CourtListener 10863048•People v. Ferguson CA1/4
Full text
Filed 5/21/26 P. v. Ferguson CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A174468
v.
XAVIERA KAYLI FERGUSON, (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 01-25-02412)
Defendant and Appellant.
Xaviera Kayli Ferguson appeals an involuntary medication order
issued pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1370. She contends that the trial
court erred by relying on the report of the psychologist who was appointed
pursuant to section 1369 to evaluate her competency to stand trial and that
absent this report, the trial court’s ruling is not supported by substantial
evidence. We find no error and affirm the order.
BACKGROUND
On August 15, 2025, Ferguson was charged with one count of making a
false report of a bomb in violation of section 148.1, subdivision (c). The facts
underlying the charge are not relevant to this appeal.
On September 2, defense counsel declared a doubt as to Ferguson’s
competence to stand trial. After a hearing in camera, the trial court found
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
that substantial evidence supported defense counsel’s doubt and suspended
criminal proceedings. The court appointed Dr. Melissa Johnson to evaluate
Ferguson’s competency to stand trial pursuant to section 1369. The order
also appointed Dr. Johnson to evaluate and provide an opinion to the court on
“the issue of the defendant’s medical decision-making capacity and medically
appropriate treatment pursuant to PC § 1370 (a)(2)(B)(i).” The order
provides further that Dr. Johnson “shall specifically address whether:
[¶] 1) defendant’s mental disorder requires medical treatment with
antipsychotic medication; [¶] 2) if the defendant’s mental disorder is not
treated with antipsychotic medication, it is probable that serious harm to the
physical or mental health of the patient will result; [¶] 3) the defendant has
the capacity to make a decision regarding such medications; [¶] 4) the
defendant presents, as a result of mental disorder or mental defect, a
demonstrated danger of inflicting substantial physical harm on others;
demonstrated danger may be based on an assessment of the defendant’s
present mental condition, including a consideration of past behavior of the
defendant within six years prior to the time the defendant last attempted to
inflict, inflicted, or threatened to inflict substantial physical harm on
another, and other relevant evidence; and . . . whether defendant has a
mental disorder that is typically known to benefit from antipsychotic
medication.” Her report was to be completed by October 16.
In the meantime, on September 8, counsel for Contra Costa County
Department of Health Services moved for a hearing for an involuntary
medication order pursuant to section 2603, subdivision (c).
At the hearing on the section 2603 request, Ferguson’s treating
psychiatrist at the Martinez Detention Facility testified about Ferguson’s
diagnosis with schizophrenia and her capacity to make medical decisions
2
regarding her treatment. The psychiatrist opined that it was in Ferguson’s
best medical interest to take antipsychotic medication and that because
Ferguson did not believe she had a mental illness, and “was unable to reason
about either the illness or the possible consequences of accepting or refusing
treatment,” she did not have the requisite capacity to consent to treatment.
The psychiatrist opined that Ferguson was a threat to herself, but not to
others, and that she was gravely disabled because her “symptoms are
preventing her from making decisions that are in her best interest. Or that
are in preservation of her physical and mental well-being.”
Following the hearing, the trial court issued an order allowing the
county jail to administer antipsychotic medication to Ferguson involuntarily.
The court noted that Ferguson was “in active distress due to her delusions.”
Her delusions were “interfering with the ability of doctors to pinpoint any
actual medical concerns she may have and interfering with her ability to care
for herself as testified to by the doctor.” The court found that Ferguson also
lacked the capacity to rationally analyze the risk and benefits of medication.
Dr. Johnson’s report was submitted to the court on October 6. In
addition to evaluating Ferguson’s trial competency, the report concluded: “it
is the recommendation of this evaluator that Ms. Ferguson receive mental
health treatment while awaiting trial. Specifically, she would benefit from
medication interventions and psychoeducation. [¶] a. Ms. Ferguson’s mental
disorder markedly impairs any insight she may have into the severity of her
mental illness. Therefore, it is recommended that psychotropic medication be
an option for mental health staff to treat Ms. Ferguson, [¶] b. If
Ms. Ferguson’s mental disorder is not treated with antipsychotic medication,
it is likely that serious harm to her physical or mental health will result,
[¶] c. Ms. Ferguson does not have the capacity to make a decision regarding
3
such medications, [and] [¶] d. Involuntary administration of antipsychotic
medication is likely to substantially aid in the restoration of competence for
Ms. Ferguson.”
