CourtListener 10861373•McGarry v. Uber Technologies CA4/1
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Filed 5/19/26 McGarry v. Uber Technologies CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
JOSEFINA MCGARRY, Individually and D084711
as Successor in Interest, etc.
(Super. Ct. No. 37-2022-
Plaintiff and Appellant, 00051776-CU-PO-CTL)
v.
UBER TECHNOLOGIES INC. et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Blaine K. Bowman, Judge. Affirmed.
Finn Trial Attorneys, David P. Finn and Alvin M. Gomez for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
Wood, Smith, Henning & Berman and Steven R. Disharoon; Perkins
Coie and Joshua Patashnik for Defendants and Respondents.
Josefina McGarry appeals a summary judgment entered in favor of
Uber Technologies, Inc., Rasier, LLC, and Rasier-CA, LLC (collectively
“Uber”) after the court determined no acts or omissions of Uber or its drivers
caused the tragic death of her daughter, Stella Yeh, on a freeway, miles from
where she exited an Uber ride and did not accept a second Uber ride. On
appeal, McGarry contends the trial court improperly granted Uber summary
judgment on the issue of causation because there were triable issues of fact
regarding foreseeability and whether Uber owed a heightened duty as a
common carrier to an intoxicated passenger. McGarry also contends the
court made an improper credibility finding to reject her argument that
reasonable inferences could be drawn from the evidence to support her claim
that an Uber driver forced Yeh out of his vehicle in violation of the Tom Bane
Civil Rights Act (Bane Act) (Civ. Code, § 52.1). We disagree with each
contention and affirm the judgment.1
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background2
Yeh and several college friends attended an off-campus party the night
of May 11, 2018, where Yeh drank from a water bottle filled with spirits,
played a drinking game, and took shots. After leaving the party, Yeh and
three friends went to a fast-food restaurant in Pacific Beach. Yeh got into an
argument with her friends and insisted on leaving before the group finished
1 Yeh’s siblings were parties to the action in the trial court. They are not
parties to this appeal.
McGarry also initially appealed the summary adjudication order
granted to codefentant Louvensky Geffrard. We dismissed that appeal for
lack of an appealable order or judgment.
2 We draw the facts from the undisputed facts set forth in the separate
statements and supporting evidence submitted in support of and in
opposition to Uber’s summary judgment motion. We grant Uber’s June 17,
2025 motion to augment the record with the exhibits submitted in support of
the motion for summary judgment. We also grant Uber’s June 9, 2025
motion to augment the record with the judgment entered in favor of Uber on
June 10, 2024.
2
their meal. Either Yeh or a friend called for an Uber ride to take her back to
her dorm.
Uber driver Louvensky Geffrard arrived at the restaurant at
approximately 12:49 a.m. and Yeh got into the vehicle after Geffrard
confirmed the ride and destination. At a traffic light, Yeh told Geffrard to
turn right. When Geffrard said the Uber application driving instructions told
him to turn left to go south toward her college, Yeh became angry. He
complied with her request and turned right. After they entered the freeway
on-ramp for Interstate 5 North, Yeh realized the mistake and told him to
make a U-turn.
Because he was unable to make a U-turn, Geffrard drove north on
Interstate 5 toward the next exit at Gilman Drive where he planned to turn
back. On the way, Yeh suddenly rolled down the car window and began
vomiting. Some vomit came back into the vehicle and got on the front
windshield, dashboard, and Geffrard’s clothing. Geffrard pulled over to the
side of the freeway. Yeh opened the car door and finished vomiting.
As they proceeded, Yeh asked Geffrard to let her out of the car. He said
he could not let her out on a freeway and offered to drive her back to the
restaurant where he picked her up. Yeh canceled the ride request through
the Uber application.
They exited the freeway on Gilman drive and turned left at a green
light to turn back to southbound Interstate 5. Geffrard stopped at a second
light under the freeway that was red. As he did so, Yeh opened the door and
exited the vehicle. Geffrard left and drove southbound on Interstate 5. He
had no further contact with Yeh.
