CourtListener 10862469•J.A. v. L.A. Unified School Dist. CA2/5
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Filed 5/20/26 J.A. v. L.A. Unified School Dist. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
J.A., B345115
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23STCV11866)
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant and
Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Thomas D. Long, Judge. Affirmed.
Herman Law, Justin R. Felton, and Carina R. Nixon for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
BDG Law Group, Michele M. Goldsmith, Renee B. Brown,
and Matthew R. Hicks for Defendant and Respondent.
******
A former public middle school student sued the school’s
district for negligence in not protecting him from being sexually
molested by one of its teachers and in inadequately supervising
that teacher. The trial court granted summary judgment after
the undisputed facts established that the student was molested
in the fall of 1967, but that any conduct by the teacher which
might have put the district on notice of his proclivities to molest
occurred after the fall of 1967. Because these undisputed facts
preclude a finding that the district had actual or constructive
notice, summary judgment was properly granted. We accordingly
affirm the judgment for the district.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. Molestation of plaintiff in the fall of 1967
J.A. (plaintiff) attended eighth grade at George Washington
Carver Junior High School (Carver)1 from the fall of 1967
through the spring of 1968. At that time, Norbert Volk (Volk)
was a teacher at Carver as well as the faculty advisor for the
Carver Knight fraternity, which permitted students who were at
“the top of the class” to participate in special activities. J.A. is
black; Volk was white.2
1 At the time, Carver served grades seven through nine.
2 Volk is now deceased.
2
In the fall of 1967, while plaintiff was helping the Carver
Knights clean up after a student movie event in the school’s
auditorium, Volk “touched” plaintiff’s “private part” over his
clothing. At some point later that fall, plaintiff and his brother,
with their mother’s permission, went over to Volk’s home for
dinner and to stay the night; while all three slept in the same
bed, Volk “fondled” and “rubb[ed]” plaintiff’s “penis area” through
plaintiff’s clothes.
Plaintiff told no one about either incident.
B. Volk’s molestation of other male students
1. G.B.
G.B. attended Carver from 1966 through 1969. Starting in
the fall of 1966 and ending in the fall of 1968, Volk would invite
G.B. to his home for the weekend; while there, Volk would
remove G.B.’s underwear, would put his penis between G.B.’s
legs and “do[] his thing,” and would “play” with G.B.’s penis until
both ejaculated. G.B. is black.
G.B. would sometimes get into Volk’s car on campus, and
some of G.B.’s “friends” would see him get into Volk’s car.
2. O.B.
O.B. attended Carver from 1967 through 1970. He was a
Carver Knight, and was first introduced to Volk in 1968 during
eighth grade. When O.B. worked on the “stage crew,” Volk would
occasionally fondle and grab O.B.’s crotch through O.B.’s clothes
while in the back of the auditorium and in view of “other students
. . . working back there.” Volk’s touching was “very sneaky” and
done in “such a way that it was very difficult for other . . . school
employees to see.” Volk would also take O.B. to his home, where
he would perform oral copulation on him and attempted anal
penetration.
3
O.B. reported Volk’s abuse to two of Carver’s black faculty
or staff—namely, teachers Mr. Davis and Mr. Johnson.
C. What the Carver community observed and was
told
1. Mr. Johnson
Mr. Johnson began working at Carver in the fall of 1969.
He would see Volk “pull[] his car in front of the building and
tak[e] kids . . . away from campus,” which violated the school’s
rule requiring signed “trip slips” before any faculty member could
take a student off campus, and which Mr. Johnson independently
found to be “suspicious[].”
Mr. Johnson reported his observed violations of the “trip
slip” policy by Volk to Mr. Williams (Carver’s vice principal) as
well as Dr. Anderson (Carver’s principal).
Mr. Johnson noted that other Carver faculty and staff—
specifically, Mr. Davis, Mr. Clinton, Mr. Miller, Mr. Travis, Mr.
Kawachi, and “the woman who ran the student store”—also knew
that Volk was taking students off campus without trip slips.
