CourtListener 10869705•People v. Strange CA4/1
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Filed 6/3/26 P. v. Strange CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D087347
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF1805278)
RUSSELL WARREN STRANGE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Steven G. Counelis, Judge. Affirmed.
Wallin & Klarich and Jonathan M. Lynn for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C.
Cavalier and Nora S. Weyl, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
A jury convicted Russell Warren Strange of multiple counts of lewd acts
and sexual penetration with a foreign object based on his conduct with a
teenage girl while serving as her high school coach and teacher. Strange
appeals on multiple grounds, none of which persuades us.
First, Strange challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
guilty verdicts and the jury’s finding of substantial sexual conduct necessary
to toll the statute of limitations on the lewd act counts. Despite any claimed
inconsistency between the guilty and not guilty verdicts, substantial evidence
supported both the convicted counts and the finding of substantial sexual
conduct.
Second, Strange contends the court erred in permitting an expert to
testify about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. He claims
(1) CSAAS evidence is no longer probative, as it is now “common knowledge”
that victims of child sexual abuse delay disclosing their abuse; (2) the expert’s
CSAAS testimony was “untethered to specific case evidence”; and (3) it
violated his due process rights. We are not persuaded that CSAAS evidence
should be categorically excluded, as California courts permit it under binding
Supreme Court caselaw and experts are permitted to opine on a matter with
which the jury might have some familiarity. And any assumed error from
admitting the CSAAS evidence in this case was harmless and did not violate
Strange’s right to due process.
Third, Strange accuses the prosecutor of committing misconduct during
closing arguments. Strange forfeited these prosecutorial misconduct claims,
however, by failing to object and seek to admonish the jury during trial. He
has not convinced us either objection or admonishment would have been
futile, as is required to overcome forfeiture.
Fourth, Strange argues a juror committed prejudicial conduct
warranting a new trial when she failed to disclose her cousin’s murder on a
pretrial questionnaire. We defer to the trial court’s credibility finding
favoring the juror, and substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding
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that the juror’s omission was inadvertent. Because Strange offers no proof of
actual juror bias, we discern no error.
Fifth, Strange contends his expert should have been permitted to
testify about Strange’s results on the Abel test, which assesses categories of
sexual interest. He offers no supported basis for us to depart from existing
caselaw precluding Abel test evidence in criminal cases involving sex offenses
against children.
Sixth and finally, Strange’s claim of cumulative error fails given the
one assumed error was harmless.
We therefore affirm.
I.
A.
While in eighth grade, Jane Doe met Strange through basketball and
softball programs.
In the spring of Doe’s freshman year of high school, Strange coached
her in varsity softball. At this time, when Doe was 14 years old, Strange
would hug her and “got more comfortable pulling [her] closer, holding onto
[her] longer.” Sometimes he would drive her home after games or practice.
Strange started touching Doe’s leg while in the car. Doe described it as a
“slow progression,” during which he would jokingly hit her on the knee but
later would keep his hand on her leg longer and “over time[]” move his hand
“more up [her] leg.”
That summer, Strange drove Doe to basketball practice and to practice
softball pitching. He also called her “every night.” According to Doe, at some
point that summer Strange had a visible erection when he picked her up.
During another car ride, Strange put his pinky finger on the outside of Doe’s
vagina, touching her skin but not penetrating her. Eventually, during these
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car rides Strange would “aggressively” rub Doe’s clitoris and “use two fingers”
to penetrate her vagina.
In Doe’s sophomore year, Strange was also her history teacher.
Strange would digitally penetrate Doe “two to three times a week.” When
asked the total number of times Strange digitally penetrated her vagina
between the summer after her freshman year through part of the spring of
her sophomore year of high school, Doe testified that it “might be more than
50” times. She also testified about instances when she and Strange
performed oral sex on each other and had sexual intercourse.
Their sexual relationship ended in the spring of Doe’s sophomore year
of high school, when her parents confronted her after seeing her sneak out of
the house and drive away in a familiar car. Although Doe “was not going to
tell them” and “really did not want to say what it was,” she ultimately “came
clean” and answered her parents’ questions about what Strange had done to
her.
