CourtListener 10869077•M.O. v. Superior Court CA2/8
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Filed 6/1/26 M.O. v. Superior Court CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
M.O., B352052
Petitioner, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP02799C)
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS
ANGELES COUNTY,
Respondent,
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. Linda Sun,
Judge. Petition denied.
Los Angeles Dependency Lawyers, Michael Hefty; Law
Office of Martin Lee and Martin Lee for Petitioner.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Willam D. Thetford, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
The Children’s Law Center of Los Angeles, Liz Lopez and
Etty Shalev for Minor.
_________________________________
INTRODUCTION
M.O. (Mother) filed a writ petition to challenge the trial
court’s finding that DCFS provided her reasonable services before
setting a permanency planning hearing under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26.1 Mother argues that the
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS) was obligated to assist her in securing a psychiatric
evaluation. We deny the petition because, among other reasons,
Mother successfully objected to the inclusion of any psychiatric
evaluation in her case plan and the psychologist did not
recommend adding a psychiatric evaluation to Mother’s
reunification plan.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Dependency proceedings
Mother has three children. Her two older children were 13-
month-old twins with open dependency cases when this case
began. Elena O. is the subject of this writ, and she was one-
week-old when DCFS filed this dependency petition. On May 28,
2025, DCFS’s petition alleged that (1) Elena was born with a
positive toxicology for marijuana, (2) Mother’s abuse of alcohol
and marijuana endangered Elena, (3) Mother’s mental and
1 All further undesignated statutory citations are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
emotional problems placed Elena at risk, and (4) Mother
physically assaulted the maternal grandparents in the presence
of Elena’s two siblings. In the detention report, DCFS reported
that Mother was noncompliant with her case plan in the cases for
Elena’s siblings. In the same report, Mother stated she recently
met with a “psychiatrist [to] do a psychological assessment.”
At the initial hearing, the trial court detained Elena from Mother
and found that the father was unknown.
In the jurisdictional report in this case, a social worker in
the siblings’ case stated that Mother had not completed her “730
psychiatric evaluation” with “Dr. Gonzalez,” and Mother had
canceled her appointments for the evaluation. The social worker
also stated that Mother’s appointment had been rescheduled
several times, but was currently scheduled for June 27, 2025.
Dr. Inez Gonzalez completed the evaluation on the June date,
and she is a clinical psychologist with a Ph.D. She is not a
medical doctor or psychiatrist capable of prescribing psychiatric
medication. To avoid ambiguity about her profession, we refer to
Inez Gonzalez as a psychologist rather than a doctor, while
acknowledging that she has a doctorate and the parties are
correct to define her title as “Dr.”
Regarding communication with Mother, Mother did not
speak to or meet with the social worker to discuss the petition
prior to the jurisdictional report. DCFS had some text
correspondence with Mother, but according to DCFS, she “does
not respond right away, as such texts have been limited to one a
day.” In addition, Mother only visited Elena once prior to the
filing of the jurisdictional report.
In a last minute report prior to the jurisdictional hearing,
the social worker charged with assisting Mother with services
3
stated she texted Mother multiple times, but she was unable to
meet with Mother. One meeting was set, but the social worker
canceled it due to a medical emergency. Thereafter, the services
social worker met with Mother, and the social worker concluded
that Mother was struggling with her mental health. The meeting
was brief because Mother had a difficult time discussing the case.
On July 17, 2025, the trial court sustained allegations that
Mother’s substance abuse endangered Elena under section 300,
subdivisions (b) and (j), and Mother’s mental and emotional
problems endangered Elena under section 300, subdivision (j).
Then, the trial court removed Elena from Mother’s custody.
In the siblings’ case, the trial court ordered a case plan
which included a drug and alcohol program with aftercare,
weekly drug testing, a parenting course, a psychiatric evaluation,
an order to take recommended psychotropic drugs, and individual
counseling.2 During reunification in the siblings’ case, the trial
court ordered a psychological evaluation, asking the psychologist
for a “Psychological evaluation of mother to determine mental
health issues and/or diagnosis” among other issues. The
psychiatric evaluation did not take place in the siblings’ case, and
the parties do not necessarily agree on the reason why this
occurred.3
2 We grant the unopposed request for judicial notice for the
trial court’s order appointing an expert. (Evid. Code, § 452,
subds. (c) & (d).)
