Powers v. Monica M. CA1/5

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Filed 6/15/26 Powers v. Monica M. CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

BRIAN TIMOTHY POWERS,
Plaintiff and Appellant, A172204

v. (San Mateo County
MONICA M., Super. Ct. No.
24-FAM-00235-A)
Defendant and Respondent.

MONICA M.,
A172502
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (San Mateo County
Super. Ct. No.
BRIAN TIMOTHY POWERS,
24-FAM-00235)
Defendant and Appellant.

Brian Timothy Powers (appellant) appeals from the trial court’s orders
granting a request by Monica M. (respondent) for a domestic violence
restraining order (DVRO) under the Domestic Violence Prevention
Act (DVPA; Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.)1 and denying his request for a DVRO
against her. We affirm.

1 All statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise

indicated.

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BACKGROUND2
The parties were involved in a romantic relationship that
ended in August 2023. Subsequently, appellant sent respondent emails and
text messages that, among other things, claimed to have surveillance tapes of
her; accused her and her ex-husband Bobby of having gang members follow
him; and claimed that respondent and her ex-husband planted listening
devices in his home.
On August 31, 2023, appellant sent an email falsely accusing
respondent of having sexual intercourse with a contractor working for her.
Then, on September 3, she received a text in Spanish including words to the
effect that the contractor “ ‘is fucking Monica,’ ” among other profanities. The
contractor testified that the text was false and that its wording suggested it
was from a non-native Spanish language speaker. Respondent believed
appellant sent the text from a different phone number.
On September 8, 2023, respondent reported appellant’s actions to the
San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office. Sheriff’s Deputy Anthony Psaila advised
her to cease all contact with appellant and to ask him to stop communicating
with her, and she sent him texts asking him to stop “contacting” her and
“harassing” her. Deputy Psaila then visited appellant at his residence, asked
him to stop contacting respondent, and told him if he continued to text her, it
would be considered harassment. Appellant told the deputy he was
concerned that respondent had placed listening devices in his home.

2 Our recitation of the background facts reflects the applicable

substantial evidence standard of review; we “ ‘ “accept as true all evidence . . .
tending to establish the correctness of the trial court’s findings . . . , resolving
every conflict in favor of the judgment.” ’ ” (Burquet v. Brumbaugh (2014)
223 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1143 (Burquet).)

2
Appellant persisted in contacting respondent, sending her two emails
on September 11, 2023 and a text message on October 31; respondent also
believed appellant sent her a Christmas ornament that she received in
December, which had appellant’s, her, and her children’s names on it.
Appellant also sent respondent messages on a dating application on October
10.
At the end of January 2024, respondent received two text messages
that were from a phone number she did not recognize but that she believed
were sent by appellant. The first, which she received late at night on
January 30, states, “Free tonight to talk? I see you awake.” The second
states, “You need a new work computer fast delivery.” She also received
photographs of appellant’s house via text from the same number.
Respondent contacted Deputy Psaila, and together they composed a
reply text stating, “Brian, please stop contacting me. I no longer wish to have
any communication with you, and if you communicate with me again, I will
file charges against you for harassment.” Respondent initially received the
response “Ok,” but then later received a message stating, “Hopefully Brian
just dies! That way your kids and friends will never know all the bad things
you and Bobby did to humiliate and torture him. Everyone will just think
he’s harassing you and doing all the things you actually did to him.” Deputy
Psaila asked appellant if he sent the texts, but appellant denied doing so.
On February 2, 2024, respondent filed a request for a DVRO (case No.
24-FAM-00235). On February 5, the trial court issued a temporary
restraining order directing appellant to cease all contact with respondent and
to stay at least 100 yards away.
On September 11, 2024, appellant filed a request for a DVRO against
respondent (case No. 24-FAM-00235-A). He alleged that she had engaged in

