In re H.D. CA2/5

CourtListener 10873806CalctappJun 11, 2026

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Filed 6/11/26 In re H.D. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re H.D., a Person Coming B349818
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct.
AND FAMILY SERVICES, No. 20CCJP05556A)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

S.B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Kristen Byrdsong, Temporary Judge. Affirmed.
Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey Dodds, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
S.B. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s
September 12, 2025 order denying her petition under Welfare
and Institutions Code section 3881 and terminating parental
rights as to son H.D. (minor). Mother contends the court abused
its discretion when it summarily denied her section 388 petition
and denied application of the parental relationship exception to
termination of parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision
(c)(1)(B)(i). The Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (Department) contends that the court’s decisions
on both matters were within the scope of its discretion. We agree
with the Department, and we affirm.
The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural
history, and our opinion does not meet the criteria for
publication. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c).) We therefore
resolve this appeal by memorandum opinion pursuant to
Standard 8.1 of the Standards of Judicial Administration and
consistent with constitutional principles (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14
[“Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal that
determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated”]; Lewis
v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1263, fn. omitted
[three-paragraph discussion of issue on appeal satisfies
constitutional requirement because “an opinion is not a brief in
reply to counsel’s arguments. [Citation.] In order to state the
reasons, grounds, or principles upon which a decision is based,
[an appellate court] need not discuss every case or fact raised by
counsel in support of the parties’ positions”].)

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

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DISCUSSION

A. Section 388 Petition

Mother contends the court’s September 12, 2025 summary
denial of her section 388 petition without an evidentiary hearing
was in error. We disagree.
On receipt of a section 388 petition, the court may either
summarily deny the petition or order a hearing. (In re Lesly G.
(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 904, 912.) The court may summarily
deny the petition unless the petitioner makes a prima facie
showing in his or her favor. (Ibid.; see also In re Marilyn H.
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310.) We review the summary denial of a
section 388 petition for abuse of discretion. (In re G.B. (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 1147, 1158.)
A petition to change or modify a juvenile court order under
section 388 must factually allege that: (1) there are changed
circumstances or new evidence to justify the requested order, and
(2) the requested order would serve the minor’s best interests.
(In re G.B., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1157; Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 5.570(d)(1) & (2).) “ ‘A prima facie case is made if the
allegations demonstrate that these two elements are supported
by probable cause. [Citations.] It is not made, however, if the
allegations would fail to sustain a favorable decision even if they
were found to be true at a hearing. [Citations.] While the
petition must be liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency
[citations], the allegations must nonetheless describe specifically
how the petition will advance the child’s best interests.’
[Citation.] In determining whether the petition makes the

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required showing, the court may consider the entire factual and
procedural history of the case. [Citation.]” (In re K.L. (2016) 248
Cal.App.4th 52, 61−62; see also In re Anthony W. (2001) 87
Cal.App.4th 246, 250 [“ ‘[S]pecific allegations describing the
evidence constituting the proffered changed circumstances or new
evidence’ is required”].)
When, as here, a section 388 petition is filed after family
reunification services have been terminated, the juvenile court’s
overriding concern is the child’s best interest. (In re Stephanie M.
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) The parent’s interests in the care,
custody, and companionship of the child are no longer
paramount, and the focus shifts to the needs of the child for
permanency and stability. (Ibid.; In re Malick T. (2022) 73
Cal.App.5th 1109, 1123.) Nonetheless, by showing that
circumstances have changed and that the best interest of the
child warrants further reunification services, a parent may rebut
the presumption that once family reunification services have
been terminated reunification is not in the best interest of the
child. (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309; In re
Stephanie M., at p. 317.) “[B]est interests is a complex idea” that
requires consideration of a variety of factors. (In re Kimberly F.
(1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 530; see In re Jacob P. (2007) 157
Cal.App.4th 819, 832–833.) In determining whether a section
388 petitioner has made the requisite showing, the juvenile court
may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the
case, including factors such as the seriousness of the reason
leading to the child’s removal, the reason the problem was not
resolved, the passage of time since the child’s removal, the
relative strength of the bonds with the child, the nature of the
change of circumstance, and the reason the change was not made

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sooner. (In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 616; In re
Aaliyah R. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 437, 446–447; In re Justice P.
(2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 188–189.)
Here, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it
summarily denied mother’s section 388 petition seeking
placement or an additional six months of reunification services,
based on a lack of changed circumstances. Mother had already
received statutory eighteen months of reunification services, plus
additional family maintenance services while the Department
attempted to transition minor’s placement from maternal
grandmother to mother between July 2022 and the spring of
2024. The order mother sought to change was the October 2024
disposition order following adjudication of a section 342 petition
that alleged mother had, on numerous occasions, engaged in
sexual intercourse while minor was present. In addition, the
record reflects relatively recent concerns about minor suffering
trauma if he were to return to mother’s custody and minor being
relieved when mother told him she would no longer be having
visits with him. Against this backdrop, the court’s decision to
summarily deny mother’s section 388 petition was not an abuse
of discretion.

B. Parental Relationship Exception

If the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence
at the section 366.26 hearing that a child is likely to be adopted,
“the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child
placed for adoption” unless, as relevant here, it “finds a
compelling reason for determining that termination would be
detrimental to the child due to one or more” enumerated

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exceptions. (§ 366.26, subds. (c)(1) & (c)(1)(B); see also In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630–631 (Caden C.).) “The
statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional
circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm,
which remains adoption.” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45,
53.)
Mother contends it was an abuse of discretion to deny
application of the parental relationship exception, which permits
the selection of another permanent plan if the “parents have
maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the
child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The parent has the burden of establishing this
exception. (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1153.) The
exception requires a parent to show, by a preponderance of the
evidence: (1) the parent has maintained regular visitation and
contact with the child, “taking into account the extent of
visitation permitted”; (2) the child has a substantial, positive,
emotional attachment to the parent such that the child would
benefit from continuing the relationship; and (3) terminating the
relationship “would be detrimental to the child even when
balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive
home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) The “language of
this exception, along with its history and place in the larger
dependency scheme, show that the exception applies in situations
where a child cannot be in a parent’s custody but where severing
the child’s relationship with the parent, even when balanced
against the benefits of a new adoptive home, would be harmful
for the child.” (Id. at p. 630.) When the benefits of a stable,
adoptive, permanent home outweigh the harm the child would
experience from the loss of a continued parent-child relationship,

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the court should order adoption. (Id. at pp. 633–634.) However,
if “ ‘severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive
the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such
that,’ even considering the benefits of a new adoptive home,
termination would ‘harm[ ]’ the child, the court should not
terminate parental rights.” (Id. at p. 633.)
We review the juvenile court’s findings as to whether the
parent has maintained regular visitation and contact with the
child and the existence of a parental relationship for substantial
evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.) We
review the third step—whether termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the child due to the child’s relationship
with his or her parent—for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 640.)
Even if we were to assume that mother met the first two
prongs of the Caden C. analysis, by the time of the permanency
hearing, minor was eight years old and had lived primarily with
maternal grandmother, his prospective adoptive parent, for six of
those eight years, and he was consistently expressing a desire for
permanency in maternal grandmother’s home. The court acted
well within its discretion in denying mother’s request to apply the
parental relationship exception under section 366.26, subdivision
(c)(1)(B)(i).

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DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s September 12, 2025 order denying
mother’s Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petitions and
the court’s October 14, 2025 order terminating parental rights
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

WE CONCUR:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

KIM (D.), J.

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