People v. Siguantay CA1/5

CourtListener 10866358CalctappMay 29, 2026

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Filed 5/29/26 P. v. Siguantay CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A171289
v.
MAYNOR OXLAJ SIGUANTAY, (Marin County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. CR0001267)

This is an appeal from judgment after a jury convicted defendant
Maynor Oxlaj Siguantay of second degree robbery, with a special
enhancement for personal firearm use (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 120225, subd. (a),
12022.53, subds. (b), (g));1 possessing a firearm as a felon (§ 29800, subd.
(a)(1)); and two counts of obstructing or resisting an officer (§ 69).
Defendant challenges the judgment on grounds that his trial counsel
was prejudicially ineffective in failing to object to the admission of
testimonial hearsay in violation of the confrontation clause of the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and that section 29800,
subdivision (a)(1) is facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment.
We affirm.

1 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the Penal

Code.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 26, 2024, a criminal information was filed charging
defendant with second degree robbery (§ 211; count 1), possessing a firearm
as a felon (§ 29800; count 2), and two counts of obstructing or resisting an
executive officer (§ 69; counts 3–4). It was further alleged that, in committing
the robbery, defendant personally used a firearm (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a),
12022.53, subds. (b), (g)).
A jury trial revealed the following evidence. On November 23, 2023,
around 7 p.m., the victim, Ernesto V., left home to run an errand. He came
across two male acquaintances outside a restaurant on Tamalpais Avenue in
San Rafael. As the three men chatted, defendant approached them from the
direction of a liquor store next to the restaurant. Defendant pointed a gun at
the men and demanded their money. Ernesto, who was afraid, handed
defendant $175 in cash. Defendant, before fleeing, warned the men, “ ‘I don’t
want to see you here anymore because I’ll be back.’ ”
After debating with his acquaintances what to do, Ernesto eventually
contacted the police 20 or so minutes later. Since he did not have a phone,
Ernesto entered the liquor store and asked an employee to call the police.
The employee, who believed Ernesto had been drinking, called 911 and
passed along Ernesto’s description of the robber: a Latino male; 25 to 35
years old; with “cutted [sic]” jeans, a black jacket, buzz-cut hair and a tattoo
over his right eye.
Police Officer Casey Debolt responded to the scene and spoke to
Ernesto. The officer suspected Ernesto was drunk, although Ernesto said he
had just two beers at lunch. Officer Debolt was also concerned about
inconsistencies in Ernesto’s statements. For example, Ernesto initially
stated that he “ ‘just gave him the money’ ” and later stated the robber

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demanded the money. Officer Debolt also found it strange that Ernesto
described the robber’s gun as “yellow,” which was not a typical firearm color.
About two hours later, a mile or so from the robbery scene, Officer
Debolt saw defendant walking with a woman pushing a small child in a
stroller. Similar to Ernesto’s description, defendant had a “buzzed bald
haircut” and was wearing ripped jeans and a black jacket. He also had a
tattoo, but it was over his left eye rather than his right eye. When Officer
Debolt and another officer called out to defendant, he walked away and
grabbed his waistband. The officers, concerned for their safety, handcuffed
and searched defendant. They found a firearm in defendant’s waistband that
was black with “almost like a gold color” barrel. However, they did not find
any money on defendant. After the officers placed defendant in a seated
position on the curb, he became angry and started yelling. He directed
several expletives and threats toward the officers. Among other things,
defendant told Officer Debolt, “ ‘I’m going to smoke your ass.’ ” Then, after
defendant was placed in the police vehicle, he kicked another officer near his
face.
A police officer called Ernesto and asked him to participate in an infield
identification. Ernesto was reluctant, first refusing, but then agreeing, to
participate. Once he arrived, Ernesto told officers he was “ ‘afraid’ ” to
approach defendant. Defendant, in turn, refused commands to look in
Ernesto’s direction. Ernesto, from about 20 feet away, told officers, who were
shining a flashlight on defendant, “ ‘It’s not him.’ ” Ernesto also told the
officers the robber had longer hair.
Later that evening, about 11:30 p.m., Officer Genesis Ortiz was
dispatched to the Marin County Jail to follow up on a report that an inmate
named Jose C. recognized defendant, who was also an inmate, from “a prior

