People v. Turney CA3

CourtListener 10861323CalctappMay 19, 2026

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Filed 5/19/26 P. v. Turney CA3
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yolo)

THE PEOPLE, C100122
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. CR2022-2970)
v.

TREVAUN ROMAN TURNEY,
Defendant and Appellant.

A jury found defendant Trevaun Roman Turney guilty of two counts of first
degree murder, found true a multiple murders special circumstance allegation, and found
true that defendant had a prior strike conviction and a prior serious felony conviction.
The trial court sentenced defendant to two terms of life without the possibility of parole,
plus five years on each count for the prior serious felony enhancement.
Defendant appeals, arguing (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
evidence of his internet searches, two days before the first victim’s murder, concerning
necrophilia and “what happens if you have sex with a dead body,” and certain expert
testimony, (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 378 on
consciousness of guilt because there was no evidence that he authorized or knew of a
threat made by his friend against a preliminary hearing witness, (3) the cumulative effect
of these errors prejudiced him as to count 1, and (4) the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to strike his two five-year prior serious felony enhancements. We will affirm.

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BACKGROUND
An information charged defendant with the willful, deliberate, and premeditated
murders of Maria Aguilera (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1),1 and Colleen Paolinelli
(count 2), and set forth a multiple murders special circumstance allegation. (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(3)). The information alleged defendant had been convicted of a prior strike
(§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1)), and a prior serious felony that subjected him to a five-year
enhancement on each count (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
Trial–The Prosecution
Count 1–Maria Aguilera
Maria Aguilera was 39 years old and unhoused at the time of her death. She had
eight children.
In March 2019, R.E.2 lived in a tent in Sacramento near the American River by a
bike trail which led to the “pipe bridge” 30 or 40 yards away. The pipe bridge spanned
the American River and connected the bank on the south of the river and the bank on the
north, and was used by bicycles and pedestrians. R.E. lived on the south side of the river.
Defendant lived nearby in a makeshift tent. Defendant rode a bike for transportation, and
he typically wore a beanie, flip flops with socks, and sweats. He always wore the beanie.
On March 8, 2019, at about 7:00 p.m., R.E. was in his tent when he saw defendant
with a red canvas wagon covered by a blue tarp. Defendant asked R.E. to watch the
wagon for a while. R.E. asked what was in the wagon, defendant pulled the cover back,
and R.E. saw “a girl in there just bludgeoned.” Defendant told R.E. that he “smashed her
head. The bitch wouldn’t shut up.” He said he crushed her head with a rock. R.E.
refused to watch the wagon. Defendant dragged the wagon away and over the pipe

1 Further undesignated statutory section references are to the Penal Code.
2 To protect their privacy, we will refer to the witnesses by their initials. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.90(b)(10).)

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bridge. R.E. acknowledged at trial that he had been addicted to methamphetamine, and
that he was on drugs when he saw defendant with the body.
The next morning, March 9, 2019, A.J., who was homeless and living in a tent by
the side of a bike trail near the north bank of the American River, was at her camp when
someone told her that they had seen a body in a wagon at a nearby camp. Meanwhile, in
a nearby camp, G.G. woke up and observed what looked like a red suitcase that he had
never seen before. A.J. approached the red “cloth-type wagon,” and used a stick to pull
away a blanket that was covering it, revealing a woman’s body in the fetal position with
wounds all over her body. When A.J. announced that there was a body in the wagon,
G.G. collected his possessions and relocated.
At around noon on March 9, 2019, Sacramento County Park Ranger Mark
Bardosh was crossing the pipe bridge traveling north when A.J. flagged him down and
told him, “Ranger, I have a body for you. There’s a body.” Upon the arrival of
additional rangers, A.J. directed them to the body. The rangers entered a campsite and
observed a small red pull cart covered with a tarp, blanket, or sleeping bag. Bardosh
lifted a corner of the covering and observed Aguilera’s body in the fetal position,
undressed from the waist down.
There were what appeared to be wheel tracks in the nearby grass. According to
both Sergeant Michael Severi and Detective Bryan Alonso of the Sacramento Police
Department, the tracks were consistent with the cart in which Aguilera was found. Based
on the tracks and the absence of blood at the scene, Severi believed that Aguilera had
been killed elsewhere.
Law enforcement created a flyer concerning Aguilera’s murder. Certain
information was deliberately left out of the flyer, including how Aguilera died, and that
her body was found in a red canvas wagon covered with a blue sleeping bag.
Detective Alonso interviewed R.E. in July 2019. R.E. told him that defendant
brought a body by his tent in a red cloth wagon on a Friday. Aguilera’s body was

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discovered on a Saturday. R.E. specifically described the body being covered with a
blanket or sheet, and specifically used the word “bludgeoned.” R.E. also told Alonso
something about someone named Frisco swinging a machete at him, and about an
incident where someone cut up a body on July 4; Alonso was never able to corroborate
either claim.
Dr. Jason Tovar performed the autopsy on Aguilera. He observed blunt force
trauma injuries on Aguilera’s body, including on her arm and legs. She had about nine
blunt force injuries to the right side of her face. She was missing a tooth, and other teeth
were loose. She also had abrasions and contusions on the left side of her face and head.
She sustained a skull fracture on the right side. She sustained injuries to the right and left
sides of her brain, as well as impacts to the front and back. The “front of the face was
pretty traumatic,” and the injuries to her brain were “pretty catastrophic.” Tovar testified
that it was possible that she sustained the injuries from someone stomping on her head
while she was on the ground, and it was also possible she sustained the injuries from
someone hitting her with a hard object. He did not observe defensive injuries. Aguilera
died as a result of cranial cerebral blunt force injuries. Tovar also performed a sexual
assault examination, and he did not see any objective signs of sexual assault. However,
sexual assault does not always produce visible injuries or trauma.
Ryan Nickel, a criminalist, testified as a DNA expert. Swabs from Aguilera’s
right-hand fingernail scraping, the back left corner of the red canvas wagon, and the
wagon’s handle release buttons all yielded useful DNA samples. Defendant was
excluded as a contributor to the fingernail scraping. It was inconclusive whether
defendant was a contributor to DNA found on the wagon’s handle release buttons.
Defendant was included as a possible contributor to the DNA mixture from the corner of
the wagon. It was at least two billion times more likely that defendant and another
random individual were contributors rather than two random individuals.

