People v. Pech CA5

CourtListener 10863039CalctappMay 21, 2026

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Filed 5/21/26 P. v. Pech CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F090143
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. F23909278)
v.

SHAWN RICH PECH, JR., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Stephanie L.
Negin, Judge.
James Edward Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher J. Rench and
Ismah Ahmad, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Peña, Acting P. J., Snauffer, J. and DeSantos, J.
Defendant Shawn Rich Pech, Jr. appeals after pleading no contest and being
placed on a two-year term of probation for illegally possessing a firearm. One of the
conditions of his probation required him to participate in and complete any treatment
program as directed by the probation department. He argues this condition constitutes an
improper delegation of judicial authority to the probation department. We disagree and
affirm.
BACKGROUND
The Fresno County District Attorney filed a complaint against Pech charging him
with possession of a concealed firearm in a vehicle (Pen. Code,1 § 25400, subd. (a)(1);
count 1), carrying a loaded firearm in public (§ 25850, subd. (a); count 2), and failure to
display license plates, an infraction (Veh. Code, § 5200, subd. (a); count 3). It was
further alleged as to counts 1 and 2 that Pech was not the registered owner of the firearm
(§§ 25400, subd. (c)(6), 25850, subd. (c)(6)).
Pech pleaded no contest to count 1, admitted the enhancement allegation, and the
remaining charges and enhancement allegations were dismissed. At sentencing, Pech
was placed on formal probation. In addition to imposing other conditions of probation,
the trial court articulated the following to Pech:

“You are to participate in all treatment program assessments as
directed by the court or probation and any recommended treatment
programs.

[¶] … [¶]

“Participate in any assessment, and attend and complete any
recommended alcohol or substance abuse treatment program as directed by
probation including the aftercare portions, and you must sign any waivers
of confidentiality.

[¶] … [¶]

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2.
“You must enroll, participate, and successfully complete a mental
health treatment program as directed by probation and sign any waivers of
confidentiality. Again, you must report immediately to probation if you
leave the program prior to completion.”
Pech acknowledged he understood and agreed to all the pronounced terms and
conditions of probation.
DISCUSSION
Pech argues the probation condition requiring him to participate in and complete
any treatment program as directed by the probation department unconstitutionally
delegated judicial authority to the department because it leaves open the possibility that
the department could order him into a residential treatment program without court input.
We disagree.
As a threshold matter, we reject the People’s contention that Pech’s claim has been
forfeited. A facial constitutional challenge to a probation condition may be considered
for the first time on appeal if it presents a pure question of law that does not depend on
the underlying factual record. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 888–889.) We
proceed to the merits of Pech’s claim.
“ ‘The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons
charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as
permitted by this Constitution.’ (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3.) Although the separation of
powers doctrine ‘does not prohibit one branch from taking action that might affect
another, the doctrine is violated when the actions of one branch defeat or materially
impair the inherent functions of another.’ [Citation.] ‘Separation of powers does not
mean an entire or complete separation of powers or functions, which would be
impracticable, if not impossible.’ ” (In re D.N. (2022) 14 Cal.5th 202, 212 (D.N.).)
A trial court has broad discretion to impose probation conditions to foster
rehabilitation of the defendant and to protect the public. (§ 1203.1, subd. (j); People v.
Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.) Further, the court “has authority to empower

3.
the probation department with authority to supervise the probation conditions.”
(People v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1240.)
“The court may leave to the discretion of the probation officer the specification of
the many details that invariably are necessary to implement the terms of probation.
However, the court’s order cannot be entirely open-ended.” (People v. O’Neil (2008)
165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358–1359.) “While the probation officer may properly specify
the details necessary to effectuate the court’s probation conditions, it is the court’s duty to
determine the nature of the requirements imposed on the probationer.” (People v. Smith
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902 (Smith).)
Constitutional challenges to mandatory probation conditions are reviewed de
novo. (People v. Brand (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 861, 867.) “When construing probation
conditions, we consider their context and we use common sense.” (Smith, supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at p. 902.) “ ‘A probation condition should be given “the meaning that
would appear to a reasonable, objective reader.” ’ ” (D.N., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 211,
quoting People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382.)
Pech argues this case is controlled by Smith. In that case, the trial court imposed a
probation condition requiring the defendant to “ ‘participate in any
treatment/therapy/counseling program, including residential, as directed by the probation
officer.’ ” (Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 901.) The appellate court found an
unconstitutional delegation of authority, “agree[ing] with the federal courts of appeal that
have held that entrusting the decision whether to mandate residential treatment to the
probation officer is an improper delegation of judicial authority.” (Id. at p. 903.)
One of the federal cases Smith cited was U.S. v. Mike (10th Cir. 2011) 632 F.3d
686. The Mike court held that open ended probation conditions which do not expressly
delegate the authority to commit one to residential treatment are only potentially infirm
due to their lack of clarity. (Id. at p. 696.) A common-sense approach to interpreting
such conditions is to read them in a way which renders them valid over invalid. Thus,

4.
“[w]hen reviewing challenges to non-specific, all-encompassing conditions like the one
here, other courts have opted to construe them in a manner that does not make them
infirm. [Citation.] We believe this approach is best, as we see no reason to require
‘district courts to include language eliminating all potential forms of treatment [or
testing] not contemplated at the time of sentencing.’ ” (Ibid., third bracketed insertion in
original.)
We agree with the reasoning of U.S. v. Mike. At the time of imposing probation, it
is unrealistic to expect the trial court to know exactly which treatment programs may be
of greatest value, or whether any are necessary at all. Thus, a probation condition that
orders future treatment as determined to be necessary by the probation department, but
that does not expressly allow the department to require residential treatment, should be
understood to grant authority only to require participation in nonresidential treatment
without further court input. If residential treatment may be needed, the court must
expressly authorize that specific treatment at that time.
Here, we apply the common-sense approach of U.S. v. Mike to the probation
condition at issue here as only authorizing probation the discretion to evaluate and
require nonresidential treatment programs while retaining the trial court’s authority to
order participation in residential programs. With this interpretation of the condition, we
reject Pech’s argument that an improper delegation of authority occurred.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

5.

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