Amador v. Abbass CA4/3

CourtListener 10873810CalctappJun 11, 2026

Full text

Filed 6/11/26 Amador v. Abbass CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

HUGUETTE MOLINA AMADOR,

Plaintiff and Appellant, G065047

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-
01349357)
AHMAD ABOU ABBASS et al.,
OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from judgments of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Craig L. Griffin, Judge. Affirmed.
Huguette Molina Amador, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Schmid & Voiles and Denise H. Greer for Defendant and
Respondent Ahmad Abou Abbass.
Baker, Keener & Nahra, John P. Nahra, Brenda K. Benson and
Christopher K. Berberian for Defendant and Respondent Mission Hospital
Regional Medical Center.
Cole Pedroza, Kenneth R. Pedroza and Kristin Tannler; Peabody
& Buccini, Thomas M. Peabody and Rocco J. Alexander for Defendant and
Respondent Craig Allen Salcido.
* * *
Plaintiff Huguette Molina Amador underwent a surgery at
defendant Mission Hospital Regional Medical Center (Mission Hospital). The
procedure was performed by defendants Dr. Craig Allen Salcido, an
obstetrician-gynecologist, and Dr. Ahmad Abou Abbass, a general surgeon.
Amador filed this self-represented lawsuit against Mission Hospital, Dr.
Salcido, and Dr. Abbass (collectively, defendants) for medical malpractice,
alleging various injuries from the surgery.
Defendants each filed separate motions for summary judgment.
Each motion was supported by an expert declaration stating that the relevant
defendant had (1) complied with the applicable standard of care, and (2) not
caused Amador’s injuries. Because Amador did not file any conflicting expert
testimony in response, the trial court found there were no triable issues of
fact on the medical malpractice claim and granted summary judgment to
each defendant. Separate judgments were entered.
On appeal, Amador challenges the trial court’s summary
judgment rulings. We need not address her arguments because her briefs
lack record citations, which forfeits her arguments on appeal. Nonetheless,
we have attempted to discern her arguments, and Amador has failed to meet
her burden on appeal. Defendants each provided expert opinion that they
acted within the applicable standard of care. By failing to present any
conflicting expert testimony, Amador failed to show there were any triable
issues of material fact. Nor has Amador persuaded us that the court

2
improperly excluded any evidence. The judgments in favor of defendants are
affirmed.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.
THE COMPLAINT
Amador filed this self-represented lawsuit in September 2023.
The operative complaint (the complaint) alleged a medical malpractice claim
against defendants.1
The complaint is uniquely structured. The caption page states the
complaint is for medical malpractice. The second page is blank. The third
page is also blank except for a statement that “I declare under the penalty of
perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true
and correct,” followed by the date and Amador’s signature. Attached to the
complaint is a letter directed “To Whom It May Concern.” The letter contains
a lengthy narrative but fails to specify which of the alleged facts support
Amador’s medical malpractice claims against the different defendants. Thus,
we have done our best to ascertain the facts underlying her causes of action.
Amador alleged that she sought treatment at Mission Hospital
for abdominal pain. Dr. Salcido stated that a cyst on her left ovary was
causing the pain and advised removing it through a robotic-assisted surgery.
The surgery was performed at Mission Hospital on October 6, 2022 (the
October 6 surgery), by Dr. Salcido and Dr. Abbass. After it was done, Amador
was allegedly told that it had gone according to plan and was discharged that
same day. Amador claimed that her condition worsened after she was

1 While this case involves detailed medical information, virtually the

entire record is public, including all of Amador’s medical records. Further,
Amador’s briefs discuss the relevant health information in great detail.

3
discharged, forcing her to visit another hospital on October 9, 2022. She was
diagnosed with “post-surgical perforation” of her bowels, which required
further surgery. Amador was transferred back to Mission Hospital, which
confirmed the bowel perforation. It appears that different physicians
operated on her to address this issue.
Amador asserted various acts of negligence arising from the
October 6 surgery. As to Dr. Salcido, Amador claimed the surgery was
unnecessary and that he should have treated the cyst through alternative
methods. She also alleged that Dr. Salcido did not inform her of the surgery’s
potential risks to her nearby organs, and she claimed she would not have
consented to the surgery had she known them.2 Amador further alleged that
Dr. Salcido was a not a specialist in robotic surgery and had negligently
caused the bowel perforation during the October 6 surgery.
Amador claimed that Dr. Abbass was a robotic-surgery specialist
who allegedly cleaned the surgical area and then declined to continue the
surgery. This purportedly led Dr. Salcido to take over the surgery, which
purportedly caused the bowel perforation. Thus, Amador asserted that
Dr. Abbass’s refusal to complete the surgery contributed to her injuries.
Amador’s claim against Mission Hospital is less clear. It appears
to arise from alleged negligent care following the October 6 surgery. The trial
court noted that her only specific allegation against Mission Hospital was
that one of its nurses “refused to assist [her] in urinating, insisting [that she]
could get out of bed [herself]. [The nurse’s alleged] neglect led to [her] drains

