People v. Robinson CA5

CourtListener 9391426CalctappApr 13, 2023

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Filed 4/13/23 P. v. Robinson CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F084033
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF187220A)
v.

ANGELA RENEE ROBINSON, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Chad A. Louie,
Judge.
Linda J. Zachritz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill, and Erin
Doering, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Poochigian, J. and Detjen, J.
Defendant Angela Renee Robinson was charged with several criminal offenses.
Her defense counsel expressed doubt regarding her competency to stand trial. After
having her evaluated by a doctor, the trial court found defendant not competent to stand
trial and ordered her committed to the California Department of State Hospitals. On
appeal, defendant contends that the trial court should have appointed a second doctor to
evaluate her competence to stand trial pursuant to Penal Code section 13691 because she
told the court she did not seek a finding of incompetence to stand trial. Alternatively, she
contends that even if her statements were insufficient to trigger a statutory duty for the
court to appoint a second doctor to evaluate her, they created a “due process duty” for the
court to inquire regarding whether she sought a finding of incompetence. The People
disagree with defendant’s factual contention that she informed the court that she did not
seek a finding of incompetence to stand trial and argue that defendant cannot demonstrate
any prejudice from the purported due process violation. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On October 12, 2021, the Kern County District Attorney filed an information
charging defendant with burglary (§ 460, subd. (a); count 1), maliciously throwing a
caustic chemical with intent to injure (§ 244; count 2), obstructing a law enforcement
officer (§ 69; count 3), attempted mayhem (§§ 664, 203; count 4), battery (§ 243,
subd. (a); count 5), and resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 6). As to count 1, the
information further alleged that the residence was occupied during the burglary (§ 667.5,
subd. (c)(21)).
On November 19, 2021, defendant’s counsel expressed doubt as to her
competency and requested an evaluation pursuant to section 1368. The court inquired
regarding whether defendant was agreeable with the competency determination or

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code except as
otherwise stated.

2.
whether the court should appoint two doctors to perform evaluations. Defendant
responded, “I agree, sir.” The court then appointed one doctor to perform a competency
evaluation of defendant.
On December 8, 2021, a clinical psychologist submitted her report summarizing
her evaluation of defendant and recommending that she be found incompetent to stand
trial. That report contained a comment attributed to defendant that “she had done this
before and she is competent to stand trial and definitely does not want to go to Patton
[State Hospital] again.”
On December 10, 2021, defendant’s counsel presented no argument and
“submit[ted]” on the psychologist’s report and defendant voiced no objection. The trial
court then found defendant not competent to stand trial.
On January 3, 2022, the trial court committed defendant to the California
Department of State Hospitals for a maximum term of two years.
On February 28, 2022, defendant filed a notice of appeal.
FACTUAL SUMMARY2
On September 7, 2021, defendant was housed at a residential facility serving the
mentally ill. Defendant entered the room of a male resident of the same facility. She lit a
cigarette and the male resident told her she had to put the cigarette out. Defendant
became “very irrate [sic].” She threw the cigarette to the floor and stomped on it. She
then picked up a bleach bottle and poured it over the male resident’s head. She began
“rubbing bleach onto his face and in his eyes with her hands.” She hit the male resident
on the head several times with her fists and then hit him with the bleach bottle. The male
resident exited the room, informed the staff of what had occurred, and called 911.

2 Our factual summary is drawn from the evaluating psychologist’s report.

3.
Officers were dispatched at approximately 6:30 p.m. When they arrived, they
found the male resident outside of the facility. They noted chemical burns on the back
and sides of his neck from the bleach.
Officers then interviewed defendant and determined that, based on her mental
condition, she was a danger to herself and others. They placed her on a 72-hour mental
health hold (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5150). When the officers told defendant that they
were taking her to a mental health facility, she “began screaming, ‘Stop doing this to me.
Stop putting me in mental hospitals.’ ” As one of the officers approached defendant, she
swung at him with her right hand. As officers subdued defendant, she resisted. Once
defendant was in handcuffs, the officers directed her to sit on the curb. She refused and
attempted to strike an officer with the back of her head. Defendant was then placed in the
officers’ patrol vehicle without further incident.
DISCUSSION
Section 1368 creates an ongoing obligation for a trial judge to state any doubts
regarding a defendant’s competence on the record and “inquire of the attorney for the
defendant whether, in the opinion of the attorney, the defendant is mentally competent.”
(§ 1368, subd. (a).) Defense counsel shares a similar obligation. (§ 1368, subd. (b).) If
doubt as to a defendant’s sanity is stated, section 1369 requires the trial court to “appoint
a … licensed psychologist” to evaluate the defendant’s competency unless “the defendant
or the defendant’s counsel informs the court that the defendant is not seeking a finding of
mental incompetence,” in which case the court shall appoint two doctors. (§ 1369,
subd. (a)(1).)
In this case, defendant’s trial counsel expressed a doubt as to defendant’s
competency. The trial court inquired regarding whether defendant was “agreeable with”
the evaluation or if it should, “in an abundance of caution, order an evaluation by
two doctors.” Defendant responded, “I agree, sir.” The court therefore appointed the
psychologist to evaluate defendant.

