CourtListener 10863058•In re S.P. CA2/3
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Filed 5/21/26 In re S.P. CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re S.P., a Person Coming B346869
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No.
DEPARTMENT OF 24CCJP03064
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
V.D.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Tara Newman, Judge. Affirmed.
Jesse Frederic Rodriguez, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Melania Vartanian, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Mother challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and
disposition findings and orders sustaining a subsequent petition
under section 342 of the Welfare and Institutions Code1 as to
her child S.P., removing S.P. from her custody, and denying
her reunification services under sections 361.5, subdivisions
(b)(10) and (11). We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case concerns mother’s and father’s child S.P. (born
December 2023). Father is not a party to this appeal. Before
S.P.’s birth, mother had four children with G.D.—J.D., R.D.,
A.D., and E.D. In February 2017, the juvenile court sustained
a section 300 petition on J.D.’s and R.D.’s behalf alleging G.D.
and mother had a history of engaging in violent altercations
in the children’s presence.2 J.D. and R.D. initially were released
to mother but in May 2018 were detained because mother had
allowed G.D. to have unlimited access to at least one of the
children. In July 2018, the court granted mother reunification
services. Also in July 2018, the court sustained a section 300
petition on A.D.’s behalf based on mother having allowed G.D.
to have unlimited access to A.D. and the allegations sustained
as to J.D. and R.D. And in August 2019, the court sustained
1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2 G.D. pushed mother while she was pregnant with R.D.
He was arrested. The sustained petition also alleged G.D.
had a history of drug use, had been convicted of possession of
a controlled substance, was a current user of methamphetamine,
was a registered sex offender, and had mental and emotional
problems. The court found mother failed to protect the children.
2
a section 300 petition on baby E.D.’s behalf based on his siblings’
dependency cases. The court terminated mother’s reunification
services for E.D. in July 2019 and for J.D., R.D., and A.D. in
August 2019. In August 2022, parental rights were terminated
for mother and G.D. as to the four children.
On September 24, 2024, then-nine-month-old S.P. came to
DCFS’s attention. Deputies had stopped a car—that had been
reported as stolen—after it ran a red light. Mother—a passenger
in the vehicle—had an outstanding warrant for a probation
violation.3 Mother resisted arrest and had to be restrained
forcibly. S.P., who was in a car seat inside the vehicle, was taken
into protective custody.4 A DCFS social worker interviewed
mother in jail. Mother said she didn’t know the car was stolen.
She had become emotional when she realized she was being
arrested. Mother said she and father were a couple but did
not live together.
On September 26, 2024, DCFS filed a petition under
section 300, subdivision (b)(1) on S.P.’s behalf. The petition
alleged that, on September 24, 2024, mother endangered S.P.
by riding with her in a stolen car driven by an acquaintance,
who ran a red light, and that mother was “arrested on an
3 Mother was convicted of vehicle theft in 2018 and 2021
and shoplifting in 2021.
4 According to the police report, mother and S.P.—in a
forward-facing car seat—were in the back seat of the stopped car.
Mother refused to follow the deputy’s commands but then got
out of the car holding S.P. Mother also refused to comply with
the arrest team’s orders, who had to use physical force—while
mother was holding the child—to arrest her.
3
outstanding probation violation and incarcerated for Child Abuse
With Possible Great Bodily Injury/Death, Battery On Person,
Obstruct/ETC Public Officer.” At the detention hearing,
the juvenile court ordered S.P. detained from both parents—
mother was incarcerated and father’s whereabouts were
unknown. The court continued the arraignment to October 8.
Father appeared at the arraignment and the court
appointed counsel. The parentage statement he filed said he
believed he was S.P.’s father and that S.P. had lived with him
since her birth. The court ordered S.P. to remain detained until
DCFS could speak with father. The court again continued the
arraignment.
The dependency investigator (DI) interviewed father.
He said mother had told him she wanted “to work on fixing
their relationship and to get their daughter back.” Mother and
S.P. had been staying with father at his grandparents’ house
and with mother’s family. Father denied any domestic violence
with mother. He said they got into arguments but there was
no physical violence. He wanted to have mother in his life but
didn’t know if they still had a relationship. Father admitted
having been “arrested for all types of stuff, including drugs
and guns.” He admitted he had a history of substance abuse
and last had used methamphetamine “a couple of days ago.”
Father also admitted his grandparents had a restraining order
against him that he had violated. They called law enforcement
because he was using drugs again. He was arrested and
released. Father also stated he had been diagnosed with
“Bi-Polar and Schizophrenia” and wanted to enroll in mental
health treatment.
4
Father’s grandfather—paternal great-grandfather (PGGF)
—told the DI he had kicked father out of his house three years
earlier because of his drug use. PGGF said father was staying
with him now, but he would “have to kick him out” if he didn’t
go to treatment due to the restraining order. He told the DI
he had seen mother. She and father “argued too much” when
she came to PGGF’s house. About a month earlier, when parents
“were arguing and fighting,” PGGF told mother he didn’t want
her there and would call the police. He hadn’t seen mother since.
PGGF told the DI that parents “did not throw punches, but they
were really close.” DCFS recommended the court not release S.P.
to father.