2 As described later, the record contains a signed consent that Amador

gave for the October 6 surgery, in which she acknowledged its risks. These
specific risks included “risk of injury to surrounding organs such as bowel,
bladder and ureters.”

4
overflowing, causing a rash on [her] back.” Amador does not dispute this
characterization on appeal.
As a result of alleged mistakes arising from the October 6
surgery, Amador claimed to have suffered permanent physical injuries. She
sought “the highest possible lifelong compensation for the damages . . .
endured.”
II.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Each defendant filed a separate motion for summary judgment,
and the trial court granted each one. Dr. Salcido and Dr. Abbass each
submitted expert declarations from licensed physicians. These experts
concluded that Dr. Salcido and Dr. Abbass had met the standard of care and
had not caused or contributed to Amador’s injuries. The court found these
expert declarations shifted the burden to Amador to show there were triable
issues of fact. Since Amador failed to provide any conflicting expert
testimony, the court held that she had failed to meet this burden.
Similarly, Mission Hospital presented an expert declaration from
a licensed nurse that its nursing and nonphysician staff had met the required
standard of care and had not caused Amador’s injuries. Amador again failed
to provide any conflicting expert testimony. Thus, the court found she had
failed to show a triable issue of fact.
The court subsequently entered separate judgments in favor of
each defendant and against Amador. On appeal, Amador contends these
judgments must be reversed because (1) there were triable issues of fact,
(2) she was not required to present expert testimony on negligence, (3) the

5
trial court abused its discretion by excluding and sealing certain evidence,
and (4) she was denied her right to a jury trial.3
DISCUSSION
I.
FORFEITURE OF ARGUMENTS
Defendants assert that all of Amador’s arguments on appeal have
been forfeited due to her failure to comply with certain appellate rules of
procedure. We agree.
“‘[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial
court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an
appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the
appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal
of the judgment. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘This means that an appellant must
do more than assert error and leave it to the appellate court to search the
record and the law books to test his claim. The appellant must present an
adequate argument including citations to supporting authorities and to
relevant portions of the record.’” (L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616,
619–620.)

3 We grant Dr. Salcido’s motion to augment the record to include the

judgment in his favor. Amador also filed a motion to augment the record to
include a postjudgment motion to strike. The motion to strike was filed while
this appeal was pending, so the trial court denied it for lack of jurisdiction.
Amador’s motion to augment is denied because the record she seeks to
include is irrelevant to our analysis. (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods,
Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3 [“Augmentation does not function to
supplement the record with materials not before the trial court. [Citations.]
. . . Rather, normally ‘when reviewing the correctness of a trial court’s
judgment, an appellate court will consider only matters which were part of
the record at the time the judgment was entered’”].)

6
It is not the appellate court’s “‘place to construct theories or
arguments to undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of
correctness.’ [Citation.] Nor [is it] ‘required to search the record on [its] own
seeking error.’” (L.O. v. Kilrain, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 620.) Thus, “‘“[i]f
a party fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the
record, . . . the argument [will be] deemed to have been waived.”’” (Ibid; Slone
v. El Centro Regional Medical Center (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1172
[“[A]n appellant waives or forfeits contentions that are not supported by
citations to relevant portions of the record”].)
These procedural “rules apply both to parties represented by
counsel and self-represented parties. [Citation.] ‘A party proceeding in
propria persona “is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the
same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.”’” (L.O.
v. Kilrain, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 620.)
Here, the record contains over 5,000 pages of documents,
including thousands of pages of medical records. Yet Amador’s opening brief
does not provide a single citation to the record for any of her factual
assertions. Though each defendant noted this deficiency in their respondent’s
brief, Amador did not correct it and her reply brief again failed to support her
factual assertions with record citations. Due to her failure to cite the record,

