CourtListener 10864399•People v. Lopez CA2/4
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Filed 5/26/26 P. v. Lopez CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B337120
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA486237)
v.
BRYANT LOPEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Sam Ohta, Judge. Affirmed.
Cynthia Grimm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General,
Nicholas J. Webster and Amanda V. Lopez, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Bryant Lopez was a member of the Boyle Heights gang. He
and a fellow gang member shot and killed a rival gang member. A jury found
Lopez guilty of first degree murder, shooting at an occupied motor vehicle,
and assault with a semiautomatic firearm. The jury further found true
firearm allegations. The trial court sentenced Lopez to 3 years plus 50 years
to life in state prison. On appeal, Lopez raises instructional and sentencing
errors. Lopez also asks that we review the sealed transcripts containing the
trial court’s review of police officer personnel files performed pursuant to
Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). He further
requests that we review the sealed transcripts of an in camera proceeding
regarding a privilege claim asserted by a police officer during a suppression
hearing. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On March 17, 2020, Jose Falcon (the victim) was shot and killed by two
armed men, who were later identified as Lopez and Matthew Hernandez.1 At
approximately 9:00 a.m. that day, the victim asked to use his friend Oscar
Robledo’s truck to charge his cell phone. Robledo gave the victim his keys.
When the victim was inside the truck, the two gunmen approached. Robledo
was nearby. Robledo described one gunman as “chubbier” and the other as
“skinnier.”
One of the gunmen said, “Where are you from,” and “Boyle Heights,” as
if he was claiming allegiance to that gang. Robledo responded that he was a
1 Hernandez and Lopez were tried before the same jury. Therefore, the
factual background is taken almost entirely from our opinion in Hernandez’s
direct appeal. (People v. Hernandez (B335034, June 20, 2025) [nonpub.
opn.].)
2
“paisa,” meaning that he was not from the United States. The gunmen told
the victim that they knew he was from White Fence, a rival gang. At some
point, the chubbier gunman directed the skinnier one to get Robledo on his
knees. The skinnier gunman pointed the gun at Robledo, who got down on
the ground. The gunmen wanted the victim to remove his clothing, but he
refused. They tried to force the victim out of the truck, but he resisted and
kicked them in response.
When the victim did not exit the truck, the chubbier gunman opened
the backdoor of the truck and started shooting at the victim. The skinnier
gunman followed suit and began shooting as well. During the shooting, the
victim was in the rear passenger seat of the truck. The medical examiner
determined the victim had suffered 18 gunshot wounds, which included entry
and exit wounds. He concluded the cause of death was multiple gunshot
wounds and the manner of death was homicide.
Law enforcement responded to the crime scene. The victim was dead.
Officers found 9-millimeter cartridge casings from a semiautomatic firearm
and expended bullet fragments on the ground. There were bullet impacts to
the rear, side windows, and body of the truck. A criminalist analyzed the
truck and determined the pathways of the bullets. One bullet went through
the bed of the truck. Several bullets entered the truck from the rear window,
and others came from the right side exterior. A 9-millimeter cartridge casing
was found in the side pocket of the door. A live 9-millimeter cartridge was
found inside the center console of the truck.
The criminalist noted that one bullet traveled from inside to the outside
of the truck, from the back to the front. The criminalist opined that if the
truck’s door was open at the time, then someone from the outside of the
vehicle could have shot into the open doorway, which would explain the
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trajectory of this particular bullet. She further stated that she found no
evidence that would suggest there was someone shooting from inside the
vehicle to the outside.
After the shooting, Hernandez posted a video on his Instagram account.
In the video, he stated that he was in White Fence territory and to “check the
scoreboard,” which was a sports reference to the murder of a rival gang
member. Hernandez said he was walking through a White Fence park
wearing Boyle Heights’ gang clothing. Hernandez was holding a handgun.