On October 24, 2024, DCFS filed a first amended petition,
adding these details to the b-1 count about the September 24
incident:
“The mother placed the nine month old child in a
forward-facing car seat (violation of 27360 CVC). The
mother resisted, delayed, and obstructed the orders of
law enforcement during a stolen vehicle investigation
while holding the nine month old child, with the
knowledge of an outstanding arrest warrant. The
mother’s disregard to comply with law enforcement
during the detention resulted in the physical takedown
of the mother, which could have seriously injured
the child who mother was holding just prior to the
takedown. The mother was riding in a stolen vehicle
despite being on active probation for vehicle theft.”
The amended petition also added a b-2 count against father
and mother alleging father had a “history of substance abuse
including methamphetamine and marijuana,” was a current
5
abuser of methamphetamine, had a positive toxicology screen for
methamphetamine on October 8, 2024, and an extensive criminal
history—including convictions for possession, and use, of a
controlled substance; and mother “knew or reasonably should
have known of the father’s illicit drug use and failed to protect
the child by allowing the father to reside in the child’s home and
have unlimited access to the child.”5 The next day, the court
arraigned parents on the first amended petition and ordered
monitored visitation.
On October 31, 2024, DCFS filed its jurisdiction/disposition
report. S.P. was in a foster home. On October 21, parents had a
monitored visit with S.P. at the DCFS office. Mother “appeared
to be appropriate, engaged, and she read books to the child.”
Mother had been incarcerated from September 24 through
October 19 for two different criminal cases: a violation of
her probation for grand theft auto and for petty theft. In her
interview with the DI, mother said her friend received a ticket
for a stolen license plate—the car wasn’t stolen. She also said
S.P. wasn’t in a front-facing car seat. Mother was willing “to do
anything” to get her daughter back. She told the DI she’d enroll
in parenting and individual counseling. Mother stated she knew
of father’s substance abuse history but didn’t know he currently
was using. She denied any domestic violence with father and
said their relationship was “good.” They had been together since
mother’s release but were not living together. Mother’s support
system included maternal grandmother and father. Parents
had yet to participate in any services to address case issues.
5 The amended petition also included a b-3 count relating
to father’s “mental and emotional problems.”
6
On October 21, father tested positive for methamphetamine and
oxycodone; mother tested negative for all substances. DCFS
recommended reunification services for mother and father.
On November 20 and December 4, DCFS updated the
court with last minute information for the court reports (LMIs).
Parents were having three-hour visits with S.P. on Thursdays
and Fridays at the DCFS office. The caregivers monitored
the visits. Parents missed the visit scheduled for November 8
—mother said she was sick. Mother ended her visit early on
November 21 and cancelled her November 22 visit. At an earlier
visit, parents got into an argument and the security guard “had
to intervene.” Mother said she was participating in parenting
classes but had not provided proof of enrollment.6 Father was
a “no show” for his November 7 and 22 drug tests. Mother
missed her November 21 drug test.
On December 6, 2024, the court sustained the amended
petition’s b-1 and b-2 counts as to both parents and dismissed
the b-3 count. The court declared S.P. a dependent and removed
her from father. The court released S.P. to mother over DCFS’s
and minor’s counsel’s objections. The court stayed the order until
December 12 to allow DCFS to assess mother’s new address at
maternal grandmother’s home. Mother’s case plan included
participation in developmentally appropriate parenting classes,
individual counseling to address case issues and “underlying
needs and healthy relationships,” and submission to three weekly
random and on-demand drug/alcohol tests. The court ordered
6 At the adjudication hearing, mother submitted a
November 21, 2024 letter stating she had enrolled in a parenting
course on October 28, 2024.
7
mother not to monitor father’s visits or to allow father to have
contact with S.P. “outside of DCFS-approved visits.”
On December 20, 2024, mother was arrested for domestic
violence outside of paternal grandmother’s home where
father was staying. According to the incident report, paternal
grandmother told the responding sheriff’s deputy that she
heard yelling coming from outside in front of her house. She
went outside and saw father and mother “punching each other
in the middle of the street.” Paternal uncle Noah also said he
saw parents punching each other “multiple times.” Paternal
grandmother stated that, after Noah went inside to call 911,
mother “produced” a small folding knife “from her person.”
Father fled the scene. Mother yelled profanities at paternal
grandmother “and approached her with the knife in her
right hand readily available in the open and locked position.”
Paternal grandmother was afraid she’d be assaulted and ran
inside. When law enforcement arrived, a deputy found the knife
in mother’s right hand. It was folded and in the closed position.
Paternal grandmother identified the knife as the one mother
had used.
Mother told the reporting deputy that she had gone to
the home to drop off father’s belongings. As mother was talking
to paternal uncle Christian on the driveway, father came out
of the house as if to hug her. Instead, he wrapped his arms
around her and tackled her to the ground. Mother said father
fled. She denied she and father punched each other. She also
denied ever having “used the knife as a weapon” and accused
paternal grandmother of lying. Mother initially stated she was
uninjured but later complained of back and abdominal pain
8
(and falsely claimed she was pregnant). She was taken to the
hospital and medically cleared for booking.
According to the deputy who made the report to the child
protection hotline, mother reported that, during the altercation,
maternal grandmother was in her car across the street with S.P.
