People v. Quevedo CA1/1

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Filed 6/8/26 P. v. Quevedo CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171294
v.
ISRAEL QUEVEDO, (San Mateo County
Super. Ct. No. 23-SF-009891-A)
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Israel Quevedo appeals his conviction for arson of forest
land. (Pen. Code,1 § 451, subd. (c).) He argues there is insufficient evidence
proving he burned forest land as that term is defined by section 450,
subdivision (b). We agree and, accordingly, we reverse the arson conviction
and remand for a full resentencing.2

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 As a result of our disposition, we need not address Quevedo’s other

arguments for reversal, which are based on alleged instructional errors.

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I. BACKGROUND
Quevedo was charged by information with felony arson of forest land3
(§ 451, subd. (c); count 1) and misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count 2), with a probation
enhancement (§ 1203, subd. (k)) alleged as to count 1.
During the jury trial, a witness testified that in June 2023, he was
driving slowly on El Camino Real in San Mateo when he saw Quevedo
“starting a fire on the grass northbound.” There was a “grassy area” to the
left of the sidewalk, then there was the sidewalk, and on the other side of the
sidewalk there was another piece of grass. The grassy area was dry with “a
bunch of debris, grass or weeds.” He saw Quevedo kneel down and throw a
branch on the fire, which had flames about two feet high and one foot wide.
The witness continued driving then pulled into a driveway a block and a half
away, where he watched Quevedo and called 911. He could see smoke about
10 feet high but did not see flames from that distance. As the witness was on
the phone with the 911 dispatcher, Quevedo walked up El Camino Real
towards him. Quevedo stopped in front of the witness’s truck and threw a big
asphalt piece of rock into the street. Quevedo then crossed the street and
went into a gas station.
Another witness was jogging on El Camino Real and saw “some
shrubbery . . . smoldering on the ground.” The smoldering was on the
sidewalk’s “grassy area,” with “shrubs around.” The man he had seen
kneeling down over the area had walked away before the jogger got to the

3 The information charged Quevedo with arson of a structure or forest

land, but Quevedo states that the trial court, without objection, amended the
accusation to charge only arson of forest land.

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site. The jogger called 911 and a person came from across the street and
doused the area with a water bottle.
A San Mateo police officer described the location as a residential area,
with housing on both sides of El Camino Real, which is a busy street. There
was no fire or flames burning when he arrived at the site. The officer saw
three burn marks, which he knew were burn marks because they were the
only spots where there was no grass and he could see burn mark residue—
black char or ash. He described the area where the burn marks were located
as a “line of grass” and commented on “the burnt grass” at the scene.
Several photographs of the site, taken by the police officer, were
admitted as evidence at trial. Exhibit 2 provides a wider view of the area.
Next to the road is a raised curb area with different sections. Immediately
next to the road is a strip of vegetation—which appears to be about the same
width as the paved sidewalk—running the length of the block. What appears
to be dried or dead grass and weeds cover most of the strip. Some small
shrubs grow almost in a row near a portion of the edge of the strip and trees
run down the middle of it. Three burn marks identified by the police officer
can be seen in different areas of the vegetation strip immediately surrounded
by dried or dead grass. Moving away from the road, a paved sidewalk is next
to the strip of vegetation and, on the other side of the sidewalk, there is
another strip of vegetation and then a fence. Exhibits 11A through 11E are
zoomed in photographs showing the three burn marks. The burned areas
look like dirt and the areas immediately surrounding them appear to be dried
or dead grass and weeds.
San Mateo police officers apprehended Quevedo when he walked out of
the gas station store. They searched him and found a lighter and
methamphetamine. The jury convicted Quevedo of both counts and the trial

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court sentenced him to the low term of two years in prison, with credit for
time served.
II. DISCUSSION
Quevedo challenges his arson conviction, arguing there is insufficient
evidence that he burned forest land as that term is defined by section 450,
subdivision (b).4
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
Section 451 provides: “A person is guilty of arson when he or she
willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned . . . any
structure, forest land, or property.” Section 451 identifies four types of
felonious arson: (1) arson causing great bodily injury; (2) arson causing an
inhabited structure or property to burn; (3) arson of a structure or forest
land; and (4) arson of property. (§ 451, subds. (a)–(d).) Section 450,
subdivision (b), defines forest land as “any brush covered land, cut-over land,
forest, grasslands, or woods.” By contrast, property “means real property or
personal property, other than a structure or forest land.” (§ 450, subd. (c),
italics added.) The maximum sentence for arson of a structure or forest land
is double that of the maximum sentence for arson of uninhabited property.
(§ 451, subds. (c)–(d).)
“[A]t the heart of this case lies a question of statutory interpretation—
the meaning of forest land—which we consider de novo.” (People v. Costella
(2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1, 5 (Costella); see also People v. Prunty (2015)
62 Cal.4th 59, 71.) “To the extent we must determine whether there was
sufficient evidence of forest land, we consider whether the record ‘ “ ‘discloses
substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid

4 Quevedo does not challenge his misdemeanor possession conviction

(count 2).

