S.C. v. S.D. CA2/7

CourtListener 10863035CalctappMay 21, 2026

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Filed 5/21/26 S.C. v. S.D. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

S.C., B343589

Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23STPT02606)

S.D.,

Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Christine J. Gonong, Judge. Affirmed.
Quinn & Dworakowski and David Dworakowski for
Appellant.
Joel S. Seidel for Respondent.
______________________________

S.D. (Mother) appeals from a family court judgment
granting S.C’s (Father) petition to determine his parentage over
seven-year-old W.D., awarding Father primary physical custody
and granting Father’s request to relocate to Oregon. Mother
contends the family court abused its discretion in applying the
factors for assessing a move-away request set forth by the
Supreme Court in In re Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th
1072 (LaMusga) and in failing to ensure she had sufficient
visitation time with W.D. She also contends the court abused its
discretion in ordering her to pay all airfare and accommodation
costs for her visits with W.D. Finally, she argues the court
violated her right to due process by failing to inform her that a
court reporter would not be provided at the short cause trial on
Father’s petition. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Parental Relationship Petition
On August 31, 2023 Father filed a petition to determine
parental relationship, requesting a determination he was a
parent of then-six-year-old W.D. The September 18, 2023
amended petition alleged Mother and W.D. lived in California
and Mother voluntarily declared Father’s paternity. The petition
requested the family court grant Father sole legal and physical
custody of W.D. and order drug and alcohol testing for Mother.
In a supporting declaration, Father stated W.D. was born in
April 2017, lived in Los Angeles with Mother and Father from
2017 to April 2023, lived with Father’s parents (W.D.’s paternal
grandparents) in Hillsboro, Oregon from April 2023 to
August 2023, and was currently living in Los Angeles with
Father “some of the time” since August 2023. In her response,
Mother admitted Father was the parent of W.D. and requested
the court grant her sole legal and physical custody of W.D.

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B. Father’s September 2023 Request for Temporary Emergency
Orders
On September 29, 2023 Father filed an ex parte request for
temporary emergency orders regarding child custody and
visitation. Father sought sole legal and physical custody of W.D.,
monitored visitation for Mother, and twice-weekly drug and
alcohol testing for Mother. Father also requested authorization
to move W.D. to Oregon to live with Father and W.D.’s paternal
grandparents, or in the alternative, to allow W.D. to reside with
Father in Los Angeles.
In his supporting declaration, Father averred Mother had a
serious alcohol addiction, used marijuana while drinking alcohol,
and had neglected W.D. Over the prior six years, Father often
came home to find Mother passed out from drinking or using
drugs while W.D. and his 15-year-old half-sister, Ayanah, were
left unsupervised. Father also suspected Mother was “doing sex
work.”
Father further averred that in April 2023 he and Mother
agreed to try to move to Oregon to be near W.D.’s paternal
grandparents. Father had received several job offers in Hillsboro,
and his family and friends in the state would provide a reliable
support system for W.D. Further, Father and Mother signed a
consent form for paternal grandparents to care for W.D. From
April to August, W.D. stayed with the paternal grandparents,
completed kindergarten, and was scheduled to begin first grade
in September. However, after Father met with an attorney to
commence his paternity action, Mother and maternal
grandfather drove to Oregon and took W.D. from the paternal
grandparents.

