S.N. v. Superior Court CA4/2

CourtListener 10872595CalctappJun 9, 2026

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Filed 6/9/26 S.N. v. Superior Court CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

S.N.,
E088172
Petitioner,
(Super.Ct.No. DPSW2500406)
v.
OPINION
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
RIVERSIDE COUNTY,

Respondent;

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,

Real Party in Interest.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. Sean P. Crandell,

Judge. Petition denied.

Lori Kennedy and Suzette Jacobsen for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

1
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell, Chief Assistant County Counsel,

and Julie Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.

I.

INTRODUCTION

S.N., the mother of 10-year-old A.M., petitions under California Rules of Court,

rule 8.542 to vacate the juvenile court’s order bypassing reunification services and setting

a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26. The court found under

section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), that Mother was incapable of caring for A.M. within the

statutory time limits due to her mental disability. Mother contends there was insufficient

evidence to deny her services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), because the court

relied on psychological evaluations where it was unclear as to the qualifications of either

mental health provider and neither mental health professionals testified or clarified the

reasons for their findings. Mother also argues that granting her reunification services was

in the best interest of the child. The order is supported by substantial evidence. We deny

the petition on its merits.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 29, 2025, the Riverside County Department of Social Services

(DPSS) filed a petition on behalf of A.M. pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b)

(failure to protect) and (g) (no provision for support) based on Mother’s unresolved

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2
mental health issues and not being under the care of a doctor. The petition also alleged

that Mother has had a prior child welfare history for similar concerns of general neglect

due to mental health issues in Riverside County and Los Angeles County and had failed

to benefit from services provided. The petition further alleged that Mother was unable

and/or unwilling to provide care and support to her child and had stated she could no

longer care for him. A first amended petition was filed on January 22, 2026, and a second

amended petition was filed on February 26, 2026.

Mother had prior child welfare history in Los Angeles County in 2014 that

involved her daughter, A.Z.2 Mother had been involuntarily hospitalized due to

attempting suicide. She had filled the home with carbon monoxide and overdosed on her

prescribed medication. Mother was found in a bathtub full of water with the gas on. A.Z.

was detained from Mother and released to her father. Mother received 12 months of

reunification services while A.Z. was on family maintenance with her father. In 2015,

jurisdiction was terminated with the father receiving full physical custody of A.Z. and the

parents having joint legal custody. Mother was provided with supervised visitation. In

total, Mother had nine prior child welfare allegations against her involving the children.

On November 20, 2025, DPSS received a referral alleging general neglect of A.M.

and A.Z. who was 17 years old at the time. It was alleged that A.M. and A.Z. were up at

3:00 a.m. mopping the floor because Mother did not want bugs crawling on her. Mother

2 A.Z. was not a party to this underlying dependency and is not a part of this writ
proceeding. A.Z. and A.M. have different fathers. A.M.’s father is not a party to this
writ petition.

3
stated that the home was deplorable and infested with several different insect species that

crawled in the family’s noses and mouths. A.Z. moved out of Mother’s home and was

living with a friend and the friend’s family.

The social worker met with Mother at her home. Mother allowed the social

worker to conduct a home evaluation. Mother stated that she was legally blind and

received government benefits. Mother had enough vision to cook and clean. She stated

that the apartment had some type of very small bug infestation, and the home needed to

be thoroughly cleaned on a regular basis to keep them away. She denied keeping the

children up late at night to clean. Mother showed the social worker a small amount of

water the size of a teaspoon on the bathroom floor and stated that there were pipe leaks

coming from under the floor causing this issue. The property manager, however, denied

that there were pipes under the units. Mother had pulled up the rug in the bedroom

because she believed there were bugs in it, and she was sleeping in the living room area

until new flooring could be installed. The property manager sent pest control to the unit,

but they said that there were no signs of bugs in the home. The social worker did not

observe any bugs or insects in the home during the visit. The social worker also noted

that there was no sign of a leak, or repair of a leak, or wall repair in the bedroom

anywhere, and no signs of water damage in the apartment.

On December 23, 2025, DPSS received a second referral after Mother called

dispatch stating that she was having issues with A.M. who kept running away from her.