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value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” ’ ” (Costella, at p. 5; Prunty, at p. 71.) We
examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment and we
do not reweigh evidence. (People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 820.) In the
end, “[t]he only evidentiary question before us is whether the prosecution—
consistent with the theory it advanced regarding what constituted [forest
land]—presented sufficient proof in this case.” (Prunty, at p. 85.)
“Our primary task in interpreting the statute is to determine the
lawmakers’ intent. [Citation.] We begin with the words of the statute and
their usual and ordinary meaning, which would typically be their dictionary
definition. [Citations.] Their plain meaning controls, unless the words are
ambiguous. [Citation.] ‘If the statute is ambiguous, we may consider a
variety of extrinsic aids, including legislative history, the statute’s purpose,
and public policy.’ ” (Costella, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at pp. 5–6.)
B. Analysis
It appears undisputed that the site here does not fall within the
statutory definition of forest land as cut-over land, forest, or woods. (See
§ 450, subd. (b).) The People argue it constitutes forest land as grasslands or
brush covered land. (See ibid.) We disagree.
1. Grasslands
Merriam-Webster defines “grassland” as “farmland occupied chiefly by
forage plants and especially grasses,” or “land on which the natural dominant
plant forms are grasses and forbs,”5 or “an ecological community in which the
characteristic plants are grasses.” (<https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/grassland> [as of June 8, 2026].) Dictionary.com

5 A “forb” is defined as “an herb other than grass.”

(<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/forb> [as of June 8, 2026].)

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states “grassland” is “an area, as a prairie, in which the natural vegetation
consists largely of perennial grasses, characteristic of subhumid and semiarid
climates,” or “land with grass growing on it, especially farmland used for
grazing or pasture.” (<https://www.dictionary.com/browse/grassland> [as of
June 8, 2026].)
Based on these definitions and the language of sections 450 and 451,
we agree with Quevedo that the mere presence of grass is insufficient to
make an area a grassland. The statutes distinguish between arson of forest
land, including grasslands, and arson of other types of uninhabited property,
suggesting that the Legislature intended forest land to mean something other
than any land on which grass grows. The definitions suggest a “grassland” is
an open land or prairie, occupied largely by grasses, rather than just any land
with grass on it, such as a lawn or park.
To the extent the plain meaning of section 450 is ambiguous, the
legislative history of the arson statutes also supports a narrower
interpretation of “grasslands” that emphasizes the natural character of such
areas. Instead of punishing arson of “forest land,” the previous version of one
of the arson statutes prohibited the willful and malicious burning of any
“growing or standing grain, grass or tree, or any grass, forest, woods, timber,
brush-covered land, or slashing, cutover land.” (Former § 449c; see Stats.
1976, ch. 1139, § 203, p. 5119, italics added.) In 1979, Senate Bill No. 116
reorganized and consolidated multiple Penal Code sections relating to
different forms of arson into sections 450 and 451 that were substantially
similar to the current versions. (See Stats. 1979, ch. 145, §§ 6, 8, pp. 338–
339.) The amendment from “any grass” to “grasslands” suggests the
Legislature intended to narrow the types of grassy areas giving rise to
heightened punishment for arson.

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In making the changes to the arson statutes, the Legislature sought to
make the statutes more consistent, more understandable, and easier to
prosecute. (See David A. Roberti, Chairman, Joint Com. for Revision of the
Pen. Code, letter to Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., June 25, 1979, Sen. Bill
No. 116, ch. 145.) The author of the 1979 amendments confirmed the
Legislature intended to narrow the scope of undeveloped property associated
with heightened punishment for arson, stating: “In the reorganization [of the
arson statutes,] grasslands and forest fires are more narrowly defined and
are treated the same as arson fires of buildings.” (Ibid.) Likewise, the former
California Department of Forestry (now the California Department of
Forestry and Fire Protection) stated the revisions “would put wildland arson
on the same basis penalty wise as arson of an unoccupied structure. This
recognizes the fact that in many instances a person who sets fire to a
wildland area creates a greater threat to life and property than many of the
single building unoccupied structures that are the subject of arson.” (Cal.
Dept. of Forestry, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 116 (1979 Gen. Sess.), June 26,
1979.)
With this in mind, we conclude there is insufficient evidence
demonstrating that the land here constituted grasslands within the meaning
of section 450, subdivision (b). One witness described the site as a “grassy
area” on the sidewalk with “grass,” not “just weeds.” Another witness
described it as the “grassy area” of the sidewalk with “shrubs around.” The
police officer described the area where the burn marks were as a “line of
grass” and called the burn mark areas “burnt grass.” The photographic
evidence corroborates the witnesses’ testimony. Exhibits 2 and 11A through
11E show the strip of vegetation with three burn marks. The burn marks are
in areas which appear to be dried or dead grass mixed with weeds. The

