CourtListener 10865737•People v. Gonzalez CA2/8
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Filed 5/28/26 P. v. Gonzalez CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B341277
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA108927
v.
JOSE ALFREDO GONZALEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Alison S. Matsumoto, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with instructions.
Sabrina R. Damast, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and Nicholas J. Webster,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
Jose Alfredo Gonzalez appeals the trial court’s denial of his
motion to vacate a conviction pursuant to section 1473.7. We
reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to enter
an order granting the motion. Undesignated citations are to the
Penal Code.
In 1995, pursuant to a plea agreement, Gonzalez pleaded
guilty to a violation of section 288, committing a lewd act on a
minor under 14 years old (his niece). The record is unclear if the
conviction was under subdivision (a) or subdivision (b), which
involves force. For the purposes of this appeal, the distinction is
immaterial. In accordance with the terms of the agreement, the
trial court sentenced Gonzalez to 298 days in prison and five
years of probation.
Beyond these basic facts, the record of the plea is
scant. There is no transcript from the court’s taking of the plea
or sentencing. The current prosecutor was unable to locate either
the previous district attorney or his file. The previous defense
counsel is deceased. Judge Connor, the previous judge, provided
a declaration of her general practices but does not recall
Gonzalez’s case in particular.
Contemporaneously, Judge Connor marked a box on the
plea form stating: “Defendant advised of possible [e]ffects of plea
on any alien/citizenship/probation/parole status.” She later
declared that her practice was to ensure the prosecutor “fully
advised the defendant of the potential immigration consequences,
including deportation, denial of entry, and denial of
naturalization.” She would not check the above-mentioned box
until she was satisfied the defendant had received the full
immigration advisement.
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In December 2023, Gonzalez filed a motion to vacate his
conviction under section 1473.7. The prosecutor opposed the
motion. The trial court heard testimony from Gonzalez, one of
his immigration attorneys, and his wife. After hearing argument,
the trial court denied the motion, finding Gonzalez had not
established prejudicial error.
Because the record shows Gonzalez has established he
suffered from a prejudicial error, we reverse and remand to the
trial court.
Section 1473.7 allows noncitizens who have served their
sentences to vacate their convictions if they can establish that
their convictions are invalid due to prejudicial error impairing
their ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or
knowingly accept the actual or potential immigration
consequences of their conviction. (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).) To
show prejudicial error, the noncitizen must demonstrate a
reasonable probability that the noncitizen would have rejected
the plea if the noncitizen had correctly understood the
immigration consequences. (People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th
311, 316 (Espinoza).)
In making this determination, we consider the totality of
the circumstances. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320.)
Those circumstances include the noncitizen’s ties to the United
States, the importance the noncitizen placed on avoiding
deportation, the noncitizen’s priorities in negotiating a plea
bargain, and whether the noncitizen had reason to believe an
immigration-neutral disposition was available. (Ibid.) However,
this list is not exhaustive, and no single type of evidence is
necessary for relief. (Id. at p. 321.) Any assertions by the
noncitizen must be corroborated with objective evidence. (Id. at
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p. 316.) Objective evidence can include facts in declarations,
contemporaneous documentation of the noncitizen’s immigration
concerns, and the charges the noncitizen faced. (Id. at p. 321.)
We review independently whether noncitizens have
demonstrated a reasonable probability they would have rejected a
plea offer had they understood its immigration consequences.
(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 319.) Where the trial court has
based its rulings on a “cold record,” or, in other words, only
documentary evidence, we need not defer to trial court fact
finding. (Id. at pp. 319–320.)
We apply these guidelines to this case.
Gonzalez alleged he subjectively failed to understand the
mandatory immigration consequences his plea would have. Such
error is sufficient under the statute.
The record, although sparse, supports this contention.
Words creating ambiguity accompany each mention of
immigration consequences, contrary to the prosecutor’s assertion.
The crime to which Gonzalez pleaded made his deportation
mandatory and his inadmissibility unwaivable. Yet, the
advisements were of “possible” consequences. While Judge
Connor declared her practice was to ensure defendants received
sufficient immigration advisements, she too mentions only
possible consequences. She does not state she or the district
attorney made the mandatory consequences explicit. Because
Gonzalez’s plea predated Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356,
the requirement making this advisement mandatory for defense
counsel did not yet exist. (See People v. Manzanilla (2022) 80
Cal.App.5th 891, 905–906 [where immigration consequences
clear and virtually certain, after 2010 counsel now must advise
client of those consequences].) Nothing in the record suggests
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anyone involved in Gonzalez’s case anticipated this development.
