CourtListener 10863056•J.People v. Super.Ct. CA1/3
Full text
Filed 5/21/26 J.P. v. Super.Ct. CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
J.P.,
Petitioner,
v. A175860
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN
MATEO COUNTY, (San Mateo County
Super. Ct. Nos. 24-JD-0105,
Respondent;
24-JD-0106, 24-JD-0107)
SAN MATEO COUNTY HUMAN
SERVICES AGENCY et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.
J.P. (father) seeks extraordinary writ relief from a March 10, 2026
order terminating reunification services to father for H.P., N.P., and Z.P. (the
children)1 and setting a hearing to consider termination of parental rights
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 (section 366.26 hearing;
statutory references are to this code).
We deny the petition as substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s finding that the San Mateo County Human Services Agency (the
Agency) provided reasonable services to father. We deny as moot the related
1 The children’s mother was bypassed for reunification services. Only
father is a party to this writ proceeding.
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request for a temporary stay of the section 366.26 hearing set for June 25,
2026.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We set forth only those facts necessary to resolve this writ proceeding.
As mother is not a party to this proceeding, we focus almost exclusively on
father’s circumstances.
The following summary is based in part on our prior opinion in In re
Z.P. (Apr. 1, 2026, A173553) [nonpub. opn.] (Z.P.) as to the events at issue in
that decision, specifically those leading up to and including the combined six-
and 12-month review hearing.
Circumstances Leading to Dependency Petitions
Unless and until otherwise indicated, dates refer to 2024.
“In March, the Agency filed a juvenile dependency petition as to H.P.,
then two months old (born December 19, 2023), pursuant to section 300,
subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm), (b)(1) (failure to protect), and (e)
(serious physical abuse to a child under five). The Agency also filed petitions
as to N.P. (H.P.’s twin), then two months old (born December 19, 2023), and
Z.P., then six years old (born April 1, 2017), pursuant to section 300,
subdivision (j) (abuse of a sibling). Subsequent petitions containing virtually
the same allegations were filed, culminating in the operative second amended
petition.
“The petitions alleged the following. Father brought H.P. to the
hospital on February 27 as H.P. was nonresponsive, lethargic, and would not
open his eyes. Father was observed to be under the influence of marijuana.
H.P.’s pupils were unequal in size and his body temperature was 91.2
degrees. A CT scan showed H.P. had a bilateral subdural hematoma,
suspected swelling of the optic discs, and a retinal hemorrhage. He was
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categorized as near fatal and transferred to another hospital. Father denied
knowledge of, and could not otherwise explain, the cause of H.P.’s injuries.
“On February 28, mother reported that, about five hours before father
brought H.P. into the hospital, H.P. had fallen off an air mattress and,
though he had no marks or bruises on his head, mother noticed he would not
open his eyes. Mother later reported that, on February 26, she threw H.P.
onto her bed, causing him to bounce and fling his head. On February 27, the
day H.P. went to the hospital, mother had shaken him four times and tossed
him into his car seat where he slammed his head, and he appeared to have a
seizure.
“Medical staff opined H.P.’s injuries were due to abusive head trauma
and were not typical of a short fall with no external signs of impact. The
Agency concluded H.P. suffered serious physical harm inflicted, not by
accident, by a parent.” (Z.P., supra, A173553.)
Detention Reports and Hearing
“The Agency filed a detention report seeking to detain the children
from both parents given the severity of the injuries to H.P., deemed to be
highly suspicious for physical abuse. The report stated father did not take
H.P. to the hospital until several hours after he first noticed H.P. was
unresponsive, despite mother urging him to do so. Father reported that he
did not call 911 or take H.P. to the hospital immediately because he wanted
the parents to ‘get him to open his eyes on their own.’ Father also reported
smoking marijuana about two hours before taking H.P. to the hospital ‘to
calm his nerves.’ An addendum to the report indicated father did not know
mother had hurt H.P.