Maternal grandmother allegedly fled the scene, and mother
refused to provide any information about her or S.P. On
December 23, 2024, DCFS notified maternal grandmother that
she was to bring S.P. to the DCFS office. DCFS took custody of
the child, who appeared well-cared for. Maternal grandmother
confirmed mother had gone to father’s location to drop off
his belongings, and parents had gotten into an altercation.
She denied having been at the scene, however. Maternal
grandmother said she “had been keeping” S.P. at a relative’s
house in the Los Angeles area since the incident.
On December 26, 2024, DCFS filed a subsequent petition
under section 342, alleging—under section 300, subdivisions
(a) (b), and (j)—parents engaged in a violent altercation on
December 20 where father tackled mother to the ground; parents
repeatedly struck each other with closed fists; mother brandished
a knife at father and approached paternal grandmother with
a knife; and mother was arrested under Penal Code sections
273.5, subdivision (a) (domestic violence), 245, subdivision (a)(1)
(assault with a deadly weapon), and 422, subdivision (a) (criminal
threats). The petition also alleged S.P.’s half-siblings were
dependents of the juvenile court and receiving permanent
placement services “due to the mother engaging in violent
altercations with a male companion and the mother failing
to protect the siblings.” The court detained S.P. from parents.
9
On February 7, 2025, DCFS filed its jurisdiction report
in support of the section 342 petition. Mother stated the charges
stemming from her arrest had been dropped. She denied the
petition’s allegations. Mother said maternal grandmother had
dropped her off down the street from father’s home. Maternal
grandmother said she dropped mother off at the bus stop.
Mother was supposed to call her when she was ready to be
picked up. Paternal grandmother changed her story. She told
the DI parents were arguing but were not hitting each other.
She denied mother “brandish[ed] a knife at her,” but said “ ‘she
had one in her pocket.’ ” Father also denied he and mother
were hitting each other. He agreed he probably was under the
influence at the time, however. When asked if S.P. was there
during the incident, father said, “ ‘[N]o, but maybe she was in the
car.’ ” He denied seeing S.P. and said he didn’t know if maternal
grandmother was in the car with S.P. The social worker reported
father “eluded [sic] to [S.P.] being in the car.” Father also
admitted that, the day before the incident, he had held S.P.
all night at maternal grandmother’s home with mother. Father
said he and mother weren’t “together,” but he was “ ‘working
on it.’ ” Father had not started his case plan.
Mother visited S.P. on January 27, 28, 29, and February 5,
2025. She was a no-show for her February 3 visit and cancelled
her February 4 visit. The social worker stated there were issues
with mother’s visits. She “was spending a majority of her time
laying [sic] on the sofa and arriving at the last minute of the
grace period.” Mother missed drug testing on December 6 and
20, 2024 and on January 9 and 24, 2025. According to a March 7
LMI, on February 27—during an in-person meeting—mother
told the social worker she had started classes but did not provide
10
documentation. The DI tried calling and texting mother on
March 6, but mother did not respond.
DCFS recommended mother receive no family reunification
services based on section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10)—because
the court previously terminated her services and she had “not
made reasonable efforts to treat the problems that brought [S.P.]
to the court’s attention”—and section 361.5, subdivision (b)(11)
—because her parental rights were terminated as to S.P.’s
half-siblings.
On March 11, 2025, the court held the jurisdiction hearing
on the section 342 petition. The court admitted DCFS’s reports
and took judicial notice of the court’s earlier orders and findings
in the current case and S.P.’s half-siblings’ cases. The court
also admitted mother’s exhibits: (a) a December 27, 2024 letter
stating the District Attorney’s office declined to file charges
against mother based on her December 20, 2024 arrest; (b) a
March 4, 2025 letter from mother’s parenting teacher stating
she had enrolled in a parenting course on October 22, 2024,
and had completed 17 of the 20 units required for a certificate
of completion; and (c) an enrollment verification letter stating
mother had enrolled in an anger management class on
February 25, 2025.7
S.P.’s counsel joined DCFS’s counsel in asking the court
to sustain the petition as pled. Counsel noted that, by mother’s
own statement that maternal grandmother had dropped her
off at father’s home, S.P. was present during the parents’
7 The court noted exhibits (b) and (c) had not been
authenticated and it would give them due weight with that
understanding.
11
altercation. Mother’s counsel argued DCFS had not shown
“that this was anything other than a one-off incident,” and
had provided no evidence that S.P. was “in the zone of danger.”
Counsel noted both mother and paternal grandmother suspected
father was having a mental health crisis. She believed there was
no risk of an incident like that happening again. Counsel noted
mother had no intention of reconciling with father, did not live
with him, and had seen him only twice “in the past couple of
months.” Counsel argued DCFS had not proved mother’s actions
put S.P. at risk, “especially considering that the minor wasn’t
present.” DCFS’s counsel argued mother’s statements were not
credible—that it was clear she and maternal grandmother went
to father’s home. Counsel also noted father spent the night with
mother and S.P. in violation of the court’s order releasing S.P.
to mother. Counsel argued that, “given mother’s history of
violence and violent behavior, I do think there’s significant
reason to believe that this would reoccur as mother has no
qualms about violating the court’s order to stay away from the
father, to . . . ensure father was not present [with the child].”
