CourtListener 10861412•People v. Thomas CA2/3
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Filed 5/19/26 P. v. Thomas CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B331861
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA081385
v.
DAVION THOMAS et al,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kathleen Blanchard, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard D. Miggins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Davion Thomas.
Robert L.S. Angres, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Wesley Vaughn Jones.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Amanda V. Lopez,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Appellants Davion Thomas and Wesley Vaughn Jones
challenge their convictions for second degree murder of Lashawn
Coleman. Thomas claims ineffective assistance of counsel for
failure to present evidence of his mental condition, outrageous
governmental conduct based on the detectives allowing witnesses
to remain together prior to their interviews, prosecutorial
misconduct for calling these witnesses to testify, and ineffective
assistance of counsel for not moving to exclude their testimony at
trial. Jones argues that the trial court erred by declining to
instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser
included offense. We reject their claims and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. The Facts
A. Derlene Shaw
Lashawn Coleman, also known as Teena, was an in-home
caretaker for 72-year-old Derlene Shaw. She periodically lived
with Shaw.
Shaw met Jones through mutual friends and knew him as
“Country.” Jones met Coleman through Shaw and developed a
relationship. Shaw observed Jones and Coleman arguing on
prior occasions. Once or twice, Shaw saw Coleman with injuries,
such as a black eye or injured lip.
On the night of May 21, 2021, Shaw had a get together at
her apartment at 737 Jackman Street in Lancaster, California to
celebrate her release from the hospital after being hit by a car.
Several friends were with her, including “Badass,” “Shay,” “Papa
Red,” “Freckles,” Marilyn Adams, “Carla,” James Ramires, and
Coleman. Shaw and many of the others were drinking alcohol,
smoking marijuana, and using cocaine.
2
Earlier in the day, Jones called Shaw’s apartment and
asked who was present. Shaw told him that Coleman was not
there. Coleman did not want her to tell Jones she was present
because she was getting ready to go to the store. Coleman went
to the store with Ramires and returned to Shaw’s apartment.
At 10:00 p.m. or 11:00 p.m., Jones arrived. He knocked on
the door and Badass opened it. Jones and another man entered.
The other man wore a mask and appeared to have an item in his
hand and placed it in his pocket. The other man waved hello.
After Jones entered, he talked with Coleman about
returning his items. Coleman agreed to return the items, but
their conversation escalated into an argument. They remained in
the hallway at the front of the apartment during their argument.
Shaw told them to “ ‘cut it out’ ” and “ ‘just talk.’ ” Jones pushed
Coleman. She pushed him back and said, “ ‘Don’t hit me.’ ” Shaw
stated, “ ‘Don’t hit that girl.’ ” Jones and Coleman began hitting
one another with Jones hitting her first. Coleman fought back.
Shaw said, “ ‘Why don’t you just stop, Country. Leave her alone.
She is going to get it for you.’ ”
During the time that Jones was talking with Coleman,
Jones’s companion was hanging back by the front door. Shaw
saw that Jones’s companion had a gun behind him when he
entered the apartment and then had it down in his pocket.
Coleman went to her purse and Jones pushed her again.
Coleman hit Jones and he fell back on the couch. Coleman again
went to her purse and said, “ ‘I’m getting it.’ ” Jones turned
around and looked at Coleman. Shaw initially thought Coleman
then stabbed Jones. But she determined that Coleman sprayed
Jones when he stated to his companion, “ ‘That bitch sprayed me.
Shoot that bitch.’ ” Shaw saw Jones’s companion raise a gun.
3
She said, “He got a gun.” Shaw heard gunfire. Coleman grabbed
her shoulder and said, “That bitch shot me” or “that nigga shot
me.” Coleman fell as she walked toward the living room. Shaw
heard Jones say, “I didn’t want her dead. I didn’t want to kill
her,” or “ ‘I didn’t want you to kill her.’ ” Shaw said, “ ‘Somebody
call 911. She’s been shot.’ ”
After the shooting, Jones and his companion ran out the
door. Jones’s companion left first. Before leaving, Jones was at
the bathroom door, and Shaw heard him say, “ ‘I didn’t want her
to die,’ ” “ ‘I didn’t want him to shoot her,’ ” or “ ‘I didn’t want to
kill her.’ ” When Jones walked out of the apartment, he returned
to a sliding glass door by a television. Shaw was tending to
Coleman. Shaw heard Jones say, “I didn’t want to shoot you. I
didn’t want to kill you.” Jones was crying.
B. Marilyn Adams
Marilyn Adams was Shaw’s neighbor. On May 21, 2021, at
9:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., Adams went to Shaw’s home to play
cards. Coleman opened the door when Adams arrived and
escorted her to the couch. Adams knew her as Teena. At the
time, Adams had known her for about two years.
At some point, Adams heard a knock on the front door.
Coleman said, “It’s him” and opened the door. A man entered.
Adams had never seen the man before. Adams believed that the
man arrived alone.
The man began cussing at Coleman, who told him to stop
cussing at her in front of her family members. The two
exchanged words. Once they stopped arguing, Coleman showed
Adams where to sit.