Lopez was also seen on the video with Hernandez. Both Hernandez’s and
Lopez’s gang tattoos were visible. There were various gang-related symbols
displayed on Hernandez’s Instagram account. There were also photos of
Hernandez and Lopez holding guns and making a hand symbol representing
the Boyle Heights gang.2
A gang expert testified about the Boyle Heights gang. The expert
identified Hernandez as a member, known as “Scooby.” Hernandez had
various gang-related tattoos, including a large “B” for Boyle on his face. He
also identified Lopez as a member, known as “Grande.” The expert also
testified about the White Fence gang and stated that Boyle Heights was its
rival. White Fence had a larger territory and shared part of the southern
border of Boyle Heights’ territory. The victim had several White Fence gang-
related tattoos. The murder occurred in White Fence territory and there was
gang graffiti near the crime scene.
2 At trial, Lopez did not testify or call any witnesses in his defense.
4
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A jury found Lopez guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187,
subd. (a), count 1),3 shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246, count 2),
and assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b), count 4). As to
count 1, the jury found true the firearm allegations under section 12022.53,
subdivisions (b) through (d). As to count 2, the jury found true the firearm
allegations under section 12022.5, subdivision (a) and section 12022.53,
subdivision (d). As to count 4, the jury found true the firearm allegation
under section 12022.5, subdivision (a).
The trial court sentenced Lopez to 3 years plus 50 years to life in state
prison, calculating the sentence as follows. The court imposed 25 years to life
for the first degree murder plus a consecutive 25 years to life for the firearm
enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d), but struck the
remaining firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c)). The court
stayed the low term of 3 years for shooting at an occupied motor vehicle plus
25 years to life for the firearm enhancement (§ 12202.53, subd. (d)) under
section 654, and struck the remaining gun enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd.
(a)). The court imposed a consecutive low term of 3 years for assault with a
semiautomatic firearm but struck the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd.
(a)).
Lopez appealed.
3 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
stated.
5
DISCUSSION
I. Jury Instructions
A. Perfect Self-Defense
Lopez argues the trial court committed prejudicial error by denying his
request to instruct the jury with perfect self-defense as a defense to both the
murder and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle charges. We disagree.
“[Perfect] [s]elf-defense, when based on a reasonable belief that killing
is necessary to avert an imminent threat of death or great bodily injury, is a
complete justification, and such a killing is not a crime. [Citations.]” (People
v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 133–134, italics omitted.) “For perfect self-
defense, one must actually and reasonably believe in the necessity of
defending oneself from imminent danger of death or great bodily injury.
[Citation.]” (People v. Randle (2005) 35 Cal.4th 987, 994, overruled on other
grounds by People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172.) “A trial court is required
to instruct sua sponte on any defense, including self-defense, only when there
is substantial evidence supporting the defense, and the defendant is either
relying on the defense or the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s
theory of the case. [Citation.]” (People v. Villanueva (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th
41, 49.)
Here, there was no evidence Lopez had a reasonable belief of imminent
and immediate peril warranting a perfect self-defense instruction. There was
no evidence that the victim threatened Lopez (or Hernandez) or initiated an
altercation. Rather, Lopez (and Hernandez) approached the victim in rival
gang territory, both with firearms in hand. They pointed their firearms at
the victim and tried to forcibly remove him from the truck before opening fire,
shooting him multiple times. It was Lopez (and Hernandez), not the victim,
who initiated the deadly confrontation. Thus, there was simply no evidence
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in the record that Lopez acted out of fear for his life or great bodily injury.
(See People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 134 [finding no basis for a self-
defense instruction where defendant “initiated [the] aggressive interactions,”
the victim “was unarmed,” defendant “did not testify,” and “there is no
evidence [defendant] ever told anyone that he had acted out of fear”].)
Lopez’s assertion that a round was fired by the victim inside the truck
is mere conjecture. The criminalist acknowledged one bullet traveled from
the interior of the truck through the exterior, back to front. She also opined
that if the truck’s door was open at the time, then someone from the outside
of the vehicle could have shot into that portion, which would explain the
trajectory of this particular bullet. According to the trial testimony, one of
the gunmen opened the backdoor of the truck and began shooting the victim.
This evidence corroborates the criminalist’s assessment.
