CourtListener 10861414•People v. Kelly CA2/8
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Filed 5/19/26 P. v. Kelly CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE B337232
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA065570-01)
v.
GARY EUGENE KELLY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Hayden A. Zacky, Judge. Affirmed.
David R. Greifinger, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winter, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jason Tran and Melanie Dorian, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Defendant Gary Eugene Kelly appeals an order denying his
request for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1 section
1172.75. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 14, 2010, Kelly pled nolo contendere to one
count of continuous sexual abuse upon a child under 14 years of
age, a violation of section 288.5, subdivision (a). Kelly also
admitted to one prior serious felony conviction and one prior
strike allegation based on a 1990 robbery conviction2 within the
meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and one prior prison
term for a felony conviction within the meaning of section 667.5,
subdivision (b). At sentencing on the same day, pursuant to a
plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Kelly to state prison for
an aggregate term of 30 years. The sentence consisted of twice
the base midterm of 12 years on the offense, based on one of
Kelly’s two strikes; an additional five-year term for the prior
serious felony conviction; and an additional one-year term for a
prior term of imprisonment.
In 2022, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation identified Kelly as an individual who received a
now-invalid one-year prior prison term enhancement as part of
his sentence. At a hearing on February 2, 2024, the trial court
immediately struck the one-year prior prison term and
resentenced Kelly to an aggregate term of 29 years, consisting of
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 At the time of sentencing, Kelly had two prior serious
felony convictions for robbery, under section 211, which also
counted as strikes under California’s “Three Strikes” law.
2
the enhanced 24-year sentence on the main offense plus five
years pursuant to the remaining section 667, subdivision (a)(1)
felony enhancement. At the invitation of the court, Kelly
subsequently requested a full resentencing pursuant to sections
1172.7, subdivision (a) and 1172.75, subdivision (a).
On February 5, 2024, Kelly filed a memorandum and
several exhibits in support of resentencing under section 1172.75
and Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.). Kelly asked the
trial court upon resentencing to vacate his prior strike conviction
pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th
497 (Romero) and vacate the five-year term for his prior serious
felony conviction enhancement, in addition to striking the one-
year sentence for his prior prison term enhancement, for a total
new term of 12 years imprisonment. He argued mitigating
circumstances warranted a reduction in sentence: his advanced
age of 67; his lowest possible classification and security scores;
his time in custody; his postconviction growth and maturity; his
aged prior convictions at the time of resentencing; and extensive
educational and other positive programing he had completed
while in custody. Kelly attached to his memorandum
classification scores and numerous positive progress reports and
completion certificates.
On March 14, 2024, the trial court conducted a
resentencing hearing at which it first read the original charges,
discussed Kelly’s original sentencing exposure on all three
charges, recited the facts of the case based on the probation
report, and invited oral argument.
Kelly then orally argued the points he had raised in his
resentencing motion. In response to Kelly’s advanced age
argument, the trial court noted an “interesting” recent Los
3
Angeles Times news article profiling a serial recidivist bank
robber who reoffended at the age of 70, after he previously
received a less harsh sentence based on his advanced age. The
court indicated it was “probably an aberration” and that it
understood Kelly’s argument.
The People then argued Kelly was 53 years old at the time
of the offense, had a lengthy criminal history extending over four
decades, including a juvenile record and two prior strike
convictions for robbery, and, but for the People’s efforts to
minimize retraumatizing the victim by agreeing to a 30-year
sentence, Kelly likely faced a sentence of over 100 years if he had
been convicted at trial of all charges. The People concluded by
asking “the court not to further change the sentence in this case”
because “it’s more than warranted and . . . it would be unjust,
actually, for the victim and society to change the sentence at this
point.”
The trial court then reiterated it had struck the one-year
prior prison term and resentenced Kelly to a lower aggregate
term of 29 years, consisting of double the term of 12 years on the
sexual abuse conviction under the Three Strikes Law, plus five
years pursuant to the remaining section 667, subdivision (a)(1)
serious felony enhancement. The court also noted there are
“many different mechanisms in place for people who are
incarcerated to, perhaps, earn greater credits and to get released
earlier than anticipated. [¶] I am not sure if they apply to Mr.
Kelly, but one that jumps out is Penal Code Section 3055, elderly
parole. [¶] Another that jumps out is [Proposition] 57. [¶] I just
don’t know if he is excluded from either of those based on the
nature of the charges. However, if he is not, then certainly he
can avail himself of either of those opportunities.”
