CourtListener 10874442•Safariland, LLC v. Cal. Dept. of General Services CA2/5
Safariland, LLC v. Cal. Dept. of General Services CA2/5
CourtListener 10874442CalctappJun 12, 2026
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Filed 6/12/26 Safariland, LLC v. Cal. Dept. of General Services CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
SAFARILAND, LLC, B340028
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
v. Nos. 23STCP03199)
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT
OF GENERAL SERVICES,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stephen I. Goorvitch, Judge. Affirmed.
Lindborg & Mazor, Irina J. Mazor and Peter F. Lindborg
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Tamar Pachter, Assistant
Attorney General, Michael D. Gowe and Darren Shaffer, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.
——————————
Plaintiff and appellant Safariland, LLC appeals a judgment
in favor of defendant and respondent California Department of
General Services (DGS), after the trial court denied Safariland’s
petition for writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section
1085. Safariland contends DGS lacked authority to reject
Safariland’s bid protest, and that its petition for writ of mandate
should have been granted. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Introduction and Overview
Shortly after DGS posted a notice of intent to award a
public contract to a different company, Safariland notified DGS of
its intent to protest the award. DGS sent Safariland detailed
instructions on the protest process. Safariland followed those
instructions with one key deviation. Rather than sending the
required check or money order to the DGS address provided in
the instructions, Safariland sent the check to the Office of
Administrative Hearings (OAH) at a different address. DGS
notified Safariland that by failing to submit a complete protest by
the submission deadline, Safariland had waived its right to
protest. Safariland filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking to
compel DGS to accept its protest, the trial court denied
Safariland’s petition, and Safariland appealed.
2
B. Safariland’s Bid and Attempted Protest
In February 2023, Safariland submitted a proposal in
response to a request for proposals for a contract to supply the
state of California and participating local government agencies
with body armor for purchase for a five-year period. After DGS
posted a notice of intent to award the contract to a different
company, Safariland filed a written notice of intent to protest on
July 14, 2023. On July 17, 2023, DGS sent Safariland a letter
with instructions for filing the protest, stating in relevant part:
“The Safariland Group is required to file with the
Procurement Division’s Alternative Protest Coordinator
before 5:00 p.m. (PDT/PST) on Tuesday, July 25,
2023, a complete protest filing in accordance with 2CCR,
Section 1408.[1] The protest filing is comprised of the
following: (1) a $50.00 filing fee; (2) a Detailed Written
Statement of [P]rotest and any exhibits, pursuant to 2
CCR Section 1412; and (3) either a $7,000.00 deposit for
estimated arbitration costs or, if you are a California
certified small business, a copy of your current small
business certification. The fee and deposit must be in
the form of a check or money order made payable to the
Office of Administrative Hearings and remit to the
following address:
1 We understand the references to 2 CCR, sections 1408
and 1412 in the text of the DGS letter to be referring to the
applicable DGS regulations, which appear in Title 1 of the
California Code of Regulations, not in Title 2. The regulations
are discussed later in our opinion.
3
Department of General Services
Procurement Division/Alternative Protest Coordinator
707 3rd Street, 2nd Floor
West Sacramento, CA 95605
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“If the Detailed Written Statement of [P]rotest and
exhibits are sent to the Coordinator by facsimile, the
Protestant must: verify that the pages sent were all
received by the Coordinator; and remit the required
deposit and filing fee to the Coordinator by any
reasonable means. Your complete protest filing must be
received by the Coordinator by the above stated
deadline. You are advised that failure to comply
with any of the above requirements waives your
right to protest.”
The letter was sent by Cheryl Angeles, a DGS employee in
the Procurement Division since 2000, whose signature block
identified her as the section manager for the Purchasing
Authority Management Section. According to a declaration later
prepared by Angeles, her duties included “oversight of the
Alternative Protest Pilot Project (APPP) under Public Contract
Code section 12125 et al., and oversight of the person(s) acting as
an APPP Coordinator.” At the time of the bid solicitation and
when she signed the letter, Angeles “was acting as the APPP
Coordinator,” whose “duties are normally performed by an
Information Technology Supervisor II in my section. As Section
Manager, I oversee this position and fulfill its duties when the
position is vacant.”