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Nickel also analyzed sperm cells from swabs taken from Aguilera’s sexual assault
kit. Defendant was included as a potential contributor to DNA obtained from sperm
fractions from the vaginal, rectal, and anal swabs. For the mixture from the vaginal
swab, it was at least two times 10 to the 10th power times more likely that Aguilera and
defendant were contributors rather than Aguilera and a random individual. It was at least
three times 10 to the 30th power times more likely that Aguilera and defendant were
contributors to the mixture from the rectal swab than Aguilera and a random individual.
And it was at least seven times 10 to the 30th power times more likely that Aguilera and
defendant were contributors to the mixture from the anal swab than Aguilera and a
random individual.
Nickel also compared a DNA sample from G.G., whose camp was near where
Aguilera’s body was found, to all of the samples. It was inconclusive whether G.G. was
a potential contributor to a nonsperm fraction from the vulva swab. G.G. was excluded
as to all other samples.
Although R.E. identified defendant to law enforcement in July 2019, he did so by
first name and did not know defendant’s last name. Law enforcement did not
immediately identify defendant, and he remained at large.
Count 2–Colleen Paolinelli
As of January 2021, Colleen Paolinelli was unhoused and had been staying at a
bus stop near a supermarket in West Sacramento for several months. The last time she
could be seen alive and moving on surveillance video was at approximately 7:15 p.m. on
January 18, 2021.
A cashier at the supermarket testified that, at approximately 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. on
January 18, 2021, she observed a man who was going in and out of the store and who was
also riding a bike in the parking lot. He wore a dark blue or black hoodie and red pants.

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Very early the next morning, between 2:00 and 3:30 a.m. on January 19, 2021,
M.D. was walking his dog through the supermarket parking lot when he saw a man on a
bike wearing a hoodie with red pants.
A supermarket employee arrived at work at approximately 4:49 a.m. When he
arrived in the parking lot, he saw a person standing very close to the woman who had
been living at the bus stop; she was lying on the ground. The person standing near the
woman had a beanie or a hoodie on.
At approximately 11:00 a.m., an employee of the City of West Sacramento Parks
Department found a large cardboard box in the supermarket parking lot near a bus stop
and placed it in his truck. He also noted a person lying on the ground covered by a tarp
or sleeping bag. When he placed the box in a trash enclosure at the corporation yard, he
noticed a lot of “red stuff” on it which he thought could be blood.
At approximately 12:36 p.m., West Sacramento Police Officers Francisco Lopez
and Jonas Eriemo responded to a bus stop. There, Lopez saw a mound of clothes that
appeared to be covering a body, which he recognized as Paolinelli. He also saw blood,
and there was a trail of dried footprints that appeared to be in blood leading away from
Paolinelli’s body.
A firefighter paramedic removed blankets covering Paolinelli and saw a pool of
blood. Paolinelli was facedown, and so he rolled her over and confirmed that she was
dead. She was not wearing pants or underwear. Her underwear was by her feet. There
was a brown sticky substance on her lower back consistent with soda, an empty soda can
near her feet, and another in her bag.
Having learned of police activity near the supermarket, the City of West
Sacramento Parks Department employee realized that, because it was very windy, the box
he had collected may have blown from the bus stop to where he found it. He contacted
police, and a crime scene investigator recovered the box.

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The prosecution played extensive video surveillance footage from the supermarket
and other nearby establishments recorded on January 18 and 19, 2021. Detective Samuel
Gee and Detective Nvard Avagyan interviewed defendant and testified that he was shown
still photos and video of a person on a bicycle from one of the videos, and defendant
acknowledged that it was he who appeared in the video. Defendant never denied that it
was him on the video. On appeal, defendant does not maintain that he is not the person
who appears on these surveillance videos. In the videos, defendant was wearing a gray
hoodie, a red beanie, red pants with a stripe on each leg, and black shoes.
Starting at approximately 5:30 p.m. on January 18 and continuing into the morning
of January 19, defendant rode his bicycle to the bus stop by the supermarket, where
Paolinelli was found dead, and stopped there 25 times. He spent a cumulative total of 56
minutes at the bus stop. In all of the video Detective Gee reviewed, no one else stopped
at the bus stop, although some people did walk by. A paralegal for the Yolo County
District Attorney’s Office also testified that, in all of the video she viewed, she never saw
anyone other than the man on the bicycle stop at the bus stop.
At 1:43 a.m. on January 19, defendant stopped at the bus stop and remained there
for an extended period of time. At one point, a street sweeper’s headlights illuminated
the bus stop and defendant left. Around 1:57 a.m., he returned and passed by the bus stop
several times. At 1:58 a.m., he stood with his bicycle at the intersection south of the bus
stop, with his body and head facing the bus stop.
At 2:06 a.m., defendant rode by the bus stop, turned around, and stopped. “Once
he’s stopped there, he’s at the portion of the bus stop where Ms. Paolinelli’s body was
located the next morning. Based on the video … you can see his arms were raised above
his head….” His “arms were above his head and there appeared to be a chopping
downward motion towards the area where Ms. Paolinelli was located the next morning,
and then [defendant] immediately flees southbound….” At 2:20 a.m., defendant