2. Troy Cole
Cole attended Carver from 1969 through 1972. Cole
worked on stagecraft at the school with Volk, and Volk would get
“handsy” with him. From conversations he had with fellow
students in 1971 and 1972, Cole learned that other students
would go to Volk’s house overnight, and those who did reported
running around Volk’s house naked and being touched in their
private areas. These conversations confirmed rumors Cole had
heard in the middle of 1970 about Volk’s behavior. Cole reported
that several Carver faculty or staff—including Mr. Givens, Mr.
Johnson, Mr. Anthony, Mr. Levy, Mr. Selma, Mr. Clanton—either
knew or suspected Volk was engaging in inappropriate behavior
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with students. Several of these faculty or staff warned Cole that
Volk was “dangerous,” not to be alone with him, and not to go to
his house.
II. Procedural Background
On June 20, 2023, plaintiff sued the Los Angeles Unified
School District (the District), of which Carver was a part, for (1)
negligence in not “protect[ing p]laintiff from foreseeable harm
while on school grounds or at school-related functions” and (2)
negligent hiring, retention, and supervision of Volk.3
In May 2024, the District moved for summary judgment on
the ground that the undisputed facts established that no District
administrator or supervisor “knew or had reason to know” that
Volk “had a dangerous propensity” at the time plaintiff was
molested in the fall of 1967, such that the District was not
negligent for failing to prevent that molestation. Following a full
round of briefing,4 and a hearing in December 2024, the trial
court granted summary judgment for the District. Specifically,
the court found that the undisputed facts showed that J.A. “never
told anyone about the abuse [Volk inflicted] at any time”; that
“the first time anyone told any District personnel about Volk’s
abuse was nonparty O.B.’s report no earlier than 1968”; and that
“there is no evidence prior to O.B.’s discussion of any notice or
reports of misconduct by Volk.” Because Volk’s abuse of plaintiff
occurred in the fall of 1967, and hence before any awareness of
“notice or reports of misconduct” by Volk, the court ruled that
J.A. had “not shown the existence of a triable issue of fact
3 Plaintiff also sued unnamed Does for the same two causes
of action, but did not subsequently identify any Doe defendants.
4 The District also filed evidentiary objections, but the trial
court overruled those objections.
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regarding the foreseeability of Volk’s abuse and [the District’s]
prior knowledge of Volk’s abuse.” Because the court reasoned
that a duty to protect under these circumstances arises only
when a defendant has “prior actual knowledge,” the court granted
summary judgment for the District.
Following entry of judgment, plaintiff timely filed this
appeal.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment.
I. Pertinent Law
A. Law of summary judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate, and the moving party
(typically, the defendant) is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law where (1) the defendant carries its initial burden of showing
the nonexistence of one or more elements of the plaintiff’s claims,
and (2) the plaintiff thereafter fails to show the “existence of a
triable issue of material fact” as to those element(s). (Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, 853; Code. Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subds. (a), (c), (o)(1), (p)(2).) While evaluating those
shifting burdens, we liberally construe the evidence in support of
the party opposing summary judgment and resolve all doubts
concerning that evidence in favor of that party. (Hartford
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Swift Distribution, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 277,
286; Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 874; Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) Nevertheless, a plaintiff’s “responsive
evidence that gives rise to no more than mere speculation cannot
be regarded as substantial, and is insufficient to establish a
triable issue of material fact” for purposes of defeating summary
judgment. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 163;
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Dollinger DeAnza Associates v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. (2011) 199
Cal.App.4th 1132, 1144-1145 [party “‘cannot avoid summary
judgment by asserting facts based on mere speculation and
conjecture’”].)
B. Tort law
Although a public school district is not vicariously—and
hence automatically—liable for the sexual abuse of students
committed by its employees (John R. v. Oakland Unified School
Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438, 441, 446-452 [sexual abuse is outside
the scope of employment]; Roe v. Hesperia Unified School Dist.
