had not had any visits with Mother since their
removal from her care because they both refused to see her.
As of March 2022, Mother was not in compliance with her
court-ordered case plan. She had not made any effort to enroll in
individual counseling. Although she had enrolled in anger
management and parenting education classes, her participation
in these programs had been minimal. In her discussions with the

9
social worker, Mother blamed an ongoing dispute with her
landlord for her noncompliance with her services. She also
blamed Father and L.A. for her lack of contact with the children.
Mother wanted visitation with the children and to have them
back in her care. Father wanted full custody of the children with
no visitation for Mother. In its report, DCFS recommended the
juvenile court terminate its jurisdiction over the children with an
order granting sole legal and physical custody to Father and
monitored visitation to Mother at the children’s discretion.
In a last minute information for the court filed on April 6,
2022, DCFS reported that it had recently held a team meeting
with Mother to address any concerns regarding the case. During
the meeting, Mother shared her concern about her lack of
visitation with the children. She believed all four children were
being coached into not wanting to have any visits with her.
When asked if she had apologized to Ed.T. or El.T. for her prior
abuse and neglect, Mother explained that she had not been able
to speak with the children since their placement with Father.
DCFS also reported that Mother remained noncompliant with
her case plan. She still had not enrolled in individual counseling,
and had made only minimal progress in her anger management
and parenting education classes. DCFS further noted that
Mother continued to make excuses for her lack of compliance, and
that she had not accepted any responsibility for her conduct
toward the children. DCFS continued to recommend that the
children remain placed in Father’s care.
On April 6, 2022, the juvenile court held the six-month
review hearing under section 364. DCFS’s counsel asked the
court to terminate jurisdiction and grant sole legal and physical
custody to Father and monitored visitation to Mother. Counsel

10
for Father and counsel for the children also requested that the
court grant sole custody to Father, but deny visitation to Mother.
Mother’s counsel asked the court to continue jurisdiction because
Father was not complying with the current visitation orders.
Mother’s counsel noted that Ed.T. and El.T. had not had any
visits at all, and that S.T. and A.T. had not visited with Mother
since Father decided on his own that the visits were affecting the
children’s appetites. In addition, Mother’s counsel argued that it
was improper for the court to make a visitation order subject to
the children’s consent.
The juvenile court found that the conditions that justified
the initial assumption of jurisdiction no longer existed and were
not likely to exist if supervision was withdrawn. The court
ordered the termination of jurisdiction over each of the children
pending the receipt of a custody order. The custody order granted
sole physical and legal custody of the children to Father and
monitored visitation to Mother one time per week. The custody
order further provided that Mother’s visitation was “at the
children’s discretion,” that the visits “are to be monitored by a
professional monitor only when the children consent to the
visits,” and that the “children are not to be forced to visit.” In
response to an objection from Mother’s counsel that a visitation
order “can’t be contingent on the children’s wishes,” the court
stated that “the children are not going to be forced with her if it’s
affecting their emotional well-being.”
On April 6, 2022, the juvenile court signed the custody
order and terminated its jurisdiction. Mother filed a timely
appeal.

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DISCUSSION
On appeal, Mother challenges the juvenile court’s custody
order granting her monitored visitation subject to the children’s
consent. Mother contends the court abused its discretion by
improperly delegating to the children and Father the authority to
determine whether visitation would occur, and by terminating
jurisdiction without addressing Father’s refusal to comply with
the prior visitation orders. We conclude the visitation order
issued in this case constituted an abuse of discretion, and
therefore, remand for the juvenile court to conduct a new hearing
regarding visitation.
I. Governing Legal Principles
Once a child has been adjudged a dependent of the juvenile
court under section 300, “any issues regarding custodial rights
between his or her parents shall be determined solely by the
juvenile court . . . so long as the child remains a dependent of the
juvenile court.” (§ 302, subd. (c).) Section 364 requires the
juvenile court to conduct a review hearing every six months for a
dependent child who has been placed in the physical custody of a
parent. (Id., subd. (a); In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 512.)
At the section 364 review hearing, the juvenile court “shall
determine whether continued supervision is necessary. The court
shall terminate its jurisdiction unless the social worker or his or
her department establishes by a preponderance of evidence that
the conditions still exist which would justify initial assumption of
jurisdiction under Section 300, or that those conditions are likely
to exist if supervision is withdrawn.” (§ 364, subd. (c).)
When terminating jurisdiction over a dependent child,
section 362.4, subdivision (a), authorizes the juvenile court to
issue “an order determining the custody of, or visitation with, the