Adams saw Coleman take a stun gun out of her bra and use
it on Jones. After Coleman used the stun gun, Jones said, “ ‘She
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done stun-gunned me at least three times. Shoot her.’ ”
According to Adams, Jones was talking to another man who
entered the apartment. This other man was Black and wore a
face mask. He entered five minutes after Jones, looked around,
and told everyone to “be still.” After Jones said, “ ‘Shoot her,’ ”
the second man waved a dark colored handgun and said, “ ‘Don’t
nobody move’ ” or “ ‘Everybody be still.’ ” Adams, along with
everyone else, fell to her knees. She saw the man fire the gun
and she heard one shot. Adams heard Coleman say, “ ‘He shot
me. He really shot me.’ ” Coleman put her finger over a hole in
her right shoulder, got wobbly, kind of smiled, and fell to the
ground.
After the shooting, Adams heard the name Cree as the
person who told the shooter to shoot Coleman. At trial, she could
not tell if Cree was in the courtroom. Adams testified that she
could not remember if she told the responding deputy or the
detective that Cree ordered the shooter to shoot Coleman. Adams
testified that it was possible that she did not tell the responding
deputy that Cree ordered the shooter to shoot Coleman. She had
trouble remembering things from the night of the incident which
was two years earlier.
C. James Ramires
On May 21, 2021, James Ramires went with his friend Red
to the gathering at Shaw’s apartment. Ramires took Coleman to
a liquor store. Her ex-boyfriend approached her on a three-
wheeled bike. They exchanged words. Coleman looked
disturbed. Ramires knew Coleman’s ex-boyfriend as Cree.
They returned to Shaw’s apartment. After about 15
minutes, someone knocked on the door. When the door opened,
5
Cree entered, followed by another man. Ramires saw a gun in
the second man’s waistband.
Coleman began arguing with Cree for about five minutes.
They began shoving one another. Ramires never saw Coleman
strike Cree or use any weapon against him. Cree mentioned a
gun and Coleman responded, “Who cares” or “whatever” and told
him, “Shoot me then.” Cree stated, “Shoot the bitch” and “you’re
going to die.” Ramires heard a shot fired. Coleman turned to
Ramires and said, “This fool shot me.” Ramires grabbed her
before she went to the floor. Coleman died in Ramires’s arms.
Ramires yelled, “Call 911.” Immediately after the shot, Cree and
his companion left the apartment. Ramires did not hear either of
the men say anything while they were inside of the apartment
after the shot was fired.
A minute or two after the shooting, Cree appeared at the
screen door or sliding glass door. He was crying and distraught.
He was trying to go inside the apartment and said, “Sorry.”
D. Deputy Raymond Gonzalez
On May 21, 2021, Sheriff’s Deputy Raymond Gonzalez
responded to a call for a gunshot victim at 737 Jackman Street.
Deputy Gonzalez spoke to a man who told him that the suspect
was a Black man with a tricycle. Deputy Gonzalez found a red
tricycle north of the apartment complex. Jones walked toward
Deputy Gonzalez and other deputies and they detained him.
E. Sergeant Christian Mezzano
Sergeant Christian Mezzano and his partner Sergeant
Guillermo Morales were assigned as homicide detectives for
Coleman’s death. They responded to the location where the
incident occurred. According to Sergeant Mezzano, deputies
6
found a stun gun in the bedroom after it had been moved from
the floor of the doorway and placed on the sofa. Sergeant
Mezzano and Sergeant Morales also interviewed Shaw, Adams,
Reginald “Badass” Hayes, Shirley “Shay” Geiger, Ivory “Papa
Red” Johnson, and Carla Guice.
After the interviews, Sergeant Mezzano viewed a
surveillance video recording that showed Jones and the other
man who was wearing a face mask in the hallway outside of
Shaw’s apartment. The video showed the second man had a
revolver in his left hand. The revolver’s hammer was cocked back
rendering it ready to fire. The gunman entered Shaw’s
apartment about 36 seconds after Jones. Less than two minutes
later, the gunman exited with the revolver in his right hand and
ran down the hallway. Jones exited about six to seven seconds
later.
Sergeant Mezzano directed deputies to arrest Thomas. On
May 24, 2021, deputies detained Thomas in a black Chevrolet.
He was wearing the same shoes that the shooter was wearing on
the night of the shooting as depicted in the video recording. A
cellphone was found in the car. The phone contained three
photos from May 7, 2021. The first photo showed Thomas
holding a gun and wearing the shoes and clothing worn by the
gunman as depicted in the video. The second photo showed
Thomas’s girlfriend holding a revolver. The third photo showed a
blue steel revolver like the revolver held by the gunman as
depicted in the video.
F. Other evidence
Dr. Brice Hunt from the Los Angeles County Department of
the Medical Examiner concluded that Coleman was killed by a
gunshot wound to the chest. Dr. Hunt determined that the barrel
7
of the firearm was five to six inches to a foot and a half from
Coleman.
At trial, Jones’s trial counsel and the prosecutor stipulated
that on March 1, 2021, a court issued a criminal protective order
against Jones, prohibiting him from contacting Coleman or
coming within 100 yards of her.