4.
During the evaluation, defendant told the psychologist that she had been through
the competency evaluation process before, was “competent to stand trial[,] and definitely
[did] not want to go to Patton” State Hospital. At the hearing scheduled for defendant’s
competency determination, neither defendant nor her counsel voiced any disagreement
with the trial court’s finding of incompetence. Indeed, her counsel simply submitted on
the report. Defendant contends that her statement to the psychologist was sufficient to
require the court to order a second doctor to evaluate her pursuant to section 1369,
subdivision (a)(1). We disagree.
As noted, subdivision (a)(1) of section 1369 required the trial court to appoint a
second doctor only “[i]f the defendant or the defendant’s counsel informs the court that
the defendant is not seeking a finding of mental incompetence.” Courts have read that
language to require that a defendant or their counsel “must ‘expressly inform[] the court
during the competency hearing that [the] defendant [is] not seeking a finding of
incompetence’ to trigger the requirement that the trial court appoint a second mental
health expert.” (People v. Leelu (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1023, 1030 (Leelu).) Neither
defendant nor her counsel informed the court that defendant was not seeking a finding of
mental incompetence. Before the psychologist was appointed, defendant’s counsel
voiced concerns about defendant’s competence and defendant agreed to the evaluation.
On the date of the competency hearing, defendant voiced no desire to not be found
incompetent to stand trial and her counsel “submit[ted]” on the psychologist’s report.
Defendant’s comment to the psychologist did not trigger the court’s obligation to appoint
a second doctor.
Even assuming defendant’s statement to the psychologist was sufficient to trigger
the trial court’s obligation to appoint a second doctor, any error was harmless. In this
context, it is a defendant’s burden to show prejudicial error justifying reversal. (Leelu,
supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1031–1032.) To do so, the defendant “must ‘demonstrate
there is a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error he or she would have

5.
obtained a more favorable result’ ”; to wit, that there is a reasonable probability the trial
court would have found defendant competent to stand trial had it appointed a
second doctor. (Ibid. [a defendant’s right to appointment of a second doctor is a state
statutory right rather than a federal constitutional right, therefore the standard of People
v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, applies].)
The People raised the issue of the absence of any prejudice in their brief. In
defendant’s reply brief, she responded that “her situation does not present an issue of
prejudice.” Defendant then proceeded to note that the record contains no instances of
outbursts in the courtroom and contends that she “understood the court, its personnel and
process.” While defendant was able to describe the role of court personnel, the remainder
of the psychologist’s report demonstrated that defendant was not competent: she reported
having suffered hallucinations regarding aliens attempting to control her, “ ‘IBOT[s],’ ”
and ghosts; she claimed to see “people from the past” every time she went to court who
scared her; she claimed that she hallucinated when she was on her period; she did not
understand the nature of her crimes, describing that she poured bleach on the male
resident because he had a rash on his face and eyes that was spread by sexual intercourse
or kissing; she mentioned that her father had just died; “made bizarre comments about her
father and mother ‘moving to the desert,’ ” and told the psychologist that she hears her
father’s voice in jail; and she suggested that “ ‘desert people,’ ” including some
unspecified attorney in the proceeding, were upset with her and wanted her to stay in the
area. Based on the psychologist’s report, there is no reasonable probability that
appointment of a second doctor would have resulted in the trial court finding that
defendant had the “ability to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational
manner …” and therefore would not have changed the outcome of the proceeding.
(§ 1369, subd. (a)(2)(A).)

6.
Because any error in the trial court’s failure to appoint a second doctor—required
only by state statute rather than constitutional mandate—caused defendant no prejudice,
her due process claim also fails. (See Leelu, supra, 42 Cal.5th at pp. 1031–1032.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

7.

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