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incident in the night.” Jose, who appeared intoxicated, told Officer Ortiz that
he saw defendant “hours earlier” in front of the liquor store where Ernesto
was robbed. Jose was standing with a few friends when defendant
approached them and said, “ ‘I feel like I know you,’ ” while lifting his shirt to
display a firearm in his waistband. Jose told Officer Ortiz that defendant
never removed the firearm from his waistband; nor did he rob them.
At trial, Ernesto described the robber much the same as he did on the
night in question. He stated the robber was Latino, bald but with some hair,
and with a tattoo over his eye. Ernesto also recalled the robber’s having a
yellow and silver gun. Ernesto first testified that the robber wore a black
shirt but later testified his shirt was white. Ernesto also testified the tattoo
was over the robber’s right eye. However, he also acknowledged being unsure
whether the tattoo was over the robber’s right or left eye.
The jury viewed police officers’ body camera footage. This footage
showed defendant, a Latino with buzz-cut hair, in distressed jeans with a
shirt that was black on the bottom and white on the top. He had a tattoo
over his left eye.
Similarly, video footage from the liquor store’s security camera on the
evening of the robbery showed a man with buzz-cut hair walking by the store,
with distressed jeans, a shirt that was black on the bottom and white on the
top, and a black jacket.
Lastly, video footage from a nearby train station, timestamped a few
minutes after 6:00 p.m. on the evening of the robbery, showed defendant
walking past the liquor store. Defendant was dressed in a shirt that was
black on bottom and white on top. Although defendant was partially
obstructed in the video, he appeared to remain in the same spot in front of
the restaurant beside the liquor store for about two minutes. At that point,

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defendant walked around the corner of the restaurant and broke into a run
after a car passed.
A jury convicted defendant on all counts and found true the firearm
allegation. On July 18, 2024, the trial court sentenced defendant for these
crimes, as well as for the crime of false imprisonment in violation of section
236 in another case. Defendant’s aggregate prison term amounted to
14 years 4 months.
On August 12, 2024, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends on appeal (1) his robbery conviction (count 1) must
be reversed because his counsel rendered ineffective performance by failing to
object to inadmissible testimonial hearsay as violating the confrontation
clause of the Sixth Amendment and (2) his conviction for being a felon in
possession of a firearm under section 29800, subdivision (a)(1) (count 2) must
be reversed because the statute is facially unconstitutional under the Second
Amendment. We address each issue in turn post.
I. Effectiveness of Assistance from Trial Counsel.
Defendant contends his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in
failing to raise a hearsay objection to the admission of statements made by a
jail inmate, Jose C., to Officer Ortiz regarding defendant’s presence at the
crime scene with a firearm in his waistband. At trial, Jose invoked his Fifth
Amendment rights and declined to testify. Thus, because Jose was
unavailable at trial, any statements he made out of court would have been
inadmissible hearsay. (Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 59
[158 L.Ed.2d 177] [“Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial
have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where
the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine”].) According to

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defendant, counsel’s failure to raise a hearsay objection to Jose’s statements
gifted to the prosecution “the best evidence connecting [him] both to the scene
of the robbery and the gun”—a decision “patently unreasonable” and highly
prejudicial.
“In assessing claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we
consider whether counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and whether the
defendant suffered prejudice to a reasonable probability, that is, a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. (Strickland v. Washington
(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674]; [citation].) A
reviewing court will indulge in a presumption that counsel’s performance fell
within the wide range of professional competence and that counsel’s actions
and inactions can be explained as a matter of sound trial strategy.
Defendant thus bears the burden of establishing constitutionally inadequate
assistance of counsel. (Strickland v. Washington, supra, at p. 687;
[citation].)” (People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1211; see People v.
Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 899–902 [ineffective assistance claim raised
mixed question of law and fact reviewed independently on appeal].)
Defendant has not met this high standard because he has not met his
burden of proving reasonably competent counsel would not have allowed
Jose’s statements into evidence. To the contrary, the record reflects that,
when the issue of Jose’s out-of-court statements to Officer Ortiz was raised at
trial, the trial court stated, “I’m going to take a wild guess that there’s going
to be a hearsay objection to that testimony?” Defense counsel responded,
“No, because [Jose] says there’s no robbery. Nothing was taken. He didn’t
pull out the gun. He just kind of showed it like this, or whoever was there,
just kind of showed it like this, and that was that.” This colloquy reflects

