People v. Wright CA2/1

CourtListener 10866392CalctappMay 29, 2026

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Filed 5/29/26 P. v. Wright CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B336101

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA133084)
v.

DERRICK DESHAE WRIGHT,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, David C. Brougham, Judge. Vacated in
part, affirmed in part, and remanded with directions.
Correen Ferrentino, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez, Michael C. Keller and Viet H.
Nguyen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
Defendant Derrick Deshae Wright was convicted at a court
trial on two counts of failure to update annually his sex offender
registration within five working days of his birthday (i.e.,
July 21) in 2021 and 2022, in violation of Penal Code1
section 290.012. Wright’s obligation to register as a sex offender
for life arises from his 1991 conviction for sodomy by force, in
violation of section 286, subdivision (c).
On appeal, Wright raises the following claims: (1) The trial
court erred in admitting an inculpatory post-arrest statement
Wright had made because the record does not disclose the
contents of the Miranda2 advisements the interviewing detective
gave, but just that the detective read off a “card”; (2) there is
insufficient evidence to support Wright’s convictions because
(a) the record does not show he resided in Los Angeles County or
California in July 2021 and July 2022, and (b) the record lacks
substantial evidence supporting the essential elements of actual
knowledge of the duty to register and willful failure to do so,
primarily because Wright and his wife claimed law enforcement
personnel told Wright he no longer had to register as a sex
offender; and (3) the court erred in imposing two $30 criminal
conviction assessment fees and two $40 court operations
assessment fees without first determining whether he had the
ability to pay those fees.
We reject Wright’s first two claims of error, vacate the $60
in criminal conviction assessment fees and $80 in court
operations assessment fees, remand to the trial court to consider

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).

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Wright’s ability to pay these ancillary costs, and affirm the
remainder of the judgment.
First, Wright forfeited his challenge to the adequacy of the
Miranda advisements by failing to raise that claim below.
Instead, Wright’s trial counsel suggested her Miranda objection
rested solely on her claim that Wright did not knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently waive his Miranda rights before he
made the inculpatory statement. Second, Wright’s sufficiency-of-
the-evidence claim fails because (a) the People did not have to
prove Wright was a Los Angeles County resident in July 2021
and July 2022, (b) the record contains evidence from which the
trial court reasonably could have inferred Wright remained a
California resident during that timeframe, and (c) the trial court
could reasonably have inferred that Wright was aware of his duty
to register but declined to do so. Lastly, to forestall a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, we excuse Wright’s forfeiture of
his challenge to the ancillary costs, and direct the court on
remand to consider Wright’s ability to pay those costs.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
We summarize only those facts pertinent to our disposition
of this appeal. We describe in greater detail certain trial
evidence and aspects of the procedural history in our Discussion,
post.
The People filed an information charging Wright with one
count of failing to update annually his sex offender registration

3 In reciting the relevant facts, we rely in part on
admissions from the parties’ briefing. (See Association for
Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023)
94 Cal.App.5th 764, 772, fn. 2 [employing this approach].)

3
within five working days of his birthday in July 2021, and one
count of failing to update annually his sex offender registration
within five working days of his birthday in July 2022, both of
which are violations of section 290.012, subdivision (a). Wright’s
obligation to register as a sex offender for life stems from a 1991
conviction for sodomy by force, in violation of section 286,
subdivision (c), for which he started registering in 1992.
Following a court trial, the trial court found Wright guilty
on both counts. At the February 9, 2024 sentencing hearing, the
court struck a prior strike allegation, imposed the midterm
sentence of two years in prison on one of the two counts and a
concurrent prison term of two years on the other count, and
awarded Wright 520 days of custody credit. The court also
imposed certain monetary obligations, including a restitution fine
of $300, two court operations assessment fees totaling $80, and
two criminal conviction assessment fees totaling $60.
On December 8, 2023, Wright filed a premature appeal from
the judgment. On June 3, 2024, the administrative presiding
justice deemed Wright’s premature notice of appeal to have been
filed after rendition of the judgment.

