CourtListener 10865893•Busch v. Morgan CA1/3
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Filed 5/28/26 Busch v. Morgan CA1/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
TIMOTHY R. BUSCH, as Trustee,
etc.,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A171532
v. (Alameda County
GLORIA MORGAN, Super. Ct. No. 22CV009328)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Gloria Morgan (Gloria1) appeals from an interlocutory
judgment entered after bench trial ordering the partition by sale of property
co-owned by Gloria and the Theresa Morgan 2022 Irrevocable Trust Dated
February 23, 2022 (Theresa Decanted Trust), of which plaintiff Timothy R.
Busch is the trustee. Gloria avers Busch lacked authority to litigate the
partition, the judgment is void for failure to join indispensable parties, and
the trial court erred by refusing to apply the Partition of Real Property Act
(Code Civ. Proc., § 874.311 et seq.; PRPA; further undesignated statutory
references are to this code) or the Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act
(former § 874.311 et seq.; UPHPA). We affirm.
1 For ease of comprehension and meaning no disrespect, we refer to
Gloria Morgan, Theresa Morgan, Joe Morgan, Angela Morgan, and Lisa
Morgan by their first names throughout this opinion.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The property at issue in the partition action is a single-family residence
in Alameda County (the residence), which was Gloria’s family residence while
she was married to her then-husband, Joe Morgan (Joe). Gloria and Joe
divorced in 1989, and Joe subsequently married his second wife, Theresa
Morgan (Theresa). Joe died in 2020.
To assist in understanding the issues on appeal, we explain how the
ownership interests in the residence passed over time as well as the
numerous trusts involved in the case.
Gloria and Joe entered into a marital settlement agreement, which
contained a “Further Judgment on Reserved Issues” governing the
distribution of property (property settlement agreement), including the
residence. Under the property settlement agreement, Gloria was entitled to
exclusive use and occupancy of the residence until it was sold. Further, until
July 1, 1993, Gloria had the sole and exclusive right to determine whether to
sell the residence; after that date, Joe retained that right, provided he gave
Gloria 60 days’ notice. Gloria and Joe remained co-owners of the residence,
each with an undivided one-half interest in the residence, and were each
entitled to one-half of the proceeds from the sale of the residence. The
agreement also set forth various terms governing any sale. Gloria currently
lives at the residence.
In 2012, Joe conveyed his undivided one-half interest in the residence
to the Joe L. Morgan Irrevocable Trust II (Joe Trust). This resulted in the
residence being equally co-owned by the Joe Trust and Gloria.
Joe Trust
The Joe Trust was established in 1991 and contained the following
relevant provisions.
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The beneficiaries were Theresa, Gloria, and Joe’s children. This
included Joe’s two adult children with Gloria, Angela Morgan (Angela) and
Lisa Morgan (Lisa), who were listed as “Special Beneficiaries.”
Upon Joe’s death, the remaining trust estate was to be distributed as
follows. The trustee was “instructed to set aside in a separate sub-Trust, for
the sole benefit of [Gloria], a lump sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
DOLLARS ($500,000.00),” subject to certain restrictions. The trustee was
“instructed to set aside in two (2) separate sub-Trusts, a sum of SEVEN
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($750,000.00) in each sub-Trust,
to be held for the sole benefit of each of the Special Beneficiaries,” i.e., Angela
and Lisa. Finally, “[t]he remaining body or corpus of the Trust Estate shall
be allocated into a separate trust for the benefit of [Theresa].”
The Joe Trust appointed a trustee, Tom Reich, and named Busch as the
sole successor trustee. After Reich resigned in 1995, Busch succeeded him
and continued to serve as trustee until 2022, the details of which we explain
in greater detail below.
Regarding the removal of a trustee, the Joe Trust provided: “A majority
of the adult Beneficiaries may remove a Trustee for any reason, with or
without cause, by providing notice to the Trustee and the Successor Trustee.
Upon receiving such notice, Trustee shall convey the Trust Estate to his or
her successor.”
As previously noted, Joe passed away in 2020.
2022 Proceedings
On February 9, 2022, Gloria, Angela, and Lisa sent a letter via counsel
to Busch’s counsel (February 9 letter) seeking to remove Busch as trustee of
the Joe Trust. Specifically, the letter stated they were electing to remove
Busch under the provision of the Joe Trust permitting the majority of adult
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beneficiaries to remove a trustee “ ‘for any reason, with or without cause,’ ”
and instructed Busch “to marshal all the records of the Trust so they can be
passed to the incoming Trustee who shall be appointed within the next sixty
(60) days.” The February 9 letter did not identify any successor trustee or
provide notice to any such trustee.