Doe reported Strange’s conduct to law enforcement 18 years later.
B.
The People charged Strange with five counts of lewd acts upon a child
who was 14 or 15 years old and more than 10 years younger than him (Pen.
Code, § 288, subd. (c)(1); counts 1-5); five counts of oral copulation with
someone under the age of 16 (§ 287(b)(2); counts 6-10); five counts of sexual
penetration with a foreign object of a person under age 16 (§ 289(i);
counts 11-15); and three counts of sexual intercourse with a person under
age 16 (§ 261.5(d); counts 16-18).
A jury convicted Strange on all lewd act and sexual penetration counts
but acquitted him on the remaining counts.
The court sentenced Strange to five years and eight months in prison.
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II.
A.
Strange challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions
and asserts “little rationale” exists for the jury to acquit him on some charges
but convict on others. We conclude substantial evidence supports Strange’s
convictions irrespective of the jury’s acquittal on some charges.
Strange views the acquitted counts as reflecting “the jury’s conclusion
that there was something lacking in [Doe’s] testimony,” which seems to feed
into Strange’s attack on Doe’s credibility for the convicted counts. But “as a
general rule, inherently inconsistent verdicts are allowed to stand.” (People
v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 656.) “An inconsistency may show no more
than jury lenity, compromise, or mistake, none of which undermines the
validity of a verdict.” (Ibid.) Defendants are protected against jury
irrationality or error through sufficiency of the evidence review. (Ibid.)
Thus, even to the extent the verdicts were inconsistent, “that conclusion does
not, of itself, warrant reversal.” (Ibid.)
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for substantial
evidence. In doing so, we examine the entire record in the light most
favorable to the prosecution to determine if a rational factfinder could find
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v.
Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) Substantial evidence is reasonable,
credible evidence of solid value, even if circumstantial. (Ibid.) “Conflicts and
even testimony [that] is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify”
reversal. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403.) We will not reverse
unless under “no hypothesis” whatsoever could substantial evidence support
the jury’s verdict. (Zamudio, at p. 357 [cleaned up].)
5
Strange claims “[t]his case turned on [Doe’s] credibility” and focuses on
Doe’s mental health and her purported inability to describe a unique mark on
Strange’s penis, although he provides no record citation for the latter point.
But we “resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for
substantial evidence.” (Maury, 30 Cal.4th at p. 403.)
Here, Doe testified that Strange digitally penetrated her vagina
perhaps more than 50 times. As the People note, that testimony “more than
accounted for the five counts of lewd acts and five counts of digital
penetration with a foreign object.” Testimony by Doe’s former softball
teammate about walking into a classroom to find Strange’s hand up Doe’s
shorts in a way that struck her as “sexual” corroborates Doe’s testimony.
There is more (as discussed below), but this substantial evidence suffices.
B.
Strange argues the jury’s lewd act verdicts, counts 1 through 5, cannot
stand because insufficient evidence supports the finding of substantial sexual
conduct required to toll the statute of limitations. We disagree.
We review for substantial evidence “whether a jury properly found, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that a criminal proceeding is timely under the
statute of limitations.” (People v. Wong (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1444.)
Section 803(f) extends the limitations period to prosecute certain sexual
offenses. The current version of section 803(f) is identical to the version in
effect during Strange’s trial. (Former § 803(f), Stats. 2022, ch. 258, § 115.)
Prosecution becomes timely if commenced within one year of the victim’s
report to law enforcement of certain sexual offenses that occurred when the
victim was under 18 years old so long as (1) the normal limitations period has
expired, (2) the crime involved substantial sexual conduct, and
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(3) independent admissible evidence corroborates the victim’s allegations.
(§ 803(f)(1)-(3).)
Strange challenges only the “substantial sexual conduct” component.
For tolling purposes, substantial sexual conduct means “penetration of the
vagina or rectum of either the victim or the offender by the penis of the other
or by any foreign object, oral copulation, or masturbation of either the victim
or the offender” except for nonmutual masturbation. (§§ 803(f)(2)(B),
1203.066(b).)