At 12:55 a.m., Yeh used the Uber application to request another ride.
Mark Rycz, another Uber driver, arrived at Gilman drive at 12:58 a.m. When
3
he arrived, he did not immediately see Yeh, so Rycz called her through the
Uber application. She did not answer. When Rycz saw Yeh sitting on an
embankment, he called to her, saying he was there to pick her up in response
to her ride request. She did not respond or get into his vehicle, which was
marked with Uber decals in the window. Instead, she walked away. After
waiting a few minutes, Rycz canceled the ride request and drove away
around 1:03 a.m. He did not see or interact with Yeh again.
Sometime thereafter, Yeh left Gilman Drive and traveled over four
miles to Interstate 805, just south of State Route 52. Yeh’s friends, who were
monitoring her phone location on the Find My application, noticed her phone
was stationary for about 10 minutes and then moved quickly east from the
Interstate 5 and State Route 52 interchange to the State Route 52 and
Interstate 805 interchange. The timing of her movements suggested she
traveled by vehicle. An officer testified it would not have been possible for
her to travel by foot the distance from Gilman Drive to where she was found
on Interstate 805 in that time frame. There is no evidence of who
transported Yeh eastbound on State Route 52.
At approximately 1:29 a.m., a witness driving east on State Route 52
saw Yeh standing on the transition ramp from State Route 52 to Interstate
805. Yeh waved her arms, approached the driver’s vehicle, and asked for
help. The driver pulled to the side of the ramp. He yelled to Yeh to get off
the road and to follow him to an emergency lane on Interstate 805.
After parking in the emergency lane, the driver called 911 at 1:32 a.m.
Yeh was by the driver’s side of the car as he placed the call, but she did not
communicate with him. She appeared to be intoxicated and was stumbling
around.
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As the driver spoke with the 911 dispatcher, he saw Yeh walk into
lanes of southbound traffic on Interstate 805 where she was struck by two
cars. Yeh was pronounced dead at the scene.
B. Procedural Background
McGarry sued Uber. The operative third amended complaint alleged
causes of action against Uber for (1) negligence based on a common carrier
theory, (2) negligent hiring, supervision, training, and retention, (3)
intentional misrepresentation, (4) negligent misrepresentation, (5) violations
of the Bane Act (Civ. Code, § 52.1), (6) survivorship, (7) wrongful death, (8)
unfair business practices (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.), and (9)
declaratory relief.
Uber generally denied all allegations and asserted affirmative defenses,
including lack of causation and intervening and superseding causes. The
court sustained without leave to amend Uber’s demurrer to the causes of
action for intentional and negligent misrepresentation.
Uber moved for summary judgment contending all remaining causes of
action failed as a matter of law for absence of causation.
McGarry opposed the motion contending Uber owed Yeh a heightened
duty of care as a common carrier and triable issues of fact existed regarding
whether Yeh’s death was a natural and probable consequence of the negligent
actions of Uber and its drivers. McGarry also contended reasonable
inferences could be made from the evidence that Geffrard forced Yeh to get
out of his vehicle because she vomited in the car and that his wrongful
ejectment resulted in her death.
The trial court granted summary judgment for Uber. The court
concluded McGarry could not prevail on her negligence causes of action as a
matter of law. Yeh’s departure from Gilman Drive (the alleged place of
5
danger), traveling four miles to another freeway interchange, walking into
freeway traffic, and being struck by two separate vehicles were intervening
events that were too remote to support a finding that her death was
foreseeable or a proximate cause of any action or omission by Uber or its
drivers. For the same reason, the court concluded there was no causation
between Yeh’s death and the alleged unfair business practice of failing to
“spend the necessary means to provide adequate training and supervision.”
