Conservatorship of J.S. CA2/1

CourtListener 10863063CalctappMay 21, 2026

Full text

Filed 5/21/26 Conservatorship of J.S. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

Conservatorship of J.S. B349298

(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25NWMH00449)

PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF LOS
ANGELES COUNTY,

Petitioner and
Respondent,

v.

J.S.,

Objector and
Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Rene C. Gilbertson, Judge. Affirmed.
B. Jolene Lewis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Objector and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Laura Quiñonez,
Assistant County Counsel, and Robert J. Hill, Deputy County
Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent.
__________________________________

In the proceedings below, respondent Public Guardian of
Los Angeles County filed a petition under the Lanterman-Petris-
Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.) to appoint a
conservator for appellant J.S., alleging she was gravely disabled
due to a mental disorder. At the initial hearing on the petition,
J.S.’s counsel informed the court that she had advised J.S. about
her right to a jury trial, and J.S. wanted a court trial. The court
accepted the waiver without expressly advising J.S. of her right
to a jury trial, and without confirming with J.S. that she wanted
to waive that right. At the trial on the petition, the court found
appellant J.S. to be gravely disabled and appointed Public
Guardian as her conservator.
On appeal, J.S. contends we must reverse the court’s order
because: (a) the court erred in accepting a waiver of her right to a
jury trial from her counsel; (b) the court erred in failing to
independently advise her of her right to a jury trial; and (c)
substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding that she
was presently gravely disabled. We conclude that: (a) the court
did not err in accepting a waiver from J.S.’s counsel; (b) even if
the court insufficiently advised J.S. of her right to jury trial, any
such error was harmless; and (c) substantial evidence supports
the court’s findings. We therefore affirm.

2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. August 2025 Hearing
In July 2025, Public Guardian filed a petition to appoint a
conservator for J.S., alleging J.S. was “gravely disabled as a
result of a mental disorder.” The court appointed a temporary
conservator. The following week, a “Citation” was mailed to J.S.,
informing her of the date and time for the hearing on the
petition, and advising her that she had “the right to demand a
jury trial.”
At the initial August 2025 hearing on the petition, J.S.
appeared with counsel. The court greeted her, saying, “Good
morning. Nice to see you, Ms. [S]. Nice to meet you.” After
requesting the attorneys’ appearances, the court asked J.S.’s
counsel whether she had spoken with J.S. Counsel responded, “I
did, Your Honor. She does not wish to participate in a
conservatorship. I’ve advised her of her right to a court trial or a
jury trial and she’s requested a court trial.” The court responded,
“Very well. So with the understanding that you don’t want to be
on conservatorship, J[.], I’m going to waive the jury trial and note
that for the record. I find good cause to continue this matter for a
court trial for you.”1 When scheduling a date for the hearing,
J.S.’s counsel asked the court if there was anything sooner as,
“Ms. S[.] wanted a sooner date.”
After the court told J.S. that the doctor she requested
would be visiting her, J.S.’s counsel informed the court that J.S.

1 The minute order from the hearing reflects that J.S.

“personally waives all statutory rights to a jury trial. Counsel
joins. The Court accepts the waiver as knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily made.”

3
wished to briefly address the court. J.S. then stated: “I really
would like to be discharged from the facility [at] which I’ve been
staying. I’ve been there since June 17th and I have important
obligations within the community that I need to return to at this
point. I’m doing sufficiently well, and I’ve been stable and med-
compliant for a long enough period of time that I would really like
to be discharged from the facility today and/or have the
temporary conservatorship terminated on the basis of not being
gravely disabled.”
After some colloquy with counsel, counsel for Public
Guardian informed the court the recommendation for J.S. was
“IMD,” which the court explained was “a locked facility.”2 J.S.
responded that, “when I spoke with the woman who is acting as
my public guardian at the moment, she actually told me she was
going to request an ERS for me, if I were to be conserved.” 3 After
further discussion, the court informed J.S. there was “not much”
it could do that day. A court trial was set for mid-September
2025.

B. September 2025 Trial
At the September 18, 2025 trial, J.S. appeared remotely.
After asking counsel for their appearances, the court announced

2 IMD apparently stands for an Institution for Mental

Disease. (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2013) 222
Cal.App.4th 434, 451.)
3 According to the Los Angeles Department of Mental

Health, ERS stands for Enriched Residential Services.
(<https://dmh.lacounty.gov/our-services/countywide-
services/aotla/> [as of May 19, 2026], archived at
<https://perma.cc/Q25P-T26E>.)

