CourtListener 10861368•Tharp v. Monsanto Co. CA4/1
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Filed 5/19/26 Tharp v. Monsanto Co. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DOMINIQUE THARP et al., D084928
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2019-
00005790-CU-PL-CTL)
MONSANTO COMPANY et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Kevin A. Enright, Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Singleton Schreiber and Leslie A. Brueckner, for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner, K. Lee Marshall, Saurish Appleby-
Bhattacharjee and Jasdeep Atwal, for Defendants and Respondents.
Shirlyn Daddario died of breast cancer. Her three surviving daughters,
Dominique Tharp, Sarah Dorsey, and Sunshine Daddario Axlund sued
Monsanto Company. The daughters alleged a pesticide Monsanto
manufactured caused their mother’s cancer. Monsanto moved to dismiss the
daughters’ action for delay in prosecution under the discretionary dismissal
statutes of Code of Civil Procedure sections 583.410 through 583.430 and
California Rules of Court, rule 3.1342(e). The trial court granted Monsanto’s
motion and entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of Monsanto.
On appeal, the daughters contend any delay in prosecuting the action
was excusable such that the trial court erred when it determined dismissal
was required. They also argue that because they made an initial showing of
excusable delay, the court abused its discretion when it dismissed their
action in the alternative on a discretionary basis without considering
Monsanto was not prejudiced by the delay. By not considering the lack of
prejudice to Monsanto, they argue the court could not weigh the dismissal
factors and exercise its discretion in a way that conforms with the spirit of
the law and is consistent with substantial justice. We agree with the
daughters’ arguments. We therefore reverse and remand the matter to the
trial court with instructions to consider the lack of prejudice to Monsanto.1
I.
In January 2019, Daddario’s daughters filed an action for wrongful
death and survivorship damages against Monsanto. The trial court deemed
the action related to, and consolidated it with, 13 other cases also involving
injuries caused by Monsanto’s pesticide. The court assigned the cases to a
1 We initially granted the parties’ motions to file the unredacted version
of appellants’ opening brief and volume 4 of the appendix under seal. We also
conditionally granted the motion to seal the unredacted versions of the
respondents’ brief and the appellants’ reply brief. Subsequently, we notified
the parties we were considering unsealing the appellate record on our own
motion because the record of documents sealed by the trial court is
incomplete. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.46(b)(2).) We gave the parties
the opportunity to oppose (rule 8.46(f)), but neither party did. After further
review, we deny the parties’ motions to seal, and we unseal all the records in
this matter. (See rules 2.550(d) & 8.46(f)(5); H.B. Fuller Co. v. Doe (2007)
151 Cal.App.4th 879, 898.)
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single department and divided them into three groups, placing the daughters’
action in the third and final group for trial-setting purposes.
In March 2024, with the five-year mandatory dismissal deadline under
Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310 impending, the trial court found good
cause to set trial in June.
In April, Monsanto moved to dismiss the action for delay in prosecution
under the discretionary dismissal statutes. In opposition, the daughters
submitted evidence showing they faced multiple obstacles in bringing the
case to trial, including a contract between Monsanto and the daughters’ trial
counsel, extensive settlement discussions, an inability to obtain a necessary
expert witness, and the court’s scheduling order. They stated they were not
ready for a trial in June but would be ready in July, before the mandatory
dismissal deadline. Nevertheless, the court ruled it was required to dismiss
the action because the daughters made no showing of good cause for delay.
Alternatively, the court determined discretionary dismissal was appropriate
under the California Rules of Court, rule 3.1342(e) dismissal factors even if it
assumed the daughters showed good cause.
II.
A.
Separate from the five-year mandatory dismissal deadline under
section 583.310, a trial court has the option to dismiss a case for delay in
prosecution if a plaintiff has not brought the case to trial within two years
after commencing it. (§§ 583.410(a), 583.420(a)(2)(b); Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 3.1340; Seto v. Szeto (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 76, 101.) The burden is on
defendant to show dismissal is warranted. (Visco v. Abatti (1983)
144 Cal.App.3d 904, 908.)
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We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for delay in
prosecution for abuse of discretion. (Corrinet v. Bardy (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th
69, 72.) “[A] reviewing court should not disturb the exercise of a trial court’s
discretion unless it appears that there has been a miscarriage of justice.”
(Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566.) “A proper exercise of
discretion must not be arbitrary, must conform with the spirit of the law, and
must be applied in a way that is consistent with substantial justice.”
(Corrinet, at p. 78.) “A trial court’s decision that rests on an error of law is an
abuse of discretion.” (Knapp v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (2011)
195 Cal.App.4th 932, 939.)
B.
The daughters contend dismissal was not required here. We agree.
