CourtListener 10869061•People v. Stratton CA2/6
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Filed 6/1/26 P. v. Stratton CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B346327
(Super. Ct. No. 24LBCF00917)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)
v.
TED MARLON STRATTON,
Defendant and Appellant.
Ted Marlon Stratton appeals from the judgment after a
jury convicted him of second degree burglary (Pen. Code,1 § 459;
count 1), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count
2), resisting an executive officer (§ 69; count 3), and criminal
threats (§ 422, subd. (a); count 4). Stratton was sentenced to five
years in state prison, including a principal term of three years for
count 2, and subordinate consecutive eight-month sentences for
each remaining count. Stratton contends the trial court erred by
1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
not staying his sentence for either assault with a deadly weapon
or criminal threats pursuant to section 654. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In July 2024, Stratton used an object to break a glass
window of a storeroom of an apartment complex. He took two
bicycles from inside the storeroom and walked them toward a gas
station across the street. The apartment’s security officer Dellon
Belisle responded to a call to the storeroom. A woman told
Belisle, “He’s right there,” indicating that Stratton, who was
across the street, took the bicycles.
Belisle crossed the street to retrieve the bicycles. When
Belisle took the bicycles from Stratton, Stratton made “life-
threatening statements.” He said that he was going to hurt
Belisle and asked if he wanted to “get stabbed over” the bicycles.
Belisle took these threats seriously, was afraid of Stratton, and
placed the bicycles between him and Stratton to create distance.
Belisle began to walk back across the street with the bicycles
when Stratton pulled out a knife, pulled a bicycle toward him,
and made threats to Belisle while “advancing towards” him. At
one point, Belisle was turned toward Stratton when Stratton
lunged toward Belisle while holding the knife. Stratton was
about an “arm’s distance” away and close enough to stab Belisle.
Belisle said he was scared for his life. The video of this
interaction was presented to the jury.
A police officer arrived on scene and gave Stratton
commands, which he ignored. Stratton threw the knife to the
ground. The officer tackled Stratton because of his
noncompliance, and Stratton physically “resist[ed].” Stratton
was eventually handcuffed and taken into custody.
2
The jury found Stratton guilty of all four counts. As to the
criminal threats offense (count 4), the jury found Stratton
personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (a knife).
(§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).)
At sentencing, the trial court sentenced Stratton to a total
of five years, consisting of the midterm of three years for assault
with a deadly weapon and consecutive eight-month terms (one-
third the midterm) for each remaining count. The court stayed
the one-year weapons enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) on
count 4 pursuant to section 654.
DISCUSSION
Stratton contends the sentence for either assault with a
deadly weapon or criminal threats should have been stayed
pursuant to section 654. We disagree.
Section 654, subdivision (a) provides that an “act or
omission that is punishable in different ways by different
provisions of law may be punished under either of such
provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished
under more than one provision.”
“Section 654 precludes multiple punishments for a single
act or indivisible course of conduct.” (People v. Hester (2000) 22
Cal.4th 290, 294.) “ ‘ “ ‘Whether a course of criminal conduct is
divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the
meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the
actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the
defendant may [not] be punished . . . for more than one.’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 354.) “If, on the other
hand, defendant harbored ‘multiple criminal objectives,’ which
were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he
may be punished for each statutory violation committed in
3
pursuit of each objective, ‘even though the violations shared
common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of
conduct.’ ” (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335
(Harrison).)
“[A] course of conduct divisible in time, although directed to
one objective, may give rise to multiple violations and
punishment.” (People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639, fn. 11.)
“This is particularly so where the offenses are temporally
separated in such a way as to afford the defendant opportunity to
reflect and to renew his or her intent before committing the next
one.” (People v. Gaio (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 919, 935; People v.
Kwok (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1255; see also People v. Trotter
(1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 363, 368 (Trotter) [three gunshots were
considered separate assaults because each shot was “volitional
and calculated, and were separated by periods of time” during
which reflection was possible].)
“When a trial court sentences a defendant to separate
terms without making an express finding the defendant
entertained separate objectives, the trial court is deemed to have
made an implied finding each offense had a separate objective.”
(People v. Islas (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 116, 129.)