Mother asked law enforcement to take A.M. on a “5150 hold” but he did not meet the

criteria. Mother believed that A.M. was going through a manic episode due to being

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undiagnosed with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. A.M. stated that he defied Mother

because she made him do chores which were boring and he wanted to play outside with

his friends instead. Because Mother was unable to safely care for A.M., he was taken

into law enforcement custody and transferred to the police station.

Mother denied abandoning A.M. and wanted him assessed and medicated so she

could care for him appropriately. Mother was told that A.M.’s behavior did not indicate

an assessment was needed, but Mother would repeat her belief that the child needed an

assessment and psychotropic medication. Mother accused “all persons, from neighbors,

to teachers, to the maternal aunt, as acting or colluding against her.” She also stated that

A.M. was trying to make her crazy because he threw fits, screamed and yelled. Mother

denied a mental health history for herself and denied being prescribed medications for

any diagnoses.

After the social worker obtained custody of A.M. from law enforcement, A.M.

informed the social worker that he did not want to return to his mother and indicated that

he would run away if returned to her. A.M. indicated that he was “okay” being placed in

foster care and repeatedly stated that he did not want to return to his mother. A.M. was

well-behaved and obedient, and he took direction with ease and without resentment. The

social worker spoke with a maternal aunt. The maternal aunt reported that the mother

had long-standing mental health issues. The maternal aunt was not surprised that A.M.

had behavioral issues after A.Z. left the home because the maternal aunt said that A.Z.

was A.M.’s primary caregiver due to Mother’s lack of mental health stability. A.M. was

placed in the maternal aunt’s care.

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At the December 30, 2025, detention hearing, the juvenile court formally detained

A.M. from parental custody.

A.M.’s father was eventually located. The paternal aunt had power of attorney for

him for several years. According to the paternal aunt, Father had been diagnosed with

“ ‘acute schizophrenia’ ” since the age of 20. The paternal aunt took care of all of

Father’s needs including medical issues and appointments. He had never seen A.M., and

DNA testing showed that he was A.M.’s biological father.

On January 8, 2025, the social worker interviewed A.M. A.M. was polite and

articulate and did not appear guarded. He stated that he had never seen any bugs, and it

was Mother who told him there were bugs. He was not aware of any water leaks in the

home. He admitted that he had stated that he was going to kill himself while living with

Mother. He explained that he was in a bad place and out of control and that he no longer

wanted to harm himself. He wanted to stay at his maternal aunt and uncle’s home and did

not want to go home with Mother. The maternal aunt expressed that she had concerns

regarding phone calls between A.M. and Mother. A.M. continuously stated that he did

not want to speak with Mother and would refuse to speak with her and hang up on her

sometimes.

On January 16, 2026, A.M. underwent a psychological evaluation with

Dr. Kenneth Garett. Dr. Garett found that A.M. met the criteria for post-traumatic stress

disorder. A.M. disclosed that his mother physically and emotionally abused him and that

he wished to have no contact with Mother. Based on his evaluation, Dr. Garett

recommended the court order that there be no contact between A.M. and his mother at

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that time. Dr. Garett also found that A.M. was behind in school, had learning difficulties,

and recommended A.M. be placed a special education program.

The juvenile court found that visitation between Mother and A.M. was detrimental

and denied Mother visitation. Over her counsel’s objections, the juvenile court

authorized two psychological evaluations for Mother. Mother’s counsel also informed

the court that they may be requesting a Guardian ad Litem for Mother.

On February 26, 2026, Mother’s counsel requested that a Guardian ad Litem be

appointed for Mother. The court granted the request.

Mother underwent two psychological evaluations. The first was conducted by

Dr. Garett, a licensed psychologist. Dr. Garett provided probable diagnoses of Delusional

Disorder, Bipolar 1 Disorder, and possible attention deficit disorder with hyperactivity

when Mother was younger. Dr. Garett opined that offering reunification services to

Mother at that time would not be appropriate as services may “further agitate her given

that she is not presently in a position to regain custody” and she had not fully

acknowledged the nature or severity of her mental health difficulties. Dr. Garett later

clarified that Mother would not benefit from reunification services due to the severity of

her mental illness.