II. Procedure
Separate juries convicted Jones and Thomas of second
degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)1; count 1). Thomas’s
jury found that he personally used a firearm in the commission of
the murder (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). Thomas’s jury also convicted
him of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1);
count 3). Jones’s jury additionally convicted him of corporal
injury on a person with whom he had a dating relationship
(§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 2). Jones and Thomas admitted that
they each had two prior felony convictions under the Three
Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)).
The trial court sentenced Jones to 45 years to life for
count 1, calculated as the minimum term of 15 years tripled
under the Three Strikes law. For count 3, the court imposed and
stayed six years pursuant to section 654.
The court sentenced Thomas to 49 years to life for count 1,
calculated as the minimum term of 15 years tripled under the
Three Strikes law, plus an additional four years for the firearm
enhancement. For count 2, the court imposed and stayed four
years pursuant to section 654.
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
8
DISCUSSION
I. Denial of involuntary manslaughter instruction
The trial court denied Jones’s request to instruct on
involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense to murder.
The court stated no evidence supported involuntary
manslaughter. Jones claims this was error.
A. Applicable law
“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with
malice aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).) “[M]alice may be
express or implied.” (§ 188, subd. (a).) Express malice is
established by an intent to kill. (People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d
1103, 1114.) Implied malice does not require an intent to kill.
(People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 602–603.) Implied malice
is formed when the killing “results from an intentional act, the
natural consequences of which are dangerous to human life, and
the act is deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to,
and with conscious disregard for, human life.” (People v. Cook
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 597 (Cook); People v. Knoller (2007) 41
Cal.4th 139, 143.)
Involuntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a
human being without malice. (§ 192, subd. (b).) Section 192,
subdivision (b) requires one of the following underlying acts: “an
unlawful act, not amounting to a felony,” or “a lawful act which
might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due
caution and circumspection.” Courts have also identified
nonstatutory underlying acts including one based on an
inherently dangerous assaultive felony, which is pertinent in this
case. (People v. Brothers (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 24, 33–34
(Brothers); People v. Bryant (2013) 56 Cal.4th 959, 974 (conc. opn.
9
of Kennard, J.); see People v. Bryant (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th
1196, 1205.)2
Involuntary manslaughter requires criminal negligence in
committing the underlying act that endangered human life.
(People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 423; People v Mohamed
(2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 152, 161; People v. Butler (2010) 187
Cal.App.4th 998, 1007.) Criminal negligence for involuntary
manslaughter is based on an objective standard, that is, whether
a reasonable person would have been aware of the risk of death
involved. (Butler, at p. 1008.) By contrast, a defendant commits
implied malice murder when he acts with conscious disregard for
life and subjectively appreciates the risk of danger to human life.
(Ibid.; People v. Guillen (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 934, 1027; People
v. Luo (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 663, 670–671.)
Involuntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of
murder. (People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 813.) A trial
court must instruct the jury on any lesser included offense
supported by substantial evidence, which is “evidence that a
reasonable jury could find persuasive.” (People v. Barton (1995)
12 Cal.4th 186, 201, fn. 8 (Barton); People v. Breverman (1998) 19
Cal.4th 142, 162 (Breverman), disapproved on another ground in
People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 260, fn. 7.) The
instruction is required when a reasonable jury could conclude
that the lesser included offense, but not the greater offense, was
committed. (Breverman, at p. 162.)
2 Another nonstatutory underlying act is based on a
noninherently dangerous felony accomplished “without due
caution and circumspection.” (People v. Burroughs (1984) 35
Cal.3d 824, 835, overruled in part on other grounds by People v.
Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89.)
10
We independently review the trial court’s decision to not
instruct on a lesser included offense. (Cook, supra, 39 Cal.4th at
p. 596; People v. McGehee (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1207.)
B. Aiding and abetting
“[A] direct aider and abettor to murder must possess malice
aforethought.” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 848,
superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v.
Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 836.) Liability as an aider and
abettor to express malice murder requires, by act or advice,
aiding, promoting, encouraging, or instigating the commission of
the killing with knowledge that the direct perpetrator intended to
commit the murder and the intent to aid the perpetrator in its
commission. (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 468.) A
direct aider and abettor of implied malice murder must, by act or
advice, aid, promote, encourage, or instigate the commission of
the life-endangering act. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981,
991.) The requisite mental state is “ ‘knowledge that the
perpetrator intended to commit the [life-endangering] act, intent
to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge
that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious
disregard for human life.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
Reviewing courts have recognized aiding and abetting
liability for involuntary manslaughter. (See People v. Oliver
(1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 138, 150–151.) For example, a reviewing
court affirmed a conviction for involuntary manslaughter as an
aider and abettor when the defendant prevented others from
intervening in the direct perpetrator’s fatal assault against the
victim. (People v. Le Grant (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 148, 153–154,
abrogated on another ground recognized in People v. Cox (2000)
23 Cal.4th 665, 675.)
11
C. No substantial evidence of the absence of malice
As the shooter, Thomas was liable for murder on a direct
perpetrator theory for shooting Coleman. Jones was liable for
murder as an aider and abettor to Thomas’s commission of
murder. Jones asserts that Thomas’s commission of the shooting
was an inherently dangerous assaultive crime that formed the
underlying act for involuntary manslaughter. Substantial
evidence of the absence of malice must exist to justify an
instruction on involuntary manslaughter. (Brothers, supra, 236
Cal.App.4th at pp. 33–35.)