“At the March 4 detention hearing, father was present and was
appointed counsel. The juvenile court ordered the children detained from
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both parents pending disposition but ordered supervised visits for father with
all three children.” (Z.P., supra, A173553.)
Jurisdiction/Disposition Reports and Hearings
“The April jurisdiction/disposition report stated H.P. was discharged
from the hospital on March 14 and placed at a shelter care home certified to
care for medically fragile infants, and N.P. was placed in the same home.
Z.P. was placed in a separate foster home.
“The April report provided the following summary of H.P.’s injuries.
H.P. suffered at least two separate instances of abusive head trauma as he
had bleeding in his brain that was both fresh and several weeks old. He also
had numerous injuries that were indicative of head trauma and being
shaken, including to the ligaments behind his neck, compression fractures to
his lower lumbar vertebrae, bleeding in his spine, and fractures in both
femurs. He required a feeding tube for food and medication. A doctor opined
that H.P. will likely have disabilities to his motor development, cognition,
and speech.
“The April report noted that father appeared to be under the influence
of marijuana when he brought H.P. to the hospital and admitted to smoking
marijuana earlier that evening.” (Z.P., supra, A173553.)
Several addenda to the jurisdiction/disposition report were filed in the
following five months. As relevant for our purposes, the May addendum
contained a case plan for father with numerous objectives, such as attending
the children’s medical and specialty care appointments, participating in
parent education services, including for children with disabilities, and
completing a mental health assessment and participating in its recommended
services. (Z.P., supra, A173553.) The addenda indicated father was taking
advantage of services being offered by the Agency, including transit cards
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and “Medi-Cal Lyfts” for transportation to visits with the children, a
parenting assessment, SafeCare parenting services, and meeting with a
therapist weekly. (Z.P., supra, A173553.)
“The addenda also noted H.P. had numerous neurological and
developmental complications requiring extensive medical and specialty
appointments. For example, H.P. had poor vision requiring specialty glasses
and use of eyepatches; was at high risk for having cerebral palsy; had an
increased risk of developmental delay, development of epilepsy, and learning
difficulties; had gastronomy tube surgery in September; and would likely
continue to require tube feeding for at least the near future. H.P. was moved
to a different home certified for medically fragile infants in July. N.P. and
Z.P. were placed with the paternal grandparents in August and October,
respectively.
“The court held contested jurisdiction hearings in August and
September. After hearing evidence, the court sustained the operative
dependency petitions as to each of the children and made true findings on the
allegations in the petitions. Among the relevant findings, the court found
father should have known from the severity of H.P.’s injuries, his
nonresponsive state, and his seizures that H.P. was being abused by mother
and needed emergency care. The court further found father delayed in taking
H.P. to the hospital for many hours and that hospital employees indicated
father appeared to be under the influence of marijuana.” (Z.P., supra,
A173553.)
Disposition Updates and Hearings
Contested disposition hearings took place on 11 dates between October
23, 2024, and April 21, 2025. The following relevant updates took place over
that period of time.
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Father continued to participate in weekly therapy sessions and
completed the SafeCare parenting classes in March 2025.
Although father attended a majority of H.P.’s medical appointments
and twice weekly physical, occupational, and feeding therapy appointments
through the end of 2024, father began struggling to consistently attend the
appointments once he could no longer use Medi-Cal Lyfts (as the children
were not in his care so it was not an approved use), and by March 2025 he
was attending the specialty appointments virtually rather than in person.
During this time, “[t]he social worker continued to engage with father,
including reminding him of upcoming appointments, providing monthly
public transit cards for transportation costs (both before and after there were
issues with the Medi-Cal Lyfts), mapping out transit routes before
appointments, and requesting alternative transportation methods on an
appointment-by-appointment basis. The social worker encouraged father to
attend H.P.’s occupational and physical therapy sessions in person to engage
in the activities with him, but father stated he was unable to do so due to
lack of transportation.” (Z.P., supra, A173553.)