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 13, 25 [same]), a district remains liable for
its own negligence, as pertinent here, in (1) negligently
supervising and protecting the student from such abuse or (2) in
negligently hiring, supervising, or retaining the district employee
who committed the sexual abuse (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union
High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 869-870 (C.A.) [detailing
both theories of liability]; D.Z. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.
(2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 210, 223 [same]). Both theories of liability
are grounded in negligence, which requires proof of (1) the
existence of a duty running from the district to the plaintiff, (2)
breach of that duty, (3) causation, and (4) damages. (Kesner v.
Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158 (Kesner).) Under the
theory premised on a district’s negligent supervision of the
student (the first theory) due to either “a total lack of supervision”
or “ineffective supervision” of the plaintiff-student, the plaintiff
must show, as pertinent here, that school personnel failed to
exercise “ordinary prudence.” (C.A., at p. 869.) Under the theory
premised on a district’s negligent supervision of the employee (the
second theory), the plaintiff must show, as pertinent here, that
the district’s supervisors “knew or should have known of [the
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employee’s] dangerous propensities, but nevertheless hired,
retained and failed to properly supervise [him].” (Id. at p. 875;
Rancho Cucamonga Central School Dist. v. Superior Court
(Flowers) (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 718, 721; Roe, at p. 26.)
Because a district would fail to exercise ordinary prudence by
leaving a student in the (inadequate) supervision of an employee
the district “knew or should have known” to have a dangerous
propensity, the two standards ultimately employ the same
knowledge standard—namely, one of actual or constructive
knowledge. A district will be charged with constructive
knowledge if the district’s supervisory employees “observed”
unambiguous, “inappropriate behavior” or “anything that
reasonably should have triggered suspicion of abuse.” (Flowers,
at p. 722; Doe v. Lawndale Elementary School Dist. (2021) 72
Cal.App.5th 113, 122, 137 (Doe) [constructive knowledge imputed
“where the misconduct is not ‘ambiguous’”, or when predatory
behavior is “‘open and obvious’”].)
C. Standards of review
We review de novo a grant of summary judgment (Samara
v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 338); because our task is to review
the trial court’s ruling, not its rationale, we may affirm summary
judgment on any ground raised by the parties below (Atalla v.
Rite Aid Corp. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 294, 307; Wilson v. Farmers
Ins. Exchange (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1174, fn. 2).
Although breach of a duty of care and causation are typically
questions of fact (Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 741, 749, fn. 6 [breach]; T.H. v. Novartis
Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 198 [causation]),
questions of fact may nevertheless be “determined as a matter of
law” on summary judgment “where the underlying facts are
8
undisputed [citation], or the evidence is susceptible of only one
reasonable conclusion” (Oakland Raiders v. Oakland-Alameda
County Coliseum, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1175, 1191).
II. Analysis
The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment
for the District because the undisputed facts establish that—at
the time plaintiff was sexually abused in the fall of 1967—the
District did not have actual or constructive knowledge of Volk’s
propensity to commit sexual abuse, and hence did not breach its
duties to protect plaintiff or supervise Volk. Plaintiff did not
contemporaneously tell any District employee about the sexual
abuse he suffered on two occasions in the fall of 1967. Volk
sexually abused G.B. starting in the fall of 1966; while that was
before Volk sexually abused plaintiff, there is no evidence that
G.B. contemporaneously told anyone about the abuse he had
suffered. Volk also sexually abused O.B., but that abuse did not
occur until the fall of 1968, after Volk sexually abused plaintiff.
Mr. Johnson indicated that he observed Volk’s “suspicious” and
unauthorized behavior of driving students off campus without
signed trip slips, but Mr. Johnson did not join the faculty of
Carver until the fall of 1969, two years after Volk abused
plaintiff. And Cole necessarily learned of Volk’s reputation
among Carver students and faculty for being dangerous
necessarily after Cole became a student at Carver, but that was
in the fall of 1969, two years after Volk abused plaintiff. There
was no evidence that any District employee knew or should have
known of Volk’s propensity to engage in sexual abuse prior to the
fall of 1967. Without any evidence of such actual or constructive
knowledge prior to the time plaintiff was sexually abused, the
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District was not negligent in preventing that abuse as a matter of
law, and summary judgment was appropriately granted.