The court also concluded McGarry failed to present a triable issue of
material fact as to whether either driver subjected Yeh to conduct prohibited
by the Bane Act, i.e. preventing Yeh by threat, intimidation, or coercion from
doing something she had the right to do. The court concluded it was not
reasonable to infer from the evidence presented that Geffrard ejected Yeh
from his vehicle by force or intimidation because she vomited in his car. And
McGarry offered no evidence to dispute Rycz’s testimony that Yeh walked
away from his vehicle when he arrived in response to her ride request.
Finally, the court concluded the statutory wrongful death and survivor
claims are not the proper subject for the equitable remedy of declaratory
relief and, absent any viable cause of action, both the survivor and wrongful
death actions failed as a matter of law.
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The court entered judgment in favor of Uber. McGarry appealed.3
DISCUSSION
I.
Summary Judgment Standard of Review
The trial court must grant summary judgment when the moving party
establishes it is entitled to the entry of judgment as a matter of law. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant may make this showing by
demonstrating that the plaintiff cannot establish one or more elements of
each of her causes of action. (Towns v. Davidson (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 461,
466.)
We review summary judgments de novo. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield
Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860.) We independently assess “ ‘the correctness of
the trial court’s ruling, applying the same legal standard as the trial court in
determining whether there are any genuine issues of material fact or
whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” (Trop
v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1143.)
“ ‘On review of a summary judgment, the appellant has the burden of
showing error, even if he did not bear the burden in the trial court.
[Citation.] . . . “[D]e novo review does not obligate us to cull the record for the
benefit of the appellant in order to attempt to uncover the requisite triable
issues. As with an appeal from any judgment, it is the appellant’s
responsibility to affirmatively demonstrate error and, therefore, to point out
3 McGarry did not oppose Uber’s summary judgment motion for causes of
action based on unfair competition, survivorship, wrongful death and
declaratory relief. Nor does McGarry’s opening brief challenge the trial
court’s order summarily adjudicating these issues. We, therefore, deem these
issues forfeited and do not address them. (Gray v. La Salle Bank, N.A. (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 932, 975, fn. 28.)
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the triable issues the appellant claims are present by citation to the record
and any supporting authority. In other words, review is limited to issues
which have been adequately raised and briefed.” ’ ” (Bains v. Moores (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 445, 455.)
II.
Lack of Legal Causation for Negligence
McGarry’s negligence claims against Uber were for vicarious liability
based on the conduct of Uber’s drivers and for Uber’s direct liability based on
negligent hiring, retention or supervision of the drivers. McGarry primarily
challenges the court’s determination that Uber was entitled to judgment on
these claims because she could not establish the necessary element of
causation.4
A. General Principles
It is well established that an essential element of any negligence claim
is whether an alleged breach of duty was the proximate or legal cause of a
resulting injury. (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917;
6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2025) Torts, § 961.) This is true for
claims of negligent hiring, retention or supervision (C.A. v. William S. Hart
Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 876; Phillips v. TLC
Plumbing Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1140 [liability is limited by basic
tort principles, including “ ‘some nexus or causal connection between the
4 For purposes of summary judgment, Uber did not dispute the issue of
duty. We assume, without deciding, the Uber drivers could or should have
done more to try to safeguard Yeh when she got out of the first vehicle and
she declined to respond to the second. We do not reach, therefore, the issue of
whether Uber should be held to a higher standard of care as a common
carrier (which it denies), because it is not relevant to the causation issue on
appeal.
8
principal’s negligence in selecting or controlling an actor, the actor’s
employment or work, and the harm suffered’ ”]) and for negligence claims
based on a common carrier theory (Sharufa v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC
(2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 493, 498, 501 [essential elements of negligence such as
duty and causation of injuries apply to negligence claims against a common
carrier]; see also Churchman v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (2019)
39 Cal.App.5th 246, 252 [common carrier liability does not apply to injuries
caused by ordinary risks]). A wrongful death claimant must establish a
wrongful act or neglect on the part of one or more persons caused the death of
another person. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 377.60; Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999)
21 Cal.4th 383, 390 [elements of wrongful death]; Kumaraperu v.
Feldsted (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 60, 68 [a wrongful death plaintiff must
allege the wrongful or negligent act was a direct and proximate cause of the
injury].)