4
the parties were “here for a court trial for Ms. [S.], and I have a
previous jury trial waiver that was taken on August 6th of this
year.” The court then confirmed with J.S.’s counsel that J.S. did
not object to proceeding while she appeared remotely; counsel
confirmed, saying she had spoken with J.S. and she was “fine
with moving forward with trial via CourtConnect.”

1. Testimony
Before any witnesses testified, the court announced this
was a private hearing, and J.S.’s counsel alerted the court that
J.S.’s father was in the courtroom. The court asked J.S. if she
was comfortable with her father remaining, and J.S. responded,
“no.” The court then asked her father to leave the courtroom.
Two witnesses then testified.

(a) Alete Arom
After J.S.’s counsel stipulated to Alete Arom’s credentials,
the court found her qualified to testify at the hearing. Arom
testified she had met J.S. “on a few occasions.” She first met J.S.
in November 2024, when she performed a competency evaluation
on J.S. and found her competent to stand trial.4 She next
interviewed J.S. in June 2025 in connection with a petition for
writ of habeas corpus that J.S. filed. Arom testified at the
hearing, and J.S. was “held on her hold.” She again interviewed
J.S. on July 29, 2025, for another petition for writ of habeas
corpus; J.S. was again “kept in the hospital.” Since then, Arom
“made multiple attempts to interview her”—three attempts the
previous day and one attempt the day of her testimony—but J.S.
declined to speak with Arom. When the court asked whether

4 The record is silent as to why J.S. was on trial.

5
Arom felt she had sufficient information to testify about J.S.,
Arom confirmed she did, explaining she had also received
updates regarding J.S. from the hospital and from the
conservator.
Arom opined that J.S. suffered from “bipolar disorder with
psychotic features most recent episodes manic [sic].” Arom
testified J.S. had informed her that, after the court terminated
her conservatorship in April 2025, she “briefly stayed with her
grandmother but left” and “stopped taking her medication.” J.S.
gave “many different explanations and reasons why she stopped
taking her medication, most of them blaming others.” She also
“picked up” a “criminal charge” over “some trouble at the airport.”
Arom agreed that when J.S. stopped taking her medication,
it caused her “to decompensate to the point where she was
hospitalized on three occasions and is currently hospitalized for
the fourth occasion.” Arom testified that J.S. might have taken
her medication for a few days between hospitalizations “but [was]
predominantly noncompliant when out of the hospital.”
J.S. told Arom that “on this fourth occasion . . . she had
stopped taking her medication. She was wandering. She lost her
shoes. Her feet were bleeding. She was covered in menstrual
blood in an alley in Pasadena, and a good Samaritan called and
had her admitted to the hospital.” J.S. added that “at that time[,]
she was delusional and believed that she was God, and that she
might not be in this world.”
Arom testified that when she met J.S. in connection with
the two petitions for writs of habeas corpus, J.S. “was more
stable” because she was “hospitalized,” “on medication,” and “very
motivated to do well, to get out, and to win her hearings” but she

6
“still had manic ideas about her plan for self-care” and “was
gravely disabled.”
When asked how J.S.’s mental health condition affected her
ability to take care of herself, Arom explained that J.S. “has
proven time and again that she stops taking her medication when
given an opportunity.” Arom explained that J.S. informed her
that when her conservatorship was last terminated, she
“promised Judge Herin that she would stay on” her medications,
and that the judge had even “lectured her and was very firm,” yet
J.S. stopped taking her medication anyway, and “severely
decompensates to the point where she absolutely cannot manage
her food, clothing, and shelter.” Arom also found significant that
J.S. was “hospitalized four times in a very short order.” Arom
opined that “the only time she’s really been stable is when on a
conservatorship” and that, “when she is good and when she’s
stable, she is very convincing, and she says ‘this time is going to
be different’ and this time there’s all these reasons that she’s
going to take her medication; and even though she sounds very
believable, I think ultimately, she does not take her medication,
and she cannot manage reasonable decisions.”
When asked about J.S.’s stated plans if the court were to
terminate her conservatorship, Arom testified that J.S. intended
to return to U.C. Santa Cruz where she had been a student. J.S.
claimed “she had organized everything to get financial aid, go to
Santa Cruz, move into student housing, and resume her
education there and live off of her financial aid.” Arom opined
this was not a viable plan for multiple reasons: Arom had seen
no evidence U.C. Santa Cruz had “reaccepted” J.S.; Arom
believed there were “many hoops that have to be cleared,
including a letter from a mental health professional”; Arom had