To support the absence of malice, Jones relies on Shaw’s
testimony that after Coleman was shot, she heard him express
that he did not want to kill her. We reject Jones’s argument.
At the outset, we question whether Jones made the alleged
statement. The only evidence to support it came from Shaw. But
she was inconsistent. Shaw initially testified that she did not
hear Jones say, “ ‘Why did you shoot her?’ ” or “ ‘I didn’t want you
to shoot her.’ ” She changed her testimony and said she heard
Jones say, “I didn’t want her dead. I didn’t want to kill her,” or
“ ‘I didn’t want to shoot you. I didn’t want to kill you.’ ” Shaw
continued to change her testimony by saying that she heard
Jones say, “ ‘I didn’t want her to die.’ ” Shaw also testified that
Jones said, “I didn’t want you to kill her,” or “ ‘I didn’t want him
to shoot her.’ ”
Any version of the statement does not amount to
substantial evidence to support the absence of malice. We
observe that Jones expressed either that he “didn’t want”
Coleman to die or “didn’t want” to kill her or have her killed. The
statements amounted to Jones’s mere remorse after his anger
subsided. They reflected Jones’s post-shooting realization that
12
killing Coleman was not a desirable or ideal outcome for his
choice to retaliate for her hostility to him. Jones continued to
demonstrate this remorse when he returned to Shaw’s apartment
after the shooting and approached her sliding glass door, stating,
“I didn’t want nothing to happen to you.” But intentional killers
can be remorseful for their killings. Remorse does not render the
killing unintentional.
Jones revealed his intent to kill by telling Coleman that she
was “going to die” and ordering Thomas to “shoot the bitch.”
Jones prompted Thomas to shoot Coleman as he was five to
eighteen inches away, allowing the shot to strike her chest and
hit her lung and a major artery from her heart. This manner of
killing further supports the inference that Jones, as well as
Thomas, intended to kill Coleman. (People v. Smith (2005) 37
Cal.4th 733, 742; People v. Woods (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1037,
1048 [shots directed to the victim at close range supported intent
to kill].) Under such circumstances, Jones’s statement of remorse
would not negate his intent to kill to support an involuntary
manslaughter instruction. (People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d
635, 643 [no involuntary manslaughter instruction required when
defendant shot two victims at point blank range, even though he
later denied intent to kill]; People v. Ibarra (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d
413, 420 [one line denial of intent to kill was not substantial
enough to support involuntary manslaughter when defendant
pointed gun three or four feet from victim’s chest].)
But even if Jones’s single sentence somehow negated his
intent to kill or express malice, substantial evidence established
implied malice. The court in Brothers, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at
page 34 addressed such a scenario. Brothers repeatedly beat the
decedent on the head and face with a broom handle. She left the
13
scene only after her companion forced a gag down the decedent’s
throat and he stopped moving. (Ibid.) In arguing that the trial
court should have instructed on involuntary manslaughter,
Brothers relied on her testimony that she did not know “ ‘this was
going to happen.’ ” (Ibid.) The reviewing court assumed Brothers
meant she did not intend to kill the decedent but determined that
there was “no evidence from which a reasonable juror could
entertain a reasonable doubt that Brothers had acted in
conscious disregard of the risk her conduct posed to [the victim]’s
life.” (Ibid.)
The court concluded that this formation of implied malice
precluded an instruction on involuntary manslaughter, even if
evidence negated intent to kill. (Brothers, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th
at p. 35.) The court reasoned, “Otherwise, an involuntary
manslaughter instruction would be required in every implied
malice case regardless of the evidence.” (Ibid.)
From Jones’s actions and the circumstances before the
shooting, we can infer his subjective awareness of the risk of
death posed by Thomas’s shooting Coleman and his conscious
disregard for life by his order to shoot. Jones’s proclamation to
Coleman that she was going to die supports his awareness of the
risk of death. He consciously disregarded Coleman’s life with his
order to Thomas, who was within close range of her and held a
loaded revolver with its hammer cocked back, rendering it ready
to fire. (People v. Boatman (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1273–
1274 [“Pulling the hammer back on a loaded gun and pointing it
at another” is evidence of implied malice].)
Jones concedes that the jury could have concluded that he
“acted with conscious disregard” for Coleman’s life “by urging
Thomas to shoot her.” But Jones asserts that “the jury could
14
have also concluded that [he] in aiding and abetting Thomas
acted with a mental state consistent with gross negligence”
because he “denied that he wanted Thomas to kill Coleman.”
We reject Jones’s argument. His alleged statement about
not wanting Coleman killed fails to support gross negligence as a
possible alternative to implied malice. But even if it did, as the
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, “ ‘[T]he existence of “any
evidence, no matter how weak” will not justify instructions on a
lesser included offense, but such instructions are required
whenever evidence that the defendant is guilty only of the lesser
offense is “substantial enough to merit consideration” by the jury.