On February 16, 2022, one week after receiving the February 9 letter,
Busch began the process of winding up the Joe Trust. Specifically, in
accordance with the Joe Trust’s instructions for distributing the trust estate
upon Joe’s death, Busch created sub-trusts for Gloria, Lisa, Angela, and
Theresa.
As trustee of the Joe Trust, Busch funded Gloria’s sub-trust with
$500,000, Lisa’s sub-trust with $750,000, and Angela’s sub-trust with
$750,000 from the Joe Trust estate. Busch funded Theresa’s sub-trust, the
“Theresa Morgan Irrevocable Trust created under the Joe L. Morgan
Irrevocable Trust II” (Theresa Sub-Trust), with all residual property of the
Joe Trust, including the Joe Trust’s undivided one-half interest in the
residence.
Upon their creation, Busch served as trustee of each sub-trust, but he
intended for the new successor trustee selected by Gloria and her family to
take over as trustee for all four sub-trusts.
However, Theresa did not want a trustee who was selected by Gloria, so
she asked Busch to decant her trust under the Uniform Trust Decanting Act
(Prob. Code, § 19501 et seq.). On February 23, 2022, Busch created the
Theresa Decanted Trust, of which he also serves as trustee, and decanted the
Theresa Sub-Trust into the Theresa Decanted Trust. As part of the
decantation, Busch transferred the Theresa Sub-Trust’s undivided one-half
interest in the residence to the Theresa Decanted Trust.
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As a result of the above actions, the residence was co-owned by Gloria
and the Theresa Decanted Trust, each holding an undivided one-half interest
in the property as tenants in common.
On March 21, 2022, Busch’s counsel responded to the February 9 letter,
stating that letter was “insufficient to cause Mr. Busch to be removed at this
time,” but also indicating Busch had “no interest in serving as trustee in a
situation where some beneficiaries do not want him to so serve.” Accordingly,
the response served as Busch’s “formal, voluntary resignation as trustee of
the three sub-trusts established for the benefit of Gloria, Angela, and Lisa,
respectively.”
On May 2, 2022, a successor trustee, Love Miller, was identified for the
sub-trusts for Gloria, Angela, and Lisa. Those sub-trusts were subsequently
transferred to Miller.
Partition Action
In April 2022, as trustee of the Theresa Decanted Trust, Busch
petitioned the court for partition by sale of the residence. Gloria is the sole
named defendant in the partition action. The petition listed numerous liens
and encumbrances on the residence, including a $1.25 million loan secured by
the residence provided by Fremont Bank.
In a pretrial ruling, the court found the action was not subject to PRPA
because that statute only applies to actions filed on or after January 2023.
In May 2024, the case proceeded to bench trial. Although it was not
transcribed, both parties’ posttrial statements of facts indicate the only
witness, Busch, provided testimony consistent with the above factual
summary.
The trial court found in favor of Busch and ordered the partition by sale
of the residence, finding sale and division of the proceeds more equitable than
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division of the property because it is a single-family residence. As pertinent
to the issues on appeal, the court found Busch had full authority to take the
actions in February 2022 regarding creating and funding the sub-trusts and
decanting the Theresa Sub-Trust to the Theresa Decanted Trust. Further,
because Gloria and Busch, as trustee of the Theresa Decanted Trust, were
the only owners of the residence, the court rejected Gloria’s assertion that all
interested parties had not been included in the action. Finally, the court
found the residence is not “ ‘heirs property’ ” under UPHPA, the predecessor
statute to PRPA, because the property settlement agreement constituted “an
agreement in a record binding the cotenants which governs the partition of
the property,” and the residence was therefore subject to partition.
The court entered an interlocutory judgment ordering the partition by
sale of the residence. Gloria appealed.
DISCUSSION
In a partition action, if the court finds the plaintiff is entitled to
partition, it issues an interlocutory judgment that determines the interests of
the parties in the property and orders its partition. (§ 872.720, subd. (a).)
The interlocutory judgment typically decides the manner of partition as
well. (See § 872.720, subd. (a).) As relevant here, the court may order the
property sold and the proceeds divided among the parties if it concludes doing
so would be more equitable than physical division of the property. (§ 872.820,
subd. (b); Cummings v. Dessel (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 589, 597.)