The second psychological evaluation was conducted by Dr. Jamye Jesser, a

licensed psychologist. Dr. Jesser’s probable diagnoses for Mother were Delusional

Disorder; Bipolar 1 Disorder, manic, severe; Generalized Anxiety Disorder; Unspecified

Personality Disorder, Turbulent Disorder; Paranoid Personality Style; Compulsive

Personality Style, Dependent Personality Type, and Attention Deficit Disorder. Dr. Jesser

7
did not recommend reunification between Mother and A.M. and did not recommend court

services to Mother. Dr. Jesser explained that Mother did “not seem to have significant

enough insight into her bipolar or delusional disorder, or insight enough into her toxic

relationships.”

The jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was held on March 27, 2026. The juvenile

court found true the allegations in the second amended petition. The court found true that

Mother had unresolved mental health issues and was not under the care of a doctor or

seeking counseling or therapy, and that Mother had disclosed a family history of

Schizophrenia and Bipolar Disorder. The court also found true that Mother had prior

child welfare referral history of similar allegations of general neglect due to mental health

issues in Riverside and Los Angeles Counties and had failed to benefit from services

provided. The court further found true that Mother was unable or unwilling to provide

the child with care and support and expressed that she could no longer care for him.

The court thereafter proceeded with the contested dispositional hearing. DPSS

requested that Mother be denied services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2). Mother

provided stipulated testimony. The stipulated testimony stated: “Mother would stipulate

that she loves her child very much. She is enrolled in therapy. Mother is willing to work

and improve on her mental health. And mother would like the opportunity to complete

services to reunify with her . . . child.” Mother’s counsel argued that DPSS did not meet

the burden to deny Mother services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2). Counsel also

asserted that the two evaluators were not independent, as both shared the same office and

that it was not appropriate for either evaluator to state that Mother should be denied

8
reunification services as the purpose of a psychological assessment is to determine if a

parent would benefit from services. Counsel also pointed out that despite both

psychological reports stating Mother should be denied services, both psychologists

provide specific suggestions of what services should be provided to Mother to assist with

her mental health.

Following argument by the parties, the juvenile court declared A.M. a dependent

of the court, removed him from parental custody and denied reunification services to the

parents. The court found clear and convincing evidence to deny Mother services under

section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2). The court found no evidence that the psychologists

discussed or shared any information, and it was not uncommon for several people to

share office space. The court also noted that the psychological reports, while providing

recommendations for services for Mother, were not meant to be for reunification

purposes but were generally on how Mother should get help with her mental health. The

court further found providing Mother with visitation was detrimental to A.M.’s well-

being and denied Mother visitation.

On April 1, 2026, Mother filed a notice of intent to file writ petition.

III.

DISCUSSION

Mother contends that there was insufficient evidence to deny her reunification

services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2). She also argues that granting her

reunification services was in the best interest of the child. We are not persuaded by these

arguments.

9
Dependency cases carry a presumption that parents will receive family

reunification services. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) The presumption “implements the law’s

strong preference for maintaining the family relationship if at all possible.” (In re Baby

Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 474; see § 202, subd. (a) [“reunification of the minor

with his or her family shall be a primary objective”].) Nevertheless, “in certain

situations, attempts to facilitate reunification do not serve and protect the child’s

interests.” (Baby Boy H., at p. 474.) Statutes authorizing the denial of reunification

services are often referred to as “bypass” provisions. (In re T.G. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th

976, 989.)

The bypass provision in section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), is commonly referred to

as the mental disability exception, and its application draws upon not only the subdivision

itself but also section 361.5, subdivision (c)(1), and Family Code section 7827.