[Citations.]’ ” (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 623; People
v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793, 827.)3 As stated, the
circumstances prior to the shooting refute any interpretation of
Jones’s alleged statement that would suggest he gave the order
without realizing the risk involved or that the order was not
made in conscious disregard to life.
3 Jones asserts that a lesser included offense instruction
must be given “no matter how weak” the evidence, citing People
v. Garcia (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 15, 17. But this assertion
directly contradicts nearly 50 years of Supreme Court cases since
Flannel, which disapproved of any decision that “require[s]
instructions without evidence substantial enough to merit
consideration.” (People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684–685
& fn. 12, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in
People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 138; Barton, supra, 12
Cal.4th at pp. 194–195, fn. 4.) “[E]ven on request, a trial judge
has no duty to instruct on any lesser offense unless there is
substantial evidence to support such instruction.” (People v.
Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1008.)
15
D. Harmless error
Even if we assumed that the trial court erred by not
instructing on involuntary manslaughter, that error was
harmless. In a noncapital case, the failure to instruct on a lesser
included offense supported by substantial evidence is prejudicial
only if the defendant demonstrates that it is “ ‘ “ ‘ “reasonably
probable” ’ ” ’ ” that a more favorable result would have been
reached if the court had given the instruction. (People v.
Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 196, 198; Breverman, supra, 19
Cal.4th at p. 165; see People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837.)
In addition to murder, the trial court instructed the jury on
heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter, which requires a higher
degree of culpability than involuntary manslaughter. The jury’s
conviction of murder and rejection of the lesser option render
harmless any error in not instructing on the lesser included
offense of involuntary manslaughter. Had the court instructed
the jury on involuntary manslaughter, it is not reasonably
probable it would have chosen that option. (People v. Rogers
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 884; People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th
1083, 1145.)
Any error in declining to instruct on involuntary
manslaughter also would not have rendered Jones’s trial
fundamentally unfair, as he argues. In closing argument,
defense counsel still asserted that Jones did not intend to kill
Coleman and did not act with conscious disregard for life, even
without the involuntary manslaughter instruction. The jurors
simply rejected these arguments. By convicting Jones of second
degree murder, they determined that he acted with malice.
16
II. Failure to present evidence of Thomas’s mental
condition
Thomas’s appellate counsel argues that his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present evidence of
his mental condition. Appellate counsel specifically claims this
evidence “would have persuaded the jury that [Thomas] did not
act with express malice, that he did not actually form the intent
to kill or more fundamentally that [his] history of mental illness
warranted a level of consideration, if not mercy, that might not
have technically been covered by the panoply of possible verdicts,
but could have resulted in an acquittal.” We reject appellate
counsel’s arguments.
A. Evaluation by Dr. Robert Schug
Prior to trial, a psychologist named Robert Schug examined
Thomas. On June 15, 2023, Dr. Schug prepared a report that
addressed Thomas’s “mental condition” and the existence of “any
mitigating factors to consider prior to sentencing.” Dr. Schug
reviewed Thomas’s mental health records4 which indicated that
he was diagnosed with 19 mental disorders, including ADHD,
PTSD, bipolar disorder, explosive disorder, depressive disorder,
4 At one point in his opening brief, appellate counsel
mentions that trial counsel failed “to investigate and use at trial
[his] well-established mental health defenses.” We disagree.
Trial counsel did investigate Thomas’s mental health condition.
The report of Thomas’s psychological evaluation lists the multiple
mental health records provided by trial counsel. Even appellate
counsel unartfully acknowledges that trial counsel “had it all,
and it was ‘voluminous’. . . . [R]eams and reams of evidence
establishing that his client . . . was in common parlance,
‘cuckoo.’ ”
17
oppositional defiant disorder, anxiety disorder, impulse control
disorder, psychotic disorder, conduct disorder, alcohol related
disorder, cannabis dependence, dysthymic disorder, antisocial
personality disorder, and intellectual disability.5
Dr. Schug concluded that Thomas met the formal diagnoses
for intellectual disability of moderate severity and alcohol use
disorder. Dr. Schug observed that Thomas appeared “vulnerable
to being drawn, perhaps unwillingly, into future acts of violence
and aggression—acts he may not necessarily have willfully
chosen had he not been in close proximity to other individuals
already marked by such behavior.” Dr. Schug observed that
Thomas’s “problematic relationship with [Jones] . . . antisocial
peers . . . and violent attitudes” could be seen as “motivators for
the crimes.” While acknowledging the existence of mitigating
factors for sentencing, Dr. Schug opined that Thomas posed a
moderate level of risk for re-offense based on his background and
the nature of the offenses.
5 Thomas’s appellate counsel uses the term “ ‘mental
retardation.’ ” The United States Supreme Court in Hall v.
Florida (2014) 572 U.S. 701, 704–705, used the term
“ ‘intellectual disability,’ ” consistent with the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed. 2013). (People v.
Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 717, fn. 24.) The California
Legislature replaced the term “ ‘mentally retarded’ ” with the
term “ ‘intellectual disability’ ” when it amended section 1376,
which establishes procedures for the determination of intellectual
disability in capital cases. (Boyce, at p. 717, fn. 24.) Consistent
with the Supreme Court and the California Legislature, we use
the term “ ‘intellectual disability.’ ”
18
B. No deficient performance by counsel
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Thomas
“ ‘must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.’
[Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687
(Strickland).]” (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216.) He
must also show a “reasonable probability” that he would have
received a more favorable result had counsel’s performance not
been deficient. (Strickland, at pp. 693–694; Ledesma, at pp. 217–
218; People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 (Mai).) “[C]ounsel
has wide latitude in deciding how best to represent a client.”
(Yarborough v. Gentry (2003) 540 U.S. 1, 5–6.)
On direct appeal, a conclusion that counsel’s performance
was deficient depends on whether “the record affirmatively
discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the
challenged act or omission, . . . counsel was asked for a reason
and failed to provide one, or . . . there simply could be no
satisfactory explanation.” (Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009.)
The absence from the record of a tactical purpose for the
challenged act or omission will not establish ineffective
assistance of counsel on appeal unless “ ‘no conceivable reason’ ”
could exist for that act or omission. (People v. Johnsen (2021) 10
Cal.5th 1116, 1165.) Without determining whether the record
discloses no rational tactical purpose for declining to present
evidence of Thomas’s mental condition, we observe that
conceivable reasons exist.
Thomas’s appellate counsel overstates the materiality of
the evidence of his mental condition. We recognize that under
section 28, subdivision (a), evidence of a mental disorder can be
relevant to negate the requisite mental states of deliberation and
premeditation for first degree murder and malice aforethought
19
for second degree murder.6 But Dr. Schug did not evaluate
Thomas for a section 28, subdivision (a) defense. Not
surprisingly, Dr. Shug’s report did not include an opinion that
Thomas was unable to form any requisite mental state during the
commission of the murder. Instead, he stated that Jones or other
“antisocial peers” and “violent attitudes” could have motivated
Thomas to commit the crimes.
Appellate counsel concedes that Dr. Schug’s report did not
address how or whether Thomas’s mental condition impacted his
mental state when shooting Coleman or supported theories of
defense of others7 and voluntary manslaughter based on sudden
quarrel. He simply argues that because the report did not
disclose any opinion, trial counsel should have called Dr. Schug
as a witness to explore whether Thomas’s mental condition could
have impacted his mental state.8 But Thomas’s suggestion would
require presenting evidence of a mental condition in every trial
when the defendant was charged with a specific intent crime,
regardless of whether that mental condition was relevant to
negating the specific mental state.
6 Section 28, subdivision (a) states, “Evidence of mental
disease, mental defect, or mental disorder is admissible solely on
the issue of whether or not the accused actually formed a
required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated, or harbored
malice aforethought, when a specific intent crime is charged.”
7 The trial court denied Thomas’s request for an instruction
on imperfect self defense. On appeal, Thomas does not claim that
the trial court’s denial of the instruction was error.
8 Without citing any authority, appellate counsel claims, “In
the real world of trial practice, an attorney in defense counsel’s
shoes never fails to call the medical expert. Never!”
20
Calling any witness without knowing the substance of their
proposed testimony is a gamble. Here, Dr. Schug’s report does
not indicate any opinion about Thomas’s mental state during the
commission of the shooting. We cannot conclude that during
testimony, he would have formed an opinion favorable to the
defense. Conceivably, trial counsel either discovered prior to trial
that Dr. Schug was unable to form such an opinion and decided
not to call him as a witness, or he was unwilling to take the
chance that Dr. Schug would not have formed the opinion during
testimony. Either way, trial counsel was not deficient for
declining to call Dr. Schug as a witness.
Trial counsel may have also conceivably decided that
incorporating a defense based on Thomas’s mental condition
would detract from his primary theory that Jones took the gun
from him and shot Coleman. During closing argument, trial
counsel asserted that Thomas denied shooting Coleman during
his interview with the detectives.9 Thomas’s denial to the
detectives conceivably compelled trial counsel to focus on that
theory to avoid awkwardly asking the jury to ignore his client’s
version of the facts.10 Developing a theory consistent with
9 In closing argument, trial counsel referred to Thomas’s
interview and mentioned that it was presented to the jury by the
prosecutor, but it is not part of the appellate record.
10 We recognize that during closing argument, trial counsel
mentioned secondary theories of voluntary manslaughter and
second degree murder that assumed Thomas was the shooter.
But trial counsel abbreviated his discussion of these secondary
theories to avoid distracting the jury with a version of the facts
that was inconsistent with his primary theory that Thomas was
not the shooter. We cannot second guess this decision.
(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689.)
21
Thomas’s statement preserved trial counsel’s credibility with the
jury.
Trial counsel could have concluded that he had the best
chance of prevailing with this theory, particularly because of
other evidence that supported Thomas’s version of the facts. For
example, the detectives who interviewed Thomas observed an
injury on his lip. Thomas told them that he sustained the injury
when Jones hit him in the mouth and took the gun from him to
shoot Coleman. To further support the theory, counsel focused
his cross examination of Shaw on her limited observation of the
shooter by questioning her vantage point, the conditions of her
observation, and her inability to recall details about the shooter’s
appearance. Counsel also argued that Coleman taunted Jones,
not Thomas, by saying, “just shoot me.” Counsel based this
argument on Coleman’s fight with Jones, who projected his anger
at her for not relinquishing his belongings.