At a hearing on October 21, the court noted that Dr. Johnson had
opined that Ferguson was not competent to stand trial and asked whether
either party objected to the report. Ferguson’s counsel submitted “[o]n the
issue of competency.” Counsel argued, however, that restoration of
competency was not in the interests of justice because “her charges are as a
result of her mental illness and not . . . an actual danger to others.” Counsel
also noted that Ferguson, despite being subject to the temporary involuntary
medication order, continued to have similar symptoms. Based on
Dr. Johnson’s report, the trial court found Ferguson incompetent to stand
trial. Over counsel’s objection, the court found that restoration of competency
was in the interest of justice and requested that recommendations for
placement be submitted within 15 judicial days.
On November 18, the trial court committed Ferguson to the
Department of State Hospitals. Over an objection by defense counsel, the
trial court issued an order allowing the administration of antipsychotic
medication involuntarily pursuant to section 1370, subdivision (a)(2)(B). The
written order entered thereafter reads in relevant part: “Based on the report
of Dr. Johnson, the court finds that defendant lacks capacity to make
decisions regarding antipsychotic medication, the defendant’s mental
disorder requires medical treatment with antipsychotic medication, and, if
the defendant’s mental disorder is not treated with antipsychotic medication,
it is probable that serious harm to the physical or mental health of the
defendant will result. Additionally, the Court approved an order pursuant to
Penal Code section 2603 on September 30, 2025. The court therefore
4
authorizes the administration of antipsychotic medication as needed,
including on an involuntary basis, to be administered under the direction and
supervision of a licensed psychiatrist.” 2
DISCUSSION
I.
Individuals have a qualified right under the federal and state
constitutions to refuse antipsychotic medication. (Sell v. United States (2003)
539 U.S. 166, 179; In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 14–16 (Qawi).) They have
a “significant” constitutionally protected “liberty interest in avoiding the
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Washington v. Harper (1990)
494 U.S. 210, 221–222.) This same interest is protected under California’s
right to privacy, which “clearly extends to the right to refuse antipsychotic
drugs.” (Qawi, 32 Cal.4th at p. 14.)
Pretrial detainees receive “at least the same protection” that convicted
persons do: They may exercise this right unless they are dangerous to
themselves or others and treatment is in their medical interest. (People v.
Lewis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1078, 1089–1090 (Lewis).) “Further, the
government is permitted to administer antipsychotic drugs involuntarily ‘to a
mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges in order to render that
defendant competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medically
appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may
undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive
2 Ferguson initially filed a notice of appeal following entry of the
September 30 order under section 2603. After entry of the second order
under section 1370, this court granted Ferguson’s request to deem her notice
of appeal sufficient to obtain review of both orders.
5
alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important governmental
trial-related interests.’ ” (Id. at p. 1090.)
These constitutional requirements are codified in section 1370,
subdivision (a)(2)(B), which sets forth the factual findings necessary to
support the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication to
defendants found incompetent to stand trial. (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1090.) Under this subdivision, when a defendant has been found
mentally incompetent, a trial court shall then “hear and determine whether
the defendant lacks the capacity to make decisions regarding the
administration of antipsychotic medication” and in doing so, “shall consider
opinions in the reports prepared pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1369,
as applicable to the issue of whether the defendant lacks the capacity to
make decisions regarding the administration of antipsychotic medication.”
(§ 1370, subd. (a)(2)(B).)