Strange argues that conduct like “fondling or kissing a minor, while
within the ambit of section 288, subdivision (c) if done for the purpose of
sexual arousal, does not rise to the level of ‘substantial sexual conduct.’”
Although accurate, that statement ignores the record evidence. Doe testified
that Strange digitally penetrated her vagina dozens of times. Even excluding
five of those instances as the basis for the sexual penetration counts, that
leaves more than enough instances of digital penetration to support the jury’s
finding of substantial sexual conduct to toll the statute of limitations on the
five section 288(c) lewd act counts.
C.
After Doe and a couple other witnesses testified at trial, the
prosecution introduced testimony by clinical and forensic psychologist Jody
Ward about CSAAS. Ward explained that CSAAS is a “pattern of behaviors
many children exhibit who have been sexually abused within an ongoing
relationship.”
Strange contends it was error to admit Ward’s CSAAS testimony
because (1) such evidence is no longer probative, as it is now “common
knowledge” that victims of child sexual abuse delay disclosing their abuse;
(2) Ward’s testimony was “untethered to specific case evidence”; and (3) it
7
violated his due process rights. We conclude (1) CSAAS evidence remains
generally admissible in California courts, subject to its relevancy to the case
at hand; (2) even assuming it was error to permit Ward’s CSAAS testimony
here, it was not prejudicial; and (3) Strange’s due process rights were not
violated.
CSAAS evidence serves to disabuse jurors of commonly held
misconceptions or myths about how victims of child sexual abuse react.
(People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1301.) Although inadmissible to
prove sexual abuse occurred, CSAAS “is admissible to rehabilitate [the
complaining] witness’s credibility when the defendant suggests that the
child’s conduct after the incident—e.g., a delay in reporting—is inconsistent
with his or her testimony claiming molestation.” (Id. at p. 1300.)
CSAAS evidence “must be tailored to the purpose for which it is being
received.” (People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 393.) Like all other
evidence, it is inadmissible unless relevant. (Evid. Code, § 350.) “It is
sufficient if the victim’s credibility is placed in issue due to the paradoxical
behavior” the CSAAS evidence is then introduced to explain. (People v.
Patino (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1744-1745.)
We review the admission of expert testimony for abuse of discretion.
(McAlpin, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1299.)
1.
Strange asserts that “[c]ases of individuals waiting to disclose abuse
are legion and are of common knowledge across our state,” so no myths
requiring expert CSAAS testimony remain. We are not persuaded.
In McAlpin, our Supreme Court emphasized that a jury need not be
entirely unfamiliar with the subject of an expert’s opinion to warrant its
admission. (McAlpin, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1299-1300.) Thus, the fact that some
8
jurors might have some general understanding about child sex abuse victims’
behavior does not categorically render CSAAS evidence inadmissible.
People v. Munch (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464 considered and rejected
arguments like those Strange raises now. Munch confirmed that McAlpin
remains valid and binding with respect to the admissibility of CSAAS
evidence, which continues to be admitted in California courts. (Munch, at
p. 468.) While Strange points to a small handful of states that preclude some
or all CSAAS evidence, “[t]hat other jurisdictions may disagree with
[McAplin] does not change its impact on California cases.” (Ibid.)
2.
Next, Strange contends the trial court erred by permitting Ward to give
“a wholesale recitation of CSAAS’ list of ‘myths’ that were untethered to
specific case evidence.” Even assuming error, however, it was harmless.
Strange mentions CSAAS myths generally but argues prejudice only as
to delayed disclosure. He thus forfeits any claim of prejudice as to other
myths. (In re Champion (2014) 58 Cal.4th 965, 986.) Consequently, we limit
our discussion to delayed disclosure.
We apply the Watson standard for prejudice. (Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d
at p. 395.) Under this standard, we consider whether it is reasonably
probable that Strange would have obtained a more favorable result absent
the CSAAS evidence related to delayed disclosure. (See People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
Strange claims Ward implied that “if a person has that group of
[CSAAS] symptoms, then it is because they have been abused.” Thus, he
contends the CSAAS testimony prejudiced him by allowing the jury to
conclude “abuse must have occurred” here because “children who are sexually
abused delay reporting.”