3 In their reply brief, DCFS claims the trial court “changed”
the order from a psychiatric evaluation to a psychological
evaluation. At argument for the dispositional hearing, Mother’s
4
For the case plan in Elena’s case, DCFS recommended that
the trial court order a drug and alcohol program with aftercare,
weekly drug testing, a psychiatric assessment, an order to take
appropriate medication, and individual counseling. During the
dispositional hearing, Mother’s counsel objected to a psychiatric
evaluation while noting that a psychological evaluation was
about to take place for Mother in the siblings’ case. Mother’s
counsel elaborated, “In the sibling’s case, the department had
suggested that we use Dr. Inez Gonzalez who is a psychologist
due to the difficulty and near impossibility of locating a
psychiatrist. So … the record is clear, I would ask that the box be
marked for psychological assessment and not psychiatric.”
In response, the trial court ruled, “All right, I will do that.”
At the dispositional hearing, the trial court ordered Mother
to complete a drug and alcohol program with aftercare, weekly
drug testing, a parenting program, a psychological assessment
with an order to take all prescribed medication, and individual
counseling. The trial court did not order a psychiatric evaluation.
In addition, Mother was to get credit for any services completed
in the siblings’ cases.
For the six-month review status report, DCFS attached
psychologist Gonzalez’s entire evaluation. The psychologist
concluded that Mother’s diagnosis was Unspecified Mood
Disorder, which was a provisional diagnosis. She stated Mother
“would benefit from ongoing individual therapy with a licensed
counsel argued that DCFS suggested the change from a
psychiatric evaluation to a psychological one. We need not reach
the question of whether this change was done at the trial court’s
order, DCFS’s recommendation, or for some other reason.
5
mental health provider,” a “trauma-informed approach is
recommended,” and “[t]herapy should also include evidence-based
family therapy.” For other services, Gonzalez stated, “[c]ontinued
participation in substance abuse treatment and maintenance of
sobriety is advised.” Gonzalez also wrote that a psychiatric
evaluation “should be considered to determine whether
psychotropic medication could support mood stability.” In
addition, Gonzales noted that Mother “does not currently present
with acute mental health problems.” DCFS included a heading
regarding Mother’s progress on her case plan entitled, “Mental
Health Counseling: Psychological Assessment, Psychiatric
Evaluation.” Under this heading, DCFS noted that the
psychologist’s report provided that a “psychiatric evaluation
should be considered.”
In the same status report filed on December 17, 2025, the
social worker noted that since July 2025, Mother refused to speak
with social workers to discuss her case plan and visitation.
During their limited communications, Mother did state she was
uncomfortable with the social worker who assisted her with her
case plan. In response, DCFS assigned a different social worker
for Mother, but communication between DCFS and Mother was
still quite limited after the change. Mother told DCFS she would
not answer phone calls from them, and this was largely true.
Consequently, DCFS reported that Mother “has not made herself
available” during this period.
In the same report, DCFS summarized Mother’s progress
on her case plan. Regarding the drug program, Mother began
treatment in January 2025, but was discharged in April 2025
because she did not participate in individual therapy, group
therapy, the twelve-step program, or aftercare. While she
6
reenrolled in another outpatient drug program in July 2025, her
participation was inconsistent. For example, during November
2025, Mother came to the drug treatment program only once.
Mother tested positive for marijuana nine times, she missed five
drug tests, and she tested negative six times. Mother enrolled in
weekly individual and group therapy in October 2025, and she
remained enrolled in the program at the time of the report. In
addition, a service provider told DCFS that Mother did not say
she needed mental health services, but after talking to DCFS, the
service provider would connect Mother to these services.
Regarding other aspects of her case plan, Mother completed her
parenting program, participated in her psychological assessment,
and based on Mother’s statements in the record, she was not
prescribed any psychotropic medications. Over this period,
Mother visited Elena three times.