Reunification services need not be provided if the court finds by clear and convincing

evidence from any two experts “ ‘that a parent or parents suffer a mental incapacity or

disorder that renders the parent or parents unable to care for and control the child

adequately.’ ” (Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, 880, quoting

Fam. Code, § 7827, disapproved on other grounds in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9

Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7 (O.B.); see section 361.5, subd. (b) [requiring clear and

convincing evidence]; Fam. Cod § 7827, subd. (c) [requiring “the evidence of any two

experts” to support a mental disability finding].) Additionally, section 361.5,

subdivision (b)(2), requires a finding that the mental disability “renders the parent or

guardian incapable of utilizing those services” and “subdivision (c) of section 361.5

10
speaks to the proof required under subdivision (b)(2) and provides in relevant part:

‘When it is alleged . . . that the parent is incapable of utilizing services due to mental

disability, the court shall order reunification services unless competent evidence from

mental health professionals establishes that, even with the provision of services, the

parent is unlikely to be capable of adequately caring for the child.’ ” (In re Joy M. (2002)

99 Cal.App.4th 11, 17.)

Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), incorporates the requirement specified in Family

Code section 7827, subdivision (c), that a finding of mental disability be supported by

“ ‘the evidence of any two experts,’ ” each of whom must be a psychiatrist or

psychologist meeting educational and experience requirements. (In re C.C. (2003) 111

Cal.App.4th 76, 83-84.) But “there is no requirement that both experts must agree a

parent is unlikely to benefit from services before the court may deny the parent services.

Instead, the statute requires a showing only of evidence proffered by both experts

regarding a parent’s mental disability, evidence from which the court then can make

inferences and base its findings.” (Curtis F. v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th

470, 474 (Curtis F.).)

We review the juvenile court’s denial of reunification services under section 361.5,

subdivision (b)(2) for substantial evidence. (Curtis F., supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 474.)

We decide if the evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, such that a

reasonable trier of fact could find the court’s order was proper based on clear and

convincing evidence. (Ibid.) In making this determination we do not reweigh the

evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses or indulge in inferences contrary to the

11
findings of the trial court. (In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 589 (Michael

G.).) “The substantial evidence standard of review is generally considered the most

difficult standard of review to meet, as it should be, because it is not the function of the

reviewing court to determine the facts.” (Ibid.)

We must “account for the clear and convincing standard of proof when addressing

a claim that the evidence does not support a finding made under this standard,” as we do

here. (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1011.) Nevertheless, our review is

deferential to the juvenile court’s role as the trier of fact: “When reviewing a finding that

a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the

appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which

a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true. In

conducting its review, the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the

prevailing party below and give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have

evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn

reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (O.B., at pp. 1011-1012.)

The evidence here was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that a

mental disability rendered Mother unable to care for the child and unlikely to be capable

of doing so even if she were provided with reunification services. (§ 361.5, subds. (b)(2),

(c)(1).) The record shows that Mother suffered from a mental disability and that her

mental disability rendered her incapable of utilizing services. After administering several

psychological tests of Mother and reviewing Mother’s statements and social and mental

history, Dr. Garett provided probable diagnoses of Delusional Disorder, Bipolar 1

12
Disorder, possible attention deficit disorder with hyperactivity when the mother was

younger. Dr. Garett recommended that providing Mother with reunification services at

that time would not be appropriate and that offering reunification services may “further

agitate her given that she is not presently in a position to regain custody.” Dr. Garett later

clarified that Mother would not benefit from reunification services due to the severity of

her mental illness. Dr. Jesser also administered several psychological tests on Mother,

reviewed her history and statements provided by Mother and DPSS, and listed probable

diagnoses for Mother as Delusional Disorder; Bipolar 1 Disorder, manic, severe;

Generalized Anxiety Disorder; Unspecified Personality Disorder, Turbulent Disorder;

Paranoid Personality Style; Compulsive Personality Style, Dependent Personality Type,

and Attention Deficit Disorder. Dr. Jesser reported that Mother did “not seem to have

significant enough insight into her bipolar or delusional disorder, or insight enough into

her toxic relationships.” Dr. Jesser did not recommend reunification or court services to

Mother.

Substantial evidence also shows that competent evidence from mental health

professionals established that, even with the provision of services, Mother was unlikely to

be capable of adequately caring for A.M. within the statutory time limits. Dr. Garett

reported that Mother would not benefit from reunification services due to the severity of

her mental illness and that offering services may further agitate Mother given she was not

presently able to regain custody of A.M. Dr. Jesser opined that Mother should not receive

court-ordered services given that she did not seem to have significant enough insight into

her bipolar or delusional disorder or insight enough into her toxic relationships.

