Marriage of J.C.M. & A.G.M. CA4/1

CourtListener 10863426CalctappMay 22, 2026

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Filed 5/22/26 Marriage of J.C.M. & A.G.M. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re the Marriage of J.C.M. and A.G.M.

A.G.M., D086442

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No.
24FL002881C)
v.

J.C.M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Rebecca G. Church, Judge. Affirmed.
J.C.M., in pro. per, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION
J.C.M. (Father) appeals from an order denying his motion to quash an
income withholding order (IWO) that A.G.M. (Mother) served on his
employer. The IWO directed Father’s employer to deduct regular child

support amounts from Father’s paycheck. (See Fam. Code, 1 §§ 5208, 5230.)
As we will explain, Father has not established on appeal that the trial
court erred in denying his motion to quash. We accordingly affirm the trial
court’s order.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 5, 2024, the trial court entered a judgment of dissolution
in the marriage of Father and Mother. The judgment attached a marital
settlement agreement (MSA) and incorporated its terms.
Father and Mother have two minor children. The judgment included a
child support order, under which Father was to pay a regular monthly
amount of $2,501. The MSA also includes an agreement that Father would
pay that same amount in child support beginning on November 1, 2024. The
MSA further states that “[c]hild support payments shall be paid on the 1st of
each month.” However, the MSA does not specify in what manner Father
shall pay to Mother the child support obligation.
Unknown to Father, on the same date that it entered the judgment of
dissolution, the trial court issued an IWO on form FL-195. The IWO directs
Father’s employer to deduct $2,501 per month from Father’s income to satisfy
Father’s child support obligation and to send that amount to the State
Disbursement Unit.
According to Father, beginning in February 2025, his employer began
withholding his child support payment from his income on a semimonthly
basis. Father states that he did not find out about the existence, or service, of

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the
Family Code.

2
the IWO until he reviewed his paystubs on February 22, 2025. By this time
Father, pursuant to the MSA, already paid the February 2025 child support
payment.
On February 26, 2025, Father, representing himself without counsel,
filed a “Request for Hearing Regarding Earnings Assignment.” Father stated
that (1) there was good cause to recall the IWO; and, alternatively, (2) he and
Mother had entered into an agreement for payment of child support by an

alternative arrangement. 2 In addition, Father’s supporting declaration
stated that Mother had failed to serve Father with the IWO.
Mother, through her counsel, filed a response along with a responsive
declaration and a lodgment of exhibits. Mother’s filings are not included in

the appellate record. 3

2 On the form he filled out entitled “Request for Hearing Regarding
Earnings Assignment,” Father also checked a box pertaining to “arrearages”
that was not applicable to his situation. It appears that Father attempted to
use that portion of the form to obtain an order requiring Mother to reimburse
him for an overpayment of the February 2025 child support amount.
Specifically, Father contended that for the February 2025 payment, he paid
Mother by check without knowing that his employer would later deduct the
February 2025 child support amount from Father’s income. Although the
portion of the form that Father filled out was not the correct vehicle to obtain
reimbursement for this alleged overpayment, if the claimed overpayment has
not yet been refunded by Mother, Father may pursue a claim for
reimbursement in the trial court using the appropriate procedures.
3 It is Father’s burden as the appellant to provide us with an adequate
record on appeal. An opposing party’s responsive filings are often a necessary
component of an adequate appellate record. Here, however, because the
issues presented by Father’s appeal do not require us to review the contents
of Mother’s responsive filings, we reach the merits of Father’s appeal despite
the absence of those documents in the appellate record.