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Father submitted declarations from nine witnesses, three
of whom testified at trial. Melinda Eva McDonald, one of the
three trial witnesses, was the assistant manager of the
apartment complex where the family lived. MacDonald had
observed Mother routinely smoke marijuana in front of W.D. and
Ayanah, drink alcohol “excessively and regularly for years,” and
pass out from drinking on “countless occasions.” (Capitalization
and boldface omitted.) She frequently saw W.D. playing
unattended in the apartment complex and had observed Mother
slap and pinch him until he cried. Further, Mother told
McDonald that she received monthly allowances from men for
dates and sex, and McDonald saw random men spend the night
at the apartment.
The paternal grandmother, Melissa C., and Mother’s close
friend Keith Bailey also submitted declarations and testified at
trial. Melissa averred that she and the paternal grandfather,
Mark C.,1 cared for W.D. in Oregon from April 24 until August 5,
2024. On May 9 Mother arrived in Hillsboro to stay at their
home. Melissa observed Mother appear to be intoxicated on five
occasions between May 14 and June 28, sometimes in W.D.’s
presence. Mother returned with Father to Los Angeles on
July 13. On August 5 Mother came to the grandparents’ house
without notice and took W.D. away. Bailey averred he had seen
Mother on numerous occasions verbally abuse her children, pass
out from intoxication, and consume excessive alcohol while caring
for her children. Two declarants attested to the stable and loving
environment the paternal grandparents provided to W.D. while

1 We refer to Melissa and Mark by their first names to
preserve Father’s anonymity.

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he lived in Oregon, and another declarant (W.D.’s great aunt)
attested to Melissa tutoring W.D. in preparation for
kindergarten.
On September 29, 2023 Mother, then represented by an
attorney, filed an opposition to Father’s request for emergency
orders. In her supporting declaration, she stated Father had
previously hit and verbally abused her, and Father and his
parents were alcoholics. When Father abused alcohol, he turned
abusive and jealous, and when Mother was not home or did not
respond to Father’s communications, Father would assume she
was engaging in prostitution, which was false. Mother had never
abused W.D., and she always left him in the care of Ayanah or a
trusted adult if she left for a short time. Mother signed the
consent form giving W.D.’s paternal grandparents permission to
care for W.D. when an emergency arose; Mother did not intend to
consent to any permanent custody or visitation arrangement.
Mother left Oregon with W.D. because the environment was
“incredibly unhealthy” for them. Since returning to California,
she was able to enroll W.D. in school and get him vaccinated,
despite Father’s opposition to public school and vaccines.
After a hearing on October 17, 2023, the family court
confirmed Father’s parentage of W.D. but denied his requests for
sole legal and physical custody of W.D., monitored visitation for
Mother, and drug and alcohol testing for Mother. The court
awarded Mother and Father joint legal custody of W.D., with
Father having visitation on the first, third, and fifth weekends of
each month. Father was permitted to visit Oregon with W.D.
The court set the case for trial on April 15, 2024 and ordered the
parties to submit trial documents and income and expense
declarations.

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C. Father’s April 2024 Request for Order
On April 2, 2024, after the trial date was continued to
September 10, Father filed a request for order (RFO) seeking to
modify the custody and visitation schedule to allow him visitation
during the week. In his supporting declaration, Father
summarized his continuing concerns about Mother’s care of W.D.
and stated he intended to move to West Los Angeles on May 1,
2024, which was close to W.D.’s school (thereby enabling weekday
visitation). He further averred that he visited Mother and W.D.
on Christmas Day 2023 and observed that Mother smelled of
alcohol, fell asleep several times during the day, and passed out
with W.D. present.
Father attached to his declaration Mother’s subpoenaed
monthly bank account statements from February 16, 2023
through January 17, 2024 showing payments to convenience and
liquor stores and food delivery services, which Father declared
Mother used to order alcohol.
Mother filed an opposition to the RFO and submitted a
supporting declaration in which she averred that Father
harassed and called her repeatedly, frequently showed up to her
apartment unannounced, followed her and W.D. around the
neighborhood during her custodial time, and told others that she
was a prostitute and drug addict. Mother denied the Christmas
Day allegations and denied she consumed alcohol during her
parenting time or ordered alcohol when ordering food delivery.
Mother stated Father took W.D. to Oregon in early January 2024
without notifying her and had W.D. spend most of his time with a
babysitter during Father’s custodial time.

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After a hearing, on May 28, 2024 the family court awarded
Mother and Father joint physical custody of W.D., with custody
on alternating weeks.