LEGAL BACKGROUND
Section 290, subdivision (b) provides in relevant part,
“Every person described in subdivision (c), . . . while residing in
California . . . shall register with the chief of police of the city in
which the person is residing, or the sheriff of the county if the
person is residing in an unincorporated area or city that has no
police department . . . within five working days of coming into, or
changing the person’s residence within, any city, county, or city
and county . . . and shall register thereafter in accordance with
the Act, unless the duty to register is terminated . . . as provided

4
by law.” (See § 290, subd. (b); see also id., subd. (a) [“All
references to ‘the Act’ in [sections 290 to 290.024, inclusive,] are
to the Sex Offender Registration Act.”].) As a general rule,
subdivision (c) requires an individual who is convicted of a
violation of section 286 to register. (See § 290, subd. (c)(1)
[identifying a violation of § 286 as an offense for which a person
must register]; § 290, subd. (c)(3) [excluding certain persons who
violated § 286, subd. (b)].)4
Section 290.012, subdivision (a) in turn provides in
pertinent part, “Beginning on his or her first birthday following
registration or change of address, the person shall be required to
register annually, within five working days of his or her birthday,
to update his or her registration with the entities described in
subdivision (b) of Section 290.” (§ 290.012, subd. (a).) “The
registering agency shall submit registrations, including annual
updates or changes of address, directly into the Department of
Justice California Sex and Arson Registry (CSAR).” (Id.,
subd. (d).)
Additionally, as relevant here, section 290.018,
subdivision (b) states: “[A] person who is required to register
under the act based on a felony conviction . . . who willfully
violates any requirement of the act . . . is guilty of a felony and
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for
16 months, or two or three years.” (§ 290.018, subd. (b).) “A
person who is required to register under the act who willfully
violates any requirement of the act is guilty of a continuing
offense as to each requirement he or she violated.” (Id., subd. (j).)

4 As we noted in our Procedural Background, ante, Wright
was convicted of sodomy by force in violation of section 286,
subdivision (c) in 1991.

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DISCUSSION

A. Wright Forfeited His Claim that the Miranda
Advisements Were Inadequate
Under Miranda and its progeny, “ ‘ “[an] accused [who is
the subject of custodial interrogation] must be adequately and
effectively apprised of his rights” to remain silent and to have the
assistance of counsel. [Citation.] . . . ’ [Citation.]” (See People v.
Nelson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 367, 374.) “[A] suspect in custody must
be advised as follows: ‘He must be warned prior to any
questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything
he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford
an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Singh (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 76, 96 (Singh), quoting Miranda, supra, 384 U.S.
at p. 479.) “[A] defendant’s statement is inadmissible unless all
four warnings were given to the defendant prior to the
interrogation, regardless of the defendant’s understanding of his
or her rights.” (People v. Bradford (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 843,
852.)
“ ‘Miranda makes clear that in order for [the] defendant’s
statements to be admissible against him, he must have
knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to remain silent,
and to the presence and assistance of counsel. [Citation.] [¶] . . .
We have recognized that a valid waiver of Miranda rights may be
express or implied.’ [Citation.] [¶] ‘[U]ltimately the question
becomes whether the Miranda waiver was knowing and
intelligent under the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation.’ [Citation.]” (Singh, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at
p. 99.)

6
Wright argues, “The trial court’s admission of [his] post-
arrest statement” to Detective Jeremy Cook that Wright believed
“he was no longer required to register [as a sex offender] due to
things he had read and conversations with the FBI” “constitute[s]
reversible error.” Specifically, he argues, “The prosecution failed
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Wright was
properly advised of his Miranda rights prior to custodial
interrogation, and therefore, his subsequent statement was
inadmissible.” (Italics added.) According to Wright, Detective
Cook “merely testified he ‘read a Miranda card’ to Wright,” and,
“[w]ithout the officer reciting the warnings in court or the card
being entered into evidence, there is simply no basis for the trial
court to conclude that the . . . required advisements were given.”
As explained below, Wright failed to preserve his objection to the
adequacy of the Miranda warnings. Rather, defense counsel
objected to the admission of Wright’s statements on the ground
the circumstances of his interrogation demonstrated he did not
waive his Miranda rights knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily.
Detective Cook testified on direct examination that after he
arrested Wright on an outstanding warrant issued in Kern
County for kidnapping, the detective took Wright to the hospital
because Wright had complained of chest pains. Detective Cook
testified that later that day, he took Wright to the police station
and interviewed Wright. Detective Cook further testified he read
Wright his Miranda rights from a “card,” and the detective
answered in the affirmative when the prosecutor asked him
whether Wright appeared to understand his rights. At that
point, defense counsel asked for permission to “voir dire [the