12
child.” (Ibid.) Section 362.4, subdivision (b), specifies that the
order “shall continue until modified or terminated by a
subsequent order of the superior court,” and directs that the
order be filed in a pending family court proceeding (ibid.) or, if
there is none, as part of a new family court file (id., subd. (c)).
In making a custody or visitation order under section 362.4
(commonly referred to as an “exit order”), the court’s “ ‘focus and
primary consideration must always be the best interests of the
child.’ ” (In re T.S., supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 513.) A juvenile
court is not restrained by any preferences or presumptions that
are ordinarily applicable in family court. (In re Nicholas H.
(2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251, 268; accord, In re C.M. (2019) 38
Cal.App.5th 101, 110 [“ ‘presumption of parental fitness that
underlies custody law in the family court just does not apply to
dependency cases’ ”].) We review a juvenile court’s custody exit
order for abuse of discretion. (In re C.W. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th
835, 863; In re M.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 886, 902.) We “ ‘may
not disturb the order unless the court “ ‘ “exceeded the limits of
legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd determination.” ’ ” ’ ” (In re M.R., at p. 902.)
II. The Juvenile Court Abused Its Discretion by
Improperly Delegating Authority over Visitation
Mother argues that the juvenile court improperly delegated
its authority over visitation to the children and Father by giving
them sole discretion to decide whether any visits would occur.
We agree there was an improper delegation in this case.
California courts consistently have held that the juvenile
court may not delegate the decision whether visitation will occur
to a third party, including the child, the child’s parent, or the
social services agency. (See In re Korbin Z. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th

13
511, 519 [improper delegation to child]; In re Hunter S. (2006)
142 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1505 [same]; In re S.H. (2003) 111
Cal.App.4th 310, 319 [same]; In re T.H. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th
1119, 1123 [improper delegation to custodial parent]; In re Kyle
E. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1136 [improper delegation to
social services agency].) In ordering visitation, the juvenile court
“may delegate to a third party the responsibility for managing
the details of visits, including their time, place and manner.
[Citation.] That said, ‘the ultimate supervision and control over
this discretion must remain with the court. . . .’ ” (In re T.H., at
p. 1123; accord, In re Kyle E., at p. 1135 [court “may delegate the
responsibility of managing the details of visitation . . . but not the
decision whether visitation will occur”].)
Accordingly, if the juvenile court orders visitation, “it must
also ensure that at least some visitation, at a minimum level
determined by the court itself, will in fact occur.” (In re S.H.,
supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 313.) “ ‘When the court abdicates its
discretion and permits a third party, including the dependent
child, to determine whether any visitation will occur, the court
impermissibly delegates its authority over visitation and abuses
its discretion.’ ” (In re Korbin Z., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 519.)
This rule of nondelegation applies with equal force to exit orders
issued when dependency jurisdiction is terminated. (In re T.H.,
supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1123.)
In this case, the juvenile court plainly delegated to the
children the authority to determine whether any visitation with
Mother would occur at all. The custody exit order issued by the
court expressly provided: “Mother . . . shall have monitored
visitation at the children’s discretion. The visits are to be
monitored by a professional monitor only when the children

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consent to the visits.” The order further stated that the “children
are not to be forced to visit.” At the time the juvenile court issued
the order, the two oldest children, Ed.T. and El.T., were refusing
to consent to any visitation with Mother. While the two youngest
children, S.T. and A.T., were preverbal and unable to give their
consent, Father was refusing to allow them to visit because he
believed contact with Mother was affecting the children’s health.
Thus, by making Mother’s visits subject to the “children’s
discretion” and “consent,” the juvenile court virtually guaranteed
that no visitation would occur. (See In re Hunter S., supra,
142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1505 [improper delegation where child “was
given virtually complete discretion to veto visitation, and indeed
all contact, with his mother”]; In re S.H., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th
at p. 319 [improper delegation where order specified that children
shall not be forced to visit because it “transform[ed] the children’s
ability to refuse ‘a visit’ into the practical ability to forestall any
visits at all”].)
DCFS does not dispute that the juvenile court improperly
delegated its authority over visitation. Instead, DCFS argues
that the visitation order was not an abuse of discretion because
the court made an implied finding that any visitation with
Mother would be detrimental to the children. DCFS further
asserts that, even if the court erred in failing to make a formal
detriment finding, such error was harmless given Mother’s lack
of compliance with her case plan. DCFS’s arguments on this
point are unavailing.
Where, as here, “dependency jurisdiction is terminated
with the child in the custody of one of his or her parents,
section 362.4, subdivision (a), commits to the sound discretion of
the juvenile court the authority to make an order determining a