7
seen no evidence J.S. had been awarded financial aid; and Arom
was unclear “how one can begin school in the middle of the year.”
Arom testified the most important reason the plan was not viable
was “the fact that she cannot manage on her own at this point
because of the frequent . . . discontinuation of medication and
decomposition.” Specifically, J.S.’s “inability to stay medicated
prevents her from managing any food, clothing, or shelter,
especially completely independently at UC Santa Cruz with
absolutely no verification.” Arom concluded there was no
alternative to a conservatorship.
On cross-examination, Arom testified that, based on “staff
reports and some follow up,” J.S.’s symptomology has “gotten
significantly worse” since Arom last spoke with her in July 2025.
Arom added that J.S. was “on a Riese petition.”5

(b) J.S.
J.S. testified that, if released from conservatorship, she
would live in “off-campus housing that’s provided to UC Santa
Cruz students by a website that is tailored and geared towards us
Santa Cruz students, such that they can rent and sublet to one

5 “A Medication Capacity or Riese hearing (WIC 5332-5334)

is a facility-based hearing to determine if a person on any of the
LPS holds or on a temporary conservatorship has the capacity to
refuse psychiatric medications.” (Medication Capacity or Riese
Hearing <https://www.lacourt.ca.gov/pages/lp/mental-
health/tp/facility-based-hearings/cp/medication-capacity-or-riese-
hearing> [as of May 19, 2026], archived at
<https://perma.cc/Z379-2487>.) Public Guardian contends that
“[b]y referring to Riese, Dr. Arom meant that the power to
involuntarily medicate J.S. had to be invoked.” (Fn. omitted.)
J.S. does not dispute Public Guardian’s interpretation.

8
another.” She claimed she had received documentation
confirming her readmission to the school as well as a financial
aid package she intended to accept as soon as she was out of the
hospital.6 After that, she could arrange her housing and enroll in
classes. The financial aid would cover housing and tuition but
not food, so J.S. was “applying for EBT.” She did not know the
exact amount of her financial aid package but said she would “see
it when it’s on my computer” and that it was “need-based” so
would be sufficient to cover her needs. J.S. also believed her
parents would help her out financially, “though . . . they’ve given
me no guarantees of as much yet.” She testified that, once she
went to Santa Cruz, “I think that I will be able to figure out how
to get myself a job so that I can both save some money and also
contribute to my own living.”
J.S. stated she suffered from “bipolar one disorder with
psychotic features.” When unmedicated, “I become psychotic in
which I believe things that aren’t true, as in I believe delusions;
and when I’m also not on my medication, I can -- I can either be
very depressed or I can be very manic, meaning that I have
elevated mood or I am incapable of functioning because I feel very
depressed so that I may even be too puzzled.”
When asked whether she was willingly taking her
medications, J.S. responded, “Only when I’m on medications that
help me.” She explained she had been prescribed Klonopin,
Lithium, Valproic Acid, and Seroquel, but only Klonopin and
Lithium helped her—“the other two medications are unnecessary
and cause me to gain weight and cause other unnecessary side

6 Any such documentation is absent from the appellate

record, and the record does not reflect that J.S. sought to
introduce any documents into evidence.

9
effects that are harmful to my body.” J.S. had discussed these
side effects with her doctor, but “he has not been willing to take
me off of them, in spite of the fact that I told him that they are
unnecessary and they’re not helpful to me.”
J.S. testified that if she were not in a conservatorship, she
would “absolutely” continue with mental health treatment,
explaining she would find a psychiatrist through Medi-Cal or
through Anthem (provided through U.C. Santa Cruz) and would
get her medication through her health insurance, either from a
pharmacy or hospital, or through her psychiatrist. J.S. stated,
“Medication is important for people who need them [sic]. I’m
someone who needs them, and therefore, I can get them when I
need them because I need them.”
J.S. disagreed with Arom’s testimony that her most recent
hospitalization was due to not taking her medication. J.S.
claimed, “a lot of things happened that didn’t have to do with
whether or not I made the choice to take my medication. A lot of
things happened that had to do with the fact that I was either
prevented from taking my medication or something stopped me,
even though I was about to take my medication. Something
being my brother.” But it would be different if the court released
her from conservatorship this time because “I’m going to be living
in Santa Cruz far away from people who make my mental health
worse.” J.S. did not believe she needed a conservatorship because
“I know how to take care of myself, and I have a plan for self-
care, which includes shelter, food and clothing, which
demonstrates that I’m not gravely disabled.”
On cross-examination, J.S. admitted that, in April 2025,
she also told the judge at her conservatorship hearing that she
was going to continue to take her medication, “and I meant it.”