7
witness] regarding the Miranda advisement,” and the trial court
granted that request.
During defense counsel’s voir dire of the witness, Detective
Cook once again confirmed he read Wright his Miranda rights
“straight off [a] Miranda card . . . .” Detective Cook testified the
interview was recorded on video and that he did not have Wright
sign a Miranda waiver. The remainder of defense counsel’s
questioning during voir dire concerned whether Wright validly
waived his Miranda rights, e.g., counsel asked about the location
of the interview, Wright’s demeanor, and whether Wright had
been evaluated for any mental health issues or been provided any
medication at the hospital prior to the interview. After
concluding the voir dire, defense counsel stated, “Your Honor, I
would ask the court to suppress. The Miranda is involuntary.”
The trial court overruled the objection.
After the direct examination of Detective Cook resumed,
the prosecutor asked, “[D]id [Wright] agree to waive his rights
and speak to you?” After Detective Cook responded, “I can’t say
that he ever made an expressed waiver, no,” defense counsel
declared, “Your Honor, I would object to any further questioning
regarding remarks made by my client as not knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary specific waivers.” In response to the trial court’s
questioning, Detective Cook testified that although he did not
recall Wright’s “verbatim response” to the detective’s query
regarding whether Wright understood the rights read to him,
Wright understood those rights and “proceeded to talk to
[Detective Cook].” The court then overruled defense counsel’s
objection, finding that Wright had made “an implied waiver” of
his Miranda rights. Subsequently, Detective Cook testified that
Wright said he was aware that he was required to register as a

8
sex offender. The detective further testified Wright told the
detective (a) Wright had read certain “things . . . that told him he
no longer had to register” and (b) the FBI had told him that as
well.
On appeal, Wright asserts he preserved his objection to the
adequacy of the Miranda advisements. Although Wright
acknowledges his trial attorney “objected on the grounds that his
statement[s to Detective Cook were] not knowing, intelligent, or
voluntary,” Wright maintains that “this objection implicitly
encompassed the foundational requirement of a proper
advisement” because “[a]n invalid advisement necessarily
renders any subsequent waiver invalid.”5
Wright misapprehends the test for forfeiture of an
appellate claim. The question is not whether the objection raised
below (i.e., the validity of the Miranda waiver) is, as a theoretical
matter, logically related to the claim of error raised on appeal
(i.e., the adequacy of the Miranda warnings). Rather, we
determine whether the “ ‘ “ ‘defendant . . . br[ought the] error[ ] to
the attention of the trial court[ ] so that [it could] be corrected or
avoided and a fair trial had . . . .’ ” [Citation.] . . . .’ [Citation.]”
(See People v. Polk (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1193–1194
(Polk).) The focus of the inquiry is on whether “ ‘ “ ‘it is unfair to
the trial judge and to the adverse party to take advantage of an
error on appeal [because] it could easily have been corrected at
the trial.’ ” [Citation.]’ . . . [Citation.]” (See id. at p. 1194.)
“Accordingly, unless a defendant asserts in the trial court a
specific ground for suppression of his or her statements to police

5 Wright does not argue that insofar as his trial counsel
failed to preserve this issue for appeal, the attorney rendered
constitutionally ineffective assistance to him.

9
under Miranda, that ground is forfeited on appeal, even if the
defendant asserted other arguments under the same decision.”
(Ibid.)
Wright’s trial counsel did not apprise the trial court and
the prosecution of his belief the Miranda warnings were
insufficient. The above summary of Detective Cook’s testimony
indicates defense counsel alerted the court and opposing counsel
that Wright believed the circumstances of his custodial
interrogation established he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently waive his Miranda rights (e.g., by eliciting from the
detective testimony that he did not know whether Wright had
been given medication at the hospital). Defense counsel did not
probe into the adequacy of the Miranda advisements themselves
or claim that Detective Cook failed to advise Wright of each right
secured by Miranda. Had trial counsel raised that claim below,
the court and the prosecutor would have been afforded an
opportunity to ask Detective Cook if he recalled the contents of
the Miranda card he read to Wright or determine whether the
recording of the interview contained that information.6
Accordingly, Wright forfeited his contention the prosecution
failed to demonstrate Detective Cook properly advised Wright of
his Miranda rights before conducting the custodial interrogation.
(Cf. Polk, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1191–1195 [holding that
a defendant forfeited “the issue of the substantive adequacy of . . .
Miranda warnings in the trial court” because, although she
“object[ed] on grounds of Miranda” below, she merely “contended
her statements to police were coerced” and did not
“mention . . . the warnings themselves”].)