D. The Trial and Judgment
On September 10, 2024 the family court held a one-day,
short cause trial. Mother was then self-represented, and there
was no court reporter present. Mother, Father, McDonald,
Melissa, and Bailey testified. Among the exhibits admitted at
trial were Mother’s bank statements (the same documents
attached to Father’s declaration in support of his RFO) and two of
Father’s job offers for work in Oregon.2
The family court filed a seven-page minute order with its
findings on September 10, 2024, at the conclusion of the trial.
The court stated it found, after considering the testimony,
witnesses’ demeanor, conduct, and facial expressions, and
evidence admitted at trial that Father and the third-party
witnesses were credible and Mother was not. Further, the third-
party witnesses corroborated each other’s testimony, and their
testimony was supported by admissible documentary evidence.
The court stated Father’s concerns over Mother’s fitness to care
for W.D. were supported by the evidence, finding that Mother
regularly consumed alcohol and had a habit of using marijuana
while caring for W.D. On certain occasions, she passed out after

2 Pursuant to the family court’s order, Father filed an income
and expense declaration prior to the trial date; Mother did not.
Father lodged with this court in response to our request copies of
the 10 exhibits admitted at trial. On our own motion, we
augment the record to include the exhibits. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)

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drinking and getting high, slapped W.D., left him unattended,
and engaged in sexual relations with men in exchange for money.
The family court awarded the parents joint legal custody
with Father having tie-breaking authority. The court ordered
that Father could add his name to W.D.’s birth certificate. The
court acknowledged that prior to trial, the parents had 50/50
custody, but it awarded Father “primary” physical custody with
W.D. living “primarily” with Father. The court ordered that
Mother would have visitation during spring and Thanksgiving
breaks in even-numbered years, half of W.D.’s winter breaks, and
alternating two-week periods during the summer break, with
Mother having the first two weeks. The court authorized Father
to move with W.D. to Hillsboro, Oregon after October 10, 2024,
and it ordered Mother “to pay all costs of airfare and
accommodation associated with her visitation.”
The family court weighed the factors set forth in LaMusga,
supra, 32 Cal.4th 1072, and the court found it was in W.D.’s best
interest to reside with Father in Oregon. The court found with
respect to factor 1 (child’s interest in stability and continuity)
that W.D. had lived in Oregon with his parents and paternal
grandparents, and Mother conceded he had made friends there.
Although there was a risk W.D. would miss Mother if he moved,
Mother would have “significant visitation time” if she chose to
exercise it. There was also a risk of instability if W.D. remained
in Los Angeles given Mother’s alcohol abuse and habitual use of
marijuana, which caused her to provide inadequate care for W.D.
The family court found as to factor 2 (distance of the move)
that the distance between Los Angeles and Oregon (requiring an
approximately two-and-a-half-hour flight) meant that Mother
would not be involved in W.D.’s daily life. Further, W.D. was

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seven years old (factor 3, age of child), which was old enough to
make it unlikely that he would forget the importance of his
relationship with Mother if she maintained it. For factors 4 and
5 (child’s relationship with both parents and the relationship
between the parents), the court found W.D. had a good
relationship with both parents, and Mother and Father appeared
to have a good relationship and would be able to co-parent
following Father’s relocation.
The family court did not accord any weight to W.D.’s wishes
(factor 6) due to his “lack of maturity.” With respect to factor 7
(reasons for the proposed move), Father had job offers in Oregon,
and Father believed it was in W.D.’s best interest to be in Oregon
because his paternal grandparents could help raise W.D. with a
“strong community to support.” The court noted as to factor 8
(extent to which the parents currently are sharing custody) that
Mother and Father had “50/50” custody before trial, but Mother
would have “significant visitation time” with W.D. after trial with
Father maintaining primary physical custody.
On November 27, 2024 the family court entered a judgment
of parentage recognizing Father’s paternity and adopting by
incorporation its findings and custody orders set forth in the
September 10 minute order.
Mother timely appealed.