13
Mother argues the court’s ruling is unsupported by sufficient evidence because the

mental health providers’ qualifications were not provided, the mental health providers did

not testify and suggests their reports are suspect because the reports made similar

findings. Mother’s arguments essentially attack the credibility of the mental health

providers. However, as noted above, we do not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the

credibility of witnesses or indulge in inferences contrary to the findings of the trial court.

(Michael G., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 589.) “It is the trial court’s role to assess the

credibility of the various witnesses, to weigh the evidence to resolve the conflicts in the

evidence.” (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52.)

In addition, there is nothing in the record to indicate Mother requested that the

mental health providers testify or objected to their qualifications or anything to indicate

their psychological reports were suspect because they made similar findings. If a parent

fails to object or raise an issue in the juvenile court, the parent is prevented from

presenting the issue on appeal. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338-

1339 (Lorenzo C.).) “[A] party is precluded from urging on appeal any point not raised in

the trial court. [Citation.]” (In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 843, 846.)

Mother asserts that she made reasonable efforts, pointing out her case from 2014

concerning A.Z., her successful competition of services in that case, and her reasonable

efforts prior to the detention hearing in this matter. However, Mother never raised this

issue in the court below and thus is precluded from raising it on appeal. (Lorenzo C.,

supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1338-1339.) In any event, whether or not Mother showed

“reasonable efforts” is not a part of the analysis for determining whether or not

14
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), applies. Mother appears to be using language from

section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11), because she cites two cases that analyze

those subdivisions. Section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11), are not relevant to

the instant matter.

Moreover, as part of the jurisdictional findings, the juvenile court found true that

Mother failed to benefit from services provided. According to the record, after Mother

received 12 months of reunification services while A.Z. was on family maintenance with

her father, the matter was terminated with a family law order granting her father full

physical custody and supervised visits for Mother. Given that Mother was awarded only

supervised visitation, she did not successfully reunify with A.Z.

Mother contends that even if the section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2) bypass

provision applies, the best interests of the child dictated that she should receive

reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (c). We reject this argument for

several reasons.

First, the argument is forfeited. At the dispositional hearing, Mother did not make

the argument she is now raising. “A party forfeits the right to claim error as grounds for

reversal on appeal when he or she fails to raise the objection in the trial court.

[Citations.] Forfeiture, also referred to as ‘waiver,’ applies in juvenile dependency

litigation and is intended to prevent a party from standing by silently until the conclusion

of the proceedings.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221-222.)

Moreover, even if not forfeited, the argument is not persuasive. Her argument

rests on the premise that DPSS failed to prove that section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2),

15
applies. As discussed above, we reject that premise. As such, section 361.5,

subdivision (c)(2), is inapplicable. Specifically, section 361.5, subdivision (c)(2),

provides: “The court shall not order reunification for a parent or guardian described in

paragraph (3), (4), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), or (17) of

subdivision (b) unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that

reunification is in the best interest of the child.” Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), is

excluded from the purview of section 361.5, subdivision (c)(2). Where services are

bypassed pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), it is section 361.5, subdivision (f),

that applies. That subdivision requires only that the court determine if a hearing under

section 366.26 shall be set, and if so, to conduct the hearing within 120 days after the

dispositional hearing unless the other parent is receiving reunification services. (§ 361.5,

subd. (f).) It does not require or authorize an inquiry into whether reunification would be

in the best interests of the child, even though section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), applies.

(See In re Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1129 [“ ‘[I]f the statutory language is

not ambiguous, then we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain

meaning of the language governs.’ ”]; In re David (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 675, 682

[“ ‘Appellate courts may not rewrite unambiguous statutes’ ” or “rewrite the clear

language of [a] statute to broaden the statute's application”].) Mother has therefore failed

to show error.

Ample evidence supports the juvenile court’s decision to bypass reunification

services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2).

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IV.

DISPOSITION

The petition for an extraordinary writ is denied on the merits.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON
J.
We concur:

MILLER
Acting P. J.

RAPHAEL
J.

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