6 The recording is not in the record before us.

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B. Wright Fails To Demonstrate His Convictions Were
Not Supported by Substantial Evidence
“ ‘[I]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction[ ]” [citation,] [w]e . . . examine “ ‘the entire record in
the light most favorable to the judgment’ ” to determine whether
it discloses substantial evidence — “ ‘evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value’ ” — “ ‘from which a reasonable trier of
fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”
[Citation.] Our review “ ‘ “presume[s] in support of the judgment
the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced
from the evidence.” ’ [Citation.] Even where . . . the evidence of
guilt is largely circumstantial, our task is not to resolve
credibility issues or evidentiary conflicts, nor is it to inquire
whether the evidence might ‘ “ ‘be reasonably reconciled with the
defendant’s innocence.’ ” ’ ” [Citation.] Instead, we ask whether
there is “ ‘ “substantial evidence of the existence of each element
of the offense charged” ’ ” such that any rational jury may have
convicted defendant.’ [Citation.]” (See People v. Barrett (2025)
17 Cal.5th 897, 964.)
Under the substantial evidence standard, “we must begin
with the presumption that the evidence . . . was sufficient, and
the defendant bears the burden of convincing us otherwise. To
meet that burden, it is not enough for the defendant to simply
contend, ‘without a statement or analysis of the evidence, . . . that
the evidence is insufficient . . . .’ [Citation.] Rather, he must
affirmatively demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient.” (See
People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573
(Sanghera).)
The parties agree that to secure Wright’s convictions for
failure to update annually his sex offender registration under

11
section 290.012, the prosecution had to prove Wright resided in
California in 2021 and 2022, Wright actually knew he was
required to register in 2021 and 2022, and he willfully failed to do
so. (See also Legal Background, ante [discussing relevant
statutory provisions, including § 290.012].) Wright argues the
prosecution also had to prove he “was a resident of Los Angeles
County, California at the relevant time . . . .” Wright contends
we should reverse his convictions because the prosecution did not
present sufficient evidence that (1) Wright “lived in Los Angeles
County or anywhere in California” in July 2021 and July 2022,
and (2) Wright actually knew he was required to register at that
time but willfully failed to do so. (Boldface & some capitalization
omitted.)
Wright’s sufficiency of the evidence claim fails. First, based
on applicable case authority, we reject Wright’s claim the
prosecution had an obligation to prove he was a resident of
Los Angeles County (as opposed to California) in July 2021 and
July 2022. (Discussion, part B.1, post.) Second, the record
contains circumstantial evidence from which the trial court
reasonably could have inferred that Wright was a California
resident in July 2021 and July 2022. (Discussion, part B.2, post.)
Third, Wright’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the actual knowledge and willful failure to register
elements is not well founded. (Discussion, part B.3, post.)
Wright’s argument regarding the elements of actual knowledge
and willfulness rests primarily on claims made by Wright and his
wife that law enforcement personnel told him he no longer
needed to register, which the trial court was free not to credit.
(Ibid.) Furthermore, the prosecution presented evidence that
Wright decided not to register in July 2021 and July 2022 despite

12
having been notified by law enforcement of his obligation to do so.
(Ibid.)

1. The People did not have to prove that Wright was a
resident of Los Angeles County
Wright cites CALCRIM number 1170 for the proposition
the prosecution had to prove “[t]hat Wright was a resident of
Los Angeles County, California at the relevant time . . . .” The
second element provided in that jury instruction reads as follows:
“The defendant resided (in <insert name of city>, California/in an
unincorporated area or a city with no police department
in <insert name of county> County, California/on the campus or
in the facilities of <insert name of university or college> in
California).” (CALCRIM No. 1170.)
In People v. Wallace (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1088 (Wallace),
our colleagues in Division Three of the First District held that the
prosecution need only prove that a defendant was a California
resident at the time he failed to update annually his sex offender
registration. The Wallace court explained that the operative
statutory language in section 290.012 requires the defendant to
“ ‘update,’ ” meaning “ ‘bring up to date[,]’ . . . . something already
in existence,” to wit, “ ‘his or her registration . . . .’ ” (See
Wallace, at p. 1105 [construing former § 290, subd. (a)(1)(D)]; see
also id. at p. 1105, fn. 8 [noting that former § 290, subd. (a)(1)(D)
has been renumbered § 290.012].) The court further explained
that the underlying registration being brought up to date is
governed by subdivision (b) of section 290, which “includes a
California residency requirement.” (See Wallace, at p. 1105; see
also id. at pp. 1094 & fn. 3 & 1100–1103 [discussing the
California residency requirement imposed by former § 290,
subdivision (a)(1)(A), “agree[ing] with the prosecution that it had