10
But J.S. was “prevented” from continuing with her medication for
several reasons: “It was stolen from me. I was stopped and told I
had already taken it, when I hadn’t take[n] it yet; and let’s see.
The last reason is I was not able to get home to get my
medication because I couldn’t walk, like, 15 miles to get home to
get my medication, and the only person who could help me get my
medication was not willing to help me get the medication.” She
admitted not taking her medication caused her to “end[] up in the
hospital because I became manic and unstable.” She stated that
if her medication were stolen this time, she would “go to someone,
ask for a phone number for a pharmacy, go to -- call the
pharmacy, tell them that I need a new prescription of my
medication and then work through whatever hoop I need to work
through in order to get my medication immediately”—something
she did not do the last time her medication was stolen “because I
never expected to have my medication stolen before.” When
asked what medication she would take, J.S. testified, “I just take
medication that helps me” but “I will not take medication that
does not help me.”

2. Ruling
After brief arguments from counsel, the court reviewed the
evidence. The court found Arom’s testimony “very credible as she
discussed in some detail not just the period of decompensation,
but her professional opinion as to what happens in those
situation[s] with [J.S.] and how it impacts her.” Conversely, the
court was “not satisfied with some of [J.S.]’s explanations
regarding why she was unable or not in a position or was
prevented . . . from taking her medication.”
While J.S. “gave some explanation as to” her future plans,
“this fell short, and in the court’s judgment[, J.S.] was lacking in

11
her ability to make sure that her basic needs are met.” The court
found that J.S. had “some limited insight” but that it was “pretty
clear from Dr. Arom’s testimony, as well as from [J.S.] herself,
that she is not going to continue her medication.” The court
stated J.S.’s ideas for self-care “in a vacuum are very good ideas,
but in the opinion of Dr. Arom at this point in time, she’s just
currently not in a position to carry out those goals and objectives
without . . . a bit more time and work on her part.” The court
concurred that J.S.’s plan to reenroll in U.C. Santa Cruz was not
a “viable plan.” When the court asked J.S.’s conservator to
contact U.C. Santa Cruz to ensure J.S. retained her spot in a
future class, J.S. interrupted the court to state she “would really
prefer that no one intervene with my education, and that
includes my public guardian in that matter because I do not find
my public guardian to be sophisticated and intelligent and
I’d . . . prefer she not involve herself in my studies.”
After addressing J.S.’s statement, the court found “beyond
a reasonable doubt, based on the evidence presented[,] that [J.S.]
is currently gravely disabled” and appointed Public Guardian as
her conservator. The court stated that “locked subacute will be
identified as least restrictive for [J.S.]” and made other rulings.7
As the court began thanking the parties for being present, J.S.
interrupted with, “Judge? Your Honor? Your Honor? Your

7 (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5358, subd. (a)(1) [“When ordered by

the court after the hearing required by this section, a conservator
appointed pursuant to this chapter shall place his or her
conservatee as follows: [¶] (A) For a conservatee who is gravely
disabled, as defined in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of
subdivision (h) of Section 5008, in the least restrictive alternative
placement, as designated by the court”].)

12
Honor?” After the court acknowledged her, J.S. asked, “Did you
say, ‘lease restrictive’?” The court explained that “least
restrictive at this time is identified as locked subacute,
which . . . in plain language . . . [is] like an IMD placement.”
J.S. timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
J.S. argues we must reverse the court’s order appointing
Public Guardian as her conservator because: (a) the court erred
in accepting J.S.’s waiver of a jury trial through her counsel; (b)
the court erred in not informing her of her right to a jury trial;
and (c) substantial evidence does not support the court’s
conclusion that she is gravely disabled. We address each
contention in turn.

A. The Court Did Not Err in Accepting J.S.’s
Waiver of a Jury Trial Through Her Counsel

1. J.S.’s Counsel Validly Waived J.S.’s Right
to a Jury Trial
Under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, “[a] conservator of
the person, of the estate, or of the person and the estate may be
appointed for a person who is gravely disabled.” (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 5350.) “The person for whom conservatorship is sought
shall have the right to demand a court or jury trial on the issue of
whether the person is gravely disabled.” (Id. at subd. (d)(1).)
“[B]efore the establishment of a conservatorship of the person or
estate, or both, the court shall inform the proposed conservatee of
all of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (6) The proposed conservatee has
the right to oppose the proceeding, to have the matter of the
establishment of the conservatorship tried by jury, to be