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DISCUSSION

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
“In an initial custody determination, a parent seeking to
relocate with the minor children bears no burden of establishing
that the move is ‘necessary.’ The trial court must . . . consider,
among other factors, the effects of relocation on the ‘best interest’
of the minor children, including the health, safety, and welfare of
the children and the nature and amount of contact with both
parents.” (In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 34
(Burgess), citing Fam. Code, § 3011, subd. (a) & former subd. (c).)3
“[T]he trial court has ‘the widest discretion to choose a parenting
plan that is in the best interest of the child.’” (Burgess, at p. 31;
accord, § 3040, former subd. (b).) This standard applies even
where, as here, the initial permanent custody order and
contemplated relocation modify a temporary joint custody
arrangement. (See Mark T. v. Jamie Z. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th
1115, 1124 [“Where . . . a parent who shares joint custody of a
minor makes a request to relocate the child in the context of an
initial custody determination, the trial court must decide de novo
what physical custody arrangement would be in the child’s best
interests.”]; accord, F.T. v. L.J. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1, 20-21
(F.T.); see Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 363
[“The joint custody moving parent does not have the presumptive

3 Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Family Code. In 1996, section 3011, former section (c), included
as a factor to consider, “[t]he nature and amount of contact with
both parents.” That factor is now found in section 3011,
subdivision (a)(3).

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right to change the child’s residence, and bears no burden of
proving the move is essential or imperative.”].)
The Supreme Court in LaMusga identified a non-
exhaustive list of eight factors “that the [family] court ordinarily
should consider when deciding whether to modify a custody order
in light of . . . [a] parent’s proposal to change the residence of the
child”: “[1] the children’s interest in stability and continuity in
the custodial arrangement; [2] the distance of the move; [3] the
age of the children; [4] the children’s relationship with both
parents; [5] the relationship between the parents including, but
not limited to, their ability to communicate and cooperate
effectively and their willingness to put the interests of the
children above their individual interests; [6] the wishes of the
children if they are mature enough for such an inquiry to be
appropriate; [7] the reasons for the proposed move; and [8] the
extent to which the parents currently are sharing custody.”
(LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1101.) Although LaMusga
involved a postjudgment request for custody modification, the
same factors apply to consideration of a child’s relocation as part
of an initial permanent custody order. (See J.M. v. G.H. (2014)
228 Cal.App.4th 925, 935, 937 [affirming family court’s
application of the LaMusga factors where it issued an initial
permanent custody order and granted relocation]; F.T., supra,
194 Cal.App.4th at pp. 20-24 [holding family court did not apply
LaMusga factors correctly to determine child’s best interests in
move-away case as part of initial custody determination].)
“We review orders granting or denying move-away requests
for abuse of discretion.” (Jacob A. v. C.H. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th
1591, 1598-1599; see Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 32 [“The
standard of appellate review of custody and visitation orders is

11
the deferential abuse of discretion test.”].) “Generally, a trial
court abuses its discretion if there is no reasonable basis on
which the court could conclude its decision advanced the best
interests of the child.” (Jacob A., at p. 1599.) A court also abuses
its discretion “‘by applying improper criteria or by making
incorrect legal assumptions.’” (In re Marriage of C.T. & R.B.
(2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 87, 97; accord, Jane J. v. Superior Court
(2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 894, 901.) Ultimately, “[t]he test is not
whether [the reviewing court] would have made the same order
or whether the trial court could have reasonably made some
other order, but ‘whether the trial court could reasonably have
concluded that the order in question advanced the “best interest”
of the child.’” (Lester v. Lennane (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 536, 595;
accord, Burgess, at p. 32 [“The precise measure is whether the
trial court could have reasonably concluded that the order in
question advanced the ‘best interest’ of the child.”].)