7
her arguments on appeal are forfeited.4 (L.O. v. Kilrain, supra, 96
Cal.App.5th at pp. 619–620.)
In response, Amador argues that while “pro per applicants must
follow the rules, courts have consistently held that substantial compliance –
not perfection – is required.” But the authority she cites for this proposition,
In re Marriage of Dellaria & Blickman-Dellaria (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 196,
204–205, does not support her contention. This case did not involve self-
represented parties. (Id. at p. 197 [listing the parties’ counsel].) Rather, it
discussed whether strict compliance with Family Code section 2550 was
required. (Id. at pp. 203–204.)
We recognize that courts “may take reasonable steps to enable a
self-represented litigant to be heard.” (Petrosyan v. Prince Corp. (2013) 223
Cal.App.4th 587, 594, fn. 3.) But Amador has not come close to complying – or
even attempting to comply – with the above rule on record citations. (See L.O.
v. Kilrain, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 619–620.) Her briefs provide no
usable citations for her factual assertions. Addressing her arguments would
require us to scour the record on her behalf to find evidence creating a
material issue of fact. This “effectively asks the appellate court to become
[her] lawyer. A court cannot fairly embrace this partisan role.” (Singman v.
IMDB.com, Inc. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1151–1152.)

4 Amador’s reply brief provides four citations for specific factual

assertions. But the page numbers she provides do not match the clerk’s
transcript and it is unclear what source she is citing. She also generally
explains where certain documents can be found: “the expert declaration from
Dr. Candela (16 CT 4768-4771), the surgical report (12 CT 3509), and
[Amador’s] opposition and declarations (16-17 CT 4793-4808).” But she does
not cite any specific information or pages from these documents. Nor is it
clear what information she sought to cite from them.

8
Regardless, we have attempted to comprehend Amador’s
arguments, and she has not met her burden to show reversal is warranted.
II.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. Standard of Review
“Summary judgment is appropriate only ‘where no triable issue of
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.’” (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4
Cal.5th 607, 618.) “A defendant moving for summary judgment must show
the plaintiff’s causes of action have no merit. It may do so by negating an
element of a cause of action . . . . The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to
show a triable issue of material fact as to the cause of action or defense.”
(Ghazarian v. Magellan Health, Inc. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 171, 182.)
Summary judgment rulings are reviewed de novo. (Ibid.)
B. Material Issues of Fact and Expert Testimony
“[I]n ‘“any medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must
establish: ‘(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and
diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise;
(2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the
negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage
resulting from the professional’s negligence.’”’” (Powell v. Kleinman (2007)
151 Cal.App.4th 112, 122.)
Further, for medical malpractice claims, “the plaintiff must
present evidence from an expert that the defendant breached his or her duty
to the plaintiff and that the breach caused the injury to the plaintiff.
[Citation.] ‘“California courts have incorporated the expert evidence
requirement into their standard for summary judgment in medical

9
malpractice cases. When a defendant moves for summary judgment and
supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the
community standard of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the
plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence.”’” (Powell v.
Kleinman, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 123.)
Here, defendants each submitted expert declarations stating they
met applicable the standard of care. Dr. Salcido submitted an expert
declaration from Dr. Mel Kurtulus, a licensed physician specializing in
obstetrics and gynecology with experience performing robotic assisted
surgery to remove ovarian cysts. Dr. Kurtulus reviewed the complaint and
Amador’s relevant medical records. He noted that Amador was diagnosed
with tubal ovarian abscess and ovarian torsion, and Dr. Salcido
recommended a robot assisted left ovarian cystectomy with a possible left
salpingo-oopherectomy (removal of ovary and fallopian tube).
Dr. Kurtulus noted that Dr. Salcido explained the risks of the
surgery to Amador, which included bleeding, infection, and injuries to the
bowels, bladder, ureters, and other organs. Amador signed a consent for Dr.
Salcido to perform the surgery and acknowledged that its potential risks
included “‘injury to surrounding organs such [as] bowel, bladder and
ureters.’”
The surgery occurred on October 6, 2022. Dr. Kurtulus observed
that after it commenced, Dr. Salcido determined “the left fallopian tube and
ovary were densely adherent to the rectosigmoid colon,” which obscured the
surgical area. To address this issue, Dr. Salcido called in Dr. Abbass to
dissect tissue from the surgical site. After Dr. Abbass was finished, he left
and Dr. Salcido proceeded to remove the left ovary and fallopian tube without