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that counsel had a clear strategy with respect to Jose’s testimony—to use the
evidence to show that, even if defendant were present outside the liquor store
on the evening in question and carrying a firearm, he did not commit a
robbery.
While defendant may, in hindsight, question this strategy, he cannot
prove it was objectively unreasonable. Officer Debolt testified that, when he
interviewed the victim, Ernesto V., shortly after the robbery, Ernesto gave
inconsistent accounts of what transpired. Ernesto, who appeared intoxicated,
first stated that he handed the robber money, then later said the robber
demanded it. In addition, Ernesto waited over 20 minutes before calling the
police. Finally, when officers later detained defendant, they found no money
on him. Thus, defense counsel may have sought to use statements from both
Ernesto and Jose to argue that defendant may have been present at the
alleged crime scene at some point that evening and may have been armed but
did not commit a robbery.
In so concluding, we agree with defendant that Jose’s statements were
incriminating because they placed defendant directly at the scene, armed
with a weapon, at the time of the robbery. However, based on the record as a
whole, defense counsel may have recognized that there was a wealth of
evidence, aside from Jose’s statements, that placed defendant at the crime
scene with a firearm. As such, counsel may have reasonably decided to rely
on the defense that defendant did not commit a robbery rather than the
defense that defendant was not present at the scene or armed. For example,
Ernesto accurately described defendant as a Latino male between 25 and 35
years old; with buzz-cut hair; and wearing distressed jeans, a shirt that was
partially white and partially black, and a black jacket. Ernesto also
accurately described defendant as having a tattoo over one eye and a firearm

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that was partially gold or yellow in color. Moreover, video footage from three
independent sources—the police officers’ body cameras, the liquor store’s
security camera, and a nearby train station’s security camera—corroborated
these facts regarding defendant’s appearance. Under these circumstances,
we cannot conclude counsel’s performance fell outside the broad range of
professional competence. As the California Supreme Court advises, “deciding
whether to object is inherently tactical, and the failure to object will rarely
establish ineffective assistance.” (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469,
502.) This is not one of those rare cases.
Finally, defendant insists “a finding of deficient performance is
‘inescapable’ here because counsel made clear he believed that Jose’s
testimonial hearsay statements were admissible due to his
unavailability . . . .” His claim fails. Even assuming defendant were correct
(in fact, the record is ambiguous as to counsel’s beliefs), the relevant standard
would require us to consider whether counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, not
whether counsel had the requisite knowledge regarding the admissibility of
the evidence. (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.) Thus,
defendant’s ineffective assistance claim fails.
II. Constitutionality of Section 29800, Subdivision (a)(1).
Defendant was convicted in count 2 of being a felon in possession of a
firearm. (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1).) Section 29800, subdivision (a)(1) provides, in
relevant part: “Any person who has been convicted of a felony . . . and who
owns, purchases, receives, or has in possession or under custody or control
any firearm is guilty of a felony.” Defendant contends this statute is facially
unconstitutional under the Second Amendment of the federal Constitution.
We disagree.

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The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” (U.S. Const., 2d Amend.) Whether a
firearm prohibition violates the Second Amendment on its face raises a
constitutional issue reviewed de novo on appeal. (People v. Alexander (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 469, 474; Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 799–
801.) We “ ‘presume [the] statute is constitutional unless its
unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears; all
presumptions and intendments favor its validity.’ ” (People v. Fuiava (2012)
53 Cal.4th 622, 696.) Moreover, because defendant raises a facial challenge,
he must prove the statute poses a “ ‘ “total and fatal conflict with [the Second
Amendment],” ’ ” meaning that “ ‘ “no set of circumstances exists under which
the [statute] would be valid” . . . .’ ” (Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995)
9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084; In re D.L. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 144, 157; see People v.
Crenshaw (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1169, 1174 [a defendant challenging a
statute’s constitutionality “ ‘ “carries a heavy burden” ’ ”].) He cannot do so.
Our colleagues in the First Appellate District, Division Three, recently
addressed the precise issue raised herein—whether section 29800,
subdivision (a)(1), on its face, violates the Second Amendment. In People v.
Anderson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 577 (Anderson), following an exhaustive
inquiry, our colleagues held that section 29800, subdivision (a)(1) does not
run afoul of the Second Amendment. (Anderson, at p. 589.) We agree. And,
while we need not rehash the Anderson court’s detailed analysis, we briefly
identify its key points.
The Anderson court began by examining recent United States Supreme
Court case law addressing the scope of the Second Amendment, albeit
without cause to consider the precise issue at hand—the constitutionality of