On December 7, 2025, in DCFS’s last minute report,
Elena’s caregiver who was also a paternal aunt to the siblings
reported she learned from the sibling’s paternal grandparents
that Mother was intoxicated when she arrived at the sibling’s
paternal grandparents’ home. Mother struck a relative, got
undressed, and was taken to a hospital. According to the
paternal grandfather of the siblings, Mother was intoxicated
when she arrived at his home. Mother stayed for a few minutes
when he and the father of siblings drove Mother to the home of
the great-grandparents of the siblings. Mother was unconscious
during the drive and did not hit anyone. According to the
paternal grandmother of the siblings, Mother was intoxicated
when she arrived at the paternal grandmother’s house. The
siblings’ father and grandfather then took Mother to the siblings’
great-grandparent’s house. Although the paternal grandmother
7
was not present, she said Mother was so intoxicated that she did
not know who she was when she arrived at the siblings’ paternal
great-grandparent’s house. She then took off her clothes, and the
paramedics took her to a psychiatric hospital. According to the
paternal great-grandmother of the siblings, Mother arrived at her
home incoherent before she was taken to a hospital. According to
Mother, there was no altercation, but she did not respond to
questions about whether she went to the house of the siblings’
father. According to the father of the siblings, he said he had no
knowledge of Mother coming to the house. The same paternal
aunt of the siblings who made the initial report also said that the
father of the siblings called her and was upset she told minor’s
attorney about the incident and asked her to change the story.
In the service log reflecting DCFS’s contact with Mother, in
July 2025, the social worker told Mother that she should
participate in the siblings’ case plan, which “included a 730
Psychiatrist Evaluation.”
The trial court found that Mother was not in substantial
compliance with her case plan, terminated Mother’s family
reunification services regarding Elena, and set a hearing under
section 366.26 for permanency planning. The court found that
DCFS provided reasonable services to Mother. The trial court
noted that Mother was receiving services for over 18 months
because she was also in services for the siblings’ case, and further
reasoned that she found reasonable services in the siblings’ case.
The trial court also noted that the psychologist “recommended” a
psychiatric evaluation, “which the court also ordered.”
Mother filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition on
January 29, 2026.
8
DISCUSSION
Mother primarily argues that DCFS should have facilitated
a psychiatric evaluation, but the trial court excluded a
psychiatric evaluation from Mother’s case plan after Mother
objected to it. Mother also points to Mother’s psychological
evaluation where the psychologist stated that a psychiatric
evaluation “should be considered,” but that statement falls short
of a full-throated recommendation and was made in the context of
the psychologist’s conclusion that Mother did not present with
acute mental health problems. Finally, DCFS attempted to
speak to Mother to assist her in accessing appropriate services,
but Mother refused to speak to the social workers. Based on this
record, we find substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
finding that DCFS provided reasonable services as social worker.
1. Writ and reasonable services principles
Under section 366.26, subdivision (l), an extraordinary writ
is a proper vehicle to challenge an order setting a hearing under
section 366.26, where a parent’s parental rights could be
terminated. Consistent with the statutory scheme, we determine
this writ petition on the merits. (Id., subd. (l)(4)(A).)
At the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court
determines “by clear and convincing evidence whether reasonable
services that were designed to aid the parent … in overcoming
the problems that led to the initial removal and the continued
custody of the child have been provided or offered to the parent.”
(§ 366.21, subds. (e)(8), (f)(1)(A).) “To support a finding that
reasonable services were offered or provided … ‘the record should
show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading
to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those
problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during
9
the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to
assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult.’ ”
(In re A.G. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 994, 1001.) The agency “must
make a ‘ “ ‘good faith effort’ ” ’ … to provide reasonable
reunification services in spite of difficulties in doing so or the
prospects of success.” (In re Taylor J. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th
1446, 1451.) However, the standard is not whether the services
“ ‘were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but
whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.’ ”
(In re J.E. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 557, 566.) We review the juvenile
court’s reasonable services finding for substantial evidence.
(In re J.P. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 616, 624.)
2. The trial court’s reasonable services finding is
supported by substantial evidence
Mother primarily argues that DCFS did not provide
reasonable services to Mother because DCFS did not assist in
securing a psychiatric assessment for Mother. However, we
initially note that Mother’s case plan did not include a psychiatric
assessment because Mother successfully objected to the
psychiatric assessment at the dispositional hearing. As a result,
the trial court ordered a psychiatric assessment in the siblings’
case, but not in Elena’s. We must measure DCFS’s efforts
against the circumstances of each case, and here the trial court
initially concluded a psychiatric assessment was unnecessary.