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“identity theft, defamation, stalking in person and onlin[e]” and illegally
recording him. Appellant attached a detailed statement in support of his
request.3 He also attached a report from a “computer forensic firm.” The
report found evidence of hacking and online impersonation but the report did
not identify respondent as the perpetrator.
The trial court conducted hearings in July, October, and November
2024. Respondent presented her own testimony and that of Deputy Psaila,
appellant’s ex-wife, her contractor, and her ex-husband; appellant presented
his own testimony and that of a coworker and another officer.
On November 8, 2024, the trial court granted respondent’s request for a
DVRO and denied appellant’s request. The DVRO was granted for a period of
two years. In rendering its decision, the court stated, “the Court does find
based on the presentation of satisfactory evidence that abuse did occur within
the meaning of the [DVPA]. [¶] The Court finds that [respondent] has met
her burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [appellant] did
commit abuse against her and that [appellant’s] behavior and comments to
her in the form of e-mails, in the form of text messages and in the form of
overall behavior has destroyed her mental and emotional calm.”
In rejecting appellant’s request, the court stated, “The Court is not of
the mind that you are not experiencing suspicious behavior. You submitted
information regarding damage to your tires. You submitted information
indicating that you had experienced some sort of cyber attack or cyber

3 Given the trial court’s denial of appellant’s request for a DVRO, it is

unnecessary to summarize appellant’s allegations in detail. In the discussion
section, we reject appellant’s contention that the court erred in denying the
DVRO. In short, appellant failed to present evidence that respondent was
the perpetrator of the alleged conduct beyond his own speculative
accusations.

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harassment. The issue, sir, is that the Court has not heard evidence from
you that establishes that the perpetrator of that behavior is” respondent.
On November 12, 2024, appellant requested a statement of decision.
He acknowledged that the request was late. In December, the court denied
appellant’s request as untimely.
The present appeal followed. This court consolidated appellate case
numbers A172204 and A172502.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of the DVPA “is to prevent acts of domestic violence,
abuse, and sexual abuse and to provide for a separation of the persons
involved in the domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable these
persons to seek a resolution of the causes of the violence.” (§ 6220.) To
further this purpose, a court may issue an order to restrain any person if
evidence provided to the court shows “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of
abuse.” (§ 6300, subd. (a).) “We review the grant or denial of a request for a
DVRO for abuse of discretion.” (In re Marriage of Davila & Mejia (2018) 29
Cal.App.5th 220, 226.) “ ‘ “To the extent that we are called upon to review
the trial court’s factual findings, we apply a substantial evidence standard of
review.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
I. Substantial Evidence Claim
Appellant first contends the record does not contain evidence of abuse
within the meaning of the DVPA. He argues his communications to
respondent contained “no threats or language suggesting violence.” But
“ ‘ “disturbing the peace of the other party” in section 6320 may be properly
understood as conduct that destroys the mental or emotional calm of the
other party.’ ” (Burquet, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1146.) The trial court
had before it evidence that appellant repeatedly sent respondent harassing

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texts and emails, even after she asked him to stop. Those messages included
disturbing accusations and suggested that appellant was watching and
recording respondent. Moreover, the messages were long, rambling,
incoherent, and aggressive in tone. The conduct shown by the evidence
before the court was sufficient to satisfy the statutory definition of abuse.
Appellant asserts that he did not contact respondent after September
2023, but there was very strong circumstantial evidence that appellant sent
respondent anonymous messages from a different phone number at the end of
January 2024. (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 943 [“ ‘Substantial
evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences
drawn from that evidence’ ”].) The texts included photos of appellant’s home
and reflected knowledge of respondent’s ex-husband’s name; the sender did
not deny he was “Brian” when respondent asked him to stop contacting her;
and the final text expressed sympathy for appellant for alleged mistreatment
by respondent and her ex-husband. Accordingly, substantial evidence
supports the court’s implied finding that appellant sent the messages.
In sum, appellant has not shown insufficient evidence supports the
DVRO, both because the evidence supports the court’s findings regarding
appellant’s conduct and because appellant’s conduct met the statutory
definition of abuse.4 Neither has appellant shown the trial court abused its
discretion in selecting a duration of two years.

4 Because we are required to resolve all evidentiary conflicts in favor of

the trial court’s orders (Burquet, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1143), we need
not and do not address those of appellant’s arguments that are based on his
interpretations of the evidence in his favor.