The criminalist further testified that she found no evidence that would
suggest there was someone shooting from inside the vehicle. Moreover, no
firearm was recovered from the victim. There was no eyewitness testimony of
the victim brandishing a firearm, let alone testimony that he fired one.
Neither Lopez nor Hernandez testified in their defense about such facts. It is
also pure speculation by Lopez that “people” at the scene may have removed
evidence. We conclude the trial court did not err in denying Lopez’s request
for a perfect self-defense instruction, and we reject Lopez’s contention that
the court’s failure to provide this instruction violated his constitutional
rights.
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B. Voluntary Manslaughter (Imperfect Self-Defense)
Lopez argues the trial court committed prejudicial error by denying his
request to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as the lesser included
offense of murder based on imperfect self-defense.
A trial court must instruct on lesser included offenses whenever the
evidence raises a question whether all the elements of the charged offense
have been established and there is evidence of a lesser offense which is
“‘substantial enough to merit consideration’ by the jury. [Citations.]” (People
v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 (Braverman), disapproved of on
other grounds in People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 260, fn. 7.) In this
context, substantial evidence means evidence from which a jury composed of
reasonable persons could conclude that the lesser offense, but not the greater,
was committed. (Braverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 162.) The lesser
included offense instruction should be given only “where there is substantial
evidence to support it.” (People v. Burns (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1256,
citing People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 50.) Thus, “the trial court need
not instruct on a lesser included offense whenever any evidence, no matter
how weak, is presented to support an instruction, but only when the evidence
is substantial enough to merit consideration by the jury.” (People v. Barton
(1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 195, fn. 4 (Barton).) Instruction is not required “when
the evidence is ‘minimal and insubstantial.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 201.) We
apply a de novo standard of review. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690,
733.)
Imperfect self-defense is a description of one type of voluntary
manslaughter. (Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 200–201.) “‘“Under the
doctrine of imperfect self-defense, when the trier of fact finds that a
defendant killed another person because the defendant actually, but
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unreasonably, believed he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily
injury, the defendant is deemed to have acted without malice and thus can be
convicted of no crime greater than voluntary manslaughter.” [Citation.]’”
(People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 581.) Like perfect self-defense,
imperfect self-defense requires that “the fear must be of imminent harm.”
(People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082; People v. Viramontes
(2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1262.) As discussed, there was no evidence of
imminent danger of death or great bodily injury here. Thus, the trial court
did not err in denying Lopez’s request to instruct the jury on imperfect self-
defense. In light of our conclusion, we reject Lopez’s contention that the
court’s failure to provide this instruction violated his constitutional rights.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Lopez contends he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to
counsel’s failure to request a provocation instruction, either CALCRIM No.
522 or its predecessor, CALJIC No. 8.73.4 CALCRIM No. 522 states, in
pertinent part: “Provocation may reduce a murder from first degree to second
degree. The weight and significance of the provocation, if any, are for you to
decide. [¶] If you conclude that the defendant committed murder but was
provoked, consider the provocation in deciding whether the crime was first or
second degree murder.” Similarly, CALJIC No. 8.73 provides: “If the
evidence establishes that there was provocation which played a part in
inducing an unlawful killing of a human being, but the provocation was not
sufficient to reduce the homicide to manslaughter, you should consider the
4 CALCRIM No. 522 and CALJIC No. 8.73 are pinpoint instructions and
need not be given sua sponte. (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 880;
People v. Hernandez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1333.)
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provocation for the bearing it may have on whether the defendant killed with
or without deliberation and premeditation.”
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Lopez bears the burden of
showing both that counsel’s performance was deficient, falling below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms,
and that it is reasonably probable the verdict would have been more
favorable to him absent counsel’s error. (People v. Hernandez (2004) 33
Cal.4th 1040, 1052–1053.) “We presume that counsel rendered adequate
assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment in making
significant trial decisions.” (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 703.) We
will reverse on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel “‘only if the
record on appeal affirmatively discloses that counsel had no rational tactical
purpose for his act or omission.’” (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 980.)