Plaintiff resists this conclusion with what boils down to
three arguments.
First, plaintiff argues that we must infer that District
employees witnessed Volk driving students off campus in
violation of the trip slip policy prior to the fall of 1967 (when Volk
abused plaintiff) because District employees witnessed Volk
following the same “modus operandi” in 1968 and thereafter.
Plaintiff buttresses this argument by urging that we must
construe the record in the light most favorable to him, as the non-
moving party. We reject this argument. To begin, plaintiff
himself was never driven off campus by Volk and, to the contrary,
declined Volk’s invitations for rides; as a result, Volk did not
follow what plaintiff characterizes as Volk’s “modus operandi”
with respect to plaintiff. To be sure, G.B. got into Volk’s car from
campus prior to the fall of 1967, but G.B. testified that only his
“friends” ever saw him get into Volk’s car. More fundamentally,
we reject the premise underlying plaintiff’s argument: Although
it is reasonable to infer that a person who acquired knowledge at
a specific point in time still has that knowledge at a later point in
time, it is not reasonable to infer that a person who has
knowledge at a later point in time acquired that knowledge at
any specific point in time in the past—because such an inference
would rest on nothing but speculation. (E.g., Johnson & Johnson
Talcum Powder Cases (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 292, 316 [refusing to
infer that a defendant’s knowledge of “risks of genital talc use”
reflected in “later documents” means that the defendant “knew or
reasonably should have known” of those risks “in earlier years”].)
Thus, even if we accept that certain District employees knew of
10
Volk’s violations of the trip slip policy in the fall of 1968, and that
this awareness should have triggered suspicion of abuse (which
qualifies as constructive knowledge of that abuse), we will not
engage in the speculative inference that District employees knew
of any such violations prior to the fall of 1968.
Second, plaintiff argues that he need not adduce a triable
issue of fact as to whether the District was “specifically aware
that Volk sexually abused students” (italics added) because
plaintiff need only show that students may be exposed to this
“type” of injury (namely, sexual abuse) if a teacher or student is
negligently supervised. This argument mixes apples and
oranges. Although foreseeability is evaluated at a more generic
level when assessing whether to impose a duty (Kesner, supra, 1
Cal.5th at p. 1152; M.W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union School
Dist. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 508, 518-519; J.H. v. Los Angeles
Unified School Dist. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 123, 146), here we
have accepted the duty as defined by governing Supreme Court
precedent and are assessing whether plaintiff has adduced a
triable issue of fact as to whether that duty has been breached in
this case—which turns on the evidence as to whether this district
had actual or constructive knowledge of this district employee’s
propensity for sexual abuse (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 878 [“a
district’s liability must be based on evidence of negligent hiring,
supervision or retention . . .”]; Doe, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p.
127 [“‘Most liability questions are case-specific and so not
amenable to analysis in terms of duty—they do not allow a
categorical determination whether defendant had to exercise
reasonable care at all’”]). If, as plaintiff seems to suggest, the
general foreseeability of the danger of sexual abuse by teachers
were sufficient to establish foreseeability (and hence a breach) in
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specific cases, then the test our Supreme Court has announced
for assessing whether a district had actual or constructive
knowledge sufficient to impose liability in a particular case would
be irrelevant.
Third and lastly, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred
in focusing on whether the District had “actual knowledge” and
in citing cases that erect an “actual knowledge” standard for
sexual abuse against children in contexts other than compulsory
public education. (E.g., Doe v. Los Angeles County Dept. of
Children & Family Services (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, 682-683.)
Because, as noted above, we review the trial court’s ruling and
not its reasoning, and because we have independently
determined that there is no triable issue of fact as to both actual
and constructive knowledge, any error in the trial court’s
reasoning is not a basis for reversal.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The District is entitled to its
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, J.
MOOR
_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)
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