15
noncustodial parent’s visitation.” (In re C.S. (2022) 80
Cal.App.5th 631, 638.) In exercising its discretion under
section 362.4, the court must be guided by the totality of the
circumstances and issue exit orders that are in the child’s best
interests. (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 206; In re T.S.,
supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 513.)
In fashioning any visitation order, the juvenile court also
must be mindful that “the parents’ interest in the care, custody
and companionship of their children is not to be maintained at
the child’s expense.” (In re S.H., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at
p. 317.) Furthermore, “the child’s input and refusal and the
possible adverse consequences if a visit is forced against the
child’s will are factors to be considered in administering
visitation.” (Ibid.) Nevertheless, “once the court determines that
visitation is in the child’s best interests, the court must, as part of
its duty to protect and serve those interests, ensure that such
visitation occurs under terms set by the court.” (In re Korbin Z.,
supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 514.) “Otherwise, by placing sole
discretion whether visitation will occur in the hands of the child,
the court will have ceded to the child the determination whether
visitation is in the child’s best interests.” (Ibid.)
Here, once the juvenile court made the decision to order
visitation between Mother and the children as part of its exit
order, it had the obligation to set the terms of such visitation, and
could not give the children or any other third party the sole
discretion to determine whether visitation would occur. (In re
Korbin Z., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 516 [“[a]lthough the court
was not required to order visits for [f]ather, once it did so, it could
not delegate the decision whether visitation would occur to
[child]”]; In re T.H., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1124 [once

16
juvenile court determined that father was entitled to supervised
visitation, it “abused its discretion by framing its order in a way
that gave mother an effective veto power over that right”].)
Because the juvenile court improperly delegated its judicial
authority by making Mother’s visits subject to the children’s
consent, its visitation order constituted an abuse of discretion.
Mother also asserts that the juvenile court abused its
discretion by terminating jurisdiction at a time when Father was
not complying with the existing visitation orders. Mother argues
that the court instead should have continued jurisdiction and
ordered a mental health evaluation for each of the children to
determine whether visitation with Mother was detrimental to
their well-being. While we agree with Mother that the juvenile
court improperly delegated its authority over visitation, we
disagree that the court was required to continue jurisdiction
solely to assure compliance with its visitation orders.
At a review hearing held pursuant to section 364, the issue
before the juvenile court is “whether continued supervision is
necessary.” (Id., subd. (c).) The court is not concerned with
reunification at this stage in the proceedings, but in determining
whether dependency jurisdiction should be terminated or
continued. (In re Armando L. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 606, 615.)
The termination of jurisdiction is required unless the parent, the
child, or the social services agency establishes that the conditions
justifying the initial assumption of jurisdiction still exist or are
likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn. (In re Aurora P. (2015)
241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1155–1156.) Accordingly, once the child
has been safely placed in the custody of one of his or her parents,
the lack of visitation with the other noncustodial parent is not a
proper basis for continuing dependency jurisdiction. (See In re

17
J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 111–112 [juvenile court properly
terminated jurisdiction where children were safe in mother’s care
even though one child was refusing visits with father and their
relationship had deteriorated]; In re Sarah M. (1991) 233
Cal.App.3d 1486, 1500, disapproved on other grounds in In re
Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 204 [where child was safely
placed with father, visitation issues and conflict between parents
did not justify continuing jurisdiction].)
At the section 364 hearing held in this case, the juvenile
court found that continued supervision over the children was no
longer necessary. There was ample evidence presented at the
hearing to support that finding. As reflected in DCFS’s reports,
the children had been doing well since their removal from Mother
and placement with Father. All four children appeared to be
happy and comfortable in Father’s home, and the two oldest
children, Ed.T. and El.T., expressed that they felt safe with
Father and wanted to continue residing with him. Because the
evidence showed that the children had been safely placed in
Father’s custody and no protective issues remained, the juvenile
court did not err in deciding to terminate jurisdiction.
Rather, as discussed above, the juvenile court’s error in this
case was in issuing an exit order that gave the children and
Father effective veto power over Mother’s visitation. Under these
circumstances, we reverse the portion of the juvenile court’s order
regarding Mother’s visitation with the children and remand for a
new hearing on the issue of visitation. Given that the family’s
circumstances may have changed since dependency jurisdiction
was terminated, the court should consider any relevant evidence
proffered by the parties on whether visitation is in the children’s
best interests. If, on remand, the court decides to order visitation

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between Mother and any of the children, it must set the terms of
such visitation in its order. While the court may delegate to a
third party the responsibility for managing the details of visits,
including their time, place, and manner, it may not delegate the
decision whether visitation will occur.
DISPOSITION
The portion of the April 6, 2022 order regarding Mother’s
visitation with the children is reversed, and the matter is
remanded for the juvenile court to conduct a new hearing on the
issue of visitation. In all other respects, the order is affirmed.

VIRAMONTES, J.

We concur:

STRATTON, P. J.

WILEY, J.

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