Here, Lopez has failed to demonstrate that there could have been no
rational tactical purpose for his trial counsel’s failure to request that the
court instruct under CALCRIM No. 522 or CALJIC No. 8.73. As discussed
above, there was no evidence that Lopez was provoked by the victim or that
the victim was acting aggressively towards him. Rather, the evidence
showed that the victim was killed in a coordinated and unprovoked attack.
There was no evidence that the victim was armed. Thus, Lopez’s counsel
likely made a tactical decision that omitting a provocation instruction was in
his client’s best interest. Moreover, a provocation instruction would have
conflicted with trial counsel’s strategy. In closing arguments, Lopez’s counsel
focused on misidentification (i.e., Lopez was not one of the suspects) and that
the police failed to properly investigate the murder. Because we are unable
to hold trial counsel’s performance deficient, we need not address Lopez’s
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prejudice argument. Accordingly, we reject Lopez’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim.5
II. Firearm Enhancement
Lopez challenges the trial court’s imposition of a firearm enhancement
under section 12022.53, subdivision (d). First, he argues that the court was
unaware of its discretion to impose a lesser firearm enhancement. And
second, he claims the court abused its discretion in imposing this severe
firearm enhancement, which violated his due process rights. We reject each
argument in turn.
A. Additional Background
As relevant here, Lopez was charged with, and the jury found true,
firearm allegations under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), and (d) for
his first degree murder conviction. Prior to sentencing, Lopez requested that
the trial court strike the firearm enhancement under subdivision (d) of that
section, based on his lack of criminal history and youth. The court refused to
do so and imposed the indeterminate sentence. The court then struck the 10-
year enhancement under subdivision (b) and the 20-year enhancement under
subdivision (c) of section 12022.53.
Prior to imposing the firearm enhancement, the trial court
acknowledged Lopez’s lack of criminal history and youthfulness at the time of
the offense. However, the court ultimately found that striking the firearm
5 Lopez argues he was denied a fair trial due to the cumulative instructional
errors. Because we reject the individual claims of error, there is no
cumulative error. (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1020 [“ ‘Because
we have found no error, there is no cumulative prejudice to evaluate’ ”];
People v. Lopez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 339, 371 [same].)
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enhancement would endanger public safety and was not in the interests of
justice. In support of its finding, the court noted the vulnerability of the
victim, “who was trapped inside the car, unable to run away” and “the brazen
manner in which the killing happened in a neighborhood in the morning
when people were going to school or work.” The court pointed to “the
deliberate hunt for a person who the defendant considered to be an enemy,”
and “the vicious barrage of numerous bullets fired into the car at [the
victim].” The court further stated that “[t]he mental state of a person who,
for gang allegiance, hunts and kills another human being is a person who is
an extreme danger to the public.” The court concluded, “This type of
coordinated and planned act of extreme violence through the use of firearms
destabilizes the sense of safety and security in our communities and is clearly
the type of act the Legislature had in mind when it enacted . . . section
12022.53.” Therefore, “[i]n a case of this horrific magnitude of violence, . . .
dismissal of the enhancement would clearly endanger public safety and is not
in the interest of justice.”
B. Lesser Firearm Enhancement
Lopez argues that the trial court was unaware of the scope of its
discretion to impose one of the lesser section 12022.53 enhancements or even
a section 12022.5 enhancement.6
“‘Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise
of the “informed discretion” of the sentencing court. [Citations.] A court
which is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more
6 In the interest of judicial efficiency, we analyze the merits of Lopez’s
argument without addressing his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
(People v. Williams (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 649, 657, citing, e.g., People v.
Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 831.)
12
exercise that “informed discretion” than one whose sentence is or may have
been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s
record.’ [Citation.] In such circumstances, we have held that the appropriate
remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’
that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion ‘even if it had
been aware that it had such discretion.’” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58
Cal.4th 1354, 1391; accord, People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 431–432;
People v. Yanaga (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 619, 625.) However, “we presume
that a judgment or order of the trial court is correct, ‘“[a]ll intendments and
presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is
silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.”’” (People v. Giordano (2007)
42 Cal.4th 644, 666.) Furthermore, remand is not required when it would be
an idle act. (People v. Flores, supra, at p. 432, citing People v. McDaniels
(2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 420, 425; accord, People v. Jefferson (2019) 38
Cal.App.5th 399, 409; People v. Allison (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 688, 705–706.)