Section 1369 sets forth the procedure to be followed before issuance of
an involuntary medication order. Under section 1369, subdivision (b)(2)(A), a
court may direct the licensed psychologists or psychiatrists appointed to
evaluate a defendant’s competency to further evaluate whether treatment
with antipsychotic medication is appropriate for the defendant. Under
section 1369, subdivision (c)(1), “If neither party objects to any competency
report submitted pursuant to subdivision (b), the court may determine the
competency of the defendant based on any such competency report. The court
shall also determine whether the defendant lacks the capacity to make
decisions regarding the administration of antipsychotic medication.”
However, “[i]f either party objects to any competency report and requests a
hearing, the court shall hold a hearing to determine competence and to
determine whether the defendant lacks the capacity to make decisions
6
regarding the administration of antipsychotic medication, pursuant to
subparagraph (B) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 1370.” (Id.,
subd. (c)(2).)
A court’s order authorizing a state hospital to administer antipsychotic
medication involuntarily to a defendant will be upheld on appeal so long as it
is supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Lameed (2016)
247 Cal.App.4th 381, 397.)
II.
Ferguson contends that the trial court violated her right to due process
by relying on Dr. Johnson’s report to support issuance of the November order
under section 1370. She argues that the court’s use of the report, “without
allowing confrontation and cross-examination—or a legally-acceptable waiver
of those rights—violated the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.” She also
argues that Dr. Johnson’s opinion was “nearly two months stale” and that she
only consented to proceed with Dr. Johnson’s evaluation of her competency to
stand trial, not her medical competency.
The Attorney General argues that Ferguson forfeited any challenge to
the court’s reliance on the report by stipulating to its admission and by
failing to challenge it in the trial court. (See People v. Blacksher (2011)
52 Cal.4th 769, 797–798 [where defendant submitted the question of
competency on doctors’ reports, he forfeited appellate claim that the trial
court erred in relying on allegedly insufficient reports].) Additionally, the
Attorney General notes that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to
competency proceedings and that, while a party can request a hearing under
section 1369, subdivision (c)(2), due process does not require an evidentiary
hearing with cross-examination before an involuntary medication order may
be issued. (See Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1093–1100.)
7
Ferguson acknowledges that Dr. Johnson’s report was received without
objection on October 5, but argues that her stipulation was made “only in the
context of competence to stand trial, not with respect to the need for an
[involuntary medication order]” and that Dr. Johnson’s “examination and
findings primarily concerned only the issue of competence to stand trial.”
She notes that her attorney objected to the issuance of an involuntary
medication order at the hearing on November 18 and argues that counsel’s
objection was sufficient to preserve her arguments on appeal because her
attorney had no opportunity to make a more specific objection “as the trial
court failed to telegraph its intention on November 18 to rely on the Johnson
Report for issues unrelated to competency.” Finally, she argues that her
failure to request a hearing under section 1369, subdivision (c)(2), does not
excuse the court’s failure to comply with due process before issuing the order.
Initially, Ferguson is arguably correct that her counsel’s stipulation to
the report at the October hearing applied only to the issue of legal
competency. We reject, however, Ferguson’s suggestion that Dr. Johnson was
not appointed to evaluate her medical competency. The appointment order
expressly requested an evaluation of both legal and medical competency and
Dr. Johnson’s report offered opinions as to both. More importantly, we
disagree that her objection at the November hearing was sufficient to
preserve the issues argued on appeal.
At the November 18 hearing, after committing Ferguson to the
Department of State Hospitals, the court stated, “Doctor Johnson opined that
Ms. Ferguson meets criteria for involuntary medication on capacity grounds.
There is also a Penal Code 2603 order in effect” and then asked, “[a]ny
argument?” Ferguson’s counsel responded with no additional argument and
stated only, “I would object on behalf of Ms. Ferguson.”
8
“A proper objection must ‘ “ ‘fairly inform the trial court, as well as the
party offering the evidence, of the specific reason or reasons the objecting
party believes the evidence should be excluded, so the party offering the
evidence can respond appropriately and the court can make a fully informed
ruling.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 328; see also People v.
Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 302 [“ ‘ defendant’s failure to make a timely and
specific objection’ on the ground asserted on appeal makes that ground not
cognizable”].) It is impossible to know from the record what Ferguson’s
counsel was objecting to. In any event, the objection did not alert the court
that she was objecting to the court’s reliance on Dr. Johnson’s report or that
she was requesting a further hearing at which to cross-examine Dr. Johnson.
Certainly, nothing in the objection alerted the court to any concerns
regarding when Dr. Johnson’s report was prepared or whether Dr. Johnson
obtained Ferguson’s informed consent.3 Accordingly, Ferguson has forfeited
her challenge to the court’s reliance on Dr. Johnson’s opinion that she was
medically incompetent or to the sufficiency of the report to support the court’s
order.
In her reply brief, Ferguson suggests that her failure to request a
hearing does not excuse the court’s denial of her right to due process. Citing
section 1370, subdivision (a)(2)(B), she argues that “the statutory
requirement that the trial court ‘hear and determine’ whether expert
3 Any argument based on Ferguson’s assertions that Dr. Johnson’s
opinion was stale or that Ferguson did not consent to proceed with an
evaluation of her medical competency have also been forfeited by Ferguson’s
failure to brief the issues on appeal. (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015)
234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52 [“When legal argument with citation to authority is
not furnished on a particular point, we may treat the point as forfeited and
pass it without consideration”].)
9
opinions and individual patient circumstances are ‘true,’ does not activate an
affirmative duty by persons being subjected to an [involuntary medication
order] to demand their right to confront and cross-examine. Rather, it
requires something similar to what was described in Washington v. Harper
(1990) 494 U.S. 210, 227. While Harper did not obligate the state to provide
a[] hearing with strict evidentiary rules, the Supreme Court observed there
that the procedure in question ‘provide[d] for notice, the right to be present at
an adversary hearing, and the right to present and cross-examine witnesses.’
” Ferguson makes no attempt, however, to address whether section 1369
satisfies the requirements of due process or whether on the facts of this case,
she was denied due process. Rather, she argues instead that Lewis, supra,
cited by the Attorney General, was wrongly decided and should not be
followed.
In Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at pages 1094, 1100, the court
rejected the argument that “ ‘the trial court violated [his] procedural due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by issuing an involuntary
medication order after refusing to provide him with a full evidentiary
hearing, including the right to cross-examine the competency evaluator and
any hearsay declarants on whose statements the evaluator relied.’ ” In that
case, however, the defendant expressly requested an evidentiary hearing and
properly preserved the court’s denial for review on appeal. Here, the record
establishes that Ferguson was given notice that Dr. Johnson would be
evaluating her medical competency, and at the start of the hearing, the court
gave notice that it intended to rely on Dr. Johnson’s report to determine
medical competency. Ferguson was given an opportunity to respond, and
under section 1369, subdivision (c)(2), she had the right to object and request
a hearing. She did not do so. Accordingly, the record establishes that
10
Ferguson was given the due process to which she contends she was entitled
and provides no basis for reconsideration of the issues addressed in Lewis.
Because we find that the trial court properly relied on Dr. Johnson’s
report in issuing the November order and that Ferguson has forfeited any
challenge to the sufficiency of that report to support the order, we need not
consider Ferguson’s additional argument that Dr. Hummos’s testimony was
not independently sufficient to support the order. Accordingly, we affirm the
November 18 involuntary medication order.4
DISPOSITION
The involuntary medication orders are affirmed.
GOLDMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P. J.
STREETER, J.
4 Ferguson acknowledges in her reply brief that in her opening brief she
“tended to muddle her discussion” as to the two involuntary medication
orders. Although she suggests that “the entire basis for issuing an
[involuntary medication order] under both the [section] 2603 or [section]
1369 standards should be reviewed by this court,” we see no basis for
separately considering whether substantial evidence supports the
October order. To the extent she challenges Dr. Hummos’s testimony, it is
because, as she argues, the October order “set the groundwork” for the
November order and the court relied on the October order in issuing the
November order. She has not argued that error with regard to issuance of
the October order is otherwise prejudicial.
11
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.