Strait v. Compass Group USA CA2/6

CourtListener 10869024CalctappJun 2, 2026

Full text

Filed 6/2/26 Strait v. Compass Group USA CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

LISA SUNNY STRAIT, 2d Civ. No. B346819
(Super. Ct. No.
Plaintiff and Respondent,
2024CUWT025279)
(Ventura County)
v.

COMPASS GROUP USA, INC.
et al.,
Defendants and
Appellants.

Compass Group USA, Inc., Bon Appétit Management
Company Foundation, Bon Appétit Management Co. (BAMCO),
Richard Maxwell, and Logan De’Bone, collectively appellants,
appeal from the denial of their motion to compel arbitration.
The trial court found appellants failed to establish that
respondent Lisa Sunny Strait electronically signed an arbitration
agreement when BAMCO hired her. Because appellants failed to
carry their burden of proof and the court did not abuse its
discretion in declining an evidentiary hearing, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
BAMCO is a wholly owned subsidiary of Compass Group
USA, Inc. and provides food-service management in thirty-two
states. Strait applied for a position with BAMCO on August 17,
2022.
BAMCO requires new hires to use “PeopleHub,” a secure
online portal, to complete “onboarding” documents including an
arbitration agreement. Under that system, each applicant
creates a unique username and password and must re-enter that
password before electronically signing any document. BAMCO
cannot access the employee’s username or password once the
account is created, according to BAMCO’s Operations Manager,
Sandy Bailey. The system maintains an audit log of every user
action with precise timestamps and generates a signed portable
document format (PDF) document upon execution. According to
Bailey, Strait received a unique onboarding hyperlink on August
30, 2022, at 8:50 a.m., and the audit log reflects that she
electronically signed the arbitration agreement at 10:03 a.m. that
morning.
Strait claims never to have signed the arbitration
agreement. She declares that her supervisor, Richard Maxwell,
provided her with login credentials that did not work, then called
her into his office. Maxwell logged in and completed the
onboarding paperwork while Strait sat in his office. Maxwell told
her the documents would be provided to her later. They never
were. Strait said she had no opportunity to see or review the
arbitration agreement.
Maxwell acknowledged that he “sat down with [Strait] in
[his] office to complete her onboarding,” something he does “with
many new hires.” He asserted in general terms that he did not

2
execute any documents on Strait’s behalf. Maxwell did not claim
that Strait operated the computer during that session or that she
entered her credentials and electronically signed the arbitration
agreement. Appellants did not produce any evidence identifying
the device or internet protocol (IP) address used to execute the
onboarding documents.
The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration. It
found that the documents were executed in Maxwell’s office on
his computer, which “raises the possibility that someone other
than Plaintiff executed the documents, even though Plaintiff’s
login credentials had been used.” The court further noted that
appellants had not identified the IP address of the computer used
or provided evidence the agreement was ever sent to Strait. The
court denied appellants’ request for an evidentiary hearing,
finding they had “not proffered sufficient evidence to establish a
sharply conflicting factual account” and that a hearing “would not
serve to resolve a disparity between the accounts but would
permit supplementation of evidence of the moving party’s
version.”
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
Appellants argue they carried their burden of establishing,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that Strait signed the
arbitration agreement. They also contend that, at the very least,
the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing instead of
deciding the issue on the papers. We review those two
arguments under different standards of review.
We review the trial court’s ruling that appellants failed to
carry their burden of proving Strait signed the agreement only to
determine whether appellants’ evidence was “ ‘ “ ‘(1)

3
“uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character
and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that
it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ” ’ ” (Garcia v.
Stoneledge Furniture LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 41, 52
(Garcia); Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72
Cal.App.5th 158, 166 (Gamboa).) As Gamboa recognizes, it is
“ ‘ “ ‘almost impossible’ ” ’ ” for the party bearing the burden of
proof to obtain reversal of a contrary finding. (Gamboa, at p.
166.)
We review the trial court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing
for abuse of discretion. (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin.
Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 414 (Rosenthal).)
II. Appellants failed to establish Strait executed the arbitration
agreement
An electronic signature may authenticate a contract if the
proponent establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence,
security procedures linking the signature to the signatory. (Civ.
Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a); Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc.
(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 844 (Ruiz).) A bare representation
that the document bears the employee’s signature is insufficient.
(Id. at p. 843.) The proponent must show that the signature was
affixed through the act of the employee and, critically, that it
could only have been affixed by the employee. (Garcia, supra,
102 Cal.App.5th at p. 53; Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 844.)
Appellants described PeopleHub’s security procedures in
detail, including the requirements for unique credentials,
password re-entry before signing, audit logs, and the employer’s
inability to access employee accounts.
Appellants did not, however, refute Strait’s declaration that
she did not enter those credentials on August 30, 2022, in

4
Maxwell’s office. Strait declared the login credentials Maxwell
provided to her did not work, Maxwell then requested she come
to his office to complete the application, and he signed the
documents for her on his own computer while she stood nearby.
Strait declared that she did not sign the arbitration agreement.
In his declaration, Maxwell confirms that he sat with Strait
in his office to complete her onboarding. He says nothing,
however, about how his computer was used to access Strait’s
employee portal to review and sign the documents. Maxwell does
not state whether Strait entered her own login credentials or
whether she provided her credentials to him and authorized him
to use them. He does not explain who operated the computer or
navigated through the documents when Strait was in his office.
And he says nothing about witnessing Strait sign the arbitration
agreement in his office.
Maxwell asserts that he reviewed with Strait “all
onboarding policies she signed, including the Company’s
Arbitration Agreement.” He does not, however, refute Strait’s
assertion that she could not access the portal and that he
completed the onboarding for her on his own computer while she
stood nearby. Nor does he claim she ever authorized him to sign
on her behalf. In other words, he does not explain how he had
personal knowledge that Strait signed the arbitration agreement.
Appellants argue that Strait’s credentials were created on
August 17, 2022, before any contact with Maxwell, which
establishes that Strait and only Strait could have created the
account. While that may be true, the question is not who created
the account. It is who used the account to sign the arbitration
agreement on August 30, 2022.