At the time of Lopez’s sentencing the law was clear about what would
happen when a “jury had also returned true findings of the lesser
enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c).” (People v.
Morrison (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 217, 222.) In such a case, the decision to
strike an enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d) “would leave
intact the remaining findings, and an enhancement under the greatest of
those provisions would be mandatory unless those findings were also stricken
in the interests of justice.” (People v. Morrison, supra, at p. 222.) There is no
basis for inferring the trial court did not understand this mechanism, merely
because it did not discuss it explicitly on the record. Lopez advances no
argument that persuades us otherwise. “In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, we presume that the court ‘knows and applies the correct statutory
13
and case law’” (People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 361), and as stated,
“‘“error must be affirmatively shown”’” (People v. Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th
at p. 666).
Contrary to Lopez’s contention, remand is not warranted based on the
California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th
1015 (McDavid). In People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688 (Tirado), our
Supreme Court held that a trial court could strike a section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) enhancement and impose a lesser, uncharged firearm
enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (b) or (c). (McDavid, supra,
at p. 1030.) About a month after Lopez’s sentencing, our Supreme Court
issued its decision in McDavid, extending Tirado and holding that a trial
court may also impose a lesser included, uncharged enhancement under
another statue if supported by facts that were alleged and found true. (Ibid.)
Therefore, after McDavid, the trial court had discretion to strike the section
12022.53 enhancements and impose lesser included enhancements pursuant
to section 12022.5. We conclude that, whether or not the trial court was
aware of this discretion at the time of resentencing, it undoubtedly would not
have exercised it. Therefore, a resentencing hearing would be unnecessary.
As discussed above, there is no indication the court was unaware of its
discretion to impose the lesser section 12022.53 firearm enhancements that
had also been found true by the jury. The court’s rejection of these
alternatives makes clear it would not have imposed an alternative sentence
under section 12022.5, subdivision (a), which authorizes imposition of
sentences that are for less or the same number of years as found in section
12022.53. We note our Supreme Court has cautioned that “when the
applicable law governing the defendant’s sentence has substantively changed
after sentencing, it is almost always speculative for a reviewing court to say
14
what the sentencing court would have done if it had known the scope of its
discretionary powers at the time of sentencing.” (People v. Salazar (2023) 15
Cal.5th 416, 425.) However, here, there is no speculation involved because if
the trial court declined to impose a 10- or 20-year firearm enhancement
under section 12022.53, it would not have exercised its discretion to impose
an even lesser firearm enhancement under section 12022.5.
C. Imposition of the Firearm Enhancement
Lopez contends that the trial court abused its discretion and violated
his due process rights by declining to strike his firearm enhancement under
section 12022.53, subdivision (d).
A court “may, in the interest of justice pursuant to [s]ection 1385 and at
the time of sentencing, strike or dismiss an enhancement otherwise required
to be imposed by this section.” (§ 12022.53, subd. (h); Tirado, supra, 12
Cal.5th at pp. 695–696.) Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1) provides:
“Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it
is in the furtherance of justice to do so.” Subdivision (c)(2) of section 1385
guides courts in exercising their discretion under subdivision (c) by, among
other things, instructing courts that the presence of certain enumerated
mitigating circumstances “weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement
would endanger public safety.” The statute further specifies: “‘Endanger
public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the
enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to
others.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)
We review the trial court’s determination not to strike the firearm
enhancement for abuse of discretion. (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88
15
Cal.App.5th 287, 298.) This means we will affirm as long as the court
exercised its sentencing discretion “in a manner that is not arbitrary and
capricious, that is consistent with the letter and spirit of the law, and that is
based upon an ‘individualized consideration of the offense, the offender, and
the public interest.’” (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) “‘“The
burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the
sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of
such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve
legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to
impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.”’” (People v.
