CourtListener 10864958•People v. Dunbar CA4/1
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Filed 5/27/26 P. v. Dunbar CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085300
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE426590)
DEMETRIUS DUNBAR,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Anthony J. Campagna, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard L. Fitzer, under the appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent.
Demetrius Dunbar appeals from a judgment of conviction after a jury
found him guilty as charged of being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen.
Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1))1 and ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)), resisting
an officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)), giving false information to a peace officer
(§ 148.9, subd. (a)), possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11350, subd. (a)), and possession of drug paraphernalia (id., § 11364). His
appointed appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California
(1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) and People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436
(Wende), which identified three potential arguable issues. We granted
Dunbar an opportunity to file a supplemental brief on his own behalf, but
he did not do so. After reviewing the entire record (People v. Kelly (2006)
40 Cal.4th 106, 119), we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
While on patrol around midnight on July 24, 2024, La Mesa police
officer Alex Ohlendorf noticed that the rear California license plate of a Buick
a few car lengths ahead of him was unreadable. Suspecting that the driver
may have unlawfully removed the plate’s reflective coating to obscure its
characters, Ohlendorf conducted a traffic stop and pulled the car over.2
Dunbar was driving with a female passenger.
The reason for the stop, Ohlendorf told Dunbar, was the plate’s missing
reflective coating. During the stop, Dunbar produced a fake driver’s license,
1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 “A person shall not erase the reflective coating of, paint over the
reflective coating of, or alter a license plate to avoid visual or electronic
capture of the license plate or its characters.” (Veh. Code, § 5201.1, subd.
(c)(1).)
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something Ohlendorf wanted to investigate. He also wanted to investigate a
pipe he saw in the Buick that he thought was the type used to smoke
methamphetamine.
Before Ohlendorf could do so, Dunbar attempted to escape by driving
away. He led the officer on a short vehicle chase that ended at a dead end in
a parking lot, at which time the Buick stopped and both passengers bolted.
Ohlendorf immediately apprehended the woman; Dunbar was located a few
moments later hiding in a bush. Officers found a useable amount of fentanyl
on Dunbar’s person and a loaded gun in the woman’s purse, which she said
belonged to Dunbar. They also found a bag of ammunition and more drug
paraphernalia in the Buick.
Before the preliminary hearing, Dunbar challenged the car stop in a
motion to suppress. He contended that reasonable suspicion for the stop was
lacking either because it was undisputed that the Buick’s rear license plate
was visible from ten feet away or because Ohlendorf had no reason to believe
the plate had been manipulated. The motion was denied, and Dunbar was
bound over as to all counts following the preliminary hearing. His trial
counsel did not renew his motion to suppress prior to trial.
In addition to the charges for which Dunbar was convicted, the People
alleged he suffered two prior convictions in Colorado that are strikes under
California’s Three Strikes law. In 2009, Dunbar pleaded guilty to second
degree assault by admitting “with intent to cause bodily injury to another,
[he] unlawfully and feloniously caused bodily injury to [victim] by means of
a deadly weapon, namely: handgun.”
Dunbar’s second potential strike occurred in 2022 when he pleaded
guilty to one count of child abuse resulting in death. He admitted that he
“knowingly and recklessly … caused an injury to, or permitted to be
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unreasonably placed in a situation that posed a threat of injury to, the life
or health of a child [victim’s name] that resulted in the death of the child.”
The record of conviction reveals that Dunbar was driving with three
unrestrained passengers, including two children. While traveling 76 miles
per hour in a 45 mile per hour zone, Dunbar ran a red light and struck a
pickup truck. The unrestrained passengers were ejected from the car, and
one of the children died at the scene from blunt force trauma. Dunbar was
under the influence of methamphetamine, ecstasy, and marijuana at the time
of the crash.
After a bench trial on the People’s strike prior allegations, the court
deemed Dunbar’s assault conviction a strike because (1) it included all the
elements of subdivision (a)(1) of section 245, assault with a deadly weapon or
other instrument other than a firearm, or (2) it involved the personal use of a
firearm. His child abuse conviction was a strike, the court determined,
because it met all the elements of vehicular manslaughter under section 192.
The court sentenced Dunbar to four years in custody after considering his two
strikes.
DISCUSSION
Appellate counsel filed a Wende brief requesting that we independently
review the record for error. To assist our review, counsel’s brief identifies as
potential arguable issues whether (1) Dunbar’s prior Colorado convictions
qualify as strikes under California’s Three Strikes law, (2) the superior court
erred in giving the flight instruction as to all counts, and (3) trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to renew the motion to suppress in the superior court as
required to preserve appellate review (People v. Garrido (2005) 127
Cal.App.4th 359, 363–365).
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Based on our review of the information in the records of conviction,
there is no reasonable doubt that Dunbar’s Colorado convictions are strikes
for purposes of California’s Three Strikes law. (People v. Miles (2008) 43
Cal.4th 1074, 1083 [standard of review]; People v. Griffis (2013) 212
Cal.App.4th 956, 965 [entire record of conviction may be considered]
(Griffis).) His assault conviction was a “serious felony” and thus a strike
because he admitted to personally using a firearm. (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8),
(23); Griffis, at p. 965 [§ 1192.7, subd.(c) identifies strikes].) And Dunbar’s
child abuse conviction establishes the elements of gross vehicular
manslaughter under subdivision (c)(1) of section 192, which also is a felony,
because he acted with gross negligence and was solely responsible for the
injury that resulted in the death. (§ 1192.8, subd. (a); cf. People v. Wilson
(2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 500, 511–512.)
The prosecution relied on evidence of Dunbar’s attempt to flee to
show consciousness of guilt; accordingly, the trial court, as required by
section 1127c, instructed the jury that his attempted flight from Ohlendorf
may show that he was aware of his guilt. (CALCRIM No. 372.) Dunbar
neither objected to this instruction nor requested that the court clarify the
counts to which this instruction applied. But to preserve this issue for
appeal, Dunbar “was required to request an additional or clarifying
instruction if he believed that the instruction was incomplete or needed
elaboration.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 426; ibid. [“ ‘error
cannot now be predicated upon the trial court’s failure to [elaborate or clarify]
on its own motion’ ”].)
Turning to Dunbar’s trial counsel’s failure to renew the suppression
motion, a court will deem an attorney’s assistance ineffective only if a
defendant shows that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective
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standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failings, he or she would have
obtained a more favorable result. (People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 958.)
As a rule, we presume that a “counsel’s actions [fell] within the broad range
of reasonableness.” (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198.) This
presumption is unrebutted where, as here, the record “ ‘ “sheds no light on
why counsel … failed to act in the manner challenged.” ’ ” (People v. Lopez
(2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966.) Because further briefing in this appeal cannot
fill this gap in the record, Dunbar’s remedy, if any, is by way of habeas
corpus. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266–267.)
We have independently reviewed the entire record as required
by Wende and Anders and found no additional arguable issues. Competent
counsel has represented Dunbar on this appeal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DATO, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
DO, J.
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