13
no burden to prove [the defendant] moved to a location within [a
particular county] to establish a violation of former section 290,
subdivision (a)(1)(A),” and noting the provision was redesignated
§ 290, subd. (b)].) In its decision, the Wallace court indicated the
city or county of a defendant’s residence was instead relevant in
determining whether the case had been tried in the “ ‘proper
venue . . . .’ ” (See id. at p. 1102.)
Wright does not direct us to any statutory text or case
authority supporting his position that being a resident of a
particular county is a necessary element of the offense of failing
to update annually his sex offender registration. In addition,
Wright does not argue he was tried in the wrong venue or claim
to have raised any such objection below. Accordingly, we reject
his argument the prosecution needed to establish he was a
Los Angeles County resident when he failed to update his
registration in July 2021 and July 2022. (See People v. Mojica
(2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1204, fn. 4 [“Although pattern jury
instructions are prepared by distinguished legal scholars and
provide a valuable service to the courts, they are not the law and
are not binding.”].)

2. The trial court could have reasonably inferred from
circumstantial evidence that Wright was a California
resident in July 2021 and July 2022
Wright admits that he registered as a sex offender for
nearly 30 years, and that “[t]he record indicates that Wright had
prior convictions for failing to register in 2010, 2013, and 2015,
with his 2015 conviction resulting in incarceration until 2017.”
He further acknowledges the prosecution presented evidence he
last registered as a sex offender on July 23, 2019. Indeed, Wright
does not dispute, and thus tacitly agrees with, the Attorney

14
General’s assertion the trial “evidence showed that, from 1992 to
2019, [Wright] generally complied with his annual registration
requirement as a California resident.”7 The trial court
reasonably could have inferred from this evidence that up until
July 23, 2019, Wright had been a longstanding resident of
California.
Next, Detective Cook provided testimony indicating that
when he detained Wright during a traffic stop on May 26, 2023 in
Los Angeles County, Wright gave the detective Wright’s
“California ID card . . . .”8 According to Detective Cook, although
Wright stated he did not have a permanent address and “was
transient,” Wright said he was “staying at [his wife’s] house” “in
West Covina briefly” “at the time [Detective Cook] arrested him.”
Furthermore, Wright intimates in his reply brief that he had
been “staying in West Covina” shortly before his “2023
arrest . . . .” A reasonable factfinder could have found based on
this evidence that as of Wright’s arrest on May 26, 2023, he was a
California resident.
Because a rational factfinder could have found Wright was
a longstanding California resident as of July 23, 2019 and was a
California resident on May 26, 2023, the sufficiency of the
evidence inquiry turns on whether the trial court could have
reasonably inferred that Wright remained a California resident

7 (See Reygoza v. Superior Court (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d
514, 519 & fn. 4 [criminal case in which the Court of Appeal
assumed that an assertion made by the respondent was correct
because the “defendant did not dispute [the] respondent’s claim
in his reply”].)
8 Wright’s California ID card is not in the record before us.

15
in July 2021 and July 2022. Certain facts support that
conclusion.
First, Wright does not direct us to any evidence he resided
outside of California in July 2021 or July 2022. Although this
omission is not in and of itself dispositive of the residency
question, the absence of evidence that Wright ceased to be a
California resident at some point after July 23, 2019 is
nonetheless consistent with a finding that Wright remained a
California resident. (See Sanghera, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1573 [holding that the appellant bears the burden of showing
that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict].)
Second, the prosecution presented evidence that Wright
did not notify law enforcement in California that he had relocated
to another jurisdiction between July 23, 2019 and May 26, 2023,
even though Wright was under a legal obligation to do so if he
had moved to another jurisdiction. Specifically, section 290.013
required Wright to “inform the law enforcement agency or
agencies with which he . . . last registered” “within five working
days of the move . . . .”9 The trial court admitted into evidence
entries from the CSAR (California Sex and Arson Registry)
showing that law enforcement had deemed Wright to have
“absconded” in December 2020 after having last registered at a
residential address in California. The court also admitted into
evidence the sex offender registration form Wright signed on

9 (See § 290.013, subd. (a); ibid. [indicating the provision
applies to “[a] person who was last registered at a residence
address pursuant to the Act [and] changes his or her residence
address, whether within the jurisdiction in which he or she is
currently registered or to a new jurisdiction inside or outside the
state”].)