“In January 2025, the case plan was updated to include as an objective
that father ‘[s]tay free from illegal drugs and show [his] ability to live free
from drug dependency,’ comply with required drug tests, and ‘soberly parent
the children.’ ” (Z.P., supra, A173553.)
In March 2025, H.P.’s counsel requested the court order reunification
services for father, to include an Alcohol and Other Drug (AOD) assessment
and follow recommended treatment, which was not previously included in
father’s case plan, as well as classes tailored to special-needs parenting given
H.P.’s needs, which the reports indicated father had been minimizing. H.P.’s
counsel argued father’s marijuana use on the night H.P. was brought to the
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hospital resulted in significant delay and in father being under the influence
at the hospital.
Father completed an AOD assessment in March. The April 15, 2025
assessment report indicated father met the criteria for “Cannabis Use
Disorder, Moderate.” It was recommended that father participate in an
outpatient substance abuse treatment program and provide regular
urinalysis testing to confirm a decrease in use. The assessor opined father
was under the influence during the interview and a drug test at the time of
assessment was positive for “a very high level of THC metabolites.”
In April 2025, a public health nurse assigned to the case spoke to father
about additional parent education resources for parents with children with
special needs and set up calls for father with various specialists relevant to
H.P.’s needs. Father enrolled in a new parenting class for children with
special needs through “Support for Families” beginning on April 15, 2025.
“At the conclusion of the disposition hearings, on April 21, 2025, the
court found removal of the children from father’s custody was necessary for
their protection and declared the children dependents of the court. It ordered
family reunification services to father. The court noted H.P.’s counsel had
requested the AOD assessment and special-needs parenting classes and the
court ordered those services as it found them to be appropriate. [¶] The court
bypassed reunification services for mother.” (Z.P., supra, A173553.)
Combined Six- and 12-month Hearing
Unless otherwise noted, all further dates refer to 2025.
Due to statutory time constraints, a combined six- and 12-month
hearing (combined hearing) was held just days after the final disposition
hearing, on April 25.
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“In the status review report filed ahead of the [combined hearing], the
Agency stated father had received over 13 months of pre-disposition
reunification services and had engaged with the Agency and service
providers. However, the Agency was concerned that father was completing
services without gaining insight from them. The Agency also had concerns
that father was minimizing the severity of H.P.’s injuries and how those
injuries continued to put H.P. at risk for developing issues with ‘muscle tone,
bilateral weakness and/or spasticity, cerebral palsy, developmental delays,
epilepsy, learning difficulties, limited mobility, and vision impairments.’ The
Agency recommended continuing services to father until the 18-month
meeting.” (Z.P., supra, A173553.)
That status review report also noted that, up to that point, father had
attended 88 of 115 visits with the children, all of which had been supervised
by the Agency. The visits had mostly been good and there were no obvious
safety concerns as to N.P. and Z.P., and the Agency therefore wanted to
exercise its discretion to delegate supervision of visits with N.P. and Z.P. to
the paternal grandparents, with whom they were living. However, the
Agency planned to continue to supervise father’s visits with H.P.
Father did not argue for return of the children at the April 25 hearing,
but he questioned the reasonableness of the reunification services offered as
two referrals (the AOD assessment and special-needs parenting classes) had
only just been made. Father argued that, as the circumstances leading to
jurisdiction included allegations that he used marijuana, the AOD
assessment could have been made earlier and he could have been done with
treatment by that point.
At the conclusion of the combined hearing, the court found return of the
children to father would create a substantial risk of detriment to their safety
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and that the Agency had provided reasonable services to father up to that
point. However, as it found there was a substantial probability the children
could be returned to father’s care by the 18-month review hearing, it ordered
continued reunification services to him.
The court also ordered continued supervised visits for father, and
granted the Agency discretion to delegate supervision and to move visits to
monitored or unsupervised.