“The question whether section 654 is factually applicable to
a given series of offenses is for the trial court, and the law gives
the trial court broad latitude in making this determination. Its
findings on this question must be upheld on appeal if there is any
substantial evidence to support them.” (People v. Hutchins (2001)
90 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1312.) Thus, we must view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the judgment and presume the
existence of every fact to support it that is reasonably deduced
from the evidence. (Id. at pp. 1312–1313.)
4
We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
implied finding that Stratton harbored separative objectives and
intents when he assaulted and also threatened Belisle. A person
commits a criminal threat when they “willfully threaten[] to
commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury
. . . with the specific intent that the statement . . . is to be taken
as a threat . . . and thereby causes that person reasonably to be in
sustained fear for their own safety.” (§ 422, subd. (a).) A person
commits assault with a deadly weapon when they make an
“unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a
violent injury” with a deadly weapon other than a firearm.
(§§ 240, 245, subd. (a)(1).)
Here, Belisle’s testimony and a video of the incident reflects
Stratton made “life-threatening” statements and told Belisle he
was going to hurt him. About 30 seconds after the threats began,
Stratton took out a knife while continuing to make the “life-
threatening” statements. Belisle testified that thereafter,
Stratton “lunged” toward him with the knife, and that he was
about an “arm’s distance” away and close enough to stab Belisle.
The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
judgment, reflects two separate acts separated in time—(1)
threatening to stab or hurt Belisle and (2) lunging toward Belisle
with the knife. There is about a minute in between when
Stratton’s threats began and when Stratton lunged toward him
with a knife. A minute is sufficient time for a person to reflect
and renew their intent to commit another offense. (Trotter,
supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 368 [one minute between gunshots was
sufficient period of time during which reflection was possible].)
In re Raymundo M. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 78, is
instructive. There, the court held that the trial court “could
5
reasonably have found that [the juvenile] committed the assault
with the objective of inflicting physical harm on [the victim],
whereas [the juvenile] criminally threatened [the victim] with the
separate objective of inflicting mental or emotional harm.” (Id. at
p. 95.) As the Raymundo M. court observed, “[c]ourts routinely
recognize similar distinctions.” (Ibid., citing to People v. Mejia
(2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1047; People v. Solis (2001) 90
Cal.App.4th 1002, 1022; People v. Louie (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th
388, 398; People v. Phan (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1466; People
v. Tom (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 250, 261.)
Similarly, we conclude that Stratton’s “assault and
criminal-threat counts arose from separate conduct that the
[trial] court could reasonably have concluded were undertaken
pursuant to separate objectives.” (Raymundo M., supra, 52
Cal.App.5th at p. 95.) The trial court could have reasonably
found that when Stratton threatened Belisle, he intended to
instill fear into him and cause him emotional or mental harm.
And when Stratton assaulted Belisle with a knife, he intended to
cause him physical harm. (Ibid.) Thus, the trial court could have
reasonably found that Stratton’s objectives in threatening and
assaulting Belisle were independent of, and not merely incidental
to, each other. (Harrison, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 335.) We
therefore conclude the trial court did not err by not staying the
sentence for either the assault or the criminal threats count
under section 654.
We do not interpret the trial court’s stay of the weapons
enhancement on the criminal threats conviction or the
prosecutor’s statement acknowledging the stay as indication that
the court found the assault and criminal threats offense to be an
6
indivisible course of conduct.2 In our view, the trial court’s
decision to stay the one-year weapons enhancement on count 4
does not mean the trial court necessarily found the assault and
criminal threat to be committed pursuant to the same objective.
The court could reasonably find the intent and objective behind
the criminal threats (instilling fear) separate from the intent and
objective behind the assault (physical harm) while staying a
punishment for the use of a weapon common to both offenses.
(See, e.g., People v. Wynn (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1218–
1221 [defendant properly sentenced to consecutive sentences for
burglary and assault convictions even though weapons
enhancement on burglary count stayed].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J. CODY, J.
2 Stratton raises an argument regarding the refusal of an
unanimity instruction for the first time in the reply brief. This
argument is forfeited because it was not raised in the opening
brief. (People v. Clayburg (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 86, 93.)
7
James D. Otto, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Nicole Kronberg, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Megan A. Banke, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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