The court found DCFS had shown “the violent conduct by
the parents does pose a risk to [S.P.’s] physical health and safety,
creating a detrimental home environment and putting her at
risk.” The court noted “parents were engaged in a very violent
altercation outside of the paternal relatives’ home.” The court
found “the statements that mother brandished a knife to be
credible.” The court again stated it “believe[d] that the parents’
violent altercation and conduct does endanger [S.P.’s] physical
health and safety.” The court sustained the b-1 count of the
subsequent petition, amended by interlineation to delete the
allegation that mother had been arrested. The court dismissed
12
the a-1 and j-1 counts. The court set a contested disposition
hearing to rule on DCFS’s request to bypass reunification
services for mother.
In an LMI filed April 8, 2025, DCFS reported the DI
had confirmed with mother’s parenting teacher that mother
had completed the “ ‘Skillful Parenting Infant/Toddler’ ” course.
Mother completed 105 hours, including lessons and assignments.
The teacher told the DI she had given mother a certificate and
letter of completion on April 7. Mother had not provided any of
that information to DCFS. In an April 9 LMI, DCFS reported it
received confirmation that mother had registered for a four-hour
anger management course on March 11, 2025—not February 25
as noted in the enrollment letter—but had not started the
sessions. DCFS also noted mother was inconsistent with
visits and did not call when unable to make a scheduled visit.
Mother missed three visits and was late for two visits between
January 26 and April 9, 2025. On March 29, mother and
maternal grandmother visited S.P. at the library, monitored
by the caregiver. Mother became very hostile toward maternal
grandmother, raised her voice, and called her “ ‘stupid.’ ” Due
to that incident, DCFS decided visits would take place only
at the DCFS office. Mother also had missed her drug tests.
At the April 10 disposition hearing, mother submitted the
following exhibits: (a) an April 7, 2025 letter stating she had
received “excellent test scores” in her parenting class, and (b) the
certificate of completion for the parenting class; (c) an April 9
letter certifying mother had enrolled in therapy on March 13; and
(d) an April 7 letter confirming mother had enrolled in a domestic
violence education class on March 12, 2025. The court admitted
the exhibits, giving due weight to unauthenticated exhibits (c)
13
and (d). The court also admitted DCFS’s reports and took judicial
notice of the sustained petitions, case plans, and files for the
related cases.
Counsel for DCFS argued mother had not made reasonable
efforts to address the issues that led to the termination of her
parental rights of S.P.’s half-siblings. Counsel argued mother’s
recent efforts—the completion of only a parenting class,
enrollment in an anger management class without having begun
any sessions, and her recent enrollment in a domestic violence
program and individual counseling without having made any
progress—did not demonstrate reasonable efforts “to address
the domestic violence issues and her inability to appropriately
supervise the children.” Counsel noted mother had violated
court orders by allowing G.D. to have unmonitored contact with
J.D. and R.D. and had done something similar in this case with
father. Mother’s counsel argued she had made reasonable efforts
to treat those issues, and to focus on “sufficient progress” would
constitute error. Counsel argued mother’s efforts “hardly [could]
be characterized as lackadaisical or half-hearted.” Counsel
argued that, “[j]ust because there’s a new petition at this time
with new allegations does not mean she’s not making the efforts.”
S.P.’s counsel also asked the court to bypass mother’s
reunification services. Counsel noted the issues in the half-
siblings’ cases were “about violent altercations between the
mother and her partner” and there had been “multiple violent
altercations between the mother and the father in this matter.”
Counsel argued completion of a parenting course did not
constitute reasonable efforts “towards addressing the issues that
put her before the court.” Counsel for DCFS argued “reasonable
efforts” does not mean “any efforts at all,” and here mother
14
had “made very minimal efforts.” Counsel also argued mother
had not shown it was in “the best interest of the child to reunify.”
Counsel noted mother had minimal participation in her
programs, had not appeared for drug testing since October, and
her visitation had been sporadic. Mother’s counsel responded
that the statute “does not include a standard or requirement for
how much progress is made,” and mother was “clearly far beyond
a point where she is not showing any effort at all.”
The court ordered S.P. to remain detained from parents
and suitably placed, as remaining in the home of parents would
pose a substantial danger to her safety, protection, and physical
and emotional well-being. The court noted mother completed a
parenting course, but the fact the course “was ongoing at the time
of the removal and the recent incident[ ] demonstrate[ed] that
mother was still lacking insight with regard to the violence.”
The court also noted mother had enrolled in domestic violence
and individual therapy, but as she’d just begun those courses,
that evidence did not demonstrate “a reasonable effort to address
the issue, given how far along we are in this case and when the
case plan was initially ordered.” The court also found continuing
services for mother would not be in S.P.’s best interest. The court
ordered no family reunification services for mother under section
361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (11). The court found “there has
not been a showing of reasonable efforts to address the problem
that led to the removal of the half-siblings.” The court allowed
mother to have monitored visits with S.P.
DISCUSSION
Mother challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
findings sustaining the section 342 petition, the court’s order
15
removing S.P. from her care, and the court’s order bypassing her
reunification services.
1. The court’s orders sustaining the section 342 petition
and removing S.P. were proper
a. Applicable law and standard of review
When a child already has been declared a juvenile
dependent, a subsequent petition is filed under section 342 when
“new facts or circumstances, other than those under which the
original petition was sustained, [arise] sufficient to state that the
minor is a person described in Section 300.” (§ 342, subd. (a).)
