CourtListener 10872597•People v. Williams CA1/5
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Filed 6/9/26 P. v. Williams CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for pur-
poses of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A173481
v.
SHAWNTELLA LATRICE (Solano County Super. Ct. No.
WILLIAMS, VCR237701)
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury convicted Shawntella Latrice Williams of driving
under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)) and
the trial court sentenced her, after finding she had suffered at
least three previous drunk driving convictions within a 10-year
period (Veh. Code, § 23550), to a felony term (two years) in
county jail.
Williams’s appointed appellate counsel filed a brief raising
no issues and asking us to independently review the record
pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Williams was
advised by her appellate counsel of the right to file a
supplemental brief within 30 days of the date the Wende brief
was filed. But she did not file one. Nonetheless, based on our
independent review of the record, we invited the parties to file
supplemental briefs addressing whether Williams’s prosecution—
for felony driving under the influence of alcohol—was barred by
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the statute of limitations. After obtaining briefs from counsel, we
affirm.
BACKGROUND
A.
On May 27, 2020, at about 10:00 a.m., Benicia Police
Department Officer Mark Simonson responded to a report of a
suspicious person—specifically, a female driving a silver Dodge
Neon. On arriving at the scene, Officer Simonson observed the
Dodge Neon moving backwards in a parking lot. Officer
Simonson pulled up alongside the Neon and it pulled forward and
then stopped.
After approaching the car on the passenger side, Officer
Simonson talked to the driver, who was identified as Williams,
and noticed her speech was slurred, and “her facial muscles were
very relaxed”—both of which indicated possible intoxication.
There was no one else in the vehicle with Williams, but there was
“a small bottle of gin”—the size of a “pint-size flask”—in plain
sight on the passenger seat. The bottle had been opened and was
about two-thirds full.
Officer Simonson turned over the investigation to Benicia
Police Department officer Aaron Damm when he arrived within a
couple minutes. When Officer Damm initially spoke with
Williams, she denied having any alcohol to drink. However,
Officer Damm testified at trial regarding his observations of
Williams’s conduct and appearance, including “a strong odor of
alcoholic beverage” on her breath. Officer Damm also testified
about Williams’s performance on multiple field sobriety tests,
which indicated a high probability Williams was impaired by
alcohol intoxication.
Believing Williams’s test results were positive indications
of impairment, Officer Damm asked her to give a breath sample
for a preliminary alcohol screening test. Initially, Williams was
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unable to blow enough air. Officer Damm then reset the device to
use the manual capture mode. After Williams blew again during
the manual capture test, the device showed a .20 blood-alcohol
level. After a second test, Williams was placed under arrest.
Once at the police station, a phlebotomist took blood samples
from Williams.
A senior criminalist with the Solano County District
Attorney Bureau of Forensic Services testified as an expert in,
among other things, forensic alcohol analysis and the effects of
alcohol on the body. The expert was unable to test the blood
drawn from Williams because the sample was insufficient.
Although he could not “say [Williams] was definitely impaired by
alcohol,” the expert opined that Williams’s symptomology (as
observed in video evidence shown to the jury) was “consistent
with somebody who is impaired by alcohol.”
B.
The information, which was filed on November 12, 2024,
alleges that Williams committed the offense of felony driving
under the influence (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (a), 23550) on
May 27, 2020. At the conclusion of the trial, from which the court
found Williams had at times been voluntarily absent, a jury
convicted Williams of driving under the influence of alcohol.
After Williams waived her right to a jury trial on the prior
conviction allegations, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt
that Williams had previously been convicted of driving under the
influence (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subds. (a), (b), 23153, subds. (a),
(b)), as alleged in an amended information, on the following four
occasions: July 9, 2015 (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)), June 10,
2016 (id., § 23152, subd. (b)), November 10, 2016 (ibid.), and July
9, 2019 (ibid.). The court deemed Williams’s conviction in this
case a felony.