Discretionary dismissal is “mandatory ‘only when there is an entire
absence of any showing constituting good cause.’” (Woolfson v. Personal
Travel Service, Inc. (1971) 3 Cal.3d 909, 912.) If a plaintiff makes “some
showing of excusable delay,” the strong policy favoring trial on the merits
applies. (Wilson v. Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 554, 562–
563.)
The Supreme Court has not defined what is necessary for “some”
showing of excuse or justification for delay. (Putnam v. Clague (1992)
3 Cal.App.4th 542, 552.) But some appellate courts have held that, so long as
the explanation for the delay is “not clearly unreasonable” and credible, it
satisfies the “‘some showing’” threshold. (Id. at p. 557.) Because the
threshold burden is low, only in the rare case will a trial court be without
discretion to deny a motion to dismiss for delay in prosecution.
Denham provides an example of how low the bar is. (Denham, 2 Cal.3d
at p. 564.) There, the plaintiffs’ attorney’s affidavit in opposition to the
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defendant’s motion to dismiss did not include any facts showing an excuse for
the delay in bringing the plaintiffs’ action to trial. (Ibid.) Nevertheless, the
plaintiffs’ attorney orally informed the commissioner during the hearing that
there had been “various changes in attorneys and in the law firm
representing plaintiffs,” and the commissioner took judicial notice of some of
those changes. (Id. at pp. 564–565.) The Supreme Court determined “there
was not ‘an entire absence of any showing constituting good cause presented
in [respondent court] upon the hearing of the motion to dismiss.’” (Id. at
p. 564.)
Like in Denham, the daughters here provided an explanation for the
delay in prosecution, meeting the “some showing” threshold.
First, the daughters explained that their counsel and Monsanto
executed a contract as part of a settlement between Monsanto and plaintiffs
in related cases. Although the daughters were not parties, the contract
limited their counsel’s ability to continue representing anyone suing
Monsanto for damages resulting from exposure to Monsanto’s pesticide.
Monsanto refused counsel’s request to waive those provisions, so the
daughters’ counsel spent nearly a year trying to find qualified substitute
counsel to represent them. Because Monsanto contributed to this delay, the
daughters should not be penalized with dismissal. (See Fay v. Mundy (1966)
246 Cal.App.2d 231, 238.)
Second, once qualified substitute counsel was retained, the new
attorney planned to use discovery from related actions for the daughters’
trial. Counsel’s tactical decision to hold off discovery in the present case until
discovery was completed in other related cases can constitute good cause for a
delay. (United Farm Workers National Union v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 225, 237.)
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Third, the daughters explained settlement negotiations contributed to
the delay, as supported by declarations of their and Monsanto’s counsel. And
the record shows the trial court repeatedly ordered the parties to further
engage in settlement negotiations. It was thus not clearly unreasonable for
the daughters to invest time in attempting to resolve the matter
extrajudicially. (See Corrinet, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 80.)
Fourth, the daughters’ counsel explained that they could not find an
expert to testify to the crucial link between Monsanto’s pesticide and breast
cancer because science had not yet proven the causal connection until shortly
before the hearing on Monsanto’s motion. It was not clearly unreasonable for
counsel to wait until securing such an important expert before proceeding
with trial. (See Yao v. Anaheim Eye Medical Group, Inc. (1992)
10 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1031.)
Fifth, and most importantly, the daughters explained the trial court’s
scheduling order affected their ability to proceed to trial. The court related
their case to multiple other actions against Monsanto and assigned the
related cases to a single department over their counsel’s objection. In
February 2023, the trial court issued a scheduling order splitting the cases
into three groups. The trial court’s scheduling order stated that “no cases in
group 3 will proceed forward to trial until all cases in group 2 have been tried
or settled.” The trial court placed the daughters’ case in group 3. The record
indicates that at least one group 2 case was still being litigated in
March 2024. And years before Monsanto brought the motion to dismiss, the
daughters’ counsel expressed concerns about coordination orders that could
delay trials. This concern was thus no mere “afterthought or pretext
designed to cover up neglect.” (See Putnam, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 558.) The
trial court found the daughters’ counsel’s representations credible. And
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Monsanto’s evidence did not contradict the daughters’ showing. Given these
circumstances, we cannot say complying with a trial court’s scheduling order
was irrational.
Despite the trial court’s scheduling order, Monsanto argues the
daughters could have asked for an earlier trial date and proceeded with
discovery. But the record shows, as noted above, numerous other factors
complicated setting the matter for trial and proceeding with discovery.
Because the punishment of dismissal with prejudice is severe and the
threshold the daughters needed to satisfy is low, we will not second-guess the
daughters’ counsel’s choices with the benefit of hindsight. “[I]t will always be
possible to suggest that the plaintiff might have done something differently.”
(Putnam, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 560.) Rather, we conclude the daughters made
some showing the delay in prosecution was excusable. Accordingly, the law
did not require that the trial court dismiss the daughters’ action with
prejudice.
C.