Finally, appellate counsel asserts, “And, while this court
may not wish to consider it, appellant’s jury awash in evidence
that paints appellant as sympathetic, my [sic] have decided the
case based on some level of nullification. Like it or not, it
happens.” He further claims, “[T]he jury could have felt sorry for
appellant and the verdict may have been very different.” But
counsel’s performance was not deficient for failure to present
evidence to persuade the jury to nullify based on sympathy. As
the Attorney General points out, any such effort by counsel would
have conflicted with the trial court’s instruction to the jury to not
be influenced by “pity” or “sympathy” for the defendant. (See
CALJIC No. 1.00.)
22
C. No prejudice
Even if Thomas presented evidence of his mental condition,
he would not have received a more favorable result.
First, the jury acquitted Thomas of first degree willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder and convicted him of second
degree murder. Any mental disorder defense under section 28,
subdivision (a) would not have made any difference with
deliberation and premeditation.
Second, trial counsel was confronted with overwhelming
evidence of malice. Thomas shot Coleman at close range with the
same gun he was holding in a photograph found by the deputies.
The range at which he fired the gun and his familiarity with it
support his intent to kill or express malice, as well as the
subjective awareness of the risk of death by firing the gun.
Thomas fired the shot after Jones said, “shoot the bitch” and told
her, “you are going to die.” This sequence of Jones’s statement
and Thomas’s firing the gun supports the inference that Thomas
shot Coleman to kill her.
As stated, Dr. Schug did not opine as to whether Thomas’s
mental condition negated malice or caused him to act under the
direct and immediate influence of a sudden quarrel at the time of
the shooting. We have no way of knowing whether Jones
psychologically influenced Thomas. It is impossible to say that a
more favorable result would have been achieved had the evidence
been admitted. Given the vague probative value of the evidence
of Thomas’s mental condition and the overwhelming evidence
that established malice, we conclude that Thomas was not
prejudiced by the failure to present the mental condition
evidence.
23
III. Prosecutorial misconduct or outrageous
governmental conduct
Thomas next complains that the Sheriff’s deputies failed to
separate potential witnesses, allowing them to discuss the
incident together while they waited to be individually
interviewed. He asserts that each witness’s personal recollection
could not be separated from those of the others in the group. He
further accuses the prosecutor of encouraging perjury and
soliciting false testimony by calling these witnesses at trial.
Based on the cases he cites, Thomas appears to argue that the
prosecutor committed misconduct under the federal and state
standards. Finally, Thomas contends that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to move to exclude the tainted witness
testimony. We reject Thomas’s arguments.
A. Relevant facts
After the incident, Sheriff’s deputies arrived at Shaw’s
apartment. She spoke with a deputy named Ramirez in the
hallway of her apartment. At trial, Shaw testified that she was
truthful when she spoke with him and did not purposefully omit
anything.
According to Shaw, the deputies transported her from her
apartment to the Sheriff’s station. When Shaw and the other
witnesses arrived, the deputies placed them in the same room.
The deputies called each witness one at a time to speak in
another room. The witnesses commented on how they were
waiting a long time. According to Shaw, the witnesses were not
really talking about what had happened because they were not
supposed to talk to one other about the incident. Shaw testified
that the witnesses “did discuss it a little bit.”
24
B. No prosecutorial misconduct
A prosecutor’s misconduct violates the Fourteenth
Amendment when “it infects the trial with such unfairness as to
make the conviction a denial of due process.” (People v. Morales
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44; People v. Thomas (2012) 54 Cal.4th 908,
937; Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 181.)
Prosecutorial misconduct that does not render the trial
fundamentally unfair constitutes misconduct under California
law if it involves the use of “deceptive or reprehensible methods
to attempt to persuade . . . the jury.” (Morales, at p. 44; People v.
Otero (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 865, 870; People v. Wallace (2008)
44 Cal.4th 1032, 1070–1071.)
To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a
defendant must make a timely and specific objection and request
that the trial court admonish the jury. (People v. Gamache (2010)
48 Cal.4th 347, 371.) Thomas recognizes that trial counsel did
not object or request to exclude any testimony when Shaw
informed him during cross examination that the witnesses were
in the same room prior to interviewing. Trial counsel’s failure to
object forfeits the issue for appeal. Even on the merits, we reject
Thomas’s claim and any claim of ineffective assistance for failing
to object. (See People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 126–127
& fn. 16.)
Thomas has cited nothing in the record to support his claim
that the witnesses testified falsely or changed their versions of
the event based on conversations among one another while
waiting at the Sheriff’s station. No witness testified that they
either lied to the deputies or lied in court. Shaw testified that
she was truthful when she spoke with the deputies. The record
25
contains no details of any conversation in which the witnesses
were engaged.