4
In resentencing Kelly, the trial court observed: “The facts of
this case are particularly egregious because of the ongoing nature
of the activity and the actual nature of the offenses themselves.
On the flip side, Mr. Kelly, by all accounts, has done a good job
while incarcerated in state prison, and he should be proud of the
fact that he has been able to adapt and make some positive
changes. [¶] He was 53 years old when these offenses occurred,
which generally, in our world, is almost somebody who should
have been aged out of the system. Unfortunately, that wasn’t the
case. [¶] And he was facing almost 100 years to life in the case.
And when you balance the favorable disposition versus the
potential outcome had he gone to trial, I do think that this was a
favorable disposition for him. A contract that he entered into
with the prosecution. [¶] In [defense counsel] Ms. Lin’s motion,
you did mention some of the new sentencing rules, Ms. Lin, such
as 1385(c) of the Penal Code. And what I will indicate is 1385(c)
does not apply to a decision whether or not to dismiss a
strike. . . . And in addition, there are a number of cases that
indicate 1385, subdivision (c)[2][C] . . . dismissal is discretionary,
not mandatory. And that’s People v. Mazur, 2023 case,
97 Cal.App.5th 438. [¶] So based upon the nature of the offenses
and the specifics of the defendant’s background, the court is
making a finding that it is not in the interest of justice to reduce
the sentence any further. [¶] The court declines to do so, finding
that to reduce it any longer would endanger public safety. And
that’s just based on the nature of the offense for which he is
incarcerated and the fact that he had two prior strike convictions.
[¶] So the sentence remains at 29 years, Mr. Kelly.” This appeal
followed.
5
DISCUSSION
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for resentencing
under section 1172.75 for abuse of discretion. (People v. Garcia
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 856.) One-year sentence
enhancements imposed under section 667.5 based on prior prison
terms for offenses other than sexually violent offenses are legally
invalid. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) Defendants whose sentences include
the now-invalid enhancements under section 667.5, subdivision
(b) are entitled to a recall of their sentence. (§ 1172.75,
subds. (b), (c).) Section 1172.75, subdivision (c) expressly
provides that if a judgment includes a qualifying prior prison
term enhancement, pursuant to section 667.5, the trial “court
shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.”
Subdivision (d) specifies: “Resentencing pursuant to this section
shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed
as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement,
unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.
Resentencing pursuant to this section shall not result in a longer
sentence than the one originally imposed.” (Id., subd. (d)(1).) At
any such resentencing, “[t]he court shall apply the sentencing
rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law
that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to
eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of
sentencing.” (Id., subd. (d)(2); People v. Saldana (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 1270, 1276 [§ 1172.75 requires a full
resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly
invalid enhancements].) In addition, the court may “consider
postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the
disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant
6
while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time
served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced
the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects
that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so
that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of
justice.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).) “Ultimately, the superior
court’s risk finding will be upheld ‘if it falls within “the bounds of
reason, all of the circumstances being considered[,]” ’ ” meaning
the sentencing decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or
irrational. (Garcia, at p. 857.)
First, Kelly contends the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to vacate his five-year prior serious felony enhancement
imposed under section 667, subdivision (a). (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1)
[sentencing courts may strike prior serious felony enhancements
in furtherance of justice].) Kelly argues the trial court failed to
take the several mitigating factors presented to the court into
consideration, failed to afford them “great weight,” and only
mentioned them in a “cursory manner.” We disagree.
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1) provides “[n]otwithstanding
any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in
the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that
enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.” Section
1385, subdivision (c)(2) further provides: “In exercising its
discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and
afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove
that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to
(I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public
7
safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the
enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious
danger to others.” Accordingly, if the court finds that dismissal of
an enhancement “would endanger public safety,” then the court
need not consider the listed mitigating circumstances. (Ibid.; see
People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 296.)
In People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, our Supreme
Court held “absent a finding that dismissal would endanger
public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss
enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the
enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present. In
other words, if the court does not find that dismissal would
endanger public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating
circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an
enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial,
credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless
neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance,
such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of
justice.’ ” (Id. at p. 1029.) The court then stated that in most
cases, “ ‘if the trial court finds that dismissal of an enhancement
would endanger public safety, then it is hard to see how dismissal
would further the interests of justice,’ notwithstanding the
applicability of any mitigating factors identified in subdivision
(c)(2).” (Id. at p. 1033.)