Z.P.: Appeal from April 25 Order
Father appealed the court’s reasonable services finding from the April
25 hearing. On April 1, 2026, we concluded the court erred by finding, at the
time of the combined hearing, reasonable services had been offered to father
as the AOD referral and assistance in enrolling in a special-needs parenting
class had been offered to him only weeks before the combined hearing. (Z.P.,
supra, A173553.) Notably, however, we recognized the Agency had provided
an array of other resources to father, and we “commend[ed] the Agency’s
efforts to maintain communication with father throughout the case and help
him attend the children’s many appointments and visitations.” (Ibid.)
In addition, we “stress[ed] that our finding [was] limited only to the
court’s finding of reasonable services at the time of the April 25, 2025
combined hearing, and we express[ed] no opinion as to any subsequent
findings regarding whether reasonable services have been provided to father
after the combined hearing, such as between the combined hearing and the
18-month hearing.” (Z.P., supra, A173553.)
18-month Hearing Updates
Between the combined hearing on April 25 and the final 18-month
review hearing on March 10, 2026, the Agency maintained consistent contact
with father and provided various services, including transit cards, reminders
9
for appointments, therapy, and free car transportation through Medi-Cal. Of
particular relevance to this writ proceeding are two aspects of the services
offered to father during this time period: father’s substance abuse testing and
treatment and his visitation with the children.
Substance Abuse Testing and Treatment
Father tested positive for THC on every single drug test he took
throughout the entire course of the proceedings, from April 2025 through
February 2026. He was on a set testing schedule (every Tuesday and
Wednesday, days which he requested) rather than being randomly tested.
Father began attending outpatient substance abuse services at Sitike
Counseling Center (Sitike) in June. He completed his intake on June 24 and
began group sessions on July 1. He completed at least 13 group sessions and
12 individual sessions at Sitike through November, when the outpatient
program ended.
Father’s outpatient counselor at Sitike stated father completed his
individual and group sessions but did not “ ‘successfully’ ” complete the
program because he continued to test positive. She explained he was “still in
the ‘precontemplation phase,’ ” the first phase of the program model, in which
“individuals do not recognize their behavior as a problem, lack awareness of
the problem, and are resistant to change.”
The counselor opined the outpatient program was not appropriate for
father at that time and had informed father that he needed a higher level of
care. Specifically, he needed to at a minimum engage in an intensive
outpatient program (IOP); she provided father resources for the HealthRight
360 IOP, but he declined and stated he could not go in person. She talked
with father many times about his drug use and recommended he stop all use
of THC, but he refused to do so and did not recognize the need for treatment.
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He told her at the end of the program that he “quit” using marijuana, but he
still used THC in liquid form to help with pain management and would not
stop using it. The counselor did not recommend any other services as father
was unwilling to engage in a higher level of care.
In January 2026, the social worker reminded father that Sitike
recommended an IOP due to his lack of behavioral change in the Sitike
outpatient program. Father told the social worker he was planning to call
HealthRight 360 (the IOP provider) the following day, but he also stated he
was unwilling to attend an in-person IOP and would only enroll in an online
program. When the social worker explained it was important for him to
follow Sitike’s recommendation, he stated he did not need an IOP and “ ‘no
one is saying that. I don’t do drugs. I am not addicted.’ ”
In February 2026, father reported he was not engaged in any substance
abuse treatment program. He reported attending multiple Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings weekly.
Visitation
In June, the Agency indicated father continued to have positive,
supervised visits with the children twice a week, which the Agency
coordinated in collaboration with the children’s grandparents. Some visits
took place at various Agency locations and others took place at a public
library, chosen for its central location.
On June 10, the social worker sent an e-mail to counsel notifying them
of her intent to liberalize the visits with father for all three children from
supervised to monitored. Counsel for N.P. and Z.P. agreed to liberalize visits
with those children from supervised to monitored, but H.P.’s counsel did not
agree “due to concerns about the father’s drug test results while in treatment
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and the father leaving early from visitations with [H.P.]” The Agency
therefore decided not to change the visits with H.P.
Beginning in July 2025 and continuing into February 2026, father
continued to have supervised visits with the children but also had visits with
Z.P. and N.P monitored by the paternal grandmother without Agency
supervision, usually at a nearby park or at the grandmother’s home.