Nothing showed that any consistency between the
witnesses was the product of a conversation at the Sheriff’s
station, rather than a witness’s independent recollection. On the
contrary, the witnesses testified to different details which
support the inference that no one aligned with another witness’s
account and that each witness preserved their individual
recollections. For example, all three testified about Jones
ordering Thomas to shoot Coleman, but each gave different
details that led to the order. Shaw testified that Coleman
sprayed mace on Jones, while Adams testified that she used a
stun gun three times. Ramires did not mention anything about
either a stun gun or spray. But he was the only one to say that
Jones warned Coleman about a gun and that Coleman responded,
“Who cares” or “whatever” and told him, “Shoot me then,” prior to
his order to shoot.
The record includes minimal evidence of witnesses having
contact with one another or learning information from them after
the incident. For example, Ramires testified that he had spoken
to Shaw once since the incident and they did not discuss the
details of it. Additionally, Adams revealed that she learned of
the name Cree from people talking after the shooting. But no
evidence suggests that she learned the name from a conversation
at the Sheriff’s station rather than at the scene of a shooting. It
is important to keep in mind that the witnesses knew one
another directly or through Shaw. It is unrealistic that they
would have completely terminated contact with one another after
the incident.
26
Defense counsel also tried to establish that Adams added
information during a second interview with deputies that she did
not include in her initial interview with the responding deputy.
Adams initially testified that she did not remember and was not
sure. She later testified that it was “possible” that she did not
tell the responding deputy that Cree ordered the second man to
shoot Coleman but did tell the detective during her subsequent
longer interview.
None of these examples leads us to conclude that any post-
incident discussion at the Sheriff’s station influenced or caused
any witness to lie or change his or her story. Because the record
does not support Thomas’s claim that any witness testified
falsely, we reject his argument that the prosecutor “effectively
encouraged perjury and solicited false testimony.” We conclude
that the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct by calling the
witnesses to testify. Presenting her case with these witnesses
was not “deceptive or reprehensible.” Nor did calling them to
testify render the trial fundamentally unfair.
C. No outrageous governmental conduct
Thomas also contends that the detectives11 engaged in
misconduct by permitting the witnesses to wait in the common
room prior to interviewing. He asserts that the alleged
misconduct violated his due process right to effectively examine
the witnesses. We reject Thomas’s argument.
The United States Supreme Court introduced the concept
of an outrageous governmental conduct defense in United States
11 Thomas refers to the persons who conducted the interviews
as deputies, but the record identifies them as homicide detectives
27
v. Russell (1973) 411 U.S. 423, 428–431 (Russell). In a
prosecution for drug manufacturing, the defendant in Russell
claimed that an undercover officer engaged in criminal activity by
supplying an ingredient for the drug that could not have
otherwise been obtained. (Id. at pp. 431–432.) The Court
rejected the claims that the ingredient was impossible to obtain
and that the officer’s action was indispensable to committing the
offense. But the Court left open whether outrageous
governmental conduct could violate due process and bar
prosecution.12 (Ibid.)
Assuming the viability of the defense,13 we conclude that
the detectives did not engage in outrageous misconduct by
allowing the witnesses to remain together while awaiting their
interviews.14 The detectives instructed the witnesses not to
Sergeant Mezzano and Sergeant Morales. We refer to them as
detectives to maintain consistency with the record.
12 Similarly, the California Supreme Court has declined to
decide the viability of an outrageous governmental conduct
defense. (People v. Smith (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1207, 1227 (Smith).)
13 Justice Werdegar’s concurring opinion in Smith described
the claim of outrageous governmental conduct to be a bar to
prosecution, rather than an affirmative defense. Procedurally, it
would be properly raised by a pretrial motion and decided by the
trial court. (Smith, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1228 (conc. opn. of
Werdegar, J.).) Under this view, Thomas has forfeited his claim
because he did not raise it below.
14 Thomas argues that by allowing the witnesses to remain
together prior to their interviews, the detectives knowingly or
negligently made them testify untruthfully, violating the federal
witness tampering statute (18 U.S.C. § 1512). We are not
28
speak to one another. The detectives interviewed each witness
separately, which would avoid any exposure of their account to
the other witnesses. The record does not show that the detectives
ever coerced any witness, affirmed any witness’s account, or told
them that a particular observation was correct, as Thomas points
out is a concern with suggestive eyewitness identification
procedures. Nothing about the detectives’ interviewing process
violated “ ‘fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense
of justice,’ ” which Russell suggested as the standard for the
defense of outrageous governmental conduct. (Russell, supra, 411
U.S. at p. 432.)
D. No ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to
exclude testimony
Because we reject the prosecutorial misconduct and
outrageous governmental conduct allegations, we also reject any
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to move to
exclude the witnesses’ testimony on those grounds. A reasonably
competent attorney would have similarly assessed such an
attempt to exclude the witnesses’ testimony as futile. (People v.
Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 387; People v. Torrez (1995) 31
Cal.App.4th 1084, 1091.)
persuaded. This federal statute is inapplicable to this
prosecution and the facts involved. The record does not support
Thomas’s contention that the witnesses falsely testified, as we
stated earlier.
29
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgments.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
HANASONO, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
ADAMS, J.
30
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