B. The Family Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Finding
Relocation to Oregon Was in W.D.’s Best Interest
Mother contends the family court misapplied the holding in
LaMusga by failing to justify its decision with specific findings,
failing to preserve substantial visitation time for her, and failing
to consider alternative visitation arrangements. Mother’s
contentions lack merit.
The September 10, 2024 minute order reflects that the
family court considered all eight LaMusga factors, made specific
findings on each factor, and, after weighing those factors,
concluded it was in W.D.’s best interest to reside with Father in
Oregon, notwithstanding that relocation would limit Mother’s
involvement in W.D.’s daily life. Most significantly, the court

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made findings that W.D. would likely face instability if he
remained with Mother because her alcohol and marijuana use
caused her to provide inadequate care for W.D. (factor 1); Father
and Mother would be able to co-parent after the relocation based
on their good relationship (factor 5); and W.D.’s paternal
grandparents had a strong community in Oregon to support him
(factor 7). The court further found the testimony of Father and
the third-party witnesses was credible, and Mother’s testimony
was not. Absent an evidentiary showing to the contrary, we
presume these findings are correct. (Universal Home
Improvement, Inc. v. Robertson (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 116, 125
[“One of the presumptions [indulged on appellate review] is that
the record has sufficient evidence to sustain the trial court’s
findings of fact.”], citing In re Marriage of Fink (1979) 25 Cal.3d
877, 887.) Mother has not shown the court abused its discretion.4
With respect to Mother’s visitation time, her principal
contention is that the family court abused its discretion by failing
to provide her meaningful time with W.D. (arguing her custodial
share was reduced to 15 percent), and that her holiday-based

4 Mother relies on In re Marriage of Brown & Yana (2006)
37 Cal.4th 947 to support her contention the family court failed to
provide “specific, evidence-based reasoning for its decision.” The
Supreme Court in Brown stated that for purposes of an initial
custody determination, the court must set the matter for an
adversarial hearing (as it did here) and “consider[] all relevant
factors.” (Id. at pp. 955-956.) Nothing in Brown suggests the
court must conduct a more refined analysis than the one the
family court provided here in applying the LaMusga factors. Nor
did the LaMusga court impose such a requirement, stating only
that “court[s] ordinarily should consider” the enumerated factors.
(LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1101.)

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visitation schedule was not, as described by the court, “significant
visitation time.” Mother bases her argument on cases defining
what constitutes “significant” custodial time where the parents
have joint physical custody, but in this case, the court’s order in
effect awarded Father sole physical custody, with visitation for
Mother.5 The court had broad discretion to order such a custody
and visitation arrangement. In addressing a relocation request,
the court is “not restricted to any particular formula for contact
or visitation; nor [is it] required to make a custody determination
that preserves the . . . status quo.” (Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at
p. 36.) Although “‘frequent interaction with both parents’ . . . is
the ideal . . . , when one of the parents has stated an intent to
relocate out of state, such a result is no longer possible,” and the
court “must then navigate the delta between the ideal and the
reality.” (Jacob A. v. C.H., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1601; see
F.T., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 22 [“‘[t]he question for the trial
court is not whether the parent may be permitted to move; the
question is what arrangement for custody should be made [if and
when the custodial parent moves]’”].)
Here, in light of the family court’s findings, the court had a
reasonable basis to grant sole physical custody to Father with an
alternating holiday-based visitation schedule for Mother. As
discussed, the court found that Mother’s substance use caused

5 As Mother acknowledges,although the family court
awarded Father primary physical custody, a common description
of custody, “the term ‘primary physical custody’ has no legal
meaning.” (In re Marriage of Richardson (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th
941, 945, fn. 2.) Rather, under the Family Code a parent may be
awarded either joint physical custody (§ 3004) or sole physical
custody (§ 3007). (See Richardson, at p. 945, fn. 2.)