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The trial court sentenced Williams to a two-year (middle)
term in county jail (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (h)(1)), with credit
for 216 days served.1 The court also ordered Williams to pay a
$600 restitution fine (id., § 1202.4, subd. (b)), a $30 court
facilities assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1)), and a $40
court operations assessment (Pen. Code, § 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)).
DISCUSSION
In Williams’s supplemental brief, her counsel concedes that
the prosecution was timely commenced if the felony statute of
limitations applies. Williams suggests that the prosecution was
barred by the shorter statute of limitations applicable to
misdemeanors. We agree with the People that Williams’s
prosecution was timely.
A.
First, we reject Williams’s assertion that the applicable
statute of limitations is one year. We independently review the
question of which statute of limitations to apply. (See People v.
Brown (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 765, 772.)
With some exceptions not applicable here, the statute of
limitations for a misdemeanor is one year. (§ 802, subd. (a) [one-
year limitations period applies to offenses that are “not
punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison or
pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170”]; People v. Meza
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 821, 825.) If an offense is “punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison or pursuant to subdivision (h) of
Section 1170,” the statute of limitations is, generally, three years.
(§ 801.) To determine the applicable statute of limitations,
section 805, subdivision (a), instructs: “An offense is deemed
punishable by the maximum punishment prescribed by statute
for the offense, regardless of the punishment actually sought or
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
4
imposed. Any enhancement of punishment prescribed by statute
shall be disregarded in determining the maximum punishment
prescribed.” (Italics added.)
We reject Williams’s assertion that the misdemeanor
statute of limitations applies because Vehicle Code section 23550,
subdivision (a), provides an enhancement term to the term
otherwise applicable to an underlying misdemeanor driving
under the influence offense.
“The term ‘enhancement’ has a well-established meaning in
California law.” (In re Anthony R. (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 772,
776.) A sentence enhancement adds an additional term of
imprisonment to the base term for a particular offense.2 (People
v. Jones (2009) 47 Cal.4th 566, 576; Anthony v. Superior Court
(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 700, 719 [“we do not find any authority
mandating that . . . we are required to read section 805’s
reference to ‘enhancement’ as having anything other than its
technical meaning: an additional term of imprisonment added to
the base term”]; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.405(5).)
True, a violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision
(a), is ordinarily a misdemeanor offense. (Veh. Code, §§ 23536,
subd. (a), 23540, subd. (a), 23546, subd. (a); People v. Coronado
(1995) 12 Cal.4th 145, 150.) However, if the offender has
previously been convicted of the same crime on three or more
occasions within 10 years, the same violation becomes a wobbler
offense that may be punished as a felony. (Veh. Code, § 23550,
subd. (a) [“[i]f a person is convicted of a violation of [Vehicle Code]
Section 23152 and the offense occurred within 10 years of three
or more separate violations of [Vehicle Code] Section 23103, as
2 “An example [of an enhancement is] subdivision (a) of
section 12022.7, which provides that any person who personally
inflicts great bodily injury in the commission of a felony shall ‘be
punished by an additional term of three years.’ ” (People v.
Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 101.)
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specified in [Vehicle Code] Section 23103.5, or [Vehicle Code]
Section 23152 or 23153, or any combination thereof, that resulted
in convictions, that person shall be punished by imprisonment
pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 of the Penal Code, or
in a county jail for not less than 180 days nor more than one year,
and by a fine”]; People v. Burris (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012, 1016
“[u]nder Vehicle Code section 23550, subdivision (a), driving
under the influence within seven years of three or more DUI
convictions is a ‘wobbler’ and may be prosecuted as a
misdemeanor or a felony at the prosecutor’s discretion”].)
Vehicle Code section 23550 is not a sentence enhancement
because it does not add an additional term of imprisonment to the
base term for driving under the influence. Instead, the statute
provides an alternate penalty when it is proven that the offender
has suffered three or more prior convictions for the same offense
within the past 10 years. Similar provisions—which establish an
alternate penalty due to aggravating circumstances (including
recidivism-based circumstances), do not constitute
“enhancements,” within the meaning of Penal Code section 805,
and thus may be considered for purposes of calculating the
statute of limitations. (Anthony v. Superior Court, supra, 188
Cal.App.4th at p. 712; People v. Shaw (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 92,
98, 101; People v. Johnson (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 895, 905
(Johnson).)