16
July 23, 2019, which informed Wright of his statutory duty to
notify law enforcement if he moved out of California.
There was also trial evidence concerning Wright’s
relationship with his wife, whom he had known for many years,
that suggested he remained a California resident from July 23,
2019 to May 26, 2023. Wright’s wife testified at trial that the two
had known each other since they were children. His wife also
offered testimony indicating that Wright and she were in contact
at around the time that Wright committed sodomy by force,
Wright and his wife were in their twenties at that time, and
Wright’s wife knew the victim of that offense. Additionally,
Wright’s wife testified she had helped Wright register as a sex
offender “for many years,” and she offered testimony indicating
that shortly before Wright was arrested in 2023, she and Wright
had discussions regarding whether Wright was still legally
obligated to register as a sex offender. Furthermore, Wright
intimates in his reply brief he may have “visit[ed] his wife” after
July 2019, although he claims such “short visits” would not have
“trigger[ed] the registration requirement” if he resided in a
different jurisdiction at the time. In addition, as we noted above,
Wright admitted to Detective Cook that Wright was staying at
his wife’s house in West Covina prior to his arrest.
Based on the above circumstantial evidence, the trial court
reasonably could have inferred that Wright did not cease to be a
California resident between July 23, 2019 and May 26, 2023.
Wright insists this matter is analogous to Wallace, a case in
which the Court of Appeal reversed a conviction for failure to
update annually the defendant’s sex offender registration.
(Wallace, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1091, 1108.) Wright
contends that in both Wallace and the instant case, the

17
prosecution “relied on sporadic evidence with significant temporal
gaps.”
In Wallace, the defendant was convicted on three felony
counts: (1) failing to notify the appropriate law enforcement
agency within five working days of his new address or location, in
violation of former section 290, subdivision (f)(1) (which has since
been renumbered section 290.013); (2) failing to register within
five working days of changing his address or location, in violation
of former section 290, subdivision (a)(1)(A) (which has been
redesignated section 290, subdivision (b)); and (3) failing to
update annually his sex offender registration within five working
days of his birthday, in violation of section 290,
subdivision (a)(1)(D) (which has been renumbered
section 290.012). (See Wallace, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1091, 1094–1095, 1100, 1105 & fns. 4, 7, & 8.) The defendant
in Wallace, whose birthday was December 7, stipulated he had
been convicted of sex offenses in January 1999 that subjected him
to our state’s sex offender registration and notification
requirements. (See id. at p. 1092.) The trial evidence showed the
defendant first registered as a sex offender in July 2003 in
Contra Costa County, and that the last time he registered was in
January 2006, at which time he claimed to still reside in that
county. (See id. at pp. 1092–1094, 1103.) The trial evidence
further showed that as of November 29, 2006, the address the
defendant had provided to law enforcement in his January 2006
registration form was vacant. (See id. at p. 1094.) Further, a
detective testified that he confirmed the address was vacant in
April 2007. (See ibid.)
On appeal, the reviewing court rejected a challenge to the
defendant’s conviction on the first count, reasoning there was

18
sufficient evidence he had changed his last registered address
without informing the law enforcement agency with which he last
registered and that the defendant had received “repeated notice
from agency representatives regarding his legal dut[y]” of
notification. (See Wallace, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1095–
1099.) On the other hand, the Wallace court reversed the
defendant’s convictions on the other two counts for failure to
register and failure to update annually his registration,
respectively. (Id. at p. 1108.) The Court of Appeal reasoned both
offenses required the prosecution to prove the defendant was a
California resident during the relevant timeframes, that is,
April 2007 for the failure to register count and December 2006 for
the failure to update count, and the prosecution failed to satisfy
that burden because “there was no evidence presented to the jury
regarding [the defendant’s] whereabouts after he left his last
registered address in Contra Costa County . . . .” (See id. at
pp. 1102–1103, 1105–1107.) In arriving at this conclusion, the
Wallace court “decline[d] to shift the burden to [the defendant] to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was in fact residing
outside California during th[e] time” periods in question. (See id.
at p. 1103.)
Wallace is distinguishable. As noted above, Wright
registered as a sex offender in California for nearly 30 years from
1992 to 2019, which is far longer than the two and a half year
period for which the defendant in Wallace had registered in
California. (See Wallace, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1092–
1094.) Further evidence that Wright’s ties to California were
stronger than that of the defendant in Wallace is the fact that
Wright’s wife, with whom he had a longstanding relationship,
lived in California, whereas the Wallace opinion does not identify