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continued “circulating that area where the bus stop is, and … he had spent a couple of
minutes there where he is located now at the bus stop, stopped there.”
At 2:23 a.m., defendant was again at the bus stop. “There were ... what appeared
to be three separate downward chopping motions … based on what I would say is his
arms in the video on the way that he was postured.” Defendant left the bus stop at
approximately 2:26 a.m., “circulated or hovered around the area, made that lap, … and
returned to the bus stop now a couple of minutes later.”
At approximately 2:33 a.m., defendant could be seen at the bus stop bent over and
reaching downward. “And then… it was more circulating the area and … made another
stop for an extended period of time before … riding away.” At 2:42 a.m., defendant was
near an intersection with two vehicles in the area. Defendant “continued through that
intersection, and once the traffic appeared to be clear and the bus stop wasn’t illuminated
by the headlights,… about a minute later,” defendant rode his bicycle directly back to the
bus stop. Around 2:53 and 3:03 a.m., defendant continued “hovering and circulating the
area where the bus stop is.” At 3:13 a.m., he rode his bicycle away from the bus stop and
then returned to the bus stop a minute or two later.
At 3:16 a.m., defendant returned to the area on his bicycle carrying what appeared
to be a large cardboard box. At 3:21 a.m., he took the cardboard box to the bus stop and,
when he left, he did not have the cardboard box with him.
Defendant continued to circle the area at 3:23 a.m. At 3:37 a.m., an individual,
M.D., could be seen walking his dog. Defendant in his interview stated that he
remembered seeing someone walking his dog that morning.
At 3:51 a.m., defendant could be seen at the bus stop manipulating what appeared
to be the cardboard box. He continued to hover and circulate in the area at 3:58 and 4:03
a.m. When he departed, he was carrying a 12-pack of soda. Defendant in his interview
repeatedly acknowledged stealing the soda when he was at the bus stop.

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Defendant continued coming and going from the bus stop and the nearby area as
of 4:46, 4:58, 5:11, and 5:19 a.m. At 5:42 a.m., after being at the bus stop for a few
minutes, defendant left, and he was not seen again on the surveillance video in the area of
the supermarket and the bus stop.
Based on videos recorded in other locations, defendant next crossed the
Sacramento River on the Tower Bridge and proceeded to the Downtown Commons area
of Sacramento. A video taken from that area was of higher quality than many of the
other videos, and from it law enforcement prepared a bulletin that included a still photo
of defendant. M.D. eventually contacted law enforcement and reported that the person in
the bulletin was the person he saw when he was walking his dog. He was 100 percent
certain. In November 2021, the Sacramento Police Department contacted West
Sacramento Police Detective Avagyan, lead detective on this case, advising her that the
person in the bulletin was defendant.
Defendant in his interview with the detectives repeatedly denied killing Paolinelli.
When the detectives discussed what they characterized as defendant striking
Paolinelli in a chopping motion, defendant told them that he was not striking her or
chopping her. He first said he was grabbing the soda. He then said he did not know what
motion he was making. Then he said he was just lifting his hands up. Later, he said he
was pulling his jacket out. Detective Avagyan testified that the motions defendant could
be seen making in the video did not look like someone lifting their jacket.
Defendant stated that he saw two people at the bus stop that night, an older woman
in a wheelchair and somebody lying down covered up. Defendant also told the detectives
that he found a cardboard box and gave it to the woman in the wheelchair. Both
detectives testified that they never saw anyone in the surveillance videos hanging out at
the bus stop other than Paolinelli, and they never saw anyone at the bus stop in a
wheelchair.

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Defendant stated that he believed he was wearing the same Nike slides during the
interview that he could be seen wearing in the videos. Detective Gee testified that a
bloody footprint found where Paolinelli was killed was similar to the treads of
defendant’s slides. Detective Avagyan also testified there were similarities between
defendant’s slides, slides she photographed at a store, and the shoe tread that left the
bloody footprint.
Dr. Tovar also performed the autopsy on Paolinelli. Paolinelli also sustained blunt
force trauma injuries, including several to the face. She had a loose tooth, and, during the
autopsy, that tooth came out. Among other things, Tovar observed a “patterned type
abrasion” with linear, regular marks on her neck. Tovar testified that this abrasion could
be consistent with the tread pattern from a shoe, and the injury could be consistent with
someone lying on the ground and being stomped on. The majority of Paolinelli’s injuries
were on the left side of her head. She had a fracture of the left temple, a fracture to the
back of her skull on the left, fractures in line with the ear, and orbital plate fractures.
Paolinelli died from cranial cerebral blunt force injuries. Tovar did not observe any
defensive injuries. Tovar did not observe anything abnormal in the sexual assault
examination. Tovar testified that there was no way to know whether someone had sex
with a person’s body when they were alive versus when they were dead.
Jonathan Sewell, a criminalist testifying as a DNA expert, testified that swabs
from Paolinelli’s sexual assault kit all tested negative for semen. Comparing defendant’s
DNA to a swab taken from a soda can found near Paolinelli, “it resulted in a likelihood
ratio of 17, which provides limited support for exclusion.” Defendant was excluded as a
contributor to a DNA mixture found in Paolinelli’s left-hand fingernail scraping. As for a
DNA mixture found on the handholds of the cardboard box, it was approximately
200,000 times more likely that defendant was a contributor than that he was not, which
provided “strong support for inclusion.” Additionally, it was approximately 1.5 times 10