3
On May 30, 2025, the trial court conducted a hearing. The trial court
denied Father’s motion, concluding that (1) Father had not shown good cause
to recall the IWO, and (2) Father had not proven the existence of an
agreement for the payment of child support by an alternative arrangement.
The trial court also stated that it did not “find any service issues.”
Father timely appeals from the order denying his motion to quash the

IWO. 4
III. DISCUSSION
Father seeks a reversal of the trial court’s order denying his motion to
quash, and he asks us to direct the entry of an order allowing him to pay
child support by check at the beginning of each month, which he explains was
the “status quo” prior to the issuance of the IWO.
A. Relevant Statutory Provisions
We begin by reviewing the relevant statutory provisions. Pursuant to
section 5230, a trial court is required to include an IWO whenever it makes
an order awarding child support. Specifically, that provision states,
“(a) when the court orders a party to pay an amount for support . . . the court
shall include in its order an earnings assignment order for support that
orders the employer of the obligor to pay to the obligee that portion of the
obligor’s earnings due or to become due in the future as will be sufficient to
pay an amount to cover both of the following: (1) The amount ordered by the
court for support. (2) An amount which shall be ordered by the court to be
paid toward the liquidation of any arrearage.” (§ 5230, italics added.)
After receiving an IWO, the obligee may serve it by mail on the
obligor’s employer. (§ 5232.) The materials served on the employer by the

4 Mother has not appeared in this appeal.

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obligee must include a copy of the IWO and “[a] written statement of the
obligor’s rights under the law to seek to quash, modify, or stay service of the
earnings assignment order, together with a blank form that the obligor can
file with the court to request a hearing to quash, modify, or stay service of the
earnings assignment order with instructions on how to file the form and
obtain a hearing date.” (§ 5234.) The obligor’s employer must deliver those

items to the obligor within 10 days of being served with them. (§ 5234.) 5
An obligor may bring a motion to stay the service of an IWO pursuant
to section 5260. The statute describes two different grounds for such relief:
(1) a showing of good cause that satisfies four enumerated statutory
requirements or (2) the existence of an alternative arrangement for payment
of child support. (§ 5260, subds. (a), (b).) An obligor may also move to quash
an IWO on several other grounds, including that it “does not correctly state
the amount of current or overdue support ordered by the courts.” (§ 5270,
subd. (a)(1).)
B. Father Did Not Establish Any Deficiencies in Service of the IWO
Father’s first contention is that the IWO is “void on its face” because
“Mother’s attorney did not serve Father with the [IWO], in violation of the . . .
servicing obligations of [Family Code section] 215 (a)(b).” Father argues that
“[i]n post judgment modification or enforcement proceedings, notice must be
served on the opposing party . . . .”
This argument lacks merit because an IWO is not a postjudgment order
controlled by the service provisions of section 215. Instead, as we have
explained, an IWO is required to be served by mail by the obligee on the

5 According to Father, he did not receive notice of the IWO from his
employer.

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obligor’s employer. It is then the employer’s responsibility to provide the
included documents to the obligor. Father has not submitted any evidence
showing that Mother failed to follow the proper procedures for serving an
IWO on Father’s employer.
C. Father Has Not Established a Denial of Due Process
Father next contends that he was denied due process in connection
with the trial court’s issuance of the IWO.
As we understand Father’s contention, he believes that he should have
been given notice before the trial court issued the IWO. Father’s contention
lacks merit based on the statutory scheme we have detailed above. The
applicable law states that an obligor may challenge an IWO after it is served
by following the procedures explained in section 5260 and 5270. Father took
advantage of those procedures here and was given a full opportunity to raise
arguments challenging the IWO. Father accordingly received due process.
D. Section 5230 Is Applicable Here To Require Issuance of the IWO
Father next contends that for two reasons his case is not subject to
section 5230, subdivision (a) requiring the court to issue an IWO when
making a child support order.
First, Father points to the statutory language stating that “when the
court orders a party to pay an amount for support . . . the court shall include
in its order an earnings assignment order.” (§ 5230, subd. (a).) According to
Father, that provision does not apply to his situation because “the support
amount was privately and lawfully mediated and then adopted by the trial
court in a judgment.” In that instance, according to Father, the court has not
“order[ed] a party to pay an amount for support.” (§ 5230, subd. (a).) The
argument fails because, in entering judgment, the trial court did issue an
order requiring Father to pay child support. The judgment states that “child