10
complication. Amador tolerated the procedure well and was discharged home
later that day.
Based on his review of Amador’s medical records, Dr. Kurtulus
opined that Dr. Salcido had complied with the applicable standard of care. He
likewise concluded that no negligent act or omission by Dr. Salcido had
caused or contributed to Amador’s injuries. In particular, it was appropriate
for Dr. Salcido to call in Dr. Abbass, a general surgeon, to address the
adhesions obscuring the surgical site so that surgery could be completed.
Further, he concluded there was no evidence that Amador’s bowel was
perforated during the October 6 surgery. Rather, he believed “the perforation
spontaneously occurred after the surgery, in the absence of negligence” due to
preexisting diverticulitis and diverticulosis.5 Dr. Kurtulus likewise opined
that “there was no evidence of complications” during the surgery, and it was
proper for Dr. Salcido to discharge Amador the day of the surgery
Dr. Abbass submitted the expert declaration of Dr. Frank C.
Candela, a licensed surgeon. Dr. Candela also reviewed Amador’s medical
records and the complaint. Dr. Candela reached many of the same
conclusions as Dr. Kurtulus. In particular, Dr. Candela observed that while
Dr. Salcido was performing the surgery, Dr. Abbass was called to address
“the fallopian tube appearing densely adherent to the sigmoid colon.” Dr.
Abbass separated the left fallopian tube from the sigmoid colon so that Dr.
Salcido could complete the procedure. Dr. Salcido then removed the left ovary
and fallopian tube. Dr. Candela observed that there was no sign of bowel

5 The complaint does not mention Amador’s fallopian tube. But her

appellate briefs argue that Dr. Salcido negligently removed a portion of her
fallopian tube. Dr. Kurtulus believed the removal of the fallopian tube was
necessary to complete the surgery.

11
perforation during the surgery. Rather, the medical records indicated that
plaintiff “tolerated the procedure well,” was in stable condition, and was
discharged home later that day.
Dr. Candela opined that based on his review of the medical
records, Dr. Abbass had met the applicable standard of care. He also believed
that none of the treatment Dr. Abbass provided caused or contributed to
Amador’s injuries. Rather, like Dr. Kurtulus, he believed the bowel
“perforation spontaneously occurred after surgery as a result of [Amador’s]
diverticulitis and in the absence of any negligence.”
Mission Hospital submitted an expert declaration from Pauline
Lamanski, a registered nurse. Ms. Lamanski provided opinions concerning
the care provided to Amador by Mission Hospital’s nurses and nonphysician
staff before, during, and after the October 6 surgery.6 Based on her review of
Amador’s medical records, she concluded that Mission Hospital’s
nonphysician staff had acted within the standard of care. Ms. Lamanski also
opined that nothing the nurses or nonphysician staff did or failed to do
caused or contributed to Amador’s injuries.
Amador did not provide any expert testimony in response to the
above declarations. Since the expert testimony above established that
Dr. Salcido, Dr. Abbass, and Mission Hospital all acted within the applicable
standard of care and did not cause Amador’s injuries, they were entitled to
summary judgment. (Powell v. Kleinman, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 123.)

6 Amador contends that Ms. Lamanski was “not qualified to give

opinions on major surgeries.” However, Ms. Lamanski’s opinions were
confined to the actions performed by nurses and nonphysician staff. Amador
has not shown that these topics were beyond Ms. Lamanski’s qualifications.

12
In response, Amador claims she did not need to provide expert
testimony under “the ‘common knowledge’ exception” because each
defendant’s negligence was “so clear as to be comprehensible to a layperson.”
Specifically, she asserts that “[t]he facts here – perforation of the bowel
during a routine cyst removal, failure to document complications, and
removal of a healthy fallopian tube – are sufficient to support application of
the ‘Common Knowledge’ exception.”
We disagree. As our Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he
‘common knowledge’ exception is principally limited to situations in which
the plaintiff can invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, i.e., when a
layperson ‘is able to say as a matter of common knowledge and observation
that the consequences of professional treatment were not such as ordinarily
would have followed if due care had been exercised.’ [Citations.] The classic
example, of course, is the X-ray revealing a scalpel left in the patient’s body
following surgery. [Citation.] Otherwise, ‘“expert evidence is conclusive and
cannot be disregarded.”’” (Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical
Center (1994) 8 Cal.4th 992, 1001.)
The factual issues Amador identifies are beyond a layperson’s
experience. A layperson has no training or common experience to determine
(1) whether Amador’s bowels were perforated during the surgery due
negligence or whether the injury spontaneously occurred after the surgery
due to a preexisting condition, (2) whether there were any complications
during the surgery that should have been documented, or (3) whether it was
within the standard of care to remove the fallopian tube to complete the
surgery.
Amador also contends that defendants altered her medical
records to hide their negligence. To support this claim, she attaches medical