We review an interlocutory judgment of partition for abuse of
discretion. (Cummings v. Dessel, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 597.) “Under
that standard, ‘[t]he trial court’s “application of the law to the facts is
reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” ’ [Citations.] ‘[A] disposition that
rests on an error of law [also] constitutes an abuse of discretion.’ ” (Ibid.)
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Gloria challenges the partition judgment on three grounds. First, she
argues Busch lacked authority to litigate the partition action after the
February 9 letter sought to remove him as trustee of the Joe Trust. Second,
she asserts the judgment is void because Busch failed to join certain parties
to the action. Third, she avers the court erroneously concluded PRPA and
UPHPA did not apply to the action. We address each issue in turn and find
no error in the judgment.
I. Gloria Fails To Show Busch’s February 2022 Actions Were
Unauthorized
Gloria first challenges the trial court’s finding that Busch retained
authority to create the sub-trusts, decant the Theresa Sub-Trust into the
Theresa Decanted Trust, and initiate the partition action. She argues the
February 9 letter served to validly remove Busch as trustee of the Joe Trust
under the terms of the trust instrument and his subsequent actions in
February 2022 exceeded his authority as a removed trustee.
Probate Code section 15642, subdivision (a), sets forth the only three
methods by which a trustee may be removed: “in accordance with the trust
instrument, by the court on its own motion, or on petition of a settlor,
cotrustee, or beneficiary under [Probate Code] Section 17200.” After a
trustee is removed, he or she “has the powers reasonably necessary under the
circumstances to preserve the trust property until it is delivered to the
successor trustee and to perform actions necessary to complete the . . .
removed trustee’s administration of the trust.” (Prob. Code, § 15644.)
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Busch
acted within his authority when taking the challenged actions in February
2022. The Joe Trust instrument—the only way in which Gloria asserts
Busch was removed as trustee—expressly provides that a majority of adult
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beneficiaries may remove a trustee “by providing notice to the Trustee and
the Successor Trustee” (italics added) and that, “[u]pon receiving such notice,
Trustee shall convey the Trust Estate to his or her successor.”
However, the February 9 letter plainly did not name or provide notice
to any successor trustee, instead stating such trustee “shall be appointed
within the next sixty (60) days.” Further, as the trial court found, Miller was
not identified as a successor trustee until May 2, 2022, nearly three months
after the February 9 letter. On these facts, the court could find the February
9 letter did not remove Busch as trustee “in accordance with the trust
instrument” (Prob. Code, § 15642, subd. (a)) and that he therefore retained
authority to create the sub-trusts and initiate the partition action prior to
resigning as trustee in March 2022. That authority included Busch’s ability
to fund the sub-trusts according to the Joe Trust’s terms, specifically, funding
the sub-trusts for Gloria, Angela, and Lisa with their respective lump sums
and transferring the remainder of the Joe Trust’s estate (including the one-
half interest in the residence) to the Theresa Sub-Trust. In addition, as
trustee of the Theresa Sub-Trust, and in accordance with Theresa’s wishes,
Busch had authority to transfer the one-half interest in the residence to the
Theresa Decanted Trust.
Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding Busch
acted within his authority as trustee when taking the challenged actions in
February 2022.
II. The Judgment Is Not Void for Lack of Joinder
In litigating a partition action, the plaintiff must join as defendants all
persons who have a recorded interest “in the estate as to which partition is
sought,” as well as those whom the plaintiff knows claim an interest in the
8
property, including lienholders. (§ 872.510; see 12 Witkin, Summary of Cal.
Law (11th ed. 2025) Real Property, § 66.)
Gloria asserts the partition judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction
because Busch failed to join allegedly indispensable parties to the action.
Primarily, she contends Busch was required to join Angela and Lisa as they
were beneficiaries of the Joe Trust.
However, Angela and Lisa did not have a claimed interest in the
residence for purposes of section 872.510. Although they were “Special
Beneficiaries” of the Joe Trust, they were entitled under that trust only to
payments of $750,000 each—which they received in their sub-trusts in
February 2022. Gloria fails to show how Angela and Lisa were entitled to
any other assets of the Joe Trust, including its one-half undivided interest in
the residence, which, as previously explained, was properly transferred by
Busch to the Theresa Sub-Trust under the terms of the Joe Trust (before
being transferred to the Theresa Decanted Trust). Therefore, Angela and
Lisa did not have an interest “in the estate as to which partition is sought”
(§ 872.510), and the trial court properly concluded Busch was not required to
join them to the action.
Gloria also asserts the judgment is void for failure to join Fremont
Bank, which provided the $1.25 million loan secured by the residence, or a
“representative of Joe’s estate,” because the estate may be liable for
repayment on that loan. We disagree.