Proximate cause has two components. (State Dept. of State Hospitals v.
Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 339, 352 (State Hospitals).) The first is
whether the alleged negligence was a cause in fact of the injury. A cause in
fact, also known as “but for” causation, is a necessary antecedent of an event.
(Ibid.) “To simply say . . . that the defendant’s conduct was a necessary
antecedent of the injury does not resolve the question of whether the
defendant should be liable. . . . ‘[T]he consequences of an act go forward to
eternity, and the causes of an event go back to the dawn of human events,
and beyond. But any attempt to impose responsibility upon such a basis
would result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts, and would “set society
on edge and fill the courts with endless litigation.” ’ ” (PPG Industries, Inc. v.
Transamerica Ins. Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 310, 315.)
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The second component, therefore, analyzes the appropriate scope or
limits of liability based on public policy considerations. (State Hospitals,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 353.) This is often referred to as legal cause. In
certain circumstances, “ ‘where the defendant’s conduct is an actual cause of
the harm, the defendant will nevertheless be absolved because of the manner
in which the injury occurred. . . . Rules of legal cause . . . operate to relieve
the defendant whose conduct is a cause in fact of the injury, where it would
be considered unjust to hold him or her legally responsible.’ ” (Ibid.)
Although proximate cause is ordinarily a question of fact, it is
appropriately decided as an issue of law where the facts are such that the
only reasonable conclusion is the absence of causation. (State Hospitals,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 353.) California courts also decide questions about the
scope of liability based on public policy reasons as an issue of law. (Modisette
v. Apple Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 136, 154 citing Mosley v. Arden Farms
Co. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 213, 222–223 (conc. opn. of Traynor, J.) (Mosley);
Maupin v. Widling (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 568, 573 [determination of actual
cause is a question of fact, but the scope of a defendant’s liability is a question
of law and social policy].)
The legal issue before us is whether McGarry’s death from being struck
by two vehicles on a freeway interchange that was miles from where she was
left by the Uber drivers was within the scope of risk from Uber’s conduct
based on public policy considerations. (Mosley, supra, 26 Cal.2d at p. 223.)
We conclude it was not.
“ ‘An actor’s liability is limited to those harms that result from the risks
that made the actor’s conduct tortious.’ ” (6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law
(11th ed. 2026) Torts, § 1336, quoting Rest.3d Torts: Liability or Physical and
Emotional Harm, § 29.) In other words, the harm suffered by the plaintiff
10
must be “within the scope of risk” of the defendant’s conduct. This is referred
to as the risk standard. (Ibid.)
California courts apply the risk standard to limit liability as a matter of
law when an injury is only distantly connected to the defendant’s conduct.
(Shih v. Starbucks Corp. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 1063, 1070 [applying scope of
risk standard to preclude liability when injury from losing balance on a chair
and knocking a hot drink off the table was not within the scope of risk
created by serving a hot beverage without a sleeve]; Novak v. Continental
Tire North America (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 189, 197–198 [tire manufacturer
responsible for a vehicle accident found not liable for the disabled driver’s
death from a second accident years later on a scooter the driver used after the
vehicle accident].)
McGarry contends Uber’s conduct in leaving Yeh at Gilman Drive
included a general risk that she could walk into traffic and be struck by a
vehicle. Therefore, she argues, being struck by two vehicles on a freeway
several miles away from where Yeh was dropped off should be considered
within the general range of harm arising from Uber’s negligent conduct. We
disagree.