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376–377.) The trial court’s “‘“decision will
not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. ‘An
appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its
judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.’”’” (Id. at p. 377.) In other
words, “a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Ibid.)
Here, the trial court considered all the relevant information and made
a reasonable decision not to strike the firearm enhancement. The court
considered various factors in mitigation, including Lopez’s youth and his lack
of criminal history, and concluded that the 25-year-to-life firearm
enhancement was warranted based on the “horrific magnitude of violence” of
the murder. The court stated that Lopez “deliberate[ly] hunt[ed]” a rival
gang member with Hernandez, the victim was particularly vulnerable, and
Lopez brazenly fired a “vicious barrage of numerous bullets” at the victim in
a neighborhood in the morning, with people headed to work or school. The
court also found that dismissing the enhancement “would clearly endanger
public safety and is not in the interest of justice.” Given the court’s careful
16
and thorough consideration, we conclude the court exercised its discretion “in
a manner that is not arbitrary and capricious, that is consistent with the
letter and spirit of the law, and that is based upon an ‘individualized
consideration of the offense, the offender, and the public interest.’” (People v.
Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 847.)
We discern nothing from the trial court’s ruling that supports Lopez’s
assertion that the court applied an improper standard for assessing the
danger to public safety. Specifically, Lopez cites to Gonzales to argue the
court did not additionally consider future dangerousness, i.e., “how the
dismissal of the enhancement will impact the length of the defendant’s
sentence.” (People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 228 (Gonzalez).)
In Gonzalez, the defendant was sentenced to 50 years to life for first degree
murder, plus 25 years to life for a section 12022.53, subdivision (d)
enhancement. (Gonzalez, supra, at p. 220.) The trial court denied the
defendant’s request to dismiss the enhancement based on its finding the
defendant “‘presently . . . does represent a danger to society.’” (Id. at p. 224.)
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the trial court applied an incorrect
legal standard. (Id. at p. 228.) It explained that in addition to the current
dangerousness of the defendant, a sentencing court should also consider how
dismissal of enhancements would impact the length of the defendant’s
sentence or parole eligibility, because a defendant “who has no prospect of
release from prison until he is elderly” may pose less of a risk to public safety.
(Ibid.)
Gonzalez is distinguishable. Nothing in this case indicates the trial
court expressly limited its assessment to solely whether Lopez is currently
dangerous. We thus must presume it considered the length of Lopez’s
sentence in making its determination, as there is nothing in the record that
17
establishes it did not. “We assume the trial court was aware of and followed
applicable law.” (People v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 724–725; see
also People v. Calhoun (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 117, 126 [a court’s sentencing
decision implies requisite subsidiary findings].) The court was not required
to expressly state what time period it was relying on in considering whether
to dismiss the enhancement. Indeed, if a trial court declines to dismiss an
enhancement, it is not mandated to use any “particular language” in doing so.
(People v. Bravo (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1157.) While “[s]ection 1385,
subdivision (a), requires a trial court to state its ‘reasons for [a] dismissal . . .
orally on the record,’ ” there is no similar statutory requirement when a court
declines to dismiss an enhancement. (Ibid.) Thus, a trial court need not
make any express findings on the record for a reviewing court to find a proper
exercise of discretion in denying a motion under section 1385. (Carmony,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378 [“[w]here the record is silent” we affirm].)
The trial court’s refusal to strike the firearm enhancement was within
the bounds of reason and does not reflect any abuse of discretion. We reject
Lopez’s assertion that the trial court’s decision violated his due process rights
for this reason.
III. Pitchess Hearing
Before trial, Hernandez, Lopez’s codefendant, filed a Pitchess motion
seeking discovery of personnel information of several officers. After the trial
court held in camera hearings on the requested materials, it ordered one
incident disclosed with a protective order. On appeal, Lopez requests we
independently review the in camera hearings to determine whether the
Pitchess procedural requirements were followed.
