CourtListener 10874374•People v. Carlos CA2/6
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Filed 6/12/29 P. v. Carlos CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B343249
(Super. Ct. No. 22F-07691)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Luis Obispo County)
v.
ALEXANDER JONATHAN
CARLOS,
Defendant and Appellant.
Alexander Jonathan Carlos appeals from the judgment
after a jury convicted him of possessing an inmate manufactured
weapon while in custody (Pen. Code,1 § 4502, subd. (a); count 1).
The jury also found true that Carlos suffered four prior strike
convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)). He
was sentenced to four years in state prison.
Carlos represented himself throughout the proceedings
pursuant to Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
During his sentencing hearing, Carlos sought to revoke his
Faretta waiver. He contends the trial court erred in denying his
request. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The People charged Carlos with possessing an inmate
manufactured weapon while he was in custody at the California
Men’s Colony. Carlos was serving a sentence for prior convictions
for robbery, attempted robbery, and battery with serious bodily
injury.
In August 2023, Carlos elected to represent himself and
completed a Faretta waiver form. Carlos represented himself at
his preliminary hearing, superior court arraignment, and various
pretrial hearings. He waived his right to a speedy trial, filed
numerous motions, and represented himself during jury selection
and jury trial.
The jury convicted Carlos of possessing a weapon while in
custody (§ 4502, subd. (a); count 1). In a bifurcated trial, the jury
found true that Carlos suffered four prior strike convictions
(§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) and found true two
aggravating factors (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(8), (b)(3)).
After continuing the sentencing hearing at Carlos’s request,
the trial court denied a motion to strike the priors pursuant to
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. The
court sentenced Carlos to four years in state prison (low term of
two years doubled for strike).
DISCUSSION
Revoking Faretta waiver
Carlos contends the judgment must be reversed and
remanded for a new sentencing hearing because he was denied
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the right to counsel when he sought to revoke his Faretta waiver
at sentencing. We disagree.
Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
federal Constitution, a criminal defendant possesses dual rights:
the right to counsel and the right to self-representation. (Faretta,
supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 818–819). But once a defendant knowingly
and voluntarily waives their right to counsel, that right is no
longer absolute. (People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 163–164
(Gallego).) Thus, a defendant who later seeks to revoke their
waiver must “articulate a compelling reason” for doing so.
(People v. Lawrence (2009) 46 Cal.4th 186, 188 (Lawrence).) Trial
courts are given “broad discretion” over requests to revoke a
Faretta waiver. (Id. at p. 201.)
In exercising that discretion, trial courts should consider,
among other factors: “(1) defendant’s prior history in the
substitution of counsel and the desire to change from self-
representation to counsel-representation, (2) the reasons set forth
for the request, (3) the length and stage of the trial proceedings,
(4) disruption or delay which reasonably might be expected to
ensue from the granting of such motion, and (5) the likelihood of
defendant’s effectiveness in defending against the charges if
required to continue to act as his own attorney.” (Gallego, supra,
52 Cal.3d at p. 164; People v. Elliott (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 984,
993–994.) These criteria are “ ‘not absolutes’ ” and trial courts
need not review each factor on the record. (Gallego, at p. 164;
Lawrence, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 196.) Instead, courts must
consider the “ ‘totality of the facts and circumstances.’ ” (Gallego,
at p. 164.)
Here, there was no abuse of discretion when the court
denied Carlos’s request to revoke his Faretta waiver based on the
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totality of facts and circumstances. First, Carlos represented
himself throughout the proceedings after he was held to answer.
Notwithstanding the trial court’s admonitions about the risk of
self-representation, Carlos elected to represent himself. Second,
Carlos gave no “compelling” reasons for revoking his waiver.
Carlos sought to revoke his waiver only after the court denied the
Romero motion during the middle of his sentencing hearing.
Third, the sentencing hearing had been continued for
approximately two months so that Carlos could collect records to
support his Romero motion. And fourth, there was no likelihood
that Carlos’s continued self-representation would jeopardize his
defense. “[G]iven the closeness in time of [Carlos’s] four strike
priors, and that [he was] serving a sentence connected to those
and committed this crime” and “even if [it] wanted to,” the trial
court said it could not “find that [Carlos’s] circumstances lie
outside of the spirit of the three strikes scheme.”
We acknowledge that additional delay resulting from
another continuance would not, alone, necessarily justify denying
Carlos’s request to revoke his Faretta waiver. But the trial court
here did not rely on that factor in isolation. The court considered
the totality of facts and circumstances before it. (Gallego, supra,
52 Cal.3d at p. 164; People v. Elliott, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at pp.
993–994.) Because there was no abuse of discretion, we need not
consider whether any error was prejudicial. (Lawrence, supra, 46
Cal.4th at p. 196.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
CODY, J.
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Timothy S. Covello, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
______________________________
James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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