A child comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under
subdivision (b)(1) of section 300 if, as relevant here, “there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm
or illness,” as a result of the failure or inability of the child’s
parent adequately to supervise or protect the child. (§ 300, subd.
(b)(1)(A).) A jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision
(b)(1) requires the Department to prove: “(1) the parent’s . . .
neglectful conduct or failure or inability to protect the child;
(2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or illness or a
substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.” (In re
Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601 (Cole L.).)
The statute permits jurisdiction under this subdivision
“only so long as is necessary to protect the child from risk of
suffering serious physical harm or illness.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(3).)
Thus, “[t]he relevant inquiry under section 300, subdivision
(b)(1), is whether circumstances at the time of the jurisdictional
hearing ‘ “subject the minor to the defined risk of harm.” ’ ” (In re
L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 402, 411 (L.B.).) The juvenile court
need not wait for the child actually to be abused or neglected
before it can assume jurisdiction. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th
16
766, 773 (I.J.).) “The court may consider past events in
deciding whether a child presently needs the court’s protection.
[Citations.] A parent’s ‘ “[p]ast conduct may be probative of
current conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct
will continue.’ ” (Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 602.) In
other words, the Department “must establish a nexus between
the parent’s past conduct and the current risk of harm.” (In re
J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767, 775.)
Under section 361, subdivision (c)(1), the juvenile
court may not take a dependent child from the custody of
the parent with whom the child was residing at the time
the petition was filed “unless the juvenile court finds [by]
clear and convincing evidence” that “[t]here is or would be
a substantial danger to the physical health, safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor
if the minor were returned home, and there are no
reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health
can be protected without removing the minor from the
minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.”
“ ‘In reviewing the jurisdictional findings and the
disposition, we look to see if substantial evidence, contradicted
or uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.] In making this
determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the
evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency
court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the
court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and
credibility are the province of the trial court.’ ” (In re R.T. (2017)
3 Cal.5th 622, 633; I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) Inferences
that are the result of speculation or conjecture, however, are
insufficient to support a jurisdictional finding. (In re B.D.
17
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 315, 324.) “When reviewing a finding
that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence,
the question before the appellate court is whether the record as
a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable
fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was
true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011–1012
(O.B.) [in conducting this type of review, court still must view
the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,
and “give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have
evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the
evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence”].)
“ ‘The parent has the burden on appeal of showing there is
insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s order.’ ”
(L.B., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 412.)
b. Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding
that S.P. was at substantial risk of future harm
Mother contends there was “no substantial evidence
of any ‘nexus’ between the parents’ single incident of physical
altercation and a substantial risk of serious physical injury to
S.P.” We disagree. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile
court’s finding that mother’s conduct placed S.P. at a substantial
risk of harm. As mother asserts, there had been no prior reports
of domestic violence between parents. Yet the evidence showed
parents almost came to blows not long before DCFS became
involved with S.P. Indeed, the situation was serious enough for
PGGF to have threatened to call the police unless mother left.
And during a joint monitored visit with S.P., parents argued
to the point that a DCFS security guard had to intervene. The
court thus reasonably could conclude that the December 20, 2024
incident was not a “one off” as mother’s counsel described, but
18
an escalation of parents’ behavior. And substantial evidence
supported the court’s finding that parents’ altercation on
December 20 indeed was violent.
The court found credible the witness statements made
to law enforcement at the scene describing parents as having
punched each other “multiple times.” Although paternal
grandmother later changed her story, the juvenile court
reasonably could infer her initial statements to law enforcement
were correct. The court also found credible paternal
grandmother’s initial statement that mother had brandished
a knife during the incident. Law enforcement found a knife
in mother’s hand, and paternal grandmother identified it as the
knife with which mother had approached her. Thus, mother
not only actively engaged in the violent altercation; she chose to
bring a knife to the encounter—seemingly anticipating violence
—and even approached paternal grandmother with it in a
threatening manner. Reasonably, mother’s own actions during
the altercation demonstrated S.P. was at risk of future harm,
especially considering mother had endangered S.P. just a few
months earlier when she resisted arrest while holding her.
Mother nevertheless contends that, as there was no
evidence parents fought in S.P.’s presence, any risk to S.P.
was minimal. (Citing In re S.F. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 696, 715
[incidents of tussling without physical injury outside presence
of minor insufficient to support jurisdiction], relying on Cole L.,
supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 606 [physical danger to minors
minimal where incident involved parents’ pushing and grabbing
for a phone outside minors’ presence].) As the court found,
S.P. was not within the “zone of danger” of parents’ violent
altercation. But that finding did not preclude the court from
19
also finding “parents’ violent altercation and conduct” posed a
risk to S.P.’s safety under section 300, subdivision (b). The court
noted DCFS’s report stated S.P. was in maternal grandmother’s
car across the street. We can infer the court found credible the
deputy’s report to the child protection hotline that mother had
said maternal grandmother was across the street in her vehicle
with S.P. Father also had alluded to S.P. being “in the car.”8
The court reasonably could have concluded maternal
grandmother dropped off mother at or near father’s location
and then—at least until law enforcement arrived—waited
with S.P. across the street. The fact that mother had maternal
grandmother drive her—with a knife—to father’s location
and wait for her with S.P.—rather than, for example, asking
maternal grandmother to drop off father’s belongings for her—
demonstrated mother was not putting S.P.’s safety first.