4
On July 25, 2023, Safariland sent its protest statement to
the West Sacramento address provided in the July 17, 2023 DGS
letter. On the second page of the protest statement, Safariland
advised that “The OAH filing fee of $50 and the arbitration
deposit of $7,000 were sent overnight on Friday July 21st via Fed
Ex” and provided a tracking number. The protest statement did
not specify the address to which the filing fee and arbitration
deposit were sent. In fact, the payments were not sent to the
same West Sacramento address as the protest statement, but to a
different address where OAH was located on Gateway Oaks
Drive in Sacramento.
On July 28, 2023, DGS sent an email to Safariland,
requesting documentation showing delivery of the filing fee and
arbitration deposit to the DGS Procurement Division in West
Sacramento, explaining that they were unable to confirm that the
protest package had been received. Safariland sent a proof of
delivery, and DGS pointed out that the delivery address was in
Sacramento, not the West Sacramento address identified in the
DGS July 17, 2023 letter. On Monday, July 31, Safariland
acknowledged that the checks had been sent to a different
address, due to an error by Safariland’s accounts payable
department. The email from Safariland to DGS continued, “I
hope that this does not affect our attempted protest. As
mentioned, a good faith effort was made to make payment and all
applicable documents were submitted as per the required
process.”
On July 31, 2023, Cheryl Angeles sent a letter to
Safariland, advising that under California Code of Regulations,
Title 1, section 1408, a complete protest needed to be filed by
July 25, 2023, and that “Failure to submit a complete protest, by
5
that date, waives the right to protest. [¶] To date, we have not
received a complete protest filing. Consequently, this protest will
be closed, and no further action will be taken.”
C. Trial Court Proceedings
On September 1, 2023, Safariland filed a petition seeking a
writ of mandate directing DGS to permit the protest to proceed
on the grounds that Safariland had substantially complied with
the requirements to lodge a protest. DGS filed its response, and
after both parties submitted declarations and briefing, the court
denied Safariland’s petition. The court entered judgment against
Safariland, and Safariland appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review2
“In reviewing the trial court’s denial of a writ of mandate
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, ‘[w]here the
facts are undisputed and the issue is one of statutory
interpretation, we review the trial court’s ruling de novo.’
[Citations.]” (California Manufacturers & Technology Assn. v.
Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 756, 769.)
2 The parties do not specify whether Safariland sought
relief as administrative or regular mandamus. (See Beach &
Bluff Conservancy v. City of Solana Beach (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th
244, 258–259 [discussing the difference between administrative
and regular mandamus].)
6
B. Applicable Law
The bid protest process followed by DGS in this case is
authorized in the Public Contract Code, sections 12125 through
12129.3 Both DGS and the California Department and
Technology are authorized to administer the protest process
(§ 12125), and at the direction of the California Legislature, DGS
has developed and adopted regulations governing the protest
process (§ 12126, subd. (a) [DGS shall “develop procedures and
guidelines for the implementation of” the protest process]; Cal.
Code Regs., tit. 1 (1 CCR) §§ 1400−1440.)
The regulations detail the requirements for filing a protest,
and define the “Coordinator” of the protest process as “the person
designated as the Alternative Protest Pilot Project Coordinator
by the Department of General Services, Procurement Division, to
coordinate all aspects of the Solicitation under the Alternative
Protest Pilot Project (Public Contract Code sections
12125−12130).” (1 CCR § 1402, subd. (e).). The protesting party
must submit (1) “the Detailed Written Statement of Protest and
any exhibits specified in section 1412”; (2) “a check or money
order made payable to the Office of Administrative Hearings for
3 All further statutory references are to the Public Contract
Code unless otherwise stated. In this opinion, we will refer to the
bid protest process authorized by this section as the protest
process, but we acknowledge that the statutory name has at
various points in time been either the Alternative Protest Process
or the Alternative Protest Pilot Project. (Compare current and
former Pub. Cont. Code, § 12125; see Rizzo, California
Procurement Handbook, § 9:8.)