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her to provide inadequate care for W.D.; she on occasion passed
out after drinking; she slapped W.D.; she left him unattended;
and she engaged in sexual relations with men in exchange for
money, sometimes bringing the men into the apartment she
shared with W.D. The court further found that remaining in Los
Angeles with Mother would likely expose W.D. to “instability”; a
strong community of support existed for W.D. in Oregon; W.D.
had friends there; and his paternal grandparents were there to
help raise him. Accordingly, it was reasonable for the court to
conclude that awarding Father sole physical custody of W.D. in
Oregon with holiday-based visitation for Mother was in W.D.’s
best interest to ensure he received stable parental care and
familial support. (See J.M. v. G.H., supra, 228 Cal.App.4th 925
at pp. 930, 936 [affirming order allowing mother to relocate to
Israel with child living with mother during school year and with
father for most of summer and longer school holidays (and
father’s trips to Israel) given mother’s stronger attachment
despite prior equally shared custody and fact that father was
“well bonded” with child]; Osgood v. Landon (2005)
127 Cal.App.4th 425, 432, 436 [affirming order allowing Mother
to move to Tennessee, with nonrelocating father having visitation
one week per month or every other month during the school year
and eight weeks over the summer, finding schedule “provided for
substantial contact”].)
Mother also argues the family court’s treatment of the
LaMusga factors was “superficial and internally contradictory”
because it acknowledged W.D.’s good relationship with Mother,
Mother and Father’s ability to communicate, and W.D.’s ties to
both California and Oregon, all of which supported a more
favorable visitation arrangement for Mother. However, the court

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had broad discretion to attach greater significance to other
LaMusga factors that supported W.D.’s move to Oregon
(including increased stability and support for W.D.), even if the
move reduced Mother’s custodial timeshare and visitation. (See
LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1093 [“The weight to be
accorded to such factors must be left to the court’s sound
discretion.”]; In re Marriage of Edlund & Hales (1998)
66 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1473-1474 [trial court did not abuse its
discretion in focusing on moving parent’s bond, her ability to care
for child, and nonmoving parent’s inadequate care for child
despite evidence that child would suffer some detriment from
relocation].)
Moreover, Mother misapprehends the significance of
Father’s ability to communicate with Mother, which weighed in
favor of rather than against relocation. (See LaMusga, supra,
32 Cal.4th at p. 1095 [if there were “a history of cooperative
parenting. . . . it might have appeared more likely that the
detrimental effects of the proposed move . . . could have been
ameliorated”]; In re Marriage of Abargil (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th
1294, 1299 [because mother respected child’s relationship with
father and “was likely to foster continuing contact between
them,” this met minimum requirement for international
relocation by showing there would be continuing contact between
child and remaining parent].)
Finally, Mother contends the family court failed to preserve
W.D.’s relationship with both parents to the greatest extent
possible and to consider alternative arrangements for visitation,
such as phone calls and virtual contact. But Mother cites no
authority for the proposition that courts are required to consider
alternative visitation arrangements before granting a relocation

16
request, and she fails to provide any evidence that she requested
alternative arrangements or the court failed to consider them.

C. The Family Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Ordering
Mother To Pay All Travel Costs Associated with Her
Visitation
Mother contends the family court abused its discretion in
ordering her to pay for all airfare and accommodations associated
with her visits with W.D. without finding she had the ability to
pay the costs. However, Mother has not shown that the court
failed to consider her financial circumstances, that she objected to
payment of her own visitation costs, or that she lacked the ability
to pay for the travel. As discussed, Mother did not submit an
income and expense declaration before trial, despite an order to
do so. Nor has she pointed to anything in the record showing her
inability to pay.6 She also did not have a fee waiver in the family
court or on appeal.
Moreover, Mother has cited no authority for her contention
that a family court must make an ability-to-pay finding before
ordering that the nonmoving parent pay for her own costs in
visiting the child. A.P. v. K.T. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 988, relied
on by Mother, is inapposite. A.P. addressed the insufficiency of a
family court’s ability-to-pay finding in the context of an order
requiring a mother to pay expenses associated with a court-
ordered child custody evaluation. (Id. at p. 1002.) As A.P.

6 We note the bank statements admitted at trial showed
monthly deposits during 2023 ranging from $1,700 to $4,700.
Mother does not contend the financial statements show her
inability to pay costs, nor do they support that contention in the
absence of an income and expense declaration.