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II. Due Process and Evidentiary Claims
Appellant next makes a number of claims that the trial court denied
him due process and improperly denied him an opportunity to present
evidence and conduct cross-examination.
Appellant claims the trial court denied him due process by
consolidating his request for a DVRO with respondent’s request. However,
he forfeited any objection to consolidation by agreeing to the court’s
suggestion to consider the parties’ requests jointly. (People v. Cardona (2009)
177 Cal.App.4th 516, 523.) In any event, he has not shown the court abused
its discretion by consolidating the matters. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1048, subd.
(a).)
Appellant argues the trial court denied him “cross-examination and
authentication opportunities,” but he fails to demonstrate the court abused
its discretion in those respects or that any error was prejudicial. (Zuniga v.
Alexandria Care Center, LLC (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 871, 888 [“The trial
court’s error in excluding evidence is grounds for reversing a judgment only if
the party appealing demonstrates a ‘miscarriage of justice’—that is, that a
different result would have been probable if the error had not occurred”].) In
particular, appellant has not shown the court refused to consider any
evidence or allow any cross-examination that could have affected the result
below. For example, appellant references a recording of an interaction
between respondent and an Officer Morales at the end of January 2024.
Appellant claims the recording reveals that the officer described appellant as
cooperative and that respondent suggested appellant had dementia after
learning of appellant’s identity theft allegation. But the Morales recording,
as described by appellant, is not inconsistent with the evidence supporting
the DVRO.

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Neither has appellant shown that the trial court abused its discretion
in limiting the cross-examination of his ex-wife, who testified about her
communications with respondent. Appellant sought to ask his ex-wife about
a custody proceeding they were involved in and the trial court asked for an
offer of proof. Appellant said that his ex-wife had referenced the DVRO
proceeding and concerns about his mental health in the custody proceeding.
The court warned appellant to keep the questions relevant and allowed
substantial questioning about the witness’s communications with respondent
and police officers. On appeal, appellant asserts that the trial court unfairly
limited his questioning, but the record citations he provides do not support
the assertion. Appellant has not shown the court abused its discretion in
limiting cross-examination.
Appellant also references the Christmas ornament respondent received.
The evidence in the record is inconclusive regarding who purchased the
ornament, and there is no indication the trial court relied on the ornament in
issuing the DVRO. Appellant appears to suggest the court erred in failing to
find that respondent ordered the ornament herself in order to fabricate
evidence against appellant. However, we defer to the court’s implied finding
that respondent was credible in her testimony that she did not purchase the
ornament. The evidence did not compel the court to find to the contrary.5
Appellant argues the trial court’s denial of his request for a temporary
restraining order reflected “prejudgment” of his claims. But the record
demonstrates the trial court considered appellant’s evidence and arguments
before rendering its decision.

5 Appellant also references other evidence in passing in his brief.
He
has not shown error as to those other matters, much less prejudicial error.
Neither has he shown cumulative error.

8
To the extent appellant claims the trial court erred in failing to grant
his request for a DVRO based on the forensic report of the harassment he
experienced, the claim fails because appellant failed to present evidence
respondent was responsible for the incidents he described. We reject
appellant’s claim that the court applied different “attribution” standards to
the January 2024 texts relied upon by respondent and the harassing conduct
relied upon by appellant. The circumstantial evidence permitted a
reasonable inference appellant sent the January 2024 texts, but appellant
points to no circumstantial evidence supporting an inference respondent was
responsible for the conduct he alleged, much less evidence compelling the
court to so find. The fact that appellant may have experienced hacking or
identity theft at the same time he was in conflict with respondent does not
support a reasonable inference respondent was the perpetrator.
III. Denial of Request for Statement of Decision
Finally, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his request
for a statement of decision, made on November 12, 2024, several days after
the trial court announced its decision. Code of Civil Procedure section 632
requires that a request for a statement of decision “be made prior to the
submission of the matter for decision” when “the trial is concluded within one
calendar day or in less than 8 hours over more than one day.” Respondent
explains in her brief on appeal that the total time of the hearings below was
less than eight hours.6 Appellant admitted below that his request was
untimely, and in his reply brief on appeal, he fails to rebut respondent’s

6 Respondent cites to portions of the record showing the first two

evidentiary hearings lasted 2 hours and 7 minutes and 2 hours and 42
minutes, for a total of under 5 hours. It is unclear how long the November
2024 hearing was, but the length of the transcript is a strong indication it
was much shorter than the first two hearings.

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showing that he was required to make his request before the matter was
submitted. The trial court did not err.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s orders are affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to
respondent.

SIMONS, J.

We concur.
JACKSON, P. J.
BURNS, J.

(A172204 & A172502)

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