5
Appellants argued at the hearing that other documents
Strait completed at the same time, required personal information
only she could supply. They claimed this confirms she was
actively participating in the process. But counsel did not support
this argument with admissible evidence in a sworn declaration.
Appellants’ evidence does not meet Strait’s sworn account that
Maxwell completed everything.
The absence of device-identifying evidence is also
significant. Appellants did not offer any evidence of the IP
address or device from which the alleged arbitration agreement
was executed despite having access to PeopleHub’s audit logs,
which Bailey described as recording “every user action.” They
chose not to submit any such device-identifying data. The trial
court cited this omission as one basis for its ruling. We agree it is
a meaningful gap in appellants’ evidence.
The evidentiary gap is not limited to device-identifying
data. PeopleHub generates a signed PDF upon execution, but
appellants submitted no evidence that any such PDF was
delivered to Strait’s email address or otherwise provided to her.
Strait declared she never received any onboarding documents
and was never afforded an opportunity to review the arbitration
agreement.
If Strait had personally navigated through PeopleHub and
executed the agreement, the natural expectation, consistent with
Bailey’s description of the system, is that she would have
received a copy. Appellants’ failure to produce any evidence of
transmission is therefore consistent with Strait’s account that
she was not present at the keyboard and did not personally
complete the process.

6
Appellants failed to produce evidence establishing that it
was Strait, and only Strait, who could have placed the electronic
signature on the document, as Garcia and Ruiz require. (Garcia,
supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 53; Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at
p. 844.) The trial court’s finding that appellants failed to carry
their burden is amply supported by the record.
Further, Strait’s declaration directly contradicted the
inference appellants sought to draw from the audit log, and
Maxwell’s admissions corroborated her account of the physical
setting. Because appellants’ evidence was therefore neither
uncontradicted nor unimpeached, the Garcia/Gamboa standard
forecloses reversal. (See Garcia, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 52;
Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.)
III. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold
an evidentiary hearing
Appellants assert they were entitled to an evidentiary
hearing as a matter of law. They were not.
A trial court may – but is not required to – hold an
evidentiary hearing on a petition to compel arbitration.
(Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 414; accord Garcia, supra, 102
Cal.App.5th at p. 54.) Oral testimony is the “better course” when
enforceability turns on “sharply conflicting factual accounts,” but
“there is simply no authority for the proposition that a trial court
necessarily abuses its discretion, in a motion proceeding, by
resolving evidentiary conflicts without hearing live testimony.”
(Rosenthal, at p. 414.)
Here, the trial court found that appellants had “not
proffered sufficient evidence to establish a sharply conflicting
factual account” and that a hearing “would not serve to resolve a
disparity between the accounts but would permit

7
supplementation of evidence of the moving party’s version.” We
agree.
Appellants characterize the dispute as a credibility contest
between Strait’s declaration and those of Bailey and Maxwell.
Bailey, however, was not present during Strait’s onboarding and
would not have been able to refute Strait’s account in an
evidentiary hearing. (See Garcia, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p.
52.) Maxwell’s declaration does not refute the core of Strait’s
account. He agrees that he was present in his office with Strait
to complete her onboarding, but he does not explain the specifics
or even assert that he witnessed Strait sign the arbitration
agreement. Maxwell’s assertion that he does not execute
documents for employees, and did not do so for Strait, does not
deal with the specifics in Strait’s declaration.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
live testimony restating Maxwell’s general denials would not
have resolved the central issue about who operated the computer
in his office that morning to electronically sign the arbitration
agreement.
Appellants’ reliance on Ashburn v. AIG Financial Advisors,
Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 79 (Ashburn) and Hotels Nevada,
LLC v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 754
(Hotels Nevada) is misplaced. In Ashburn, the trial court
compelled arbitration without holding a hearing and without
meaningfully engaging with the evidence; a problem not present
here. (Ashburn, at pp. 95–98.) In Hotels Nevada, the trial court
implicitly determined that a hearing was necessary, then denied
the motion without holding one. (Hotels Nevada, at pp. 758, 763–
764.) Neither case supports the proposition that the moving
party is entitled to a hearing simply by requesting it.

8
The trial court here considered the evidence, engaged with
the factual dispute, and reasonably concluded a hearing would
not resolve it. That is a permissible exercise of discretion under
Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th 394 and Garcia, supra, 102
Cal.App.5th 41.
DISPOSITION
The order denying appellants’ motion to compel arbitration
is affirmed. Costs are awarded to respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

VAN ROOYEN, J.*

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

CODY, J.

* Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court,

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

9
Benjamin F. Coats, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura
_________________________

Fisher & Phillips LLP, Lonnie D. Giamela and Tristy
Rashtian for Defendants and Appellants.
Bordin Semmer LLP, Joshua Bordin-Wosk, Benjamin A.
Sampson, and Joseline Sanchez Moreno for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.