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evidence, therefore, demonstrates that Quevedo burned grass. The area
surrounding the three burn marks was also mainly dried grass and weeds,
some shrubs, and trees planted in the middle of the vegetation strip running
down the block. Next to the strip of vegetation—moving away from the
road—was a paved sidewalk. The mere presence of grass does not make this
area a grassland as it was not natural, wild, farmland, prairie land, or
grazing land. The area contains none of the other features suggestive of a
grassland described by the dictionary definitions and supported by the
statutes’ context and history. Accordingly, there is insufficient evidence that
the area was a grassland.
2. Brush Covered Land
Costella, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th 1, appears to be the only published
decision addressing the meaning of “brush covered land” as part of section
450’s definition of forest land. Because the Penal Code did not further define
brush or brush covered, the Costella court looked to the dictionary definitions
of those terms. (Costella, at p. 6.) “According to Merriam-Webster, the
meaning of ‘brush’ is ‘scrub vegetation’ or ‘land covered with scrub
vegetation.’ [Citation.] ‘Scrub,’ in turn, is ‘a stunted tree or shrub.’ ” (Ibid.)
Additionally, we note that the definitions of “brush” by Dictionary.com
include “a dense growth of bushes, shrubs, etc.; scrub; thicket” and “bushes
and low trees growing in thick profusion, especially close to the ground.”
(<https://www.dictionary.com/browse/brush> [as of June 8, 2026].)
In Costella, the defendant set fire to a murder victim in a spot
alongside a highway. (Costella, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 4.) Immediately
surrounding the body was an area with bare dirt, grass, weeds, and scattered
shrubs. (Id. at pp. 4–5, 6.) But aerial photographs depicting a wider view of
the area showed that “green vegetation densely covered—and in many places

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entirely covered—most of the undeveloped plot of land.” (Id. at p. 6.) Thus,
while the defendant had set fire “in a brush scattered clearing,” the area was
“otherwise brush covered.” (Id. at p. 7.) The court saw “no requirement that
every inch of the subject land be covered by brush.” (Ibid.)
Based on the definitions and the discussion in Costella, we believe the
definition of “brush covered land” requires that at least some portion of the
land in question be densely populated with brush, even if it is not
“continuously covered with brush.” (Costella, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 7.)
Here, there is insufficient evidence of any dense population of brush. One
witness described “some shrubbery” smoldering. Other witnesses described
the land as a “grassy area” with “burnt grass.” Exhibits 2 and 11A through
11E show the strip of vegetation between the road and the paved sidewalk
consisting mostly of dried or dead grass and weeds with some trees. There
are some shrubs in a small area of the strip near the burn marks. On the
other side of the paved sidewalk is another small strip of vegetation. While
the evidence demonstrates that at least some portion of the site was
populated with shrubs, that is, brush, there is no evidence demonstrating
that any part of the land was densely populated with brush. Accordingly,
there is insufficient evidence that the land was “brush covered.”
In sum, there is insufficient evidence that the land at issue constituted
forest land under sections 450, subdivision (b), and 451, subdivision (c).
Therefore, the arson conviction must be reversed.
III. DISPOSITION
The conviction for arson (count 1) is reversed for insufficient evidence,
and the conviction for possession of methamphetamine (count 2) is affirmed.
The sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for a

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full resentencing of the count 2 conviction.6 (See People v. Buycks (2018)
5 Cal.5th 857, 893.)

_________________________
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
HUMES, P. J.

_________________________
SMILEY, J.

People v. Quevedo / A171294

6 We express no opinion whether on remand the People could charge

Quevedo with arson of property pursuant to section 451, subdivision (d), and
retry him on such a charge. (See § 654; People v. Goolsby (2015) 62 Cal.4th
360.)

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