19
any evidence showing the defendant had any connection to the
state aside from his residency from July 2003 to January 2006.
(See ibid.) Also, as we explained above, there was evidence that
when Detective Cook apprehended Wright in California in May
2023, Wright admitted to living with his wife (albeit temporarily)
and had in his possession a California identification card. In
contrast, the Wallace decision does not disclose where that
defendant was apprehended and there is no indication he
remained in the state after he last registered as a sex offender in
January 2006. (See, e.g., id. at p. 1103 [“[T]he prosecution
acknowledges there was no evidence presented to the jury
regarding [the defendant’s] whereabouts after he left his last
registered address . . . in . . . Contra Costa County.”].) These
differences between Wallace and the case before us demonstrate
the evidence here “was sufficient to permit a reasonable inference
that [Wright] remained in California” in July 2021 and
July 2022. (See ibid.)
Lastly, Wright apparently argues his testimony that he
spoke to the FBI in Mojave in 2016 indicates he might not have
been a California resident in 2021 and 2022. He contends, “[T]he
city of Mojave is about 130–140 miles to the Nevada border,
about a two to two-and-a-half-hour drive. There is no evidence
that Wright did not live or reside outside of California and drive
or use public transport to visit his wife for short visits that did
not trigger the registration requirement.”10 Evidence that
Wright encountered the FBI in Mojave in 2016 has no apparent
bearing on whether he was a California resident in July 2021 and

10Wright does not clarify whether he is claiming to have
encountered the FBI in Nevada.

20
July 2022.11 Furthermore, the undisputed fact (discussed at the
beginning of this part) that Wright registered as a sex offender in
California each year (with a few minor exceptions) from 1992 to
2019 undermines Wright’s suggestion that he was residing in
another jurisdiction when he had this purported encounter with
the FBI.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Wright remained
a California resident in July 2021 and July 2022.

3. Wright fails to establish the trial court’s findings of
actual knowledge and willful failure to register
are not supported by substantial evidence
Wright contends, “[T]he state presented no evidence to
rebut Wright’s and his wife’s testimony that in 2021 and 2022 he
did not actually know he still needed to register because two law
enforcement officers, an FBI agent and his probation officer, told
him he was no longer required to register.” Wright further
claims, “[H]is wife, who has some experience with regulations as
a social worker conducted her own research believing Wright no

11 Wright claims on page 18 of his opening brief that at
pages 666 to 667 of volume three of the reporter’s transcript, he
testified that he encountered the FBI in Mojave after he was
hospitalized in 2020. In the excerpt from the reporter’s
transcript he cites, however, Wright did not identify clearly the
year in which he supposedly met the FBI in Mojave. At
pages 671 to 674 of volume three of the reporter’s transcript,
Wright provided testimony indicating he claims to have spoken to
the FBI on two occasions: (1) in Mojave in 2016, and (2) in a
telephone conversation with an FBI agent in May 2022 or
May 2023.

21
longer had to register, advised Wright of this and then sought
confirmation from the Department of Justice.” Wright also
appears to rely upon Detective Cook’s testimony that Wright had
told the detective the FBI informed Wright he no longer had to
register as a sex offender.
Although Wright intimates in his opening brief the trial
court erred in “finding that a mistake of law is not a valid
defense” to the instant offenses, he does not offer any legal
analysis or citation to authority supporting that position.
Assuming arguendo a mistake of law is a potential defense to the
charge of failing to update annually one’s sex offender
registration, under the substantial evidence standard, the trial
court did not have to credit Wright’s and his wife’s claims that
the FBI and a probation officer told Wright he no longer needed
to register, or his wife’s claim to have told Wright she believed he
ceased to be subject to the lifetime registration requirement.12
The trial court instead could reasonably have inferred from
the following evidence that Wright knew of his duty to register
but elected not to discharge it in July 2021 and July 2022:
(a) Detective Cook’s testimony Wright told him that Wright was
aware he was required to register as a sex offender but had
claimed to no longer be subject to that requirement, and
(b) certified documents Wright had signed as recently as 2019
acknowledging that (i) he was required to register as a sex
offender for life and (ii) he had a duty to update his sex offender

12 (See People v. Thomas (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 930, 936–
937 [holding that under the substantial evidence standard, the
factfinder is entitled to give the “statements [of a witness]
whatever weight it deem[s] appropriate, or to disregard them
altogether”].)