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support is ordered.” In doing so, the judgment incorporates the “Child
Support Information and Order Attachment,” which details the trial court’s

child support order. 6
Second, Father contends that issuance of an IWO was improper
because “there were no child support arrears, and there is no history of
support non-payment nor late payment since the signing of the [marital
settlement agreement.” This argument fails because it is based on a
misunderstanding of the applicable statute. Under section 5230, the trial
court is required to issue an IWO when making a child support order,
regardless of whether the obligor owes any arrears. (§ 5230, subd. (a).) To
support his position, Father cites Code of Civil Procedure, section 706.030,
which allows a local child support agency to issue an “earnings withholding
order . . . on a writ of execution to collect delinquent amounts payable under a
judgment for the support of a child, or spouse or former spouse, of the
judgment debtor.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 706.030, subd. (a), italics added.)
However, that provision is inapplicable here, as the trial court issued the
IWO pursuant to section 5230, subdivision (a); the order was not issued
pursuant to section 706.030.

6 Father also contends, without elaboration, that he was denied due
process because “Mother’s attorney circumvented the reporting requirements
to the local child support agency codified in [Family Code section]
4701(d)(1)(2).” The statutory provision that Father identifies directs the
Department of Child Support Services to administer a statewide automated
system for the reporting of court-ordered child support obligations to credit
reporting agencies, which must include certain standards. Father does not
explain the relevance of that provision here, and we perceive no manner in
which it applies.

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E. Father Has Not Identified an Agreement For an Alternative
Arrangement to Pay Child Support
Much of Father’s appellate argument focuses on the contention that,
when entering into the MSA, he and Mother decided they would continue to
follow the status quo that was in place prior to the entry of the judgment of
dissolution. According to Father, the status quo consisted of him making
monthly child support payments by check directly to Mother at the beginning
of each month.
Under section 5260, a trial court may stay service of an IWO if it finds
that “an alternative arrangement exists for payment.” (§ 5260, subd. (a).)
The statute specifies that “[a]n alternative arrangement for staying a wage
assignment order shall require a written agreement between the parties that
provides for payment of the support obligation as ordered other than through
the immediate service of a wage assignment.” (§ 5260, subd. (b)(2).)
Here, the trial court found that no such alternative arrangement
existed. We apply a substantial evidence review in evaluating the trial
court’s factual findings. (See In re Marriage of Heiner (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th
1514, 1520.)
The only part of the MSA addressing the method for payment of child
support states, “Child support payments shall be paid on the 1st of each
month.” Notably, this language does not state that payment will be made by
check directly from Father to Mother. It also does not state that the parties
are adopting an arrangement for payment of child support “other than
through the immediate service of a wage assignment” (§ 5260, subd. (b)(2)).
Nor does it state that the parties desire to maintain the status quo regarding
the arrangement for making child support payments. Based on those
considerations, the trial court reasonably concluded that the parties did not

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enter into an alternative agreement for payment of child support by check,
rather than by an IWO, within the meaning of section 5260.
F. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Determining That
Father Failed to Establish Good Cause to Stay Service of the IWO
Finally, Father contends that he showed good cause to stay the service
of the IWO pursuant to section 5260, subdivision (a).
Section 5260 states that good cause for staying an IWO requires the
existence of four specific conditions:
“(A) The court provides a written explanation of why the stay of
the wage assignment would be in the best interests of the child.
“(B) The obligor has a history of uninterrupted, full, and timely
payment, other than through a wage assignment or other
mandatory process of previously ordered support, during the
previous 12 months.
“(C) The obligor does not owe an arrearage for prior support.
“(D) The obligor proves, and the court finds, by clear and
convincing evidence that service of the wage assignment would
cause extraordinary hardship upon the obligor.” (§ 5260,
subd. (b)(1).)