13
represented by legal counsel if the proposed conservatee so
chooses, and to have legal counsel appointed by the court if not
otherwise represented by legal counsel.” (Prob. Code, § 1828,
subd. (a).)8
Here, at the initial hearing on the petition, the court asked
J.S.’s counsel whether she spoke with J.S. J.S.’s attorney
responded, “I did, Your Honor. She does not wish to participate
in a conservatorship. I’ve advised her of her right to a court trial
or a jury trial and she’s requested a court trial.” The court
responded, “Very well. So with the understanding that you don’t
want to be on conservatorship, J[.], I’m going to waive the jury
trial and note that for the record. I find good cause to continue
this matter for a court trial for you.”
J.S. argues the court erred by failing to elicit a waiver of
her right to jury trial from her personally, as opposed to from her
counsel. We disagree.
We find instructive Conservatorship of Mary K. (1991) 234
Cal.App.3d 265 (Mary K.) and Conservatorship of C.O. (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 894 (C.O.).
In Mary K., at the initial hearing on the petition, the court
inquired of appellant’s counsel whether he had spoken with his
client. (Mary K., supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 269.) Counsel
responded that he had, and “[s]he has indicated that she doesn’t
feel that she needs a conservator and for that reason, while she is
not requesting a jury trial, she would like the Court itself to have

8 This section of the Probate Code is incorporated into the

LPS Act. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5350 [“The procedure for
establishing, administering, and terminating a conservatorship
under this chapter shall be the same as that provided in Division
4 (commencing with Section 1400) of the Probate Code”].)

14
a trial on her behalf.” (Ibid.) On appeal, the appellant argued
that “California law requires that the conservatee herself be
advised of her rights and that the conservatee personally waive
them” and that “the court’s failure to procure such personal
waivers here require reversal of the judgment.” (Ibid.) The
appellate court disagreed, finding “an on-the-record personal
waiver of a jury trial is not required from the proposed
conservatee. Rather, counsel may validly waive the conservatee’s
right to a jury trial.” (Id. at p. 271.) “Here, appellant’s counsel
stated he had spoken with his client and she wished to waive a
jury trial. Appellant does not contend her attorney was without
actual authority to waive a jury. Thus, the record supports the
conclusion that the right to a jury trial on the conservatorship
petition was validly waived.” (Ibid.)
Similarly, in C.O., “C.O. had been placed under an LPS
conservatorship with the public guardian as conservator.” (C.O.,
supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 901.) The public guardian then
“petitioned for reappointment as LPS conservator for C.O.,” and
the court caused a written citation to be served on C.O.,
informing him of the time and date for the hearing on the
petition, and advising him that he had “the right to a court or
jury trial on the issue of grave disability.” (Ibid.) At the initial
hearing, C.O.’s attorney informed the court, in C.O.’s presence,
“Your Honor, I’ve had a chance to speak with [C.O.] a couple of
times before today’s court hearing. And at this time [C.O.] is
requesting a court trial.” (Id. at p. 902.) The trial court set the
matter for a court trial and “did not advise C.O. on the record of
his right to a jury trial or elicit a personal waiver of that right
from him.” (Ibid.) Neither C.O. nor his attorney requested a
court trial at the initial hearing or at the trial itself. (Ibid.)

15
On appeal, C.O. “contends the trial court was statutorily
required to obtain from him a personal waiver of his right to jury
trial, and the trial court erred by relying upon the waiver by his
counsel.” (C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 909.) The appellate
court disagreed, holding that “absent circumstances suggesting
the proposed conservatee’s counsel lacked actual authority,
counsel disregarded his client’s wishes, or that the proposed
conservatee was actually unaware of his right to a trial by
jury . . . counsel may waive on behalf of the proposed conservatee
his or her right to have the matter of establishment or
reestablishment of the conservatorship decided by jury trial.”
(Id. at p. 911.) The appellate court also found “there is
substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s implied finding
that C.O.’s waiver was knowing and voluntary given the citation
mailed to him that explained his right to jury trial, the evidence
that his counsel informed him of his right to jury trial, his
presence at the hearing when his counsel stated he wished a
‘court trial,’ and the evidence of his communications with his
counsel about how he wished to proceed.” (Id. at pp. 918–919.)
J.S.’s situation is essentially identical to those discussed in
Mary K. and C.O. The citation mailed to J.S. explained her right
to a jury trial. J.S.’s counsel stated, in J.S.’s presence, that she
had specifically advised J.S. on her right to a jury trial, and J.S.
requested a court trial. Neither in the proceedings below nor on
appeal has J.S. suggested—much less pointed to any evidence—
demonstrating that her counsel deceived the court or lacked
authority to waive the right to a jury trial on her behalf. J.S.
does not claim she was unaware of her right to a jury trial.
Moreover, the record affirmatively demonstrates J.S.
understood what was happening both at the initial hearing and

16
at trial, and was able to advocate for herself. At the initial
hearing, as the court was setting a trial date on the
conservatorship petition, J.S. was able to communicate to her
counsel that she wanted a sooner trial date. After the court set a
trial date, J.S. personally addressed the court to explain why she
should be released immediately. When Public Guardian’s counsel
informed the court the recommendation for J.S. was “IMD,” J.S.
told the court her temporary guardian had informed her she
would request an “ERS” for her.
On the day of trial, before testimony began, she expressed
being uncomfortable that her father was in the courtroom. As
the court was ruling on the petition and stating it would direct
the conservator to contact U.C. Santa Cruz to ensure it would
keep a spot open for J.S. in a future class, J.S. interrupted the
court to express her opposition to this direction. And, when J.S.
was unsure the court had said “least restrictive,” she persistently
sought the court’s attention until she was able to ask about it.
On this record, we conclude J.S. validly waived her right to
a jury trial.