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to the 26th power more likely that blood found on the box was Paolinelli’s as opposed to
a random individual’s.
The Defense
Andrea Barnett sent surveillance videos to the FBI in an effort to enhance them.
The results were not “much different.”
Ranger Bardosh from the Sacramento Regional Parks Department described an
occasion when he searched R.E. and found methamphetamine and a pipe, and he issued
R.E. a citation.
An investigator for the public defender’s office bought size 11 Nike slides of the
same model identified by the prosecution and measured the features of the treads. She
offered details of her measurements.
Sergeant Joseph Ellis acknowledged leaving out of a narrative summary that, in an
interview, R.E. claimed Detective Alonso was “out there buying pussy, man, on the
block. Smoking dope with people.” Ellis “dismissed” R.E.’s account, believing him to
be “mistaken.” Additionally, Ellis testified that R.E. said some “outlandish” things, and
that he seemed “very paranoid….”
Stipulations
The parties stipulated that Aguilera’s blood contained amphetamine and
methamphetamine, and that Paolinelli’s blood did not contain drugs or alcohol.
Jury Verdicts and Sentencing
The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder on both counts, and found
true the multiple murders special circumstance allegation. In a bifurcated proceeding, the
jury found true the allegations that defendant had been convicted of a prior strike, and
that he had been convicted of a prior serious felony.
The trial court denied defendant’s Romero motion (see People v. Superior Court
(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497), and sentenced him to life without the possibility of

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parole on each count, plus an additional five years on each count for the section 667,
subdivision (a)(1) prior serious felony enhancements.
DISCUSSION
I
Admission of Internet Searches and Expert Testimony

A. Additional Background
Stephen Jurgeson, an investigator for the Yolo County District Attorney’s Office,
reviewed data discovered in a warrant search of defendant’s electronic accounts. On
March 6, 2019, defendant’s account searched, “what happens if you have sex with a dead
body.” At around the same time, defendant’s account visited the Wikipedia entry for
“necrophilia,” which, according to Jurgeson, is defined as “having a sexual fetish
surrounding dead bodies.”
The prosecution sought to introduce this evidence under Evidence Code Section
1101, subdivision (b), as relevant to show intent, motive, and common scheme or plan.
Defendant opposed the motion, arguing that the evidence was substantially more
prejudicial than probative and should be excluded under Evidence Code section 352. He
asserted that necrophilia was uniquely shocking and offensive, that there was no evidence
that he had sex with Aguilera after her death, and there was no evidence that he had sex
with Paolinelli at all.
In argument before the trial court, the prosecutor argued that “there’s no evidence
as to if the sex happened when Ms. Aguilera was alive or dead. It could have happened
either way…. The People believe that it happened after she had been killed.” The
prosecutor acknowledged there was no evidence of sexual assault as to Paolinelli, but
argued that defendant’s intent in killing her was so that he could sexually assault her, he
just did not get the opportunity. The prosecutor emphasized that both victims were found
naked from the waist down.

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The trial court granted the prosecution’s in limine motion, ruling the evidence
admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b).
At trial, DNA expert Nickel testified, with regard to a sperm found on Aguilera’s
anal swab, that he saw “a lot of sperm,” and the “literature suggests that after about two
days, you don’t see sperm. So it’s putting it within about a 48-hour time frame.” Nickel
testified about factors that can affect the potential diminishment in the amount of sperm
to be found, including activity, hygienic practices, and bathing. The prosecutor posed a
hypothetical question involving circumstances where a man had sex with a woman and
killed her, and whether Nickel would expect to find a high volume of sperm because
there would be less time for it to degrade and the deceased woman would not move
around, so there would be less opportunity for drainage. Nickel testified: “Given those
factors, that less opportunity to walk around, less opportunity for drainage, there’s going
to be a higher concentration of semen present.”
B. Defendant’s Contentions
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of
his internet searches, two days before the murder of Aguilera, concerning necrophilia and
“ ‘what happens if you have sex with a dead body,’ ” and Nickel’s testimony concerning
the hypothetical posed by the prosecutor. We disagree.
C. The Admission of Evidence and Standard of Review
Only relevant evidence is admissible at trial. (Evid. Code, § 350.) “ ‘Relevant
evidence’ means evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or
hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.)
With exceptions not relevant here, “evidence of a person’s character or a trait of
his or her character … is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a
specified occasion.” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) However, nothing in Evidence
Code section 1101 “prohibits the admission of evidence that a person committed a crime,

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civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident….) other
than his or her disposition to commit such an act.” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).)
A reviewing court reviews “ ‘the trial court’s rulings on relevance and the
admission of evidence under Evidence Code sections 352 and 1101 for abuse of
discretion.’ ” (People v. Parker (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1, 39.) “ ‘ “Under the abuse of
discretion standard, ‘a trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed, and reversal … is not
required, unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 26.)
D. Analysis
The evidence overwhelmingly established that defendant had sex with Aguilera.
The likelihood ratios established it was a virtual, if not actual, certainty that it was
defendant’s sperm found in Aguilera’s vaginal, rectal, and anal swabs.
Nickel testified that the “literature suggests that after about two days, you don’t
see sperm. So it’s putting it within about a 48-hour time frame.” Nickel also testified
that certain factors could diminish the presence of sperm, including activity, bathing, and
hygiene. He saw “a lot of sperm” on the sample from Aguilera’s anal swab.
Thus, the evidence established that defendant had sex with Aguilera within 48
hours of her death (or within 48 hours of when the swab was collected).
No evidence established that defendant had sex with Aguilera after she died.
However, no evidence established that he had sex with her before she died.
Dr. Tovar’s testimony that he observed no indications of sexual assault does
nothing to resolve the unanswered question of when defendant had sex with Aguilera.
He could have had consensual sex with her before her death, leaving no signs of trauma.
Given Tovar’s testimony that sexual assault does not always produce trauma, defendant
could have committed a sexual assault before Aguilera’s death, leaving no signs of