7
the OAH filing fee of $50”; and (3) the arbitration deposit.4
(1 CCR § 1408, subd. (a)) Each of these items must be submitted
to the Coordinator by 5 p.m. of the statutory deadline,5 and if the
written protest statement is submitted by facsimile, the
protesting party must “[v]erify that the pages sent were all
received by the Coordinator;” and “[r]emit the required deposit
and filing fee to the Coordinator by any reasonable means. If
sending via carrier, the postmark date or equivalent shall be used
to determine timeliness.” (1 CCR § 1408, subd. (b).) If a
protesting party is not a certified small business, it must make a
deposit of estimated arbitration costs, “by check or money order
made payable to the Office of Administrative Hearings” and
“[f]ailure to remit a timely required deposit waives the right of
protest.” (1 CCR § 1408, subd. (c)(5).)
C. Analysis
Safariland raises four contentions on appeal: (1) that the
only published case analyzing application of the protest process
requirements – Imagistics Internat., Inc. v. Department of
General Services (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 581 (Imagistics) – is
4 The regulation outlines the arbitration deposit amount,
and establishes a different process if the protesting party is a
certified small business. (1 CCR § 1408, subd. (c) & (d).)
5 The statutory deadline is “the Close of Business on the
7th working day after the time specified in the Solicitation for
written Notice of Intent to Protest under section 1406 (1 CCR
§ 1408, subd. (a)), and close of business is defined as 5 p.m. (1
CCR § 1402, subd. (c).)
8
either distinguishable or incorrect; (2) DGS abused its discretion
when it rejected Safariland’s protest because the check was not
delivered to the Coordinator (1 CCR § 1408); (3) deference should
not be given to DGS’s interpretation of the regulation; and (4) the
Coordinator position was vacant. None of these arguments
persuades us that a writ of mandate should issue.
1. The Imagistics Case
Safariland argues that Imagistics is either inapplicable or
incorrectly decided. We disagree on both counts.
Similar to the procedural background here, the plaintiff
and appellant in Imagistics unsuccessfully sought to protest the
award of a public contract to another company, and the trial
court denied the plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandate.
(Imagistics, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 585–588.) In
Imagistics, the statement of protest was due by the close of
business on July 5th. Plaintiff timely delivered the protest and
the exhibits, but the check was not delivered until just after close
of business, and a DGS staff member who was still at the office
refused to accept the check. (Id. at pp. 585–586.) Around 6:30
p.m., DGS sent a fax notifying plaintiff that its protest was
terminated, as it was incomplete for want of a check for the fee
and deposit. The next day, DGS received a letter and a check in
an envelope postmarked July 5. DGS returned the check, stating
that the late submission of payment did not meet filing
requirements. DGS awarded the contract to a different party on
July 7th. (Id. at p. 586.)
Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandate, which the trial
court denied, rejecting plaintiff’s argument that by aggregating
9
the company’s compliance with subdivisions (a) and (b) of
1 CCR section 1408, the court could find that plaintiff had fully
complied with the regulation’s requirements. (Imagistics, supra,
150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 586–587.) “Applying the principle of strict
compliance, [the trial court] ruled that plaintiff could not appear
in person with the [statement of protest] and exhibits but without
a check (as required under [1 CCR § 1408, subd. (a)]), or fax the
[statement of protest] and mail a check postmarked on the
deadline but fail to fax the exhibits (as required under [1 CCR
§ 1408, subd. (b)]).” (Id. at p. 587.) The reviewing court’s opinion
rejected plaintiff’s argument that it had substantially complied
with a reasonable reading of the regulations, explaining that “the
regulation does not grant the protest Coordinator any discretion
to accept a late filing; rather, it specifically calls for forfeiture of a
protest for noncompliance. Under these circumstances, the
doctrine of substantial compliance is inapplicable, as a court does
not have the power to issue a writ of mandate to accept a late
filing.” (Imagistics, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 588.)