2. J.S.’s Arguments to the Contrary Are
Unpersuasive
J.S. cites several cases that she claims stand for the
proposition that the court was not permitted to accept a jury
waiver from her attorney. We find her authority distinguishable.
J.S. first cites to a pair of Supreme Court cases regarding
waiving the right to jury trial in the context of other civil
commitment proceedings. In People v. Blackburn (2015) 61
Cal.4th 1113 (Blackburn), our Supreme Court held that, in
proceedings to extend the involuntary commitment of a mentally
disordered offender, “the trial court must advise the MDO

17
defendant personally of his or her right to a jury trial and, before
holding a bench trial, must obtain a personal waiver of that right
from the defendant unless the court finds substantial evidence—
that is, evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt—that the
defendant lacks the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary
waiver, in which case defense counsel controls the waiver
decision.” (Id. at p. 1116.)
Similarly, in People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160 (Tran),
our high court stated that in proceedings to extend the
commitment of a person originally committed after pleading not
guilty by reason of insanity to a criminal defense, the “trial court
must advise the NGI defendant personally of his or her right to a
jury trial and, before holding a bench trial, must obtain a
personal waiver of that right from the defendant unless the court
finds substantial evidence that the defendant lacks the capacity
to make a knowing and voluntary waiver, in which case defense
counsel controls the waiver decision.” (Id. at p. 1163.)
J.S. cites these cases to support her argument that the trial
court was required to advise her personally as to her jury trial
rights, and to “obtain from her a personal, knowing, and
intelligent waiver of that right.” But in both Blackburn and
Tran, our Supreme Court cited mandatory statutory language
requiring a personal waiver. For mentally disordered offenders,
the Court noted that Penal Code section 2972, subdivision (a)
provides that “[t]he trial shall be by jury unless waived by both
the person and the district attorney.” (Blackburn, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 1124.) The Court held that “person” referred to the
individual facing involuntary commitment. (Id. at pp. 1124–
1125.) Similarly, “in a commitment extension
proceeding, . . . ‘[t]he trial shall be by jury unless waived by both

18
the person and the prosecuting attorney.’ ” (Tran, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 1163, quoting Pen. Code, § 1026.5, subd. (b)(4).)
By contrast, J.S. cites no such mandatory language in the
LPS Act, and we have found none. (See Prob. Code, § 1828,
subds. (a)(6) & (b) [court must inform proposed conservatee of
right to jury trial but after informing proposed conservatee of her
rights, court must “consult” proposed conservatee for her opinion
on “[t]he establishment of the conservatorship,” “[t]he
appointment of the proposed conservator,” and “[a]ny order
requested under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 1870), and
in the case of an allegedly developmentally disabled adult, of each
limitation requested in that order”]. Nothing states the court
must consult the proposed conservatee about her opinion on a
jury trial.) Therefore, unlike in the contexts discussed in
Blackburn and Tran, there was no similar requirement that the
court obtain a personal waiver from J.S. herself. (See also C.O.,
supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 911–912 [explaining why differences
in statutory language between LPS Act and statutes discussed in
Blackburn and Tran result in different conclusions regarding
ability of counsel to waive jury trial right].)
Nor are we persuaded by Conservatorship of Heather W.
(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378. There, the trial court failed to
advise the appellant of her right to a jury trial, and her counsel
did not request a jury trial. (Id. at p. 381.) On appeal, the
appellate court reversed the order appointing a conservator. (Id.
at p. 382.) Citing Blackburn and Tran, the appellate court held
“LPS commitment proceedings require the court to obtain a
personal waiver of the right to a jury trial from the proposed
conservatee.” (Id. at p. 383.)