At a November 4 hearing, the court expressed to the Agency (off-record)
that it wanted the Agency to progress father’s visits with N.P. and Z.P. The
court and the parties discussed having the Agency inspect father’s three-
bedroom house in San Francisco for safety, which is where father wished to
have the children live with him if they were returned to him.
Following that hearing, the Agency stated it was working with father to
progress his visits with N.P. and Z.P. from monitored to unsupervised and to
change the location of the visits to the father’s home in San Francisco if
appropriate. In connection with that effort, the Agency asked father who
lived in that home; he replied he stayed with mother in San Bruno but
planned to stay at the San Francisco home when he had the children. He
said his brother and cousin stayed in the San Francisco home but refused to
provide their information to the social worker even after being reminded she
was trying to support the progression of visitation and reunification.
Later in November, the social worker scheduled an in-home visit at the
San Francisco home and confirmed the visit with father beforehand. During
the in-home visit, the social worker reported the following. She smelled
marijuana smoke upon first entering, but the odor dissipated within a few
minutes and was replaced by a strong cleaning product smell. There was ash
and a burn hole on the arm of the couch along with a strange item, which
father stated was a torch for lighting incense. The living room was small and
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clean (with some small clutter) and the first floor of the home had clean, new
wood flooring, but the stairs had strips with nails sticking up running along
the sides of the steps. The kitchen was clean and appeared safe, but there
was a large pile of trash and household items on the other side of a glass
door.
When the social worker went upstairs, she heard a voice and asked
father if someone was there, but he said no. The social worker saw a man
kneeling at a toilet and dumping a small garbage can into the toilet. The
man said he was father’s cousin and had come over the night before to spend
the night and got sick. The cousin went into a room that looked “well lived
in,” set up with a bed and personal items. Father stated it was an extra
room.
Father’s bedroom was reasonably clean and looked appropriately set up
for an adult. He stated that was the room that he and the children would
share if they slept there. A third bedroom, which father said was also an
extra room, was very messy and unsafe, containing a stained mattress with
items above and below it. There were items scattered around the room and
big garbage bags full of unknown items. On a shelf in the closet was a large
clear plastic container with a spout containing a bright green liquid, which
father stated was “ ‘old Kool-Aid’ ” without clearly explaining why it was
there.
When the social worker expressed concern about the condition of the
home and noted father had many days to prepare for the visit, father stated
he had been cleaning up the house and would clean everything before the
children came. He also planned to fix the issue with the exposed nails,
dispose of all the trash, and bring children’s items over if the visits were to
take place there, which is what he wanted. Father denied that anyone else,
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including his brother or cousin, lived at the house. As of December 9, father
reported he was still working on the house.
In November, mother and father had another child, S.P., who was
detained from the parents but is not involved in the instant writ proceeding.
In February 2026, the social worker attempted to again visit the San
Francisco home to see if it was appropriate and offered father two dates that
worked for her and the social worker on S.P.’s case, who wanted to see the
home as well. Father stated he was not available but offered another date.
However, the social workers were not available that day; no additional dates
appear to have been discussed and the visit did not take place.
Throughout this period, father regularly attended visits with the
children, but he also canceled or left early from some visits, including some
monitored visits with N.P. and Z.P. Visits with N.P. and Z.P. did not
progress from monitored to unsupervised visits.
18-month Review Hearings
In its final report in February 2026, the Agency stated father remained
engaged with service providers, but it was concerned he was completing
services without fully understanding their purpose or gaining insight into the
underlying issues affecting the health and safety of his children. “[F]ather
minimizes the impact that his substance use has on the family, even though
his substance use was included in the petition, and he refuses to take
responsibility for his lack of progress and behavioral change. The father
continues to assert that he will figure it all out once the children are returned
to his care, instead of demonstrating an understanding of the issues and
show ability to actively care for and protect the children now.”