Moreover, the evidence supported the court’s implied
finding that the violent conduct could recur. Mother took no
responsibility for her involvement in the altercation, denying
she and father hit each other or that she brandished a knife.
“One cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge.” (In re
Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197; see also In re A.F.
(2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [“ ‘[D]enial is a factor often
relevant to determining whether persons are likely to modify
their behavior in the future without court supervision.’ ”].)
Father also denied he and mother were “ ‘ hitting each other’ ”
8 Once maternal grandmother finally returned S.P. to DCFS
after the altercation, she denied having been at the scene of the
incident. Yet she knew parents had been in an altercation and
that mother had been arrested. We can infer the juvenile court
did not credit maternal grandmother’s denial.
20
and admitted he likely was under the influence. The court also
reasonably could conclude parents’ relationship would continue.
Mother identified father—along with maternal grandmother—
as her support system. Critically, she had allowed father to stay
with S.P. all night despite the court’s order barring her from
giving him access to S.P. and her knowledge—from S.P.’s case—
that he continued to use illicit drugs. Mother similarly had given
G.D. access to S.P.’s half-siblings and remained in a relationship
with him.9 We thus reject mother’s contention that her past
dependency history was irrelevant to the question of S.P.’s future
risk of harm because it involved G.D.’s violence against her.
Mother cites In re Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713,
disapproved of on another ground in In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th
266, 278. That case is distinguishable. There, the parents’
domestic violence had taken place two to seven years before
a dependency petition was filed on behalf of their children.
The court found it insufficient to prove the children were at
a substantial risk of harm. There was no evidence of ongoing
violence between parents, the children had not been present, and
parents had since separated. (Daisy H., at p. 717.) Here, parents
had maintained a relationship and recently had engaged in
aggressive behavior before their altercation—almost coming
to blows at PGGF’s home and requiring a security guard’s
9 Mother’s and G.D.’s child E.D. was born in June 2019
—more than two years after J.D. and R.D. were declared
dependents and about a year after they were detained from
mother and then found to have been endangered by mother
having allowed G.D. to have access to the children in violation
of the court’s order. Their child A.D. (born January 2018) also
was declared a dependent almost a year before E.D. was born.
21
intervention during an argument. In short, parents’ conduct
had escalated. Mother’s lack of insight into how her conduct put
S.P. at risk, and her poor judgment, also supported the court’s
decision that S.P. was at substantial risk of future harm.
Given mother’s own violent conduct and parents’
continuing relationship, S.P. did not have to witness parents’
violent altercation for the court to conclude that incident,
along with the evidence of mother’s past conduct, put S.P.
at substantial risk of harm. (See, e.g., In re E.B. (2010) 184
Cal.App.4th 568, 576 [“ ‘Studies show that violence by one parent
against another harms children even if they do not witness it.’ ”],
disapproved of on another ground in O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 1003, fn. 4.) Accordingly, the evidence supported an implied
finding that parents likely would reengage in violent conduct
and the court’s finding that S.P.—only 15 months old as of the
March 11, 2025 adjudication hearing—was at substantial risk
of physical harm.
c. Substantial evidence supports the court’s order
removing S.P. from mother’s custody
Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
finding by clear and convincing evidence that S.P. would be at
substantial risk of harm in mother’s custody. Again, not only did
mother engage in a violent altercation with father, but she also
allowed him to have unrestricted access to S.P. in violation of
the juvenile court’s order. Mother had lost custody of S.P.’s half-
siblings when she similarly violated the court’s order and allowed
their father G.D. to have contact with their children. Mother
argues there is no evidence that she allowed father to have
contact with S.P. outside of DCFS-approved visits, but father
admitted he had held S.P. all night at mother’s residence with
22
maternal grandmother. Moreover, father was abusing drugs.
He admitted he likely was under the influence during parents’
altercation—the day after mother allowed him to stay the night
with S.P. And, again, mother demonstrated she lacked insight
as to how her continued relationship with father put S.P. at risk.
We also reject mother’s argument that the evidence did
not support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that there
were no reasonable means to protect S.P. other than removing
her from mother’s custody. Mother let father have unlimited
access to S.P. at her home—and engaged in the altercation with
father—only two weeks after the court had ordered S.P.’s release
to mother on the condition mother was “not to allow father to
have contact with the child.” As mother also had failed to abide
by the court’s similar order in S.P.’s half-siblings’ cases—and
had named father as part of her support system—the court
reasonably could conclude removal was necessary to protect S.P.
In sum, the record convinces us that a reasonable factfinder
could have found it highly probable that S.P. was at substantial
risk of harm if left in mother’s custody.
2. The court did not err in bypassing mother’s
reunification services
a. Applicable law and standard of review
Under section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11),
reunification services need not be provided to a parent if the
juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that either
“the court ordered termination of reunification services for any
siblings or half siblings of the child because the parent . . . failed
to reunify with the sibling or half sibling after the sibling or
half sibling had been removed from that parent” (§ 361.5, subd.
(b)(10)(A)), or “the parental rights of a parent over any sibling or
23
half sibling of the child had been permanently severed” (§ 361.5,
subd. (b)(11)(A)); and the parent “has not subsequently made
a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of
the sibling or half sibling of that child from that parent” (§ 361.5,
subds. (b)(10)(A) & (11)(A)).
