CourtListener 10870956•People v. Miranda CA2/8
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Filed 6/5/26 P. v. Miranda CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B340714
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA056316)
v.
HUMBERTO MIRANDA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, David W. Stuart, Judge. Affirmed in part and
remanded in part with directions.
Michael H. Casey, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Roberta L. Davis and Nima Razfar, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
In 2008, a jury convicted Humberto Miranda of attempted
premeditated murder, second degree robbery, assault with a
firearm, and possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury also
found true several sentencing allegations. The trial court
sentenced Miranda to 59 years to life in prison under the “Three
Strikes” law (Pen. Code,1 §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12,
subds. (a)-(d)). His sentence included prior prison term sentence
enhancements, which have since been abrogated. Miranda was
entitled to a full resentencing. At that resentencing Miranda
asked the trial court, among other things, to strike his prior
strike convictions in addition to the now-invalid prior prison term
enhancements. The trial court refused to strike his prior strike
convictions. Miranda contends this was an abuse of discretion.
Miranda also contends the trial court erred when it
delegated recalculation of his custody credits to the Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation instead of doing the
recalculation itself. Finally, he argues the trial court erroneously
reimposed the original restitution order without the prior
condition of joint and several liability as to his two codefendants.
The People agree with the last two contentions. We agree as
well. We affirm the judgment but remand with directions to the
trial court to recalculate Miranda’s custodial credits and to
reimpose the restitution order with joint and several liability.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Miranda was jointly charged with Steven Garcia and
George Hernandez with the premeditated attempted murder and
second degree robbery of Rustam K. Miranda alone was charged
with possession of a firearm by a felon and assault with a
firearm. He was also charged with criminal street gang
enhancements under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C),
firearm enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b),
(c), (d), and (e)(1), prior prison term enhancements under section
667.5, subdivision (b), and prior strike convictions under the
Three Strikes Law. A jury convicted Miranda of all substantive
offenses and most of the enhancements. In a bifurcated trial the
court found true two Three Strikes priors and two section 667.5,
subdivision (b) prior prison terms. The trial court sentenced
Miranda to 59 years to life in prison. (People v. Miranda (2011)
192 Cal.App.4th 398, 402–403.) It also imposed a victim
restitution order of $74,742.84 subject to joint and several
liability with the two codefendants.
Before 2020, the Penal Code directed criminal sentencing
courts to impose a one-year term for each prior separate prison
term or county jail term the defendant had previously served for
a felony. Effective January 1, 2020, the Legislature eliminated
these one-year prior prison term enhancements except in cases
involving prior terms for sexually violent offenses. Two years
later, the Legislature made the change retroactive. The
Legislature also established a mechanism by which individuals
serving a term for a judgment with such an enhancement would
be resentenced. (§1172.75, subd. (b); People v. Rhodius (2025)
17 Cal.5th 1050, 1053–1054.)
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In 2022, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
identified Miranda as an inmate eligible for resentencing because
he was serving a sentence with now-invalid prior prison term
enhancements. On April 22, 2024, Miranda filed a petition to
recall and resentence. Miranda also asked the court at
resentencing to strike at least one of his two prior strike
convictions which formed the basis of his sentence under the
Three Strikes Law. (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
13 Cal.4th 497.)
The trial court dismissed the prior prison term
enhancements, vacated and dismissed the gang enhancements,
and denied the Romero motion to strike the prior strike
convictions. Miranda was resentenced to 25 years to life in
prison. The court stated the restitution order of $74,742.84
remained. This appeal followed.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
We draw the facts, as do the parties, from our opinion
affirming Miranda’s judgment of conviction. In brief, Miranda
and three other men drove up to a car parked at a gas station.
The victim was seated in the parked car smoking marijuana.
Two of the men got out and asked the victim where he was from.
He responded, “Nowhere.” He also declined to share with the
men the marijuana he was smoking. One of the men pulled a
gold chain off the victim, who gave chase. The victim heard gun
shots and saw Miranda firing a handgun at him. The victim was
hit twice. After a high-speed chase ending in a crash into a light
pole, police arrested three of the four men in the car, including
Miranda. The fourth was never apprehended. (People v.
Miranda, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 404.)
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DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Denying the Romero Motion.
On appeal Miranda argues that the trial court did not give
sufficient weight to the mitigating factors he presented to support
a reduction of sentence. Under section 1385, subdivision (a), a
trial court may dismiss a prior strike conviction for sentencing
purposes in furtherance of justice. (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at
pp. 529–530.) In deciding whether to strike a prior conviction,
the relevant factors for the court to consider are “ ‘whether, in
light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and
prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the
particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the
defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or
in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not
previously been convicted of one or more’ ” strike convictions.