(Armando L. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 549, 554.)
Thus, DCFS can hardly be faulted with failing to assist in
securing a psychiatric assessment for Mother when Mother’s
successful objection resulted in the trial court excluding it from
her case plan.
10
Mother also argues the psychologist evaluating Mother
“recommended” a psychiatric evaluation. However, the record
does not support this claim. Rather, the psychologist stated that
a psychiatric evaluation should be “considered.” Here, the
psychologist’s permissive language falls short of a
recommendation. In contrast, the psychologist made a series of
recommendations for Mother’s reunification plan, particularly
her therapy. Psychologist Gonzalez stated Mother “would
benefit” from individual therapy, a trauma informed approach “is
recommended,” and therapy “should also include” family therapy.
Regarding other services, Gonzalez stated a drug treatment
program “is advised.”
Mother relies on In re K.C. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 323, but
that case is distinguishable for some of the reasons we have
already discussed. There, with some caveats, a psychologist
made a preliminary diagnosis of the father with “mood disorder
with obsessive-compulsive features” and “[p]aranoid [p]ersonality
[d]isorder,” among other diagnoses. (Id. at p. 326.) The
psychologist went on to say that “[s]ervices that ‘should be offered
to treat the diagnosis’ included ‘[m]edication and therapeutic
management through psychotropic evaluation and treatment for
possible mood and thought disorder.’ ” (Ibid.) While the social
worker coached and assisted the father in visiting a public
mental health service provider three times, including by
recruiting father’s therapist to accompany the father on a visit,
the provider continually turned the father away for services. (Id.
at p. 327.) There, the social worker did not assist the father in
accessing other potential mental health service providers, and
the Sixth District found no substantial evidence supported the
trial court’s reasonable services finding. (Id. at p. 329.) K.C.
11
presents different facts from those here. Most importantly, the
psychologist in K.C. recommended a psychotropic evaluation,
while the psychologist here did not.
Mother also cites to Patricia W. v. Superior Court (2016)
244 Cal.App.4th 397, but that case is also distinguishable. There,
the mother “experienced a relapse of schizophrenic episodes that
involved violent hallucinations of harming and killing their
child.” (Id. at p. 401.) In that case, there was “no evidence the
agency offered services to either parent designed to help them
improve mother’s ability to take her medication as prescribed.”
(Ibid.) Our case is not analogous, as the psychologist here
concluded Mother “does not currently present with acute mental
health problems.” Moreover, DCFS did secure a psychological
evaluation of Mother, and did connect her with services to
address her substance abuse.
In reply, Mother also argues that DCFS mistakenly
believed that Mother’s case plan in Elena’s case included a
psychiatric evaluation. This argument finds no support in the
record. Rather, DCFS merely told Mother that she was ordered
to complete a psychiatric evaluation in the siblings’ case, which
appears to be an accurate statement. In addition, Mother
selectively cites the jurisdictional report and a heading in the
report to argue that DCFS understood that the trial court
ordered a psychiatric evaluation in this case. However, when
read in context, DCFS correctly noted that the psychologist said
that a psychiatric evaluation should be “considered” and does not
say that the trial court ordered one in this case. Mother also
notes that the trial court stated that it “ordered” a psychiatric
evaluation for Mother, but this is a factually correct statement as
the trial court did make that order, albeit in the siblings’ case.
12
Moreover, to the extent there is some imprecision in the record
between psychiatric and psychological evaluations, the only
evaluation ordered in this case was a psychological one, and that
evaluation took place.
Finally, DCFS largely connected Mother to services, but
Mother did not complete them. As an initial matter, the
psychological evaluation took place despite Mother cancelling
various appointments. In addition, Mother made it difficult for
DCFS to communicate with her by refusing to speak via phone
and frequently neglecting to respond to text messages. Further,
when Mother articulated that she was uncomfortable with a
social worker, DCFS selected a different social worker to connect
Mother to services. However, after the change in social workers,
Mother still did not communicate with DCFS. On this record, the
trial court’s finding that DCFS provided reasonable services is
supported by substantial evidence.
DISPOSITION
The petition is denied.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.
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