We first reject Safariland’s attempt to distinguish
Imagistics from the case before us. Safariland argues that
because Imagistics concerned the timeliness of the plaintiff’s
submission, its reasoning does not apply because Safariland
timely submitted both the statement of protest and its fee
payment. The reasoning and holding of Imagistics is not so
narrow, as it concerns not just timeliness, but the extent to which
either the court or the coordinator has discretion to excuse
noncompliance or partial compliance with the regulation’s
requirements. The reviewing court held that the coordinator did
not possess any such discretion, because the regulation
10
“specifically calls for forfeiture of a protest for noncompliance.”
(Imagistics, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 588.)
We also reject Safariland’s argument that Imagistics was
wrongly decided because its application of the principle of strict
compliance was unwarranted in the absence of a legislative
mandate for the particular regulatory requirement. Safariland
argues that unlike the election cases upon which the Imagistics
court relied (see Imagistics, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 588−589, citing Barnes v. Wong (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 390
and Sonoma County Nuclear Free Zone ’86 v. Superior Court
(1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 167), the question of correctly tendering
the filing fee and arbitration deposit is more like payment of a
filing fee, which is not a prerequisite for a timely filing, as set
forth in the rules of court and affirmed in Rapp v. Golden Eagle
Ins. Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1172–1173. As explained in
more detail in the next section, we are not convinced by
Safariland’s criticism of Imagistics in this regard. The
Legislature has given DGS express authority to “develop
procedures and guidelines for the implementation” of the protest
process (Pub. Cont. Code, § 12126, subd. (a)), and has expressly
provided that “[a]ny protests filed in relation to the proposed
contract award shall be conducted under the procedures set forth
by” DGS (id., subd. (b)). The same statute also imposes on DGS a
seven-day time limit to review the protest to determine whether
it is frivolous. (Id., subd. (c)(2).) We see no issue with applying
strict compliance principles in this context, particularly absent
any statutory or regulatory language giving DGS authority to
accept a protest without payment, as is the case in the rules of
court governing filing a notice of appeal. (Cf., Cal. Rules of Ct.,
Rule 8.100 (b)(3), (c) & (d).)
11
Safariland also argues that 1 CCR section 1408’s penalty
for noncompliance is invalid because it is unwarranted in the
absence of any statute or case holding that the place of the fee
payment, rather than its timing, has jurisdictional implications.
Anticipating the counterargument that permitting a protesting
party to deliver checks directly to OAH rather than DGS places
an unnecessary burden on DGS to confirm receipt of the checks,
Safariland cites to Renken v. Compton City School Dist. (1962)
207 Cal.App.2d 106 (Renken). Renken, however, discussed the
question of additional burden on a school district only after
finding that the school district had unreasonably and arbitrarily
imposed a requirement that permitted it to withhold dues in
favor of one organization, but refuse to do the same for a similar
type of organization. (Renken, supra, 207 Cal.App.2d at p. 114.)
Only as an additional basis for its decision did the Renken court
point out that its conclusion was not weakened by the trial court’s
finding that refusing to permit such discrimination would
“ ‘increase[] without foreseeable limitation’ ” the already great
burden on the school district’s accounting and clerical staff of
administering wage and salary deductions, because a greater
number of employees would seek such deductions. (Id. at p. 115.)
We find the holding and reasoning of Imagistics to be valid,
persuasive, and applicable to the facts of the case before us.
2. Validity of the DGS Regulations
Safariland argues that because the enabling statutes under
which 1 CCR section 1408 was adopted do not address fee
payment, DGS abused its discretion when it determined that
12
failure to remit the fees to the correct address constituted a
waiver of the right to protest. We are unpersuaded.
As discussed already, the Legislature has directed DGS to
“develop procedures and guidelines for the implementation” of
the protest process. (§ 12126, subd. (a).) Safariland does not
argue that DGS lacks authority to set filing fees or require an
arbitration deposit as part of the protest process, or to require
payment of those amounts. Instead, the thrust of Safariland’s
argument seems to be that the regulation requiring those
payments to be delivered to the protest coordinator is invalid
because it is not reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the statute. (Gov. Code, § 11342.2; In re Mohammad (2022) 12
Cal.5th 518, 529 [valid regulation must be consistent with and
“reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
authorizing law”], citing Morris v. Williams (1967) 67 Cal.2d 733,
749.) Although Safariland does not phrase its argument this
way, it is implicitly arguing that DGS abused its discretion when
it, without statutory or valid regulatory authority, rejected
Safariland’s protest solely on the ground that the required fees
were not timely delivered to the address specified by DGS.