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trauma. And he could have had sex with Aguilera’s body after her death, leaving no
signs of trauma.
No evidence established that defendant had sex with Paolinelli. However, both
victims were discovered unclothed from the waist down.
Theorizing that defendant had sex with Aguilera after she died and intended to
have sex with Paolinelli after she died, the prosecution argued the internet search
evidence was relevant under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) to prove intent,
motive, and common scheme or plan. “ ‘In ascertaining whether evidence of other
crimes has a tendency to prove [a] material fact, the court must first determine whether or
not the uncharged offense serves “ ‘logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference’ ” to
establish that fact.’ ” (People v. Williams (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 396, 419.)
The “ ‘probativeness of other-crimes evidence on the issue of motive does not
necessarily depend on similarities between the charged and uncharged crimes, so long as
the offenses have a direct logical nexus.’ ” (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327,
361-362.) The evidence that defendant was interested in and researched necrophilia two
days before killing Aguilera would serve logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference
to support the prosecution’s theory that defendant was motivated to kill Aguilera and
Paolinelli by a desire to have sex with dead bodies. The evidence had a direct logical
nexus to the killings under this theory.
Similarly, this evidence would logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference
supply his intent in killing the victims under this theory, to satisfy his desire to have sex
with dead bodies.
In arguing that the evidence was also relevant to prove a common scheme or plan
to kill both victims in order to have sex with them, the People focus on the similarities
between the two murders, specifically that both involved unhoused women who were
found unclothed from the waist down. This analysis would be more apt to the admission
of evidence of one of the murders in attempting to prove the other. “[I]n establishing a

15
common design or plan, evidence of uncharged misconduct must demonstrate ‘not
merely a similarity in the results, but such a concurrence of common features that the
various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a general plan of which they are
the individual manifestations.’ ” (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402.) The
internet searches concerning necrophilia do not demonstrate a concurrence of common
features between them and the murders.
In any event, as stated, the evidence had some tendency in reason to establish
intent and motive, and thus was relevant. (See Evid. Code, §§ 210, 1101, subd. (b).)
Defendant argues that the primary issue in this case was identity, and that issues
such as motive and intent were not material. However, by pleading not guilty, defendant
“place[d] all issues in dispute, and thus the perpetrator’s identity, intent and motive are all
material facts.” (People v. Walker (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 782, 796; accord, People v.
Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1010; see also People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303,
315 [“In order to satisfy the requirement of materiality, the fact sought to be proved may
be either an ultimate fact in the proceeding or an intermediate fact ‘from which such
ultimate fact[] may be presumed or inferred’ ” (fn. omitted)].) And given the DNA
evidence establishing that defendant had sex with Aguilera, the evidence of his interest in
necrophilia could have some relevance in establishing the identity of her killer.
Having concluded the evidence was relevant, we turn to Evidence Code section
352. “The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the
issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) The “ ‘prejudice’ referred to in
Evidence Code section 352 means ‘ “evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an
emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on
the issues.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Schultz (2020) 10 Cal.5th 623, 670.)

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The probative value of the evidence was significant. The evidence of defendant’s
internet searches concerning necrophilia and “what happens if you have sex with a dead
body” furnished a potential motive and intent for both murders.
On the other side of the scales, defendant does not argue that the admission of the
evidence necessitated undue consumption of time, or that it posed any danger of
confusing the issues or misleading the jury. Instead, he focuses on what he deems to be
the substantial danger of undue prejudice resulting from the admission of this evidence.
Necrophilia is a taboo subject. (See Flynn v. Holder (9th Cir. 2012) 684 F.3d 852,
861 [noting, in a case involving an issue unrelated to any in this case, the “taboos we
have against cannibalism, defilement of corpses, and necrophilia”].) A person who
“commits an act of sexual penetration on, or has sexual contact with, remains known to
be human” is guilty of a felony. (Health & Saf. Code, § 7052, subd. (a).) In short, the
evidence that defendant performed research on “what happens if you have sex with a
dead body” and necrophilia two days before Aguilera’s death had some potential for
undue prejudice.
That said, defendant was charged with the brutal murders of two unhoused
woman. Numerous cranial cerebral blunt force injuries were inflicted on each of the
women. Neither woman showed evidence of having sustained any defensive wounds,
suggesting that they were caught unawares when attacked. Each victim was left
unclothed from the waist down. In the case of Aguilera, defendant carted her body
around in a red canvas wagon and asked an acquaintance to watch the wagon for a while,
and then left the body in the wagon at a homeless encampment. Additionally, defendant
either had sex with Aguilera within 48 hours before “bludgeon[ing]” her to death, or had
sex with her body postmortem. In the case of Paolinelli, defendant could be seen on
videos stopping at the bus stop where she was killed no fewer than 25 times over the
night of January 18 and the early morning of January 19, 2021, spending a total of 56
minutes there. He began his forays to the bus stop well before he could be seen on