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But evidence beyond the CSAAS testimony supported the jury’s finding
that Strange sexually abused Doe. As discussed above, Doe’s teammate saw
Strange with his hand up Doe’s shorts in a “sexual” manner. In addition,
Doe’s father testified about confronting Strange the day after Doe disclosed
what had been happening, during which time Strange never denied the
accusation that he was “having sex” with Doe and instead responded that he
“‘d[id]n’t know what’s wrong with [him].’” And years later, during a recorded
call when Doe spoke with Strange about him “having sex with [her] when
[she] was a kid” and touching her “in[]appropriately,” Strange did not deny
her account. Instead, he apologized profusely and admitted he “live[s] with
this guilt” and that he is an “awful person.” On this record, it is not
reasonably probable that Strange would have obtained a more favorable
verdict had the CSAAS evidence been excluded.
3.
Strange further argues that admitting the CSAAS evidence violated his
due process rights. This argument rests on his claim that CSAAS evidence
“falls prey to [a] syllogistic fallacy.” We discern no violation of his due
process rights on this basis.
“[I]ntroduction of CSAAS testimony does not by itself deny [an]
appellant due process.” (Patino, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 1747.)
According to Strange, the evidence presented an “incomplete
syllogism . . . that the delay in disclosure is caused by or related to the child
sexual abuse itself.” But Ward cautioned the jury that CSAAS “cannot be
used to diagnos[e] or determine whether or not sexual abuse occurred.” On
cross-examination, she confirmed that CSAAS should not be used to
determine if someone has been abused and emphasized that “[w]e can’t take
any of these behaviors[ to] try to diagnose or determine whether or not sexual
10
abuse occur[red].” To guide the jury, the court instructed that Ward’s CSAAS
testimony “is not evidence that the defendant committed any of the crimes
charged against him” and could be considered only in deciding if Doe’s
conduct “was consistent with the conduct of someone who has been molested,
and in evaluating the believability of the alleged victim.” (CALCRIM
No. 1193.) For the first time in reply, Strange argues CALCRIM No. 1193
“needs to be rewritten to make clear that CSAAS evidence is admissible only
to show that the alleged victim’s behavior is not inconsistent with having
been abused, not that it is consistent with being abused.” This belated
argument, however, is forfeited as untimely. (People v. Tully (2012)
54 Cal.4th 952, 1075.)
Under these circumstances, we conclude Ward’s testimony did not
violate Strange’s due process rights.
D.
Strange claims the prosecutor “made three improper arguments that
misled the jury” by (1) arguing witness testimony of Doe disclosing Strange’s
actions could be independent evidence for tolling purposes, (2) arguing Doe’s
testimony was “‘consistent’” with the CSAAS expert’s testimony, and
(3) paraphrasing a biblical interpretation Strange expressed on a recorded
call. The People argue Strange forfeited his prosecutorial misconduct claims
by failing to object during closing argument. We agree these claims are
forfeited.
Prosecutors are given wide but not unlimited latitude during argument.
(People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 289.) Their conduct crosses the line
to misconduct if it “‘either infects the trial with such unfairness as to render
the subsequent conviction a denial of due process[] or involves deceptive or
reprehensible methods employed to persuade the trier of fact.’” (Ibid.)
11
To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must
(1) timely object and (2) ask the trial court to admonish the jury to disregard
the improper argument. (People v. Choyce (2025) 18 Cal.5th 86, 114.) When
a defendant has let purported prosecutorial misconduct pass without
comment, to avoid forfeiture on appeal the defendant must show that
objecting would have been futile or an admonition would not have cured the
harm. (Ghobrial, 5 Cal.5th at p. 290.)
Strange does not assert he timely objected or sought the necessary
admonition for any of these prosecutorial misconduct claims. He relies on
two cases to try to avoid forfeiture without fully connecting those cases to the
one before us.