Kelly makes no argument to refute the trial court’s finding
that dismissing the five-year enhancement would endanger
public safety. Instead, he argues only that the court abused its
discretion in failing to properly afford “great weight” and consider
these mitigating factors in section 1385:
8
• Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. In
this instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement
shall be dismissed. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B).)
• The application of an enhancement could result in a
sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement
shall be dismissed. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C).)
• The enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is
over five years old. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(H).)
We find the trial court clearly explained the reasons it
reduced Kelly’s sentence by one year only. The court found
dismissal of the enhancement would pose a public safety risk
based on the “nature of the offenses and the specifics of [Kelly’s]
background,” and “the fact that he had two prior strike
convictions.” The trial court rationally based its decision on the
nature of the offense of conviction (three years of continuous
sexual abuse of a minor), the advanced age at which Kelly
committed the offense, and Kelly’s two prior strikes for robbery.
(People v. Jefferson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 235, 242–243 [trial
court’s exercise of discretion “must not be disturbed on appeal
except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an
arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in
a manifest miscarriage of justice”]; People v. Shaw (2020)
56 Cal.App.5th 582, 588 [no abuse of discretion when the trial
court refused to dismiss a five-year sentencing enhancement for a
25-year-old prior serious felony conviction, finding “whatever the
nature of [defendant’s] past convictions, the trial court could have
reasonably determined that their frequency weighed against
striking the enhancement”].) Contrary to Kelly’s argument, the
court did not have to specifically use the language of the statute
in weighing the factors and rendering its decision. (People v.
9
Bravo (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1157 [no error at § 1172.75
resentencing despite court not using “great weight” language or
analysis on the record].)3
Next, Kelly contends the court abused its discretion in
denying his request to dismiss his prior strike under the Three
Strikes law, pursuant to Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497. A trial
court has discretion under the Three Strikes Law to dismiss or
vacate prior conviction allegations or findings in the furtherance
of justice. (§ 1385, subd. (a); Romero, at pp. 529–530.) A trial
court’s refusal to strike a prior felony conviction is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th
367, 375.) The party attacking the sentence must clearly show
that the decision was irrational or arbitrary. (Id. at p. 377.) In
the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have
acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives. A decision will
not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree.
An appellate court is neither authorized nor warranted in
substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial court.
(People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977–
978; see generally 3 Witkin, Cal. Criminal Law (5th ed. 2025),
Punishment, § 521.)
3 The trial court referred to the “contract” or plea agreement
Kelly accepted which greatly reduced his sentencing exposure.
We do not read this stray comment to mean that the court felt
bound by the plea agreement reached between the parties at the
original sentencing or that it refused to resentence Kelly because
he had earlier agreed to, and therefore should be bound by, the
initial sentence. (People v. Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 972
[defendant is entitled to full resentencing regardless of whether
the sentence resulted from a plea agreement].)
10
As the record reflects, the trial court was aware of Kelly’s
background, including his age when he committed the prior
strikes and the instant offense, the age of the prior convictions,
and his time and performance while in custody. In addition to
acknowledging case law exempting prior strike enhancements
from the application of section 1385, subdivision (c), the trial
court also noted it was aware of its discretion to decide whether
to strike the prior strike conviction. The court acknowledged
Kelly’s age at the time of the offense should have “aged [him] out
of the system” and the strikes were not remote in time. From
1983 to 2002, Kelly was convicted of robbery on two separate
occasions, grand theft, battery, trespass, and several controlled
substance offenses. Kelly committed the instant offense over the
course of three years beginning in 2006, after just having been
released from a four-year term of imprisonment for his robbery
conviction in 2002. There was no “crime-free cleansing period of
rehabilitation.” (People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th
809, 813.) Unfortunately, until recently, Kelly “has led a
continuous life of crime after the prior” (ibid.), which supports the
trial court’s decision to deny dismissal of his prior strike. The
trial court properly balanced mitigating and aggravating factors
and acted well within its discretion in denying dismissal of
Kelly’s prior strike.4
4 We do not rule on Kelly’s argument that section 1385,
subdivision (c) should also apply to sentencing schemes like the
Three Strikes law. Kelly did not raise this argument until his
reply brief on appeal while his opening brief, in contrast,
conceded section 1385, subdivision (c) did not apply to dismissal
of strikes. Further, given the trial court’s conclusion, discussed
above, “that to reduce [Kelly’s sentence] any longer would
endanger public safety,” it appears the trial court assessed public
11
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
VIRAMONTES, J.
SCHERB, J.
safety under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) in connection with
Kelly’s request to dismiss any strikes.
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