Section 874.225 provides that, subject to exceptions not pertinent here,
the judgment in a partition action “does not affect a claim in the property or
part thereof” of nonjoined interest holders if the claim was either recorded, or
known to the plaintiff, when judgment was entered.
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Although lienholders, including Fremont Bank, apparently should have
been joined under section 872.510, Gloria does not show that the failure to do
so voided the judgment. We note the petition expressly listed several liens on
the residence, including the $1.25 million loan provided by Fremont Bank.
Hence, that loan was clearly recorded and known to Busch when the
judgment was entered, and Gloria fails to demonstrate that either Fremont
Bank or Joe’s estate lost any claim by Busch’s failure to join them in the
litigation. (See § 874.225.) Moreover, nothing in section 874.225 suggests the
failure to join an interest holder voids an interlocutory judgment.
Finally, even assuming, arguendo, the petition failed to join an
indispensable party, Gloria’s contention that any such failure deprived the
trial court of jurisdiction to order partition is unavailing. (See Doe v. Regents
of University of California (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 282, 305–307 [rejecting
contention that failure to join indispensable party is a jurisdictional defect
rendering judgment void for lack of jurisdiction].) Thus, the judgment is not
void on joinder grounds.
III. The Court Did Not Err In Concluding Neither PRPA nor UPHPA
Applies to the Action
Gloria argues the trial court erred when it concluded PRPA and
UPHPA do not apply to the action. We are not convinced.
As an initial matter, Gloria appears to assert PRPA applied, yet she
acknowledges the partition action was filed in April 2022, before PRPA’s
effective date. Indeed, by its own terms, PRPA applies only to “actions for
partition of real property filed on or after January 1, 2023.” (§ 874.311,
subd. (c).) Thus, PRPA does not apply to the action.
10
Gloria avers that, even under UPHPA (which she apparently refers to
as “the earlier PRPA framework”), the court erred in concluding the property
was not “heirs property.”
UPHPA applies to actions “filed on or after January 1, 2022, for
partition of real property that is heirs property.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 119, § 1;
former § 872.020, subd. (b).) UPHPA defined “heirs property” as “real
property held in tenancy in common” that meets various requirements,
including, as relevant here, that “[t]here is no agreement in a record binding
all the cotenants which governs the partition of the property.” (Stats. 2021,
ch. 119, § 2; former § 874.312, subd. (e)(1).)
The court did not abuse its discretion in finding the property settlement
agreement constituted an agreement in the record binding all the cotenants
and governing partition of the residence. The property settlement agreement
expressly concerned the interests in the residence (which, at the time,
belonged to Gloria and Joe), and governed who had the right to sell the
residence. Specifically, Gloria retained the “the sole and exclusive right to
determine when and if the family residence is listed for sale until July 1,
1993,” after which point Joe had that right. It also included terms governing
the procedure for selling the property.
Gloria contends not all cotenants were parties because the property
settlement agreement was executed between herself and Joe, and did not
include the entities that later obtained Joe’s one-half interest in the residence
(i.e., the Joe Trust and ultimately the Theresa Decanted Trust). However,
Joe’s entire interest in the property was properly transferred to the Joe
Trust, which, by its terms, “own[ed] all incidents of ownership, rights,
powers, interests, privileges, and benefits of every kind that may accrue on
account of any of the assets of the Trust Estate.” That included the right to
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sell the residence after 1993. As we have explained, the Joe Trust’s one-half
interest in the residence was then properly transferred to the Theresa Sub-
Trust before decanting to the Theresa Decanted Trust. Thus, the property
settlement agreement bound the cotenants of the residence at the time of the
partition action: Gloria and the Theresa Decanted Trust.
For similar reasons, Gloria’s assertion that Joe divested his interest in
the property settlement agreement by transferring it to the Joe Trust is of no
moment, as Joe’s former interest passed to the Joe Trust. Finally, Gloria’s
argument that the property settlement agreement merely allocated decision-
making authority over the residence during her and Joe’s lifetimes, and thus
did not govern the instant partition action, is similarly unsupported.
In sum, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding the residence
was not “heirs property” under UPHPA. (See former § 874.312, subd. (e)(1).)
Accordingly, Gloria’s challenges to the partition judgment are unavailing.
DISPOSITION
The August 22, 2024 interlocutory judgment is affirmed. Busch shall
recover costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
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PETROU, J.
WE CONCUR:
FUJISAKI, Acting P. J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
A171532 / Busch v. Morgan
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