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377, quoting People v.
Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)
A trial court’s refusal to dismiss or strike a prior strike
conviction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v.
Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 375.) The party attacking the
sentence must show that the trial court’s decision not to dismiss
or vacate a prior strike was irrational or arbitrary. (Id. at
p. 377.) In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is
presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing
objectives. A decision will not be reversed merely because
reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike a prior
conviction or the trial court did not explicitly articulate all
relevant factors and focused on one aggravating factor only. An
appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in
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substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.
(People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977–
978, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People
v. Lynall (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1108.)
Here Miranda asked the court to consider striking at least
one of his prior strike convictions because of several mitigating
factors: physical abuse he suffered as a child at the hands of his
father; abuse which drove him out to the streets where he
encountered and engaged in criminal gang culture; his youth
when he sustained his two prior strikes (he was 16 and 17 years
old); his youth when he sustained the current convictions (he was
23 years old); his almost six years of discipline free custody time;
promises of postrelease support from family and friends; and his
extraordinary record of participating in vocational and
educational programs while incarcerated.
In declining to strike any of the prior strike convictions, the
trial court reviewed the probation report, which included
Miranda’s criminal history and his age at the commission of the
offenses in his record. The trial court stated: “The strikes in this
case were two juvenile robberies from 1999 and 2000. [¶] Mr.
Miranda was born in 1983, so he was 16 and 17 at the time of the
juvenile robberies which made them strikes, which was a long
time ago, but this case arose in 2006, so only six years later with
intervening convictions. [¶] Well, at the time of the sentencing in
this case and I still believe today he’s still an appropriate subject
to be dealt with under the Three Strikes Law. [¶] I am going to
resentence him, which is going to change his sentence, but I’m
not going to strike a strike here today. So the Romero motion is
denied.”
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We find no abuse of discretion. The trial court was aware of
Miranda’s age at the time of his offenses and articulated its view
that Miranda was not outside the spirit of the Three Strikes Law
given that he had committed three felonies within a span of six
years. There was no “crime-free cleaning period of
rehabilitation.” (People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th
809, 813.) In asking us to find an abuse of discretion, Miranda
argues that the court did not give appropriate weight to his
youth. As set out above, we do not reweigh the evidence as we
are not authorized to substitute our judgment for that of the trial
court. That the court did not comment on other mitigating
factors does not render the resentencing improper. (People v.
Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 919 [court not required to
state reasons for rejecting factors in mitigation].) The trial
court’s decision not to strike the strike priors was neither
arbitrary nor irrational.
II. The Trial Court Erred in Reimposing the Victim
Restitution Order Without Joint and Several
Liability.
When Miranda was originally sentenced, the trial court
imposed a restitution order of $74,742.84 on all three defendants.
The court ordered joint and several liability, that is, “each
defendant is entitled to a credit for any actual payments by the
other.” (People v. Blackburn (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1520, 1535;
People v. Leon (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 620, 622 [if two defendants
convicted of the same crime caused economic loss, a court may
impose liability on each defendant to pay the full amount of the
economic loss, as long as the victim does not obtain a double
recovery].) Thus, the trial court has “the authority to order direct
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victim restitution paid by [all] defendants jointly and severally.”
(Blackburn, at p. 1535.)
Miranda argues, and the People agree, that to prevent the
possibility of unjust enrichment—a double recovery by the
victim—the restitution order must be corrected to reflect joint
and several liability. We agree and direct the trial court to do so.
III. The Trial Court Erred in Delegating the
Recalculation of Custody Credits to the Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation
Miranda contends, and the People agree, that the trial
court erred in delegating the recalculation of his custody credits
to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. We agree
also. The trial court should have recalculated and pronounced
the number of custody credits Miranda had garnered to the date
of resentencing.
“[W]hen a prison term already in progress is modified . . .
the sentencing court must recalculate and credit against the
modified sentence all actual time the defendant has already
served, whether in jail or prison, and whether before or since he
was originally committed and delivered to prison custody.”
(People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29.) We remand the
matter to the trial court to recalculate Miranda’s custody credits.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The matter is remanded so the
trial court can recalculate appellant’s custody credits and correct
the abstract of judgment to reflect joint and several liability for
the victim restitution order.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
WILEY, J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
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