The 18-month review hearings took place on several dates between
August 2025 and March 2026. The court heard testimony from numerous
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witnesses and considered the reports and addenda prepared in connection
with the hearings, which were consistent with the above information
regarding father’s engagement with substance abuse testing and treatment
and visitation with the children.
The Agency recommended terminating reunification services to father,
and counsel for the children joined in that recommendation. Father argued
the court must return the children to his care and custody.
At the final hearing on March 10, 2026, the court discussed visitation
and noted father never asked for overnight visits with N.P. and Z.P., which
father’s counsel explained was because the visits never progressed to
unsupervised (a prerequisite step) despite repeated requests. The court
questioned whether the visits did not progress because there was no evidence
the San Francisco home was ready, despite counsel’s representation that it
was, and noted father could have brought in photos or other evidence to
demonstrate it was ready.
The court also explained it was concerned with what father’s plan was
if the court were to return the children to his custody. Counsel replied they
did not have a formal plan, but father planned to set up the home in San
Francisco for the children, get “all the child equipment ready for them” at
that home, and have them live there with him. The court was surprised
father did not have a formal plan as he had been asking for return of the
children for several months.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court recounted the series of
events leading to the dependency proceedings and noted father appeared to
be under the influence of marijuana when he took H.P. to the hospital. The
court stated H.P. had extreme physical disabilities and special needs (though
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he was making progress in therapies), N.P. had speech issues, and Z.P. had
schooling concerns.
The court detailed the state of father’s San Francisco home during the
in-home visit, as described above. The court had concerns about father’s
credibility and honesty because he told the social worker no one was at the
home, yet his cousin was present and appeared to be living there.
The court found by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable
services had been offered to father as the record was abundant with the
efforts made to assist him, including transportation, transit cards, setting up
drug testing on days that were convenient for him, and setting up various
other services.
The court found this to be a difficult case because father had complied
with the service plan, but the problem was whether he made enough progress
to meet the objectives of the plan and safely return the children to him;
otherwise, the reason for removing the children would not have been
ameliorated. The case began with father delaying bringing H.P. to the
hospital and being under the influence of marijuana, but two years later and
throughout the two years he was still testing positive for marijuana. The
court believed father was never going to give up marijuana and, because he
was in the early “pre-contemplation” stage, he failed to understand the effect
that had on him.
The court stated: “[W]hen he is under the influence of marijuana, he is
distracted and not focused. Three children with special needs requires focus
and attention, 100 percent. And when a parent is known to use marijuana
regularly, to be diagnosed with this condition, with three children with
special needs, and given the opportunity for over two years to address
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this issue, he has not done so. He has not done so. In fact, he refuses to do
so.”
Accordingly, the court found return of the children to father would
create a substantial risk of detriment to them, terminated reunification
services to him, and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing for June 25, 2026.
Father filed a writ petition seeking relief from the court’s order and
requesting a temporary stay of the hearing.
DISCUSSION
Father’s sole argument is that, because the visits with N.P. and Z.P.
never progressed to unsupervised, the court erred in finding reasonable
services were offered. A review of the record reveals that the court’s finding
is supported by substantial evidence.
I. Applicable Law
When a child is removed from the custody of a parent, the court
ordinarily must order child welfare services for the purpose of facilitating
reunification of the family. (Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th
609, 624 (Michael G.).) When at least one child in a sibling group is under
three years old at the time of initial removal, as H.P and N.P. were, the
parent is presumptively eligible for at least six months of reunification
services. (See id. at p. 625 & fn. 5; § 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B), (C).) During this
stage of dependency proceedings, the court holds periodic review hearings to
evaluate reunification efforts and appropriate next steps, including the
adequacy of the reunification services offered or provided and the parent’s
progress. (Michael G., at p. 625; see § 366.21.)
Because the court found at the combined hearing a substantial
probability the children may be returned to father within six months, the
court extended reunification services and continued the case for an additional
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six months. (Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 625; § 366.21, subds. (e)(3) &
(g)(1).) This led to the 18-month review hearings at issue in this writ
proceeding, which generally represents the maximum period for reunification
services. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3)(A); Michael G., at p. 633.)