This is unlike Ingahm v. Luxor Cab Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1045
(Ingahm), a case relied upon by McGarry. In Ingahm, a cab driver told a
physically unstable woman to get out of the cab two blocks from her
destination at a dental clinic and in an area that required her to walk up a
hill, despite her pleas to take her further due to her condition. As she tried to
walk the remainder of the way, she fell and injured herself. (Id. at pp. 1047–
1048.) Although the appellate court did not expressly analyze the case
through the risk standard lens, it is apparent the risk of a fall while walking
is within the range of harm that could result from a cab driver negligently
11
ejecting a physically unstable passenger from a cab two blocks away from her
destination. Because there was a factual question about whether the woman
was harmed as the result of her own actions or those of the cab driver, the
appellate court concluded the matter was appropriately an issue for a jury.
(Id. at pp. 1054–1055.)
Here, in contrast, Yeh was not injured within the range of risks
associated with any negligence in leaving her at the Gilman Drive location.
There was undisputed evidence that the first Uber driver did not allow Yeh to
get out of the vehicle when she asked while they were on the freeway. Had
he allowed her to get out of the car on the freeway, the scope of risk could
have included the risk of injury from walking into freeway traffic. But that
did not happen.
When Yeh exited the vehicle, for whatever reason, they were off the
freeway on a relatively safe street away from busy traffic and she had her
phone. Both drivers testified they saw no cars in the area. Had Yeh suffered
an injury like Ingahm from a fall due to lighting or other characteristics of
the Gilman Drive location while trying to walk elsewhere, perhaps that could
have been within the scope of risk created by Uber. But the scope of risk
associated with any negligent conduct from leaving her in this location
cannot be stretched so far as to include being struck by vehicles on a different
freeway several miles away.
McGarry nevertheless contends the range of harm from Uber’s conduct
should include the risk that a bad actor could have picked up Yeh, could have
transported her several miles away to another freeway interchange, and
could have left her on the side of the freeway where she could wander into
traffic and be struck by vehicles. This is a speculative bridge built too far on
too many “could haves.” (Kim v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024)
12
105 Cal.App.5th 252, 258; Shih v. Starbucks Corp., supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1070; see also Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 781
[speculation regarding causation is too tenuous to create a triable issue of
fact].)
As the trial court noted, this case bears some similarities to the case of
Lammers v. Pacific E.R. Co. (1921) 186 Cal. 379 (Lammers), where an
intoxicated train passenger was ejected from a train and was injured hours
later by another passing train three quarters of a mile away from where he
was ejected from the first train. (Id. at pp. 383–384.) In this legal chestnut,
the Supreme Court concluded any negligence in ejecting the passenger was
not the legal cause of his injuries because “however dangerous the point of his
ejection may have been, plaintiff immediately left the tracks of the defendant
railway and entered a ditch.” (Id. at p. 384.) If he had “succeeded in getting
on one of the numerous streets and highways in the vicinity and been injured
by a passing automobile, it would hardly be contended that the injury was
the proximate result of the ejection.” (Ibid.)
The sad truth is that no one knows how Yeh made her way from
Gilman to Interstate 805 where she died. As in Lammers, no matter how
intoxicated Yeh was, she “was entitled to go wherever [she] pleased.” Her
death was not within the scope of risk because she left a place of relative
safety and made her way to another place of danger. Also as in Lammers,
“[t]here is no more reason for holding the defendant liable for the injury in
this case than there would be had the plaintiff wandered into some
neighboring yard and been shot as a burglar.” (Lammers, supra, 186 Cal. at
p. 384.)
It would be an unwarranted extension of liability to hold Uber
responsible for consequences created by either negligent or intentional
13
conduct of an unknown individual, whether a bad actor or a good Samaritan,
in transporting Yeh from Gilman Drive to the interchange of State Route 56
and Interstate 805. “ ‘[L]egal responsibility must be limited to those causes
which are so close to the result, or of such significance as causes, that the law
is justified in making the defendant pay.’ ” (Kumaraperu v. Feldsted, supra,
237 Cal.App.4th at p. 68.) This is not such a case. The gap between any
negligence of Uber and its drivers in leaving Yeh at Gilman Drive and her
tragic death on a freeway miles away is too attenuated to hold Uber
responsible. (Modisette v. Apple Inc., supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 155.) To
hold otherwise would require rideshare companies such as Uber to act as an
insurer for any harm suffered by a passenger who departs a ride anywhere
other than the originally requested destination. Public policy cannot and
does not compel such a result. The court properly granted summary
judgment on the negligence causes of action for lack of legal cause.