Just as the reviewing court in Imagistics rejected the
argument that DGS was not prejudiced by a brief delay in the
arrival of the check (Imagistics, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at
p. 590), we reject Safariland’s argument that because it had
informed the protest coordinator and the checks were ultimately
destined for OAH, DGS was precluded from rejecting the protest
solely on the grounds that the check had not been sent to the
correct location. Similar to the plaintiff’s argument in Imagistics,
Safariland’s argument “disregards the massive number of
contracts and proposals that defendant DGS administers, and
13
apparently is premised on the belief that it would be a simple
matter” to correlate the payment with the protest. (Ibid., fn.
omitted.) Safariland’s reliance on Renken to argue that DGS
somehow exceeded its rulemaking authority by imposing a
requirement that was not reasonably necessary is also not well
taken, for the same reasons discussed in the previous section.
(See Renken, supra, 207 Cal.App.2d at p. 114.)
In an earlier section of its brief, Safariland argues that the
right to protest a bid is analogous to the right to appeal, citing to
Rapp v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co., supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1172–1173. Rapp held that the right to appeal a court
decision cannot be denied for failure to timely pay a filing fee.
The attempted analogy fails because the rules of court under
review in Rapp expressly provided a mechanism to address late
payment of fees (id. at pp. 1169−1170), while the DGS
regulations here expressly provide that the filing fee and
arbitration deposit must be delivered “to the Coordinator by the
Close of Business” (§ 1408, subd. (a), and that “[f]ailure to remit a
timely required deposit waives the right of protest” (id., subd.
(c)(5)). The court in Imagistics noted the same absence of
discretion in the regulatory language: “the regulation does not
grant the protest Coordinator any discretion to accept a late
filing; rather, it specifically calls for forfeiture of a protest for
noncompliance. Under these circumstances, the doctrine of
substantial compliance is inapplicable, as a court does not have
the power to issue a writ of mandate to accept a late filing.”
(Imagistics, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 588.)
14
3. Deference to Agency Interpretation
Safariland asks this court to refrain from giving deference
to DGS’s interpretation of 1 CCR section 1408 because the
location where a fee payment is remitted does not require subject
matter expertise. Because the regulatory language is clear, there
is no need to give deference to DGS’s application of the
regulation’s requirements.
4. The Role of Coordinator
Finally, Safariland argues that it was impossible for it (or
any other protesting party) to comply with the requirements of
1 CCR 1408 because the coordinator position was vacant during
the relevant time period. We reject this argument.
The identity of the protest coordinator is defined in
1 CCR section 1402, subdivision (e), as “the person designated as
the Alternative Protest Pilot Project Coordinator by the
Department of General Services, Procurement Division, to
coordinate all aspects of the Solicitation under the Alternative
Protest Pilot Project (Public Contract Code sections
12125−12130).” Nothing in 1 CCR section 1402 requires a
specific action by DGS to “designate” a particular person to act as
the coordinator for the protest process. While Safariland argues
that the coordinator must be a “specific human being,”, a more
reasonable reading of the regulations is that while DGS may
have an internally designated coordinator, externally all
protesting parties need only address their submissions to the
coordinator. Consistent with this reading of the regulations,
15
Angeles’s July 17, 2023 letter giving instructions on how to file a
protest advises Safariland that the filing fee and the arbitration
deposit “must be in the form of a check or money order made
payable to the Office of Administrative Hearings and remit to the
following address.” The address given (for DGS offices in West
Sacramento) identifies the Procurement Division and the
Alternative Protest Coordinator as the recipients, but does not
name a specific human being. Angeles’s declaration establishes
that although the coordinator duties are usually carried out by
one of her subordinates, she oversees the position and fulfills the
coordinator duties when the position is vacant. As such, she was
the coordinator designated by DGS.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent California
Department of General Services is awarded its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
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