19
As explained above, both Blackburn and Tran relied on
specific statutory language absent here. Moreover, Heather W.
acknowledged that Mary K. arrived at a different result because,
in Mary K., “ ‘counsel stated he had spoken with his client and
she wished to waive a jury trial’ ” and the appellant in Mary K.
“ ‘does not contend her attorney was without actual authority to
waive a jury.’ ” (Heather W., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 384.)
“By contrast, the record here does not indicate that Heather W.
was given the choice to have a jury trial.” (Ibid.)
Here, the record is undisputed that J.S.’s counsel stated
she had spoken with J.S. about her right to a jury trial, and that
J.S. wanted a court trial.9

B. To the Extent the Court Erred by Not Explicitly
Advising J.S. About Her Right to Trial by Jury,
That Error Was Harmless
J.S. also contends the court erred in failing to advise her of
her right to jury trial, which is a structural error requiring
automatic reversal. Public Guardian disagrees, arguing that, by
directly telling J.S. it was “going to waive the jury trial,” the
court informed her of her right to a jury trial. Additionally,
Public Guardian contends any error should be analyzed under

9 Because we find J.S. validly waived her right to a jury

trial, we need not address her contention that “[i]f, as here, a
person is not informed of her right to a jury trial and no waiver of
a jury trial is taken from her, she has not been afforded the due
process to which she is entitled before being deprived of her right
to a jury trial.” (See C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 914 [“we do
not agree that a trial court’s failure to obtain a personal waiver
on the record of the proposed conservatee’s right to a jury trial
violates a constitutional due process right”].)

20
the prejudicial error standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson). While neither party cites authority on
what constitutes a sufficient advisement of a right to a jury trial,
we need not resolve this dispute because, assuming the court’s
advisement was insufficient, we agree with Public Guardian that
we determine whether the error prejudiced J.S., and it did not.
This issue was addressed in C.O., discussed above. After
agreeing with C.O. that the trial court was required under the
LPS Act to personally advise him of his right to a jury trial, the
appellate court concluded the failure to do so “by itself does not
warrant automatic reversal,” and C.O. was required to prove
prejudice under Watson. (C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 908,
919.) Citing Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1136, the C.O.
court noted our Supreme Court’s holding that “a trial court’s
acceptance of a defendant’s personal waiver [of a right to jury
trial] without an express advisement may be deemed harmless if
the record affirmatively shows, based on the totality of the
circumstances, that the defendant’s waiver was knowing and
voluntary.” (C.O. at p. 918.) The appellate court found the trial
court’s error harmless, noting it saw “nothing in the record
suggesting that C.O. would have elected a jury trial over a court
trial if the trial court had advised him personally at the court
proceeding of his right to the former.” (Id. at p. 919.) We reach
the same conclusion.
J.S. contends that “[t]he effect of not informing Appellant of
her right to a jury trial and allowing her counsel to waive that
right was to deny that right to Appellant.” She then goes on to
argue that “no error is more structural than the denial of a jury
trial” and cites several cases supporting this proposition. But we
reject the premise of J.S.’s argument—as discussed above, we

21
find the record affirmatively demonstrates, based on the totality
of the circumstances, that J.S.’s waiver of her right to a jury trial
was knowing and voluntary.10

C. The Court Did Not Err in Finding L.S. Gravely
Disabled
“The ‘pivotal issue’ in each [LPS] proceeding is whether the
proposed conservatee is ‘presently’ gravely disabled.”
(Conservatorship of A.B. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 362, 374, review
denied Apr. 22, 2026, S295302 (A.B.).) Here, the court found
“beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the evidence presented that
[J.S.] is currently gravely disabled.”
J.S. contends the court erred because: (1) substantial
evidence does not support the court’s finding that she was
presently gravely disabled; (2) substantial evidence supported a

10 In her reply brief, J.S. cites K.R. v. Superior Court (2022)

80 Cal.App.5th 133, arguing it constitutes a “split in authority”
regarding whether the harmless error standard applies in this
case. K.R. is inapposite. As K.R. recognized in declining to apply
the harmless error analysis set forth in C.O., “C.O. held that
where a trial court accepts counsel’s waiver of the jury trial right
on the client’s behalf, the court’s failure to personally advise the
proposed conservatee of the jury trial right does not by itself
warrant automatic reversal and may be found harmless if the
record affirmatively shows, based on the totality of the
circumstances, that the waiver was knowing and voluntary.
(C.O., at p. 918.) Here, however, the record contains no
indication that K.R.’s counsel purported to waive K.R.’s jury trial
right or that the trial court acted to accept any such waiver.”
(K.R., at p. 144.) In the instant case, it is undisputed that J.S.’s
counsel purported to waive her jury trial right, and the court
accepted the waiver.