17
surveillance video making downward chopping motions at Paolinelli at the bus stop. And
he continued returning to the bus stop and hovering around the area for hours after.
All of this is to say that the evidence that defendant performed two internet
searches, specifically for “what happens if you have sex with a dead body” and
necrophilia, was not more inflammatory than the charged murders. (See People v. Mani
(2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 372 [evidence challenged under Evid. Code, § 352 “was not
significantly more inflammatory than the charged offenses such that there was a
substantial danger that the introduction of this evidence would cause undue prejudice”].)
“Evidence Code section 352 requires the exclusion of evidence only when its probative
value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. ‘Evidence is substantially
more prejudicial than probative [citation] [only] if, broadly stated, it poses an intolerable
“risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the reliability of the outcome.” ’ ” (People v.
Tran (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1040, 1047.) We conclude that the probative value of the
evidence was not substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would
create substantial danger of undue prejudice. (Evid. Code, § 352.)
Finally, defendant argues that Nickel’s testimony was speculative and based on
facts not in evidence. “Use of hypothetical questions is subject to an important
requirement. ‘Such a hypothetical question must be rooted in facts shown by the
evidence….” (People v. Vang (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1038, 1045.) At the page of the
reporter’s transcript defendant cites, Nickel testified, in response to the hypothetical
posed by the prosecutor, that if a male had intercourse with a woman and killed her,
because the victim would be deceased, “[g]iven those factors, that less opportunity to
walk around, less opportunity for drainage, there’s going to be a higher concentration of
semen present.” The facts shown by the evidence included that semen was found in
Aguilera, she was dead, and, according to Nickel’s testimony, the semen was deposited
within 48 hours of her death (or when the swab was collected), not necessarily limited to
prior to death. Nickel’s testimony was rooted in facts shown by the evidence.

18
II
Instructional Error
A. Additional Background
On November 15, 2022, R.E. testified at the preliminary hearing and defendant
was present. Subsequently, R.E. was riding his bike when he saw D.C., a friend of
defendant’s, and D.C. said to R.E., “Hey, you fucking snitch bitch,” or something similar.
Later, when R.E. went to his tent, his possessions were strewn all about, and his friend
told him that D.C. had just left.
K.K. testified that, on November 30, 2022, D.C. came to the campsite looking for
R.E. Referring to R.E., D.C. said, “He’s telling.” K.K. did not see anyone disturb R.E.’s
campsite.
D.C. testified that he knew both defendant and R.E. He denied calling R.E. a
“snitch bitch” and denied seeing R.E. that day.
B. The Trial Court’s Instruction and Defendant’s Arguments
Over defendant’s objection, the trial court instructed the jury with a tailored
version of CALCRIM No. 378: “If the defendant had someone threaten a witness, that
conduct may show that he was aware of his guilt. If you conclude that the defendant had
someone threaten a witness or tried to have someone threaten a witness, it is up to you to
decide the meaning and importance of that conduct. However, evidence that the
defendant had someone threaten a witness or tried to threaten a witness cannot prove guilt
by itself.”
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with CALCRIM
No. 378 on consciousness of guilt because there was no evidence that he authorized or
knew of any threat made by D.C. He argues that the error was prejudicial as to count 1.
We agree the instruction was error but conclude it was harmless.

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C. Error
A jury instruction must be supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Cole
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1206.) Substantial evidence “is evidence sufficient to ‘deserve
consideration by the jury,’ that is, evidence that a reasonable jury could find persuasive.”
(People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201 fn. 8.) An appellate court reviews the trial
court’s decision to give a jury instruction de novo. (Cole, at p. 1206.)
There was evidence that D.C. knew both defendant and R.E., and that he
threatened R.E. However, we find no evidence that defendant had D.C. threaten R.E., or
that he tried to, so as to be reflective of his consciousness of guilt and to support
CALCRIM No. 378 as given here. (See People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 135, fn.
32 [“Evidence of efforts to intimidate a witness is … admissible to show a defendant’s
consciousness of guilt if there is evidence the defendant authorized or acquiesced in the
efforts”]; see also People v. Hannon (1977) 19 Cal.3d 588, 600 [“the admission of
evidence purporting to show suppression or attempted suppression of evidence is
erroneous absent the prerequisite of proof that the defendant was present at such an
incident or proof of authorization of such illegal conduct”].)
The People argue that substantial evidence supported the instruction because
defendant’s girlfriend communicated with defendant every other day, and she knew D.C.
These representations are accurate. The People further claim that, in a jail call, defendant
told his girlfriend to tell someone named Ricardo, “don’t say good shit” about R.E. to the
defense investigator. At the pages of the reporter’s transcript to which the People cite,
defendant’s girlfriend actually testified that it was not true that defendant told her that.
Even if the People’s representation was supported by the record, however, this provides
nothing beyond speculation to support the premise that defendant also told D.C., directly
or indirectly, to threaten R.E. “Speculation is not substantial evidence.” (People v.
Ramon (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 843, 851.)

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D. Prejudice
Defendant argues that the instruction was prejudicial as to count 1 under both the
Chapman standard for federal constitutional error (see Chapman v. California (1967)
386 U.S. 18), and the Watson test for state law error (see People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818). We conclude the error was harmless under any standard.
On the evening of March 18, 2019, defendant asked R.E. to watch a red canvas
wagon covered by a blue tarp. R.E. then saw the body of a woman in the wagon who had
been bludgeoned. Defendant told him that he “smashed her head. The bitch wouldn’t
shut up,” and that he crushed her head with a rock. When R.E. refused, defendant
dragged the wagon away and over the pipe bridge.
The next morning, Aguilera’s body was found on the other bank of the American
River in a red canvas wagon with a blue covering. Based on wheel tracks and the lack of
blood where Aguilera was found, law enforcement believed she was killed elsewhere.
We note that R.E. had been on drugs when he saw defendant with the body, and he
lied at the preliminary hearing when he said he was not using drugs. Additionally, R.E.
recounted for law enforcement other events that were never corroborated, and, to
Sergeant Ellis, he said some outlandish things and seemed paranoid.
We also note, however, that when law enforcement created a flyer concerning
Aguilera’s murder, certain information was deliberately left out, including how she died,
and that her body was found in a red canvas wagon covered with a blue sleeping bag. In
his July 2019 account to law enforcement, R.E. specified that the body he saw had been
bludgeoned, and that it was in a red cloth wagon covered with a blanket or sheet.
Additionally, he reported that defendant brought the body by his tent on a Friday, and
Aguilera’s body was discovered on a Saturday.
Aguilera died as a result of cranial cerebral blunt force injuries. She did not
sustain defensive injuries. Based on the DNA evidence, it was a virtual certainty that it
was defendant’s semen found in Aguilera’s vaginal, rectal, and anal swabs, and that the