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statutes prohibiting felons from possessing firearms. (Anderson, supra,
104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 584–586.)
First, in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 570 [171 L.Ed.2d
637], the high court held that while based on “both text and history, that the
Second Amendment confer[s] an individual right to keep and bear arms,” this
right should not be understood as “a right to keep and carry any weapon
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” (Id. at pp.
595, 626.) In particular, the court added that “nothing in our opinion should
be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
firearms by felons,” which are “presumptively lawful regulatory measures.”
(Id. at pp. 626–627 & fn. 26.)
Next, in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. 1
[213 L.Ed.2d 387] (Bruen), the court set forth a two-part framework for
deciding Second Amendment challenges: “[W]hen the Second Amendment’s
plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively
protects that conduct. To justify its regulation, the government may not
simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest. Rather, the
government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this
Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only if a firearm
regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition may a court
conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s
‘unqualified command.’ ” (Bruen, supra, at p. 17.) The court clarified,
however, that “analogical reasoning under the Second Amendment is neither
a regulatory straightjacket nor a regulatory blank check. . . . [It] requires
only that the government identify a well-established and representative
historical analogue, not a historical twin. So even if a modern-day regulation

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is not a dead ringer for historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough
to pass constitutional muster.” (Id. at p. 30.)
Lastly, and more recently, in United States v. Rahimi (2024) 602 U.S.
680 (Rahimi), the court upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute
prohibiting a person from possessing a firearm when he or she is subject to a
domestic violence restraining order and deemed to pose a clear threat of
physical violence to another. The court explained that its “precedents were
not meant to suggest a law trapped in amber” and that courts must ascertain
whether the new law is “ ‘relevantly similar’ to laws that our tradition is
understood to permit, ‘apply[ing] faithfully the balance struck by the
founding generation to modern circumstances.’ ” (Rahimi, supra, at pp. 691,
692.) In doing so, the court reiterated the statement in Heller that “many
[regulatory] prohibitions, like those on the possession of firearms by ‘felons
and the mentally ill,’ are ‘presumptively lawful [under the Second
Amendment].’ ” (Rahimi, supra, at p. 699.)
The Anderson court recognized this United States Supreme Court
authority as controlling and undertook the requisite legal and historical
analysis. Based on its analysis, the court held that, while the Second
Amendment presumptively protects the defendant’s right to possess a loaded
firearm notwithstanding his status as a felon, “sources from 17th-century
England, colonial America, and the early federal period demonstrate that
California’s felon-in-possession firearm regulations comport with our national
tradition of firearm regulation.” (Anderson, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp.
588–589.) The court explained that in this historical tradition, “categories of
persons thought to pose a danger to the community were forbidden to have
arms, and individuals were sometimes disarmed as a consequence of being
convicted of criminal conduct. When the founding generation framed and

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debated constitutional text, it considered such limitations inherent in the
right the Second Amendment protects.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, the court held
that “this nation’s tradition of firearm regulation allows for a categorical ban
on the possession of firearms by persons who have been convicted of a felony.”
(Id. at p. 599.)
We find no reason to stray from the reasoning of our Anderson
colleagues. As such, we adopt it herein in rejecting defendant’s Second
Amendment challenge. In doing so, we reiterate a facial challenge “is the
‘most difficult challenge to mount successfully,’ because it requires a
defendant to ‘establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the
Act would be valid.’ ” (Rahimi, supra, 602 U.S. at p. 693.) Thus, since
defendant raises a facial challenge, “ ‘to prevail, the Government need only
demonstrate that [the statute] is constitutional in some of its applications.’
(Rahimi, at p. 693 [144 S.Ct. at p. 1899].)” (Anderson, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th
at p. 600.) Here, as in Anderson, section 29800, subdivision (a)(1) is
“ ‘constitutional as applied to the facts of [defendant’s] own case.’ ”
(Anderson, at p. 600.) Defendant was sentenced in this case simultaneously
with another criminal case, Marin County Superior Court case No.
SC220927. In the latter case, he pleaded guilty to a felony count of false
imprisonment by violence (§ 236), as well as misdemeanor counts of drawing
or exhibiting a firearm (§ 417) and obstructing or resisting a police officer
(§ 148). In addition, the court found him in this case to have been in violation
of the grant of probation in case No. SC220927. Under these circumstances,
we may confidently conclude that, “in the founding era, he could have been
disarmed as punishment for at least one of these crimes.” (Anderson, supra,
at p. 600.)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

Jackson, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

Simons, J.
Chou, J.

A171289/People v. Maynor Oxlaj Siguantay

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