“The ‘reasonable effort[s]’ necessary to avoid section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(10) [or (b)(11)] bypass are not synonymous
with ‘ “cure.” ’ [Citation.] They must, however, be more than
‘ “lackadaisical or half-hearted.” ’ [Citation.] Moreover, not
every ‘effort by a parent, even if clearly genuine, to address the
problems leading to removal will constitute a reasonable effort
and as such render these provisions inapplicable. It is certainly
appropriate for the juvenile court to consider the duration, extent
and context of the parent’s efforts, as well as any other factors
relating to the quality and quantity of those efforts, when
evaluating the effort for reasonableness. And while the degree
of progress is not the focus of the inquiry, a parent’s progress,
or lack of progress, both in the short and long term, may be
considered to the extent it bears on the reasonableness of
the effort made.’ ” (Jennifer S. v. Superior Court (2017) 15
Cal.App.5th 1113, 1121 (Jennifer S.); see also id. at pp. 1126–
1127 [“[s]uch a severe impairment of parental rights should only
be available where it is clear that parents continue to struggle
with the issues that resulted in the loss of their previous
children”].)
If the court finds a parent is described by section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(10) or (11), the court “shall not order reunification
for [the parent] . . . unless the court finds, by clear and convincing
evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child.”
(§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2).) “It is the parent’s burden to prove that the
24
minor would benefit from the provision of court-ordered services.”
(Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1124.)
We review the juvenile court’s order denying reunification
services under section 361.5 for substantial evidence. (Jennifer
S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1121; see also O.B., supra, 9
Cal.5th at pp. 1005, 1011 [under clear and convincing standard,
substantial evidence must support finding to a high probability].)
We review the juvenile court’s best interest determination for
abuse of discretion. (Jennifer S., at pp. 1124–1125.)
b. The court properly applied section 361.5,
subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11)
DCFS argues mother’s evidence did not demonstrate
she had made reasonable efforts, noting she only recently had
enrolled in counseling10 and domestic violence classes and had
not started her anger management course, though she registered
for it on March 11, 2025.
Mother argues she presented evidence she had made
reasonable efforts to treat the problems that led to the removal
of S.P.’s half-siblings: the April 7, 2025 parenting progress
letter stating she had “excellent test scores,” a certification of
completion for that parenting course of the same date, an April 9,
2025 letter from a licensed therapist confirming mother had
10 In addition to the parenting class, mother’s December 6,
2024 case plan for the initial petition required her to participate
in individual counseling “to address case issues to address
underlying needs and healthy relationships” and to submit
to three random and on-demand drug tests. Mother completed
the parenting class as of April 7, 2025, but she didn’t enroll in
individual counseling until March 13 and she had missed all of
her drug tests after her one negative test on October 21, 2024.
25
“initiated therapy service[s]” on March 13, 2025, and another
April 7 letter confirming mother had enrolled and completed
the intake process for a domestic violence education course on
March 12 and stating “[s]ince her enrollment date,” mother had
“been an active participant in services.” Mother contends the
court thus erred in finding she had not made reasonable efforts to
treat the problems that led to the removal of S.P.’s half-siblings.
She asserts her “only jurisdictional transgression” in S.P.’s half-
siblings’ case was “her failure to protect the children from the
G.D. father, who perpetrated violence against mother, suffered
from mental problems, and had a substance abuse problem.”
Mother acknowledges the children were removed from her
custody because she “allowed the G.D. father unmonitored access
to at least one of the half-siblings,” and her parental rights
were terminated in August 2022 as a result. But she notes the
domestic violence attributed to G.D. happened about seven years
earlier.
Mother also argues the court improperly considered her
lack of participation in domestic violence counseling as evidence
she failed to demonstrate reasonable efforts because there was
no evidence she was ordered to participate in domestic violence
counseling in the half-siblings’ cases. Mother’s lack of
participation in domestic violence counseling was but one factor
the court considered. But even if it hadn’t been ordered in
the half-siblings’ cases, certainly participation in counseling to
recognize and address domestic violence issues would have been
relevant to the problems that led to the half-siblings’ removal.
In any event, while G.D. may have been the instigator
of the violence against mother in the half-siblings’ cases, she
maintained a relationship with him and allowed him to have
26
access to the children. She did the same thing here. Mother
allowed father—whom she knew was using illicit drugs, like
G.D.—to have access to S.P. in violation of the court’s order.
And, as the court noted, mother did so—and engaged in the
violent altercation on December 20—despite the fact she was
participating in a parenting course. In short, rather than making
reasonable efforts to correct the issues that led to the earlier
loss of her reunification services and parental rights, mother—
as the court found—continued to lack insight into those issues
by engaging in the same type of behavior. If anything, the
evidence shows mother’s conduct had escalated: she resisted
law enforcement while holding her baby; and, although father
first tackled mother during the December 20 incident, she
participated in the fight and had brought a knife with her.
Yet mother took no responsibility for her participation in the
December 20 incident. And, although her counsel argued at the
jurisdiction hearing that mother had “no intention of reconciling
with the father,” she had maintained a relationship with him,
as she apparently had with G.D.