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A criminal defendant is entitled to the discovery of confidential police
officer personnel records if the information contained therein is relevant to
his ability to defend against the charge. (Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp.
537–538.) To obtain such records, the defendant must submit an affidavit
showing good cause for the discovery. (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3).) A
showing of good cause requires a defendant seeking Pitchess discovery “to
establish . . . a logical link between [a proposed defense] and the pending
charge” and “to articulate how the discovery being sought would support such
a defense or how it would impeach the officer’s version of events.” (Warrick v.
Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1021.) Discoverable information is
“limited to instances of officer misconduct related to the misconduct asserted
by the defendant.” (Ibid.; see California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court
(2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1021, italics omitted [“[D]ocumentation of past
officer misconduct which is similar to the misconduct alleged by defendant in
the pending litigation is relevant and therefore subject to discovery”].)
“ ‘When a defendant shows good cause for the discovery of information
in an officer’s personnel records, the trial court must examine the records in
camera to determine if any information should be disclosed.’ ” (People v.
Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 391, quoting People v. Winbush (2017) 2
Cal.5th 402, 424.) “ ‘[T]o protect the officer’s privacy, the examination of
documents and questioning of the custodian should be done in camera . . . ,
and the transcript of the in camera hearing and all copies of the documents
should be sealed.’ ” (People v. Anderson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 391, quoting
People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1229.) An appellate court
independently examines the record made by the trial court “to determine
whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a defendant’s motion
19
for disclosure of police personnel records.” (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th
1179, 1285.)
We are not persuaded that review is required here because there is no
indication that Lopez filed a Pitchess request or joined Hernandez’s Pitchess
request. Nonetheless, we have reviewed the sealed transcripts of the in
camera proceeding. We conclude that the court complied with the procedural
requirements of a Pitchess hearing, including an adequate description of the
documents provided to it, and that the court did not abuse its discretion. (See
People v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1231.)
IV. In Camera Review
Prior to trial, Hernandez moved to suppress a video from his personal
Instagram account. Hernandez argued that his Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable search and seizure was violated by the Los Angeles
Police Department when Officer Keoni Smith, shortly after the murder,
viewed an allegedly incriminating video on his Instagram account. During
the hearing, the trial court denied Lopez’s oral request to join his
codefendant’s motion, finding that he lacked standing. At the hearing,
Officer Smith testified he created an Instagram account to connect with and
befriend Hernandez. However, when asked about certain details about his
Instagram account, Officer Smith asserted the privilege under Evidence Code
section 1040. Thereafter, the trial court conducted an in camera proceeding
regarding the validity of the privilege, which included further testimony from
Officer Smith. The court ruled that the information was privileged under
Evidence Code section 1040, subdivision (b)(2).7 The court clarified that the
7 “Evidence Code section 1040, subdivision (b)(2), authorizes the trial court to
decline to disclose confidential records maintained by a public entity when it
20
“privilege relates to the name of the [Instagram] account and anything that
would identify that account, such as photographs, videos, and images, that
may be uploaded onto that account.”
On appeal, Lopez requests that we conduct an independent review of
the in camera proceedings to determine whether “any error” occurred. We
agree with the Attorney General that Lopez lacked standing to join in
Hernandez’s motion because Lopez failed to demonstrate that he had a
“legitimate expectation of privacy” in Hernandez’s personal Instagram
account. (See United States v. Payner (1980) 447 U.S. 727, 731.) It is
undisputed that Hernandez’s Instagram included an incriminating video of
both defendants. However, “ ‘[a] person who is aggrieved by an illegal search
and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a
search of a third person’s . . . property has not had any of his Fourth
Amendment rights infringed.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Workman (1989) 209
Cal.App.3d 687, 695.) Lopez fails to articulate any legal argument to the
contrary on appeal. In any event, we have reviewed the sealed transcript of
the in camera hearing and find no error.
finds the ‘necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the information . . .
outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the interest of justice.’” (People v.
Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 73.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ZUKIN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MORI, J.
COGLIATI, J.*
*Judge of the Santa Cruz Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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