At the 18-month review hearing, if the court decides the children
cannot be safely returned to the parent’s custody, “the court ordinarily must
proceed to schedule a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26, at
which the court decides whether to terminate parental rights and place the
child for adoption or else select another permanent plan.” (Michael G., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 627; § 366.22, subd. (a)(3).)
Additionally, “[t]hough a court at the 18-month review hearing must
determine whether reasonable services have been offered or provided to the
parent, an affirmative answer is not a statutory prerequisite to setting the
permanency planning hearing.” (Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 629–
630.) Hence, a court may set a section 366.26 hearing even if it finds a
parent did not receive reasonable reunification services in the immediately
preceding 12- to 18-month review period. (Id. at p. 634.)
However, importantly for this case, a court is prohibited from
terminating parental rights at the permanency planning hearing if the
Agency “ ‘has failed to offer or provide reasonable reunification services to a
parent throughout the reunification period.’ ” (Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 629.)
As to the adequacy of reunification services, the Agency must make a
good faith effort to develop and implement a reunification plan, and we judge
the adequacy of that plan and the reasonableness of the Agency’s efforts
based on the circumstances of each case. (Amanda H. v. Superior Court
(2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1345.) “ ‘[T]he record should show that the
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supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody,
offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable
contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made
reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved
difficult.’ ” (Ibid.) The standard is whether the services provided were
reasonable under the circumstances, not whether they were the best that
might have been provided. (Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66
Cal.App.4th 965, 969.)
A critical component of reunification services is visitation as, without
visitation, reunification is close to impossible. (Serena M. v. Superior Court
(2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 659, 673 (Serena M.).) To that end, visitation “shall be
as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child.” (§ 362.1,
subd. (a)(1)(A).) “ ‘While visitation is a key element of reunification, the court
must focus on the best interests of the children “and on the elimination of
conditions which led to the juvenile court’s finding that the child has suffered,
or is at risk of suffering, harm . . . .” ’ ” (Serena M., at p. 673.)
We review a court’s reasonable services finding for substantial
evidence. (B.D. v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1132, 1150, 1155.)
“In making this determination, we review the record in the light most
favorable to the court’s determinations and draw all reasonable inferences
from the evidence to support the findings and orders. [Citation.] ‘We do not
reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely
determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the [juvenile]
court.’ ” (Kevin R. v. Superior Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 688–689.)
19
II. Substantial Evidence Supports the Court’s Reasonable Services
Finding Despite the Failure To Liberalize Visits with N.P. and Z.P.
As noted above, we concluded in Z.P. that the court’s finding of
reasonable services up to the point of the combined hearing was erroneous.
(Z.P., supra, A173553.) Hence, though the court could set the section 366.26
hearing regardless of its reasonable services finding at the 18-month hearing,
it may terminate father’s parental rights only if it properly found reasonable
services were offered at some point in the proceedings, including in the 12- to
18-month review period at issue here. (See Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
pp. 629–630.) For the reasons we explain, substantial evidence supports the
court’s finding of reasonable services.
In finding reasonable services had been offered to father, the court
pointed to the “abundant” efforts in the record by which the Agency sought to
assist father throughout the proceedings, such as transportation, transit
cards, and setting up drug testing on days of his choosing, among other
services. Indeed, the record is replete with actions by the Agency over the
course of nearly two years to offer services to father, including SafeCare
parenting classes, individual therapy, Medi-Cal car service when available,
transit cards for public transportation, mapping out transit routes, regular
reminders for appointments and visits, setting up visitation with the children
at various Agency locations throughout the Bay Area, setting up monitored
visits with N.P. and Z.P. with the paternal grandmother, several months of
substance abuse testing and treatment, and trying to help father enroll in an
IOP after it was recommended by Sitike. Plainly, there is substantial
evidence in support of the court’s finding.