21
semen was deposited within 48 hours of Aguilera’s death (or within 48 hours of when the
swab was collected). Defendant was a possible contributor to DNA found on the corner
of the wagon.
Meanwhile, the offending instruction only told the jurors that, if they found that
defendant had someone threaten a witness, that may show that he was aware of his guilt;
that, if they concluded defendant had someone threaten a witness, or tried to, it was up to
them to decide the meaning and importance of that conduct; and that any evidence that
defendant had someone threaten a witness, or tried to, could not by itself establish
defendant’s guilt.
Under Chapman, the “reviewing court must reverse the conviction unless, after
examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant
circumstances, it determines the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 3; Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at
p. 24.) We do not agree with defendant’s characterization that the evidence against him
in the murder of Aguilera “was not strong,” and that this was a “close[]” case. On the
contrary, we find the evidence of defendant’s guilt overwhelming. Having examined the
entire cause, and considering all relevant circumstances, we conclude that the error in
instructing the jury with the tailored version of CALCRIM No. 378 was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt as to count 1.
III
Cumulative Error

Defendant argues that the cumulative effect of the evidentiary and instructional
errors prejudiced him as to count 1. We have found no prejudice resulting from the
instructional error, and we have rejected defendant’s claim of evidentiary error. Thus,
there is no cumulative effect of multiple errors to consider in the aggregate. We therefore

22
reject defendant’s cumulative error claim. (See People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264,
305; see also People v. Richie (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1347, 1364, fn. 6.)
IV
Prior Serious Felony Conviction Enhancements

A. Additional Background
Before sentencing, defendant unsuccessfully requested the dismissal of the section
667, subdivision (a)(1) prior serious felony enhancements pursuant to section 1385.
Defendant relied on the statutory mitigating circumstances that the current offenses were
connected to prior victimization or childhood trauma (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(E)), and that
the enhancements were based on a prior conviction more than five years old (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2)(H)). In support of his motion, defendant submitted a social history detailing
his life. As the introduction of the social history put it: “Abandoned, separated, and
neglected, [defendant’s] emotional and physical needs were rarely met throughout his
entire childhood. As a result of intense traumas and losses–including the death of his
biological father when he was 1 years-old and his mother’s arrest for murder when he
was 14 years old–[defendant] often had no one but himself to rely on for protection or
survival, let alone guidance and support. His childhood story … is a tragic case of a child
falling between the cracks.”
The prosecution did not dispute defendant’s representations concerning his
childhood, or that the current crimes were connected to childhood trauma. In opposing
defendant’s motion, the prosecution relied on defendant’s prior convictions, juvenile
adjudications, arrest history, and the present offenses. Among other things, in 2003,
defendant was in an altercation at school and threatened staff with a chair and a stick. In
April 2010, he was placed in the emergency custody of a county department of human
services after he was reported as having behavioral problems and a preoccupation with
sexual content. In October 2010, he was accused of robbing a 13-year-old boy, taking his

23
cell phone, and punching him in the eye. In October 2010, he was arrested for sexual
battery for touching a 15-year-old female student’s buttocks. In December 2010, he
made inappropriate sexual comments to a 15-year-old student, grabbed her, and kissed
her over her objections, and he was arrested for sexual battery. In March 2011 he had a
juvenile court petition sustained charging grand theft from a person. In the conduct
giving rise to his prior serious felony conviction, in 2013, defendant was convicted of
robbery for punching a man in the face and snatching a cell phone out of his hand.
Interviewed about the crime, defendant purportedly said that he did not have any remorse
for the victim and that he would continue to rob people. Defendant received a two-year
sentence and, in 2014, violated parole. In January 2018, defendant placed both hands
around the neck of a woman he was dating and strangled her with full force for 10
seconds and threw her to the floor. In October 2021, defendant punched his girlfriend in
the nose five to six times.
B. The Trial Court’s Ruling and Defendant’s Arguments
In denying defendant’s motion, the trial court stated: “In considering whether the
Court should grant the petition to dismiss or stay any of those, the Court considers the
relative youth of the defendant. The Court has considered the challenging distressed
background of the defendant as far as his family history. The Court has considered his
relative lack of convictions as an adult and a juvenile. The Court has also considered the
evidence presented by the People which includes descriptions of incidents that may not
have resulted in a conviction or an adjudication in juvenile court. The Court also
considers the circumstances of the crimes for which the jury found him guilty. [¶] In
balancing all of those things, the Court finds it would not be in the furtherance of justice
to dismiss or stay any of the enhancements. The motion is denied.”
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the
five-year prior conviction enhancements in light of the age of the prior, his traumatic
childhood, and because he received two life sentences. We disagree.