13
records to her briefs showing they were dictated and/or signed three days
after the October 6 surgery. She appears to believe this timing gap indicates
the records were altered. We cannot consider documents outside the record
(Lona v. Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 102), and Amador does not
state whether these medical records are part of the record. Further, even if
we could consider them, any inference that these documents were altered
would be speculative at best. “Responsive evidence that ‘gives rise to no more
than mere speculation’ is not sufficient to establish a triable issue of material
fact.” (Carlsen v. Koivumaki (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 879, 889–890.)
In sum, Amador failed to provide conflicting expert testimony
showing that any of the defendants breached the applicable standard of care
or caused her injuries. As such, she did not show a triable issue of fact, and
each defendant was entitled to summary judgment. (Powell v. Kleinman,
supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 123.)
C. Exclusion of Evidence
Next, Amador claims the trial court abused its discretion by
“seal[ing] and exclud[ing] [her] medical records – her primary form of proof –
on the erroneous basis that their disclosure would cause irreparable harm to
Defendants. The Court further disregarded the probative value of testimony
from treating physicians and specialists who diagnosed her injuries.”
Amador’s exact argument is unclear. She appears to believe that
the court’s sealing of her medical records excluded them from consideration.7
Amador misunderstands the nature of the sealing process. Court records are

7 Amador fails to specify which medical records were allegedly

excluded. However, she appears to be referring to the medical records
attached to the declaration of Brenda K. Benson, who was Mission Hospital’s
counsel below.

14
generally accessible to the public. (Overstock.com, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs
Group, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 471, 483–486.) “Unless confidentiality is
required by law, court records are presumed to be open.” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 2.550(c).) However, a court may order that records be sealed, i.e.,
shielded from public access, when certain criteria are met. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 2.550(d).) Amador does not address whether the sealing criteria
were met here, so we need not determine whether the medical records were
improperly sealed.
Regardless, even if the trial court sealed the documents in error,
Amador has failed to establish any prejudice. “An appellant bears the burden
to show not only that the trial court erred, but also that the error was
prejudicial in that it resulted in a miscarriage of justice. [Citation.] An error
is prejudicial and results in a miscarriage of justice only if the reviewing
court concludes, based on its review of the entire record, that it is reasonably
probable that the trial court would have reached a result more favorable to
the appellant absent the error.” (Jones v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2013) 221
Cal.App.4th 986, 999.)
Amador’s reply brief appears to argue that she could not view the
sealed documents and did not know what they contained. But the record
contains a proof of service showing that the sealed documents were served on
Amador, and she does not contest that service was improper. (See American
Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 390 [proof of
service creates rebuttable presumption of proper service].) Nor has Amador
shown that sealing her medical records affected her ability to provide
conflicting expert testimony. Thus, even if the medical records were unsealed,
defendants would still have been entitled to summary judgment due to
Amador’s failure to provide such evidence.

15
To the extent Amador claims the trial court improperly excluded
other evidence, she has not identified the evidence at issue. Dr. Salcido
appears to have been the only defendant to have filed evidentiary objections.
He “objected to [Amador’s] declaration in its entirety because [she] ha[d] not
shown that she is a licensed physician qualified to render medical opinion
testimony. [Dr. Salcido] also objected to the exhibits offered by [Amador] as,
among other things, lacking foundation.” The court sustained Dr. Salcido’s
“objections . . . to the extent that they challenge the evidence submitted by
[Amador], i.e., the declaration and exhibits.”
Amador has not shown any error in the trial court’s evidentiary
rulings. She has not explained how she was qualified to render medical
opinion, nor has she set forth any foundation for the excluded exhibits. We
cannot make these arguments for her. (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc.
(2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277.)
D. Right to Trial
Finally, Amador contends she was improperly deprived of her
right to a jury trial because the trial court granted defendants summary
judgment. However, “in civil cases the right to jury trial does not ripen
‘unless there is a genuine issue of material fact suitable for a jury to resolve.’
[Citation.] This is why courts may grant summary judgment in civil cases
without offending the losing party’s right to a jury trial . . . .” (People v.
$2,709 United States Currency (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1278, 1285.) Since
Amador has not shown any error in the court’s summary judgment rulings,
she was not improperly denied her right to a jury trial.

16
DISPOSITION
The judgments in favor of Mission Hospital, Dr. Salcido, and Dr.
Abbass are affirmed. In the interests of justice, each party shall bear their
own costs on appeal.

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DELANEY, J.

SCOTT, J.

17

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.