22
registration on an annual basis within five working days of his
birthday.13
In sum, Wright fails to demonstrate the record lacks
substantial evidence that (1) he was a California resident in
July 2021 and July 2022, (2) he had actual knowledge of his duty
to update his registration, and (3) he willfully failed to comply
with that obligation.

C. We Excuse Wright’s Forfeiture of His Challenge to
the Ancillary Costs and Remand for the Trial Court
To Consider Wright’s Ability To Pay Those
Obligations
In People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, the Supreme Court
held that because “the imposition of ancillary payments raises . . .
equal protection issues[,] . . . . upon request, a court must
consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court
operations assessment (Pen. Code, § 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)) or a
court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1)).”
(See Kopp, at p. 9; see also id. at p. 27 [indicating the “court
facilities assessment” referenced in Kopp is the “ ‘criminal
conviction assessment’ ” authorized by Gov. Code § 70373].) Kopp
held that in making this determination, a court must “allow[ ] the

13 (See People v. Johnson (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 67, 72–73
[indicating that a factfinder may conclude a defendant “willfully”
failed to register as a sex offender if he or she had “a ‘purpose or
willingness’ to make the omission”]; cf. Wallace, supra,
176 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1098–1099 [holding that “evidence of [the
defendant’s] repeated notice from [law enforcement] agency
representatives regarding his legal duties was . . . sufficient to
permit the jury to infer his actual knowledge” of his duty to notify
the agency of a change of address].)

23
parties to present any relevant evidence or argument on the
matter.” (See id. at pp. 30–31.)
At Wright’s sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed two
court operations assessment fees totaling $80 and two criminal
conviction assessment fees totaling $60. On appeal, Wright
argues the trial court erred in imposing these ancillary costs
without first determining whether he had the ability to pay
them.14
Although Wright admits his “trial counsel did not object to
the court’s imposition of the . . . fees on the basis that Wright
did not have the ability to pay,” Wright asks us to excuse his
forfeiture to avoid addressing whether “trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object.” In particular, Wright argues his
trial counsel’s failure to “object to these fees based on [in]ability
to pay . . . [constituted] ineffective assistance of counsel because
the record was full of evidence Wright suffered homelessness and
hospitalizations, some for psychiatric issues . . . .” The Attorney
General acknowledges in his brief that Wright told Detective
Cook that Wright was transient, and that Wright testified he had
been hospitalized in 2020, 2021, and 2022.
To avoid passing upon whether Wright’s trial attorney
failed to provide constitutionally adequate assistance, we exercise
our discretion to excuse Wright’s forfeiture of his challenge to the
imposition of the ancillary costs. (See People v. Torres (2025)
113 Cal.App.5th 88, 92 [noting that a reviewing court may reach
the merits of a forfeited claim “[t]o forestall [a] defendant’s claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel”].)

14 Although Wright contested the $300 restitution fine in
his opening brief, Wright withdrew his challenge to that fine in
his reply.

24
The Attorney General claims that the trial court’s failure to
ascertain Wright’s ability to pay the $140 in ancillary costs
was not prejudicial, that is, he argues that “any [constitutional]
error in imposing the fees and fines was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.” The Attorney General seems to contend that
“young and able-bodied convicted defendants [can] pay fines and
fees from prison wages or other sources.” We find perplexing the
Attorney General’s invocation of this principle here, given that
the evidence that Wright was transient and had repeatedly been
hospitalized suggests he might have difficulty earning the funds
needed to pay the ancillary costs. Further, although the Attorney
General characterizes the “$140 imposed for court operations and
criminal conviction assessment fees [as] minimal,” we are unable
to assess Wright’s ability to pay that amount without a more fully
developed record on that point. Therefore, we are not persuaded
that any constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
For these reasons, we vacate the $80 court operations
assessment fees and $60 criminal conviction assessment fees and
remand the matter to afford the trial court an opportunity to
determine in the first instance whether Wright has the ability to
pay those costs.

25
DISPOSITION
We vacate the court operations assessment fees totaling
$80 and the criminal conviction assessment fees totaling $60.
The judgment is affirmed in all other respects. In accordance
with People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, the matter is remanded
to the trial court to consider defendant Derrick Wright’s ability to
pay these ancillary costs.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

M. KIM, J.

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