Mother nevertheless contends the court improperly
conflated the issues from the half-siblings’ cases with those
in S.P.’s case because she was not found to have been the
perpetrator of the domestic violence in the earlier cases. We
do not agree that mother’s failure to protect S.P.’s half-siblings
from G.D.’s domestic violence is a distinct issue from mother’s
involvement in the domestic violence that led to S.P.’s removal.
The issues may not be identical, but they both involve violence
and mother’s lack of judgment as to what was in her children’s
best interest.
27
Relying on Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th 1113,
mother also contends DCFS did not meet its burden to show
a lack of reasonable services by clear and convincing evidence
because it failed to present evidence from the half-siblings’ case
of the “dispositional reports and the reports upon which any
terminations of services were based” or that the social worker
had “thoroughly reviewed the prior records, interviewed
the parents regarding past efforts, and [was] able to speak
authoritatively as to why the parent at issue has failed to make
reasonable efforts during the relevant timeframe.” (Citing
Jennifer S., at p. 1126 [“to meet the burden to establish, by clear
and convincing evidence, a lack of reasonable efforts . . . , child
welfare workers must focus on the facts underlying the previous
dependency action and its resolution, as well as on any efforts
made by the parent since the sibling removal”].) But as that court
also explained, “where substantial evidence supporting bypass
is available, it would indeed be a tragedy to delay permanency
for the dependent child at issue—the very reason these bypass
provisions exist—simply because the relevant child welfare
agency failed to do its job.” (Id. at p. 1127.)
It’s true the social worker didn’t testify at the contested
disposition hearing, and DCFS’s reports from the half-siblings’
cases do not appear to have been attached to the report in this
case.11 Nevertheless, the evidence before the juvenile court
supported its finding, to a high probability, that mother’s efforts
11 The court did, however, take judicial notice of the court file
for the half-siblings’ cases. DCFS also submitted minute orders
from those cases that the court admitted into evidence by
reference. They are part of the appellate record.
28
to resolve the issues that led to the removal of her children were
not reasonable. Again, mother had completed a parenting class—
yet engaged in the conduct leading to the removal of S.P. while
in the class—and only just had begun to participate in individual
counseling and domestic violence education. Mother had years
since the half-siblings’ removal to participate in these types of
services. Indeed, the court had ordered mother to participate
in individual counseling as early as February 2017 when it
sustained the dependency petition as to J.D. and R.D. Yet, by
2019—when mother’s reunification services as to S.P.’s half-
siblings were terminated—the court had found her progress
in her case plan “toward alleviating or mitigating the causes
necessitating placement” had “not been substantial.” That she
then waited until March 2025 to enroll in individual counseling—
despite the court having ordered her to do so in December 2024
as part of her case plan—further supports the court’s finding
that her efforts were not reasonable.
c. Mother failed to show reunification was in
S.P.’s best interest
Finally, the record does not compel us to conclude the
juvenile court abused its discretion in finding it would not be in
S.P.’s best interest to reunify with mother. (Jennifer S., supra,
15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1125.) “The concept of a child’s best interest
‘is an elusive guideline that belies rigid definition. Its purpose
is to maximize a child’s opportunity to develop into a stable, well-
adjusted adult.’ ” (In re Ethan N. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 55, 66.)
In determining whether reunification is in a child’s best interest,
courts have considered “ ‘the parent’s current efforts, fitness,
and history; the seriousness of the problem that led to the
dependency; the strength of the parent-child and caretaker-child
29
bonds; and the child’s need for stability and continuity.’ ”
(Jennifer S., at p. 1124; see also Ethan N., at pp. 66–67.)
“A best interest finding requires a likelihood reunification
services will succeed; in other words, ‘some “reasonable basis
to conclude” that reunification is possible.’ ” (In re Allison J.
(2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1116.)
Mother argues that, as there was no possibility of expedited
finality for S.P. because father was offered reunification services,
S.P.’s stability was not an issue in bypassing her reunification
services. She contends she had a significant relationship with
S.P.—having cared for her for the first nine months of her life—
and notes DCFS reported she was appropriate with S.P. during
their visits and “able to maintain a positive bond.”12 Mother also
argues her “part in the reason for the [half-siblings’] dependency
proceeding was . . . not serious.”
By the April 2025 hearing, S.P. was only 16 months old.
Mother had cared for S.P. without incident for the first nine
months of her life. Yet mother endangered S.P.—then nine
months old—by resisting arrest while holding her. Mother then
defied court orders and allowed father to have access to S.P.
despite having lost custody of her other children for similar
behavior. Mother also minimized the incident with father, which
the court found to be “a very violent altercation,” especially as
mother had a knife. And mother’s current efforts had been
minimal. She did visit S.P. and acted appropriately with her,
but her visits with S.P. were inconsistent—she was late to some,
12 DCFS made that report after the court terminated mother’s
reunification services in a status review report filed May 20,
2025.
30
canceled others, and failed to show up to some visits without
explanation. She also fell asleep during a visit. Mother’s
evidence does not compel a finding that reunification was
in S.P.’s best interests. The juvenile court reasonably could
conclude reunification was unlikely given the circumstances
of the current case and mother’s past history.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the court’s March 11, 2025 order sustaining
the section 342 petition, and the court’s April 10, 2025 orders
removing S.P. from mother and denying mother reunification
services.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EGERTON, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
HANASONO, J.
31
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