24
C. Section 1385 and Standard of Review
Section 1385 provides that, “[n]otwithstanding any other law, the court shall
dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of
that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).) In
exercising its discretion under section 1385, subdivision (c), “the court shall consider and
afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the
mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present.” (Id. at, subd. (c)(2).)
“Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of
dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement
would endanger public safety.” (Ibid.)
Section 1385’s language directing courts to “afford great weight” to evidence of
mitigating circumstances does not create a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissal.
(People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1028.) Instead, “absent a finding that
dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or
dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated
mitigating circumstances when they are present.” (Id. at p. 1029.) The California
Supreme Court in Walker discussed with approval the formulation in People v. Ortiz
(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, that, “absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public
safety, a court is required to engage ‘in a holistic balancing with special emphasis on the
[nine] enumerated mitigating factors,’ in which those mitigating factors weigh ‘strongly
in favor of … dismissal.’ ” (Walker, at p. 1029; see also id. at pp. 1034, 1036.) The
Supreme Court elaborated: “if the court does not conclude that dismissal would endanger
public safety, then mitigating circumstances strongly favor dismissing the enhancement.
But ultimately, the court must determine whether dismissal is in furtherance of justice.
This means that, absent a danger to public safety, the presence of an enumerated
mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless
the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that

25
‘may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such
that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.’ ” (Id. at p. 1036.) The
“ ‘ultimate question before the trial court remains whether it is in the furtherance of
justice to dismiss an enhancement’ [citation] and this ‘furtherance of justice’ [citation]
inquiry requires a trial court’s ongoing exercise of ‘discretion.’ ” (Id. at p. 1033.)
“We review a court’s decision to deny a motion to strike a five-year prior serious
felony enhancement for an abuse of discretion.” (People v. Shaw (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th
582, 587.) “[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational
or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v. Carmony (2004)
33 Cal.4th 367, 377.)
D. Analysis
One mitigating circumstance on which defendant relies is that the “current offense
is connected to prior victimization or childhood trauma.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(E).) The
trial court expressly considered defendant’s difficult childhood, stating that it had
“considered the challenging distressed background of the defendant as far as his family
history.” Thus, the parties agreed that defendant had a challenging and difficult
childhood, and the trial court evidently agreed, as do we.
The other mitigating circumstance on which defendant relies is that the
“enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is over five years old.” (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2)(H).) Defendant’s prior serious felony conviction was a May 6, 2013, conviction of
robbery, and, assuming he murdered Aguilera on March 8, 2019, that prior was five years
10 months old on that date. (See People v. O’Bannon (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 974, 977
[prior conviction’s age is measured from date of prior conviction to date current offense
was committed].)
Thus established, the trial court was required to “consider and afford great weight”
to these two mitigating circumstances. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)

26
As stated, the trial court recited that it “considered the challenging distressed
background of the defendant as far as his family history,” and that it balanced all of the
factors it discussed. Defendant argues that the court’s “comment that it ‘balance[d]’ all
the mitigating and aggravating factors [citation] suggests it considered them with the
same lens, rather than properly affording great weight to the enumerated factors.”
However, in “the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the [trial] court
‘knows and applies the correct statutory and case law.’ ” (People v. Thomas (2011)
52 Cal.4th 336, 361.)
Notwithstanding these two mitigating circumstances, the trial court determined
that granting defendant’s motion and striking his two five-year prior serious felony
enhancements “would not be in the furtherance of justice….”
Defendant has a lengthy history of criminal and violent behavior. Additionally,
his present crimes are egregious, involving highly similar murders in which he inflicted
numerous and fatal blunt force head injuries on two unhoused women, who, based on the
absence of defensive wounds, never had the opportunity to defend themselves.
Defendant left his victims unclothed from the waist down, Aguilera crammed into a red
canvas wagon and Paolinelli on the ground of a bus stop covered by a cardboard box.
While both murders are defendant’s “current” crimes, we do note that they took place
close to two years apart, after defendant evaded detection for Aguilera’s murder.
We cannot conclude that the trial court’s determination that granting defendant’s
motion would not be in furtherance of justice was “so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.)
Defendant suggests that the trial court’s determination was an abuse of discretion
because it failed to make the “threshold” determination whether “dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)), and that the court was
required to address that question. He raises related arguments about the effect of his life
without the possibility of parole sentences on the danger to public safety analysis.

27
However, a court is not required to find that dismissal of an enhancement would
endanger public safety to deny dismissal of an enhancement under section 1385,
subdivision (c). “[U]ltimately, the court must determine whether dismissal is in
furtherance of justice. This means that, absent a danger to public safety, the presence of
an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an
enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of
countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the
mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of
justice.’ ” (People v. Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1036; see also id. at p. 1033 [§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2), “does not erect a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissal that can only
be overcome by a finding that dismissal endangers public safety”].) “The trial court must
find that any dismissal under subdivision (c) is in ‘furtherance of justice.’ [Citation.]
The ‘endanger public safety’ language applies only as an exception to the requirement
that the court must give ‘great weight’ to the presence of any mitigating circumstances.
[Citation.] But the controlling ‘furtherance of justice’ standard is broader and allows the
court to consider factors beyond public safety in exercising its discretion whether to
dismiss an enhancement, including the nature and circumstances of the crimes and
defendant’s background, character, and prospects.’ ” (People v. Mazur (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 438, 446.) In other words, “the court retains discretion under section
1385[, subdivision] (c)(2) to choose not to dismiss the enhancement in the furtherance of
justice for reasons other than public safety.” (People v. Ponder (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th
1042, 1052.) Having found here that dismissal would not be in furtherance of justice, the
trial court was not required to undertake a superfluous analysis of whether dismissal
would endanger public safety.

28
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

\s\
KRAUSE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

\s\
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

\s\
WISEMAN, J.*

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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