In People v. Alvarado (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1577, 1581, 1585, the
prosecutor improperly threw the prestige of her office behind the sole
eyewitness. The prosecution’s case “turned on [the witness’s] credibility,
making it too late for an admonition to unring the bell sounded by the
prosecutor’s improper attempt to bolster his credibility.” (Id. at p. 1586.)
Here, Strange fails to explain how the mention of the “fresh complaint”
evidence as related to the statute of limitations or the prosecutor’s
paraphrasing of Strange’s interpretation of the Bible improperly bolstered
the credibility of any witness. As for the CSAAS-related statements, we are
“unpersuaded by [Strange’s] conclusory assertion that no admonition could
have cured the prejudicial effect of the comments taken together.” (Ghobrial,
5 Cal.5th at p. 290.)
In People v. Kirkes (1952) 39 Cal.2d 719, 726, the prosecutor’s
comments, amounting to “flagrant misconduct,” “were interspersed
throughout the closing argument in such manner that their cumulative effect
was devastating”; thus, admonitions would not have cured their harmful
12
effect. Strange claims “the prosecutor’s improper remarks were similarly
interspersed throughout the closing argument” here. But without explaining
how they were cumulatively “devastating,” Strange has not persuaded us
that objecting and seeking to admonish the jury would have been futile here,
as is required to overcome forfeiture.
Accordingly, Strange has forfeited his prosecutorial misconduct claims.
E.
Strange contends he was deprived of a fair trial when the trial court
declined to remove Juror No. 8 for alleged misconduct. We discern no abuse
of discretion.
1.
During trial, Juror No. 8 asked if the proceedings would extend beyond
a certain date and revealed that her cousin had been killed, “and one of the
murderers [wa]s getting sentenced” on that date. Yet in a pretrial
questionnaire, Juror No. 8 had apparently responded “‘No’” when asked if she
“‘or a close friend or a relative [have] ever been a victim of violent crimes such
as murder, robbery, [domestic violence], sexual assault, [or] child abuse.’”
(Italics added.) Defense counsel requested the trial court ask Juror No. 8
about this discrepancy.
Juror No. 8 indicated she and her cousin were not close; he was a
“distant cousin” who she would see at family events, but “[h]e wasn’t really
around the family like that.” Her cousin had been murdered two years before
the trial in another county. Sometime after, Juror No. 8 moved in with the
deceased cousin’s father, her uncle.
Juror No. 8 agreed her answer to the questionnaire was “not accurate.”
She explained that she “didn’t think of” her cousin’s murder when completing
the questionnaire and that it “just passed [her] mind.” She denied being
13
intentionally untruthful. Juror No. 8 said she did not know a lot about the
case against her cousin’s murderer but rather only what her uncle told her.
According to Juror No. 8, she “[s]ometimes” did not think about the case until
her uncle informed her he was going to court for it. She reiterated that she
simply “didn’t think about [her cousin’s] case” when responding to the
questionnaire. Juror No. 8 confirmed that her cousin’s experience would not,
from her perspective, affect in any way her ability to be fair and impartial in
Strange’s case.
The trial court found Juror No. 8 credible. It concluded the inaccurate
response to the questionnaire was “inadvertent” with “no intent to deceive,”
and thus there was no evidence of concealment implicating any bias. The
court expressed it was “convinced” that Juror No. 8 “can be fair and
impartial.”
As a result, the court denied Strange’s motion for a mistrial based on
Juror No. 8’s alleged misconduct.
2.
A defendant has a constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury.
(People v. Wilson (2021) 11 Cal.5th 259, 309.) “If a juror actively conceals
factual information or falsifies voir dire responses, the process of selecting
jurors is undermined.” (Id. at p. 310.)
“In the case of unintentional failure to disclose, the trial court
evaluates whether a juror is so biased that they cannot perform the duties
required of them.” (Wilson, 11 Cal.5th at p. 310.) But “an honest mistake on
voir dire cannot disturb a judgment in the absence of proof that the juror’s
wrong or incomplete answer hid the juror’s actual bias.” (In re
Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 300.) “[T]he juror’s good faith when
14
answering voir dire questions is the most significant indicator that there was
no bias.” (Ibid.)