“Determinations of good cause are generally matters within the trial
court’s discretion, and are reversed only for an abuse of that discretion.”
(Laraway v. Sutro & Co., Inc. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 266, 273.)
The first condition concerns the best interests of the children. (§ 5260,
subd. (b)(1)(A).) At the hearing on Father’s motion, Mother’s counsel argued
that in light of one of Father’s reasons for wanting to pay child support by
check, it would not be in the best interest of the children to stay service of the
IWO. Specifically, according to Father, he should be permitted to pay child
support by check so that he could “reasonably deduct reimbursement of
children’s medical care and childcare” from his child support payments if
Mother failed to reimburse him for her share of those expenses. Father’s
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declaration elaborated: “Father is health insurance payee and daycare payee
for [the parties’ children]. By circumventing the status quo of payment
established by the [marital settlement agreement], the Court removes ability
for Father to reasonably deduct reimbursement of children’s necessary
medical care and childcare, which Mother has previously sought to disavow
financial responsibility without the specter of future litigation.” As Mother’s
counsel explained, it would not be in the best interest of the children to allow
Father to unilaterally deduct amounts from the child support payments
because the amount of available support would be impacted, and self-help

was not a permissible manner for resolving disputes over reimbursement. 7
Moreover, counsel explained that the IWO was in the best interest of the
children “because it removes a reason for communication and for interaction
between the parties, which reduces tension and ultimately benefits the
children.” The trial court was within its discretion to find counsel’s
arguments persuasive and to conclude that, for those reasons, staying service
of the IWO was not in the best interest of the children.
As for the second condition, Father failed to prove that he had “a
history of uninterrupted, full, and timely payment, other than through a
wage assignment or other mandatory process of previously ordered support,

7 As counsel pointed out, Father’s desire to deduct amounts that he
believed he was owed as reimbursement for medical and childcare costs was
contrary to the terms of the marital settlement agreement, which states
reimbursement shall be governed by section 4063. That statutory provision
requires a party to apply to the court for resolution of disputes over
reimbursement. (§ 4063, subds. (b)(4), (c).) In making its ruling, the trial
court noted that Father’s intention to deduct amounts from child support
payments “is not a permissible method of reimbursement pursuant to the
judgment and Family Code 4063 which has been ordered in this case.”

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during the previous 12 months.” (§ 5260, subd. (b)(1)(B).) Father stated in
his declaration that he had, as of the date of his declaration, paid Mother “on
time in the form of nine personal checks or cashier’s checks.” However, that
statement was insufficient to establish payment for the previous 12 months;
nor was it sufficient to show that there was any “previously ordered support.”
(§ 5260, subd. (b)(1)(B).)
The third condition does not disqualify Father, as the parties agreed
that Father did not owe any arrearages. (§ 5260, subd. (b)(1)(C).)
Finally, for the fourth condition, Father was required to prove that
service of the IWO “would cause extraordinary hardship upon the obligor.”
(§ 5260, subd. (b)(1)(D).) Father argues that service of the IWO on his
employer would cause him hardship because of “the risk of potential
employer retaliation” due to service of the IWO. However, at the hearing in
the trial court, Father was not able to identify any evidence suggesting that
his employer would retaliate against him for service of the IWO. Instead,
Father brought up an unrelated issue involving claims against his employer-
provided health insurance. Moreover, Father’s fear of retaliation from his
employer is unfounded because employers are statutorily prohibited from
using an IWO as ground for adverse action against an employee. (§ 5290.)
Accordingly, Father failed to satisfy the fourth condition requiring a showing
of extraordinary hardship.
In sum, we conclude that the trial court was well within its discretion
to conclude that Father failed to show good cause for an order staying service
of the IWO.

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IV. DISPOSITION
The order denying Father’s motion to quash the IWO is affirmed.

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.

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