Accordingly, because imprisonment “pursuant to
subdivision (h) of [Penal Code] [s]ection 1170” is the maximum
term prescribed by the statutes for the offense of driving under
the influence (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (a), 23550, subd. (a)),
the applicable statute of limitations is three years. (See Pen.
Code, §§ 801 [“[e]xcept as provided in [Penal Code] [s]ections 799
and 800, prosecution for an offense punishable by imprisonment
in the state prison or pursuant to subdivision (h) of [Penal Code]
[s]ection 1170 shall be commenced within three years after
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commission of the offense”] italics added, 805, subd. (a); Shaw, at
pp. 98, 100-101 [three-year statute of limitations applied to child
annoyance or molestation offense that was a felony, under Pen.
Code, § 647.6, subd. (c)(2), due to defendant’s recidivism];
Johnson, at pp. 904-907 [three-year statute of limitations applied
to indecent exposure offense that was a felony, under Pen. Code,
§ 314, subd. 1, because of defendant’s prior convictions for same
offense].)
Contrary to Williams’s assertion, the maximum penalty set
by Vehicle Code section 23550, subdivision (a), does not
constitute an enhancement, which we are to disregard under
Penal Code section 805. Williams supports her assertion only by
citing opinions that refer, in passing, to Vehicle Code section
23550 (or its predecessor, Vehicle Code section 23175, repealed by
Stats. 1998, ch. 118, § 41, eff. July 1, 1999) as “enhancement
statutes.” (See, e.g., People v. Sweet (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 78,
83.) None of these cases considered whether Vehicle Code section
23550 provides for an enhancement within the meaning of Penal
Code section 805. An opinion is not authority for propositions not
considered. (Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894,
900, fn. 6.)
B.
In the event we conclude (as we have) that the three-year
statute of limitations (§ 801) applies, Williams concedes that the
prosecution was timely due to tolling. We agree.
In a felony case, prosecution is not commenced at the time
the complaint is filed. (§ 804; Johnson, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at
p. 900.) Section 804 provides three dates on which a felony
prosecution may begin: (1) when the information or indictment is
filed; (2) when the defendant is arraigned on a felony complaint;
or (3) when an arrest or bench warrant issues.
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Here, the information filed in the instant prosecution
(Solano County Superior Court Case No. VCR237701) shows, on
its face, that the offense was committed on May 27, 2020, but the
information was not filed until November 12, 2024. (See § 804,
subd. (a).) The record before us at the time we conducted our
initial independent review showed Williams was not arraigned on
a felony complaint until August 14, 2023—about three years and
three months after the offense was committed. (See id., subd.
(c).) And a bench warrant naming Williams issued just a few
weeks earlier, in July 2023. (See id., subd. (d).)
After we requested supplemental briefing, Williams asked
to augment the record to include court records from a previous
case (Solano County Superior Court Case No. VCR236114) that
was dismissed but had been based on the same conduct. We
granted that request.
The undisputed facts now before us clarify that the statute
of limitations was tolled for a period of 248 days while the
VCR236114 case was pending and that the instant (VCR237701)
prosecution commenced within three years of May 27, 2020—once
the 248 days the prior (VCR236114) case was pending are
subtracted from the total elapsed time until Williams’s
arraignment on a felony complaint. (See § 803, subd. (b) [“[t]he
time during which prosecution of the same person for the same
conduct is pending in a court of this state is not a part of a
limitation of time prescribed in this chapter”]; § 804, subd. (c)
[prosecution is commenced when “[t]he defendant is arraigned on
a complaint that charges the defendant with a felony”].)
Williams’s conviction is not time barred. Our independent
review of the record uncovered no other arguable issues that
would result in a judgment more favorable to Williams.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:
JACKSON, P. J.
SIMONS, J.
People v. Williams (A173481)
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