Without an explicit statement about the mandatory
consequences, the immigration advisement was inadequate.
(People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 523 (Vivar) [failure to
advise of certain immigration consequences of plea rendered
representation constitutionally deficient].) Thus, we reject the
prosecutor’s argument that the presumption that the court and
counsel comply with the law created an inference Gonzalez would
have been advised of the mandatory consequences.
The record contains additional facts supporting the
inference that Gonzalez misunderstood the ramifications of his
plea because no one told him his plea carried a mandatory
immigration consequence. Gonzalez’s declaration and testimony
are corroborating. Letters from Gonzalez’s wife, neighbors,
sister, and mother-in-law also support this inference. Each of
these people was familiar with Gonzalez’s life at the time, and
each stated they did not remember immigration concerns ever
being mentioned in connection with his plea.
The trial court noted that a psychological evaluation
completed before Gonzalez’s sentencing included a
recommendation that Gonzalez be deported. Gonzalez testified
he did not remember his counsel discussing that with him. The
trial court found it “inconceivable that the report from the C.D.C.
was not discussed between the defendant and his attorney.” We
defer to the trial court’s credibility finding, but this fact supports
Gonzalez: the report lists deportation as a recommendation and
not as a mandatory consequence. As noted, an advisement that a
mandatory consequence is a possibility is inadequate. (Vivar,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 533 [advisement that plea might have
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adverse immigration effects insufficient where deportation would
be mandatory].)
Shortly after Gonzalez completed his sentence, he
attempted to resume the process of adjusting his status. This
fact also supports Gonzalez’s petition: if he had understood the
mandatory result, he would not have wasted his time or money
on an effort that risked bringing his status to the attention of
immigration authorities. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320
[taking actions that subject noncitizen to immigration authority’s
scrutiny inconsistent with an understanding that noncitizen is
now immediately deportable.)
We turn next to whether Gonzalez has established
prejudice from this mistake. We focus on whether there is a
reasonable probability Gonzalez would have turned down the
plea agreement had he understood the immigration
consequences.
We look at all the circumstances. (Espinoza, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 320.)
First, we consider Gonzalez’s ties to the United States.
Gonzalez came to the United States when he was 25. At the time
of his plea, he had been married to a United States citizen for
almost a decade and had two children, born in 1987 and 1991.
His sister and cousins also lived in the United States. Gonzalez
had a third child living in Guatemala but did not have a
relationship with her until years after his plea.
Gonzalez worked as a welder and was the main
breadwinner for a household that included his wife, children,
sister, sister-in-law, and mother-in-law. Since the age of 25, his
whole life had been in the United States. His wife stated they
planned to remain in the United States, and in fact Gonzalez was
6
in the process of adjusting his status at the time of his
conviction. Gonzalez continued these efforts after his release and
remained in the country until he was deported in 2009. These
ties are sufficient.
We consider next the importance Gonzalez placed on
immigration consequences. Gonzalez declares he did not
understand the immigration consequences, and he never would
have accepted the plea agreement if he had understood them.
The letters from people close to him corroborate that no one
discussed immigration consequences in connection with the
conviction with Gonzalez. His continued efforts to adjust his
status buttresses his claim that staying in this country was a
priority.
The trial court found that receiving probation instead of
prison time was Gonzalez’s priority. This preference does not
exclude Gonzalez’s concern with his immigration status. If
Gonzalez did not understand probation might come at the cost of
a more favorable immigration outcome, his focus on probation
makes sense.
Finally, we determine whether there was reason for
Gonzalez to believe an immigration-neutral disposition was
possible. Gonzalez’s attorney testified to several other crimes to
which Gonzalez could have pleaded that would have been better
for his immigration prospects. Although Gonzalez’s exposure was
eight years, his plea agreement was for less than a year of prison
time. He may have needed to accept a longer prison time to
obtain a lesser conviction, but he averred this willingness. The
sparse record we have does not provide reason to believe the
prosecutor would have rejected such a proposal automatically.
Moreover, though the trial court stated, and the prosecutor
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argues, it would have been irrational to roll the dice on a longer
sentence with such an offer in hand, the Supreme Court of the
United States has recognized that someone in Gonzalez’s position
might indeed rationally make such a decision, as Gonzalez
affirmed he would have. (Lee v. United States (2017) 582 U.S.
357, 371.)
DISPOSITION
We reverse and remand for the trial court to enter an order
granting Gonzalez’s motion pursuant to section 1473.7.
WILEY, J.
We concur:
STRATTON, P. J.
SCHERB, J.
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