III.
Summary Judgment Was Proper for the Bane Act Cause of Action
“ ‘The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by the
specified improper means (i.e., “threats, intimidation or coercion”), tried to or
did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do
under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not
required to do under the law.’ ” (Shoyoye v. Cty. of Los Angeles (2012)
203 Cal.App.4th 947, 955–956.)
McGarry did not dispute the Bane Act claim against Uber was based on
Geffrard’s conduct. Uber presented evidence that Yeh, not Geffrard,
cancelled her ride request through her application. Geffrard did not order
Yeh out of the vehicle or refuse to transport her. Instead, he offered to drive
14
her back to where he picked her up. She exited the vehicle while he was
stopped at a red light.
McGarry purported to dispute these facts in opposition to the separate
statement, but McGarry presented no contrary evidence. Instead, for each
material fact on the issue of the Bane Act, she included a statement that
“reasonable inferences” could be made that Geffrard “ejected” Yeh from the
vehicle because she vomited in the vehicle, which required him to end his
driving night early. McGarry stated Yeh’s call for a second Uber ride “clearly
suggests” she was “forced out of the car.”5
The trial court concluded that McGarry failed to raise a triable issue of
fact as to the Bane Act and it was not reasonable to infer from the undisputed
evidence presented that Geffrard ejected Yeh from his vehicle by means of
force, threat, or intimidation simply because she vomited in his car and he
could not continue driving that night.
On appeal, under a catchall heading saying “Plaintiff’s remaining
claims were improbably [sic] adjudicated on summary judgment,” McGarry
includes one paragaph at the end of her brief on the Bane Act simply saying
the court improperly found Geffrard’s testimony credible “despite evidence
and opposition from the plaintiff.” This includes one citation to the trial
court’s ruling and no authority. This does not comply with the spirit of
California Rules of Court, rule 8.204, which requires each brief to state each
point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point, and
support each point by argument, by citation of authority, and reference to the
5 McGarry’s response statements to the material facts she “disputed”
failed to comply with the statutory requirement to refer to supporting
evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(3).) Therefore, the court had
discretion to grant the motion. (Ibid.)
15
record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a).) Therefore, we could deem the
issue forfeited for failure to adequately brief the issue. (Bains v. Moores,
supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 455.)
Nevertheless, we address the merits briefly. The trial court correctly
observed McGarry did not present evidence supporting the claim that
Geffrard violated the Bane Act. Instead, she claimed, without evidence, that
Geffrard’s testimony was not truthful and it was reasonable to “infer” he
ejected her from the car by force or threat because he had to clean his car.
The court’s determination that it was not reasonable to draw such inferences
from the evidence did not amount to a credibility determination. Rather the
court concluded that McGarry’s argument was not reasonable because it was
based on speculation.
“ ‘ “Speculation . . . is not evidence” that can be utilized in opposing a
motion for summary judgment.’ [Citation.] Speculation also differs from a
reasonable inference. ‘When opposition to a motion for summary judgment is
based on inferences, those inferences must be reasonably deducible from
the evidence, and not such as are derived from speculation, conjecture,
imagination, or guesswork.’ (Joseph E. Di Loreto, Inc. v. O’Neill (1991)
1 Cal.App.4th 149, 161.)” (Advent, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, PA (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 443, 459.) We agree the inferences
McGarry seeks to draw are based on speculation, not reasonable deduction
from the evidence. Therefore, the trial court properly granted summary
judgment as to the Bane Act allegations.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment in favor of Uber is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to
their costs on appeal.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, J.
KELETY, J.
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