Further, although we found the reasonable services finding at the time
of the April 25, 2025 hearing was erroneous in Z.P., that conclusion was
20
premised solely on the recency of two critical referrals (for the AOD
assessment and special-needs parenting classes), which were made just
weeks before the combined hearing. (Z.P., supra, A173553.) We still
recognized the numerous other resources provided to father, including the
ones described above, and commended the Agency’s consistent
communication with father and assistance in helping him attend the visits
and appointments. (Ibid.) Nearly a year passed between that hearing and
the finding of reasonable services in March 2026, during which time
numerous services—including substance abuse treatment and testing—were
steadily provided or offered to father.
Father nevertheless avers the failure to liberalize his visits with N.P.
and Z.P. to unsupervised precludes a finding of reasonable services. In
support, he relies on Tracy J. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1415
(Tracy J.), in which the appellate court found visitation services were
unreasonable where the agency failed to advance the parents’ visits with
their asthmatic child. In that case, the agency refused to progress the visits
to unsupervised based solely on feeling “ ‘uncomfortable’ ” leaving the child
alone with the parents, who had developmental disabilities, despite evidence
that their disabilities did not endanger the child. (Id. at pp. 1419, 1426.)
Notably, in Tracy J., supervised visits at the parents’ home involved a clean
home without any safety concerns. (Id. at p. 1421.)
In that context, the Tracy J. court held an agency may not “impede the
progression of visitation services to a parent solely out of concerns about the
parent’s mental health status.” (Tracy J., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1419.)
The court explained: “When the Agency limits visitation in the absence of
evidence showing the parents’ behavior has jeopardized or will jeopardize the
child’s safety, it unreasonably forecloses family reunification on the basis of
21
the parents’ labeled diagnoses, and does not constitute reasonable services.”
(Id. at p. 1427.)
Father’s case is readily distinguishable from Tracy J. Fundamentally,
there is no evidence that the progression of visitation was limited due to
vague feelings of being “uncomfortable” despite no evidence of danger to the
child. And, of course, here the Agency did not withhold visitation due to
concerns about a developmental disability as to father.
Further, the Agency took steps to progress the visits with N.P. and Z.P.
to unsupervised, which were expected to take place at father’s San Francisco
home, by conducting the in-home visit in November 2025. Unlike the safe
home in Tracy J., father’s home included a torch on the couch, exposed nails
on the stairs, trash throughout the home, an odor of marijuana, and an
unexpected cousin who may have been living there. Though father asserted
at the March 2026 hearing that the home was safe, the court found he failed
to provide photos or any other evidence to support that claim. We decline to
fault the Agency for failing to permit unsupervised visits at that home in the
absence of evidence that it was suitable for N.P. and Z.P.
Finally, we are not persuaded by father’s assertion that the Agency
“ ‘unreasonably foreclosed’ ” family reunification by failing to liberalize the
visits with N.P. and Z.P. and deprived him of the opportunity to demonstrate
his ability to safely care for the children. Instead, the court’s concern over
father’s ability to care for the children centered on his failure to ameliorate
the reason the children were removed in the first place, in particular,
delaying bringing H.P. to the hospital and being under the influence of
marijuana when he did so. Yet, over the following two years, father tested
positive for marijuana on every single test he took, refused to cease using
THC, and declined to engage in an IOP as recommended. Thus, the record
22
does not support his claim that the lack of unsupervised visits with N.P. and
Z.P. foreclosed family reunification. (See Serena M., supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at
p. 673 [though visitation is a key part of reunification, court must focus on
best interest of children and elimination of conditions leading to finding of
harm].)
In sum, there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the
court’s finding at the March 10, 2026 hearing that reasonable services were
provided to father. Accordingly, we shall deny father’s petition.
DISPOSITION
The petition for an extraordinary writ is denied on the merits.
(§ 366.26, subd. (l); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452(h)(1).) The request for a
temporary stay is denied as moot. Our decision is final as to this court
immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
23
PETROU, J.
WE CONCUR:
TUCHER, P. J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
A175860 / J.P. v. Superior Court
24
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