22
conclusion that J.S. could provide for her basic needs; and (3) the
court relied too heavily on Arom’s testimony without giving
“proper weight” to J.S.’s testimony. We discern no error.
On appeal from an order establishing a conservatorship,
“[w]e review the whole record in favor of the judgment below to
determine whether there was substantial evidence [the
appellant] was gravely disabled beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(Conservatorship of S.A. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 48, 54 (S.A.).)
“Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and
reasonable inferences flowing from it.” (Ibid.) “Testimony of one
witness can suffice to support a finding of grave disability.”
(Ibid.)
J.S. contends it was “improper to find a potential
conservatee is gravely disabled based on a ‘likelihood’ that if she
were released she would at some future time stop taking her
psychotropic medication” because “[t]he pivotal issue is whether
the person is ‘presently’ gravely disabled.”
“But a person may be found gravely disabled if the evidence
shows the person cannot provide for basic personal needs for food,
clothing or shelter without medication and will not take the
necessary medication unless required to do so.” (A.B., supra, 118
Cal.App.5th at p. 374; see also S.A., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p.
54 [“Evidence conservatees (1) lack insight about their mental
illness, (2) would not take medication without the support of a
conservator, and (3) could not provide for themselves without
medication is enough to support a court’s finding of grave mental
illness”].) “When applying the definition of mental disorder . . . ,
the historical course of the person’s mental disorder, as
determined by available relevant information about the course of
the person’s mental disorder, shall be considered when it has a

23
direct bearing on the determination of whether the person is a
danger to others, or to himself or herself, or is gravely disabled,
as a result of a mental disorder.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5008.2,
subd. (a).)
Here, the court found it was “pretty clear” that J.S. “is not
going to continue her medication” and that she had only “some
limited insight” into her mental health issues. Substantial
evidence supports these findings.
Arom testified that, when the court terminated J.S.’s
conservatorship in April 2025, J.S. had “promised Judge Herin
that she would stay on” her medications, and that the judge had
even “lectured her and was very firm,” yet J.S. stopped taking her
medication anyway. She then “decompensate[d] to the point
where she was hospitalized” four times. On the latest occasion,
J.S. “was wandering. She lost her shoes. Her feet were bleeding.
She was covered in menstrual blood in an alley in Pasadena.”
She also “was delusional,” and “believed that she was God, and
that she might not be in this world.”
Arom opined J.S. was “predominantly noncompliant [with
taking her medication] when out of the hospital,” and “has proven
time and again that she stops taking her medication when given
an opportunity.” Arom also testified J.S. was on a “Riese
petition,” meaning she was being involuntarily medicated. And
when J.S. stopped taking her medication, she “severely
decompensates to the point where she absolutely cannot manage
her food, clothing, and shelter.” Thus, Arom testified J.S.’s plan
to return to U.C. Santa Cruz was not viable for several reasons,
the most important of which was that her “inability to stay
medicated prevents her from managing any food, clothing, or

24
shelter, especially completely independently at UC Santa Cruz
with absolutely no verification.”
J.S. herself testified that she only believed two of her four
medications were helpful to her and, if released from
conservatorship, she would “just take medication that helps me”
but would “not take medication that does not help me.” In other
words, she would not take two of the four medications prescribed
to her.
This testimony constitutes evidence supporting findings
that J.S. lacked some insight into her mental health issues,
would not take all her prescribed medication without the support
of a conservator, and could not provide for herself without
medication. Therefore, substantial evidence supports the court’s
findings that she was presently gravely disabled.
J.S. argues that substantial evidence supported a finding
that she had a viable plan to provide for her basic needs. Even
were that true, “when two or more inferences can reasonably be
deduced from the facts, either deduction will be supported by
substantial evidence, and a reviewing court is without power to
substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.” (People v.
Fulcher (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 749, 752.)
Finally, J.S. argues “[t]he court’s verdict finding appellant
gravely disabled was not supported by substantial evidence in the
record” because “[t]he court relied on expert testimony opining
that Appellant lacked insight and was likely to stop taking her
medication” but “failed to take into account testimony of
Appellant’s present plan to voluntarily accept treatment and to
provide food, clothing and shelter.” In other words, J.S. faults the
court for giving greater weight to Arom’s testimony and
discounting her own, and in essence asks us to reweigh that

25
testimony to reach a different conclusion. This we cannot do.
(See, e.g., S.A., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 56 [“We do not
reweigh evidence”].) Moreover, the court found Arom to be “very
credible” but was “not satisfied with some of [J.S.]’s explanations
regarding why she was unable or not in a position or was
prevented . . . from taking her medication.” “[A]fter a bench trial,
we review the court’s determinations about witness credibility
with extreme deference.” (Id. at p. 55.)
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the court’s
finding that J.S. was currently gravely disabled.

DISPOSITION
The court’s order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

M. KIM, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

WEINGART, J.

26

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.