17
recognized, section 3112 requires the family court to inquire into
the parents’ financial condition before allocating the costs of the
evaluation between the parties. (A.P., at p. 1002.) There is no
analogous provision in the Family Code that requires the court to
consider a parent’s ability to pay visitation costs.

D. The Lack of a Reporter’s Transcript Did Not Violate
Mother’s Due Process Rights
Mother contends the family court violated her due process
rights by not informing her that if she wanted a court reporter to
be present at the September 10, 2024 trial, she needed to request
or retain one. As a threshold matter, we cannot tell from the
record whether the court advised Mother that there would not be
a court reporter at the trial. Nor has Mother shown that any
failure to advise her would have violated her right to due process.
Moreover, Mother did not request a court reporter on the day of
trial after it became clear there was no court reporter who would
be transcribing the trial, nor did she request a continuance so she
could retain one.
Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, relied on by Mother,
does not assist her. The Supreme Court in Jameson held that
when a superior court adopts a general policy of not providing
court reporters in most civil cases but allowing private parties
who have the financial means to retain a private court reporter,
“an official court reporter, or other valid means to create an
official verbatim record for purposes of appeal, must generally be
made available to in forma pauperis litigants upon request.” (Id.
at p. 599.) But as Mother concedes, she was not an indigent
litigant, and she did not request a court reporter. Mother’s
reliance on California Rules of Court, rule 2.956(c)(2) fares no

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better. That rule likewise provides that, upon request, “[t]he
court must provide an official reporter if the party has been
granted a fee waiver and if the court is not electronically
recording the hearing or trial.”7 As stated, Mother did not have a
fee waiver in the family court (or on appeal).
Mother is correct that a verbatim record of a superior court
proceeding is often critical to success on appeal. As the Supreme
Court explained in Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at
pages 608 to 609, “the absence of a court reporter at trial court
proceedings and the resulting lack of a verbatim record of such
proceedings will frequently be fatal to a litigant’s ability to have
his or her claims of trial court error resolved on the merits by an

7 As the Jameson court observed, Government Code
section 68086, subdivision (d), “directs the Judicial Council to
adopt rules to ensure that parties are given adequate and timely
notice of the availability of an official court reporter.” (Jameson
v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 612-613.) The Judicial Council
adopted California Rules of Court, rule 2.956 in response to the
Government Code’s directive. (See Jameson, at p. 613).
Rule 2.956(b)(3) provides with respect to superior courts that do
not normally provide official court reporters for civil trials (like
the Los Angeles Superior Court), “[T]he court must require that
each party file a statement before the trial date indicating
whether the party requests the presence of an official court
reporter. If a party requests the presence of an official court
reporter and it appears that none will be available, the clerk
must notify the party of that fact as soon as possible before the
trial.” The record does not reflect whether the family court
required the parties to file a statement before the trial date
requesting a court reporter or whether Mother filed such a
statement. And, as discussed, Mother did not request a court
reporter.

19
appellate court. This is so because it is a fundamental principle
of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily
presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to
demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate
court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies
reversal of the judgment.”
But that does not mean Mother did not have the ability to retain
a certified shorthand reporter to serve as the official pro tempore
reporter in the courtroom. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 2.956(c)(1)). In addition, Mother had the option to prepare
an agreed statement or settled statement under California Rules
of Court, rules 8.134 and 8.137, but she failed to do so. These
options are not a complete substitute for a verbatim transcript,
but Mother could have included facts that were essential to her
case on appeal, including, for example, recounting any testimony
that supported Mother’s position or evidence that showed
Mother’s inability to pay the costs for transportation. Mother did
not employ any of these techniques to protect her appellate
rights. The fact that Mother was self-represented at the trial did
not shift the burden of ensuring an adequate record: Although
we recognize that a party who is self-represented has a more
limited understanding of the rules of court than an experienced
attorney, “mere self-representation is not a ground for
exceptionally lenient treatment.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994)
8 Cal.4th 975, 984.)

20
DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Father is to recover his costs on
appeal.

FEUER, J.
We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

GIZA, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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