We review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s determinations of
whether a failure to disclose was intentional or resulted in juror bias.
(Wilson, 11 Cal.5th at p. 310.) When doing so, we defer to the trial court’s
related credibility determinations. (Ibid.)
3.
The People argue Strange forfeited this argument by failing to provide
record citations related to the alleged juror misconduct. California Rules of
Court rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) requires each brief to “[s]upport any reference to a
matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the
record where the matter appears.” Strange’s opening brief did not. Despite
this deficiency, we elect to reach the merits.
In his opening brief, Strange accuses Juror No. 8 of “lying” and argues
her “willingness to lie . . . reflected that the juror wanted to remain on this
case.” No evidence supports this contention. And it fails to address the trial
court’s findings that the lack of disclosure was inadvertent and that Juror
No. 8 was credible, both which are supported by substantial evidence. In
reply, Strange points to the relative recency of the cousin’s murder and
sentencing and claims the fact that Juror No. 8 currently lives with her
cousin’s father evidences “a reasonable probability of prejudice.” But he
offers no “proof that the juror’s wrong or incomplete answer hid the juror’s
actual bias,” so we will not disturb the judgment. (Hamilton, 20 Cal.4th at
p. 300.)
F.
Strange argues the trial court erred by prohibiting his expert from
testifying about Strange’s results on the Abel test, which assesses categories
15
of sexual interest, and thus deprived him of his rights to due process, present
a defense, and a fair trial. We disagree.
Once again, the People advocate for forfeiture based on Strange’s
failure to include procedural background or record citations on this topic. We
decline to apply forfeiture on that basis and instead review the admissibility
of the expert’s testimony for abuse of discretion. (McAlpin, 53 Cal.3d at
p. 1299.)
“The Abel test is never used to infer whether someone committed a
particular sex act; rather, it reveals which categories provoke persisting
sexual interest” by assessing how much time the test-taker spends on
“photographs of both genders, from preschoolers to adults, clad in bathing
suits.” (People v. Fortin (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 524, 532, fn. 2.)
Fortin excluded Abel test results in a criminal prosecution for the
molestation of two young girls. (Fortin, 12 Cal.App.5th at pp. 526-527.) It
observed that “California courts have yet to recognize that the Abel test may
be used in cases involving sex offenses against children,” as it “has not gained
acceptance as a way to prove or disprove an accused’s sexual interest in
children during the guilt phase of a criminal trial.” (Id. at pp. 532, 534.) The
expert in Fortin conceded several points that “undermine[d] the evidentiary
value of the Abel test,” including that “there is no way to avoid false
negatives and false positives” and the test can be thwarted multiple ways.
(Id. at pp. 532-533.)
Strange offers us no reason to depart from Fortin, which bound the
trial court. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450,
455.) At trial, defense counsel sought to permit an expert to testify about
Strange’s Abel test results based on his and the expert’s “understanding” that
the Abel test is “accepted in the community.” But our record lacks any
16
evidence underpinning that “understanding,” and on appeal Strange fails to
explain how the Abel test has overcome the infirmities identified in Fortin.
Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding this evidence.
As for Strange’s claim that excluding the Abel test violated his
constitutional rights, it is both forfeited and without merit. Strange
“forfeited his constitutional claims by failing to object on these grounds at
trial.” (People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1196, fn. 6.) In any event,
“[w]hen expert evidence is excluded because it fails to meet foundational
requirements, no federal constitutional violation occurs.” (Fortin,
12 Cal.App.5th at p. 534.)
G.
Lastly, Strange contends the cumulative effect of these asserted errors
“irreparably prejudiced his constitutional right to a fair trial.” “[A] series of
trial errors, though independently harmless, may in some circumstances rise
by accretion to the level of reversible and prejudicial error.” (People v.
Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 844.) Such is not the case here, as the lone
assumed error was harmless. (Accord People v. Martinez (2003) 31 Cal.4th
673, 697.)
III.
We affirm.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
KELETY, Acting P. J.
RUBIN, J.
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