The daughters contend the trial court abused its discretion in reaching
its alternative ruling that discretionary dismissal was appropriate without
considering the lack of prejudice to Monsanto. We agree.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for delay in prosecution, “the court
must consider all matters relevant to a proper determination of the motion,
including” certain enumerated factors. (Rule 3.1342(e), italics added.) While
prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay is not expressly
mentioned, “it also must be taken into consideration in deciding whether to
dismiss under section 583.420.” (Cordova v. Vons Grocery Co. (1987)
196 Cal.App.3d 1526, 1535.) Indeed, prejudice to a defendant is imbedded in
factors 9 and 10 of the rule, which, respectively, require the court to consider
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“[w]hether the interests of justice are best served by dismissal or trial of the
case” and “[a]ny other fact or circumstance relevant to a fair determination of
the issue.” (Rule 3.1342(e)(9)–(10).) Evaluating prejudice is essential to
properly considering the interests of justice because, “in the absence of
prejudice to defendants[] attributable to unreasonable delays by plaintiff, the
probability of a miscarriage of justice is greater when a trial on the merits is
denied than it is where plaintiff is permitted to proceed.” (City of Los Angeles
v. Gleneagle Dev. Co. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 543, 563.)
A showing of prejudice is not always required to dismiss, because the
underlying policy “is not grounded solely in prejudice caused by delay to a
defendant.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 332.) Its “purpose, too, is
to expedite the administration of justice by compelling every person who files
an action to prosecute it with promptness and diligence.” (Ibid.)
But once a plaintiff has shown some good cause for the delay, the
plaintiff is entitled to the great weight of the policy favoring trial on the
merits. (Putnam, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 564.) The Legislature has clarified,
even with regard to the mandatory five-year dismissal rule, that “the policy
favoring trial . . . on the merits [is] generally to be preferred over the policy
that requires dismissal for failure to proceed with reasonable diligence.”
(§ 583.130.) Thus, a defendant’s demonstration of actual prejudice will often
be essential to tip the scales of justice in favor of dismissing the action under
section 583.420. (See, e.g., Tannatt v. Joblin (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 1063,
1070.)
Because the daughters satisfied their threshold burden, the burden
shifted to Monsanto to demonstrate prejudice (see Yao, 10 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1031–1032) “‘through the revival of claims that have been allowed to
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses
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have disappeared’” (Tustin Plaza Partnership v. Wehage (1994)
27 Cal.App.4th 1557, 1564–1565). Monsanto did not present any evidence of
prejudice by declaration or otherwise. Indeed, Monsanto “does not show that
a single item of evidence has been lost or that a single witness is unable to
recall material events.” (Putnam, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 565.) As a result, the
trial court made no express finding of prejudice here.
The reporter’s transcript of the hearing shows the trial court’s chief
concern was the unfairness to Monsanto of having to prepare for a complex
trial before the five-year mandatory dismissal deadline in July 2024. But the
court already found good cause to set the action for trial in June 2024, before
the five-year mandatory dismissal date.
As Monsanto did not demonstrate actual prejudice, it instead argued
prejudice was presumed. Monsanto, however, was mistaken. (See Yao,
10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1032.) “[C]ourts should not presume that a delay in
prosecution is prejudicial to a defendant.” (Howard v. Thrifty Drug &
Discount Stores (1995) 10 Cal.4th 424, 442.)
Courts also decline to “infer prejudice where there was timely service of
the complaint and only lethargy thereafter.” (Luti v. Graco (1985)
170 Cal.App.3d 228, 235.) “A defendant who is served has the ability to
prepare a defense notwithstanding the plaintiff’s inactivity.” (Id. at p. 233.)
Here, Monsanto did not assert a delay in service of process. And there are no
facts from which we can infer that the daughters effectively denied Monsanto
the right to begin preserving the evidence and conducting meaningful
discovery. Thus, the daughters’ delay did not prevent Monsanto from
preparing for trial earlier. (See Putnam, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 565.)
Citing Howard, Monsanto argues that “when a plaintiff fails to make a
showing of excusable delay, the trial court remains within its discretion in
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dismissing the case despite the lack of actual prejudice.” (Howard, 10 Cal.4th
at pp. 443-444; See also, Cubit v. Ridgecrest Community Hospital (1987)
194 Cal.App.3d 1552, 1572.) But the trial court here made the discretionary
dismissal order “assuming” the daughters made some showing of good cause
for delay. And, for the reasons noted above, we conclude they in fact made
the minimal showing of good cause required. Accordingly, the trial court
should have weighed and considered the lack of prejudice to Monsanto. By
not doing so, the trial court abused its discretion.
III.
We reverse the judgment and remand to the trial court with
instructions to weigh the dismissal factors of California Rules of Court,
rule 3.1342(e) and in doing so expressly consider the lack of prejudice to
Monsanto. The daughters are entitled to recover their appellate costs. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
DATO, J.
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