CourtListener 10860860•People v. Singh CA1/4
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Filed 5/18/26 P. v. Singh CA1/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A174671
v. (Solano County Super.
BARJINDERJIT SINGH, Ct. No. F2501474)
Defendant and Appellant.
Barjinderjit Singh appeals from a judgment rendered after a jury trial
in Solano County Superior Court, in which he was convicted of misdemeanor
battery and violating a criminal protective order and placed on three years
formal probation. Singh’s appointed appellate counsel has submitted a brief
pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) requesting we
independently review the record.1 Counsel has advised Singh of his right to
submit a supplemental brief, and Singh has not done so. Our independent
review of the record has disclosed no appellate issues that warrant further
briefing.
1 Counsel previously filed a brief raising one appellate issue, then
moved to have the brief stricken because of a fundamentally flawed analysis.
We granted counsel’s motion and ordered the brief stricken from the record.
1
I. BACKGROUND
In July 2025, the Solano County District Attorney’s office filed an
information charging Singh with three counts: injuring his child’s parent,
S.S., within seven years of a prior conviction, a felony (Pen. Code, § 273.5,
subd. (f), count one)2; interference with a wireless communication device, a
misdemeanor (§ 591.5, count two); and disobeying a criminal protective order,
a misdemeanor (§ 166, subd. (a)(4), count three). Certain aggravating factors
were alleged under California Rules of Court, Rule 4.421 for all three counts.
The charges involved allegations that on June 26, 2025, Singh
physically attacked his ex-wife, S.S., took her phone, and violated a criminal
protective order restraining him from disturbing her peace. A jury trial
followed.
Before and during trial, the parties debated the admissibility of certain
evidence of prior acts of domestic violence by Singh proffered by the
prosecution; video of S.S. in 2023 acting aggressively towards one of her
children proffered by the defense; and the testimony of a prosecution expert
in the area of domestic violence and domestic violence victim behavior. The
court allowed in some, but not all, of the evidence of prior acts the
prosecution sought to introduce, the 2023 video, and the expert testimony.
S.S. was among the witnesses the prosecution presented. She testified
that she married Singh in 2011, had two daughters with him, divorced him in
2024, and that he hit her on two occasions in 2021 when he was under the
influence of alcohol. On June 26, 2025, S.S. said, Singh came to her home to
see their children and became intoxicated. For some hours, he verbally
abused her and her parents, who were also present, including by threatening
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated.
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to kill them. Then, after S.S. indicated she was going to call the police and he
tried to grab her phone, she ran from him outside and Singh chased after her.
At first, S.S. testified that during the chase she lost control of herself and fell
down; but after her memory was refreshed by what she told police soon after
the incident, she testified that Singh twice pushed her to the concrete ground,
causing her injuries. She further testified that he then grabbed her phone
away from her. S.S.’s final trial testimony was arguably inconsistent with
some of her prior statements, such as her failure to tell the 911 dispatcher or
say in her testimony at the preliminary hearing that Singh had shoved her to
the ground.
The prosecution also presented the testimony of a neighbor who
witnessed some of the incident. He testified that he was in his driveway
taking out his trash at about 7:50 p.m. on the day of the incident when he
heard loud screaming and crying. He looked in the direction of the noise and
saw, about 30 or 40 feet away, a fence trying to be opened and slammed
closed, then opened again and a woman running, appearing frantic. A man,
whom he identified as Singh, was chasing her. According to the neighbor,
Singh “grabbed [the woman] by the hair and slammed her right into the
pavement of the driveway and began getting on top of her and what looked
like he was choking her because he was on top and had her pinned.” He
slammed her on her side and on the front of her face, then held her down as
she flailed trying unsuccessfully to get up. An elderly man (whom other
evidence indicates was S.S.’s father) began beating Singh with what looked
like a bamboo stick. Singh then ran into a field with S.S.’s phone. S.S.’s face
and elbow were bleeding and she was very shaky. Sometime later that
evening, the police arrested Singh as he sat on a curb at the scene of the
incident.
3
The prosecution also presented the testimony of the expert in the area
domestic violence and domestic violence victim behavior. In addition, the
prosecution presented evidence that at the time of the incident, Singh was
subject to a criminal protective order that restrained him from disturbing
S.S.’s peace, and that Singh had suffered a prior domestic violence felony
conviction.
The testimony of the neighbor, as well as what he told an officer in the
aftermath of the incident, also indicates that sometime after Singh grabbed
S.S.’s phone away from her, he returned to the area of S.S.’s house, where
S.S. slapped him with a shirt and then her hand. S.S. also testified that prior
to Singh chasing her, she hit him with her phone in his lower leg. Based on
this and other evidence, such as the 2023 video of S.S. acting aggressively
towards one of her daughters that was shown to the jury and the purported
inconsistencies in S.S.’s various accounts of what happened, the defense
argued that S.S. was not credible in recounting that Singh pushed her and
caused her injuries rather than her falling untouched by him; that S.S. did
not act consistent with the expert testimony on domestic violence victim
behavior; that the neighbor was too far away and too biased to accurately
recount what had occurred, based on certain aspects of his testimony; and
that S.S. was the aggressor against Singh, who merely acted in self-defense.
Among other things, defense counsel contended Singh was merely
trying to take away S.S.’s phone because she had just struck him with it
rather than to prevent her from calling the police. Counsel conceded,
however, that if the jury found that Singh ended up on top of S.S. “struggling
with her to get the phone,” it could find Singh “guilty on one of the lessers,
right, because that would be potentially a battery on her, grabbing her to try
to take the phone but not causing injury . . . .”
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The jury found Singh not guilty of count one—felony injuring his child’s
parent—but guilty of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor battery
(§ 243, subd. (e)(1)). The jury could not reach a verdict on count two,
interference with a wireless communication device. It found Singh guilty of
count three, violating the criminal protective order. The court declared a
mistrial as to count two.
The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Singh on
formal probation for three years. The court imposed various terms and
conditions, including requiring Singh to serve 184 days in county jail while
granting him total credits of 184 days, abstain totally from using alcohol,
submit to alcohol testing, attend and successfully complete a 52-week
batterer’s treatment program, and successfully complete a residential
treatment program for his alcohol abuse. It also imposed certain fines and
fees. At the sentencing hearing, the court indicated it would terminate
Singh’s probation as successfully completed if he successfully completed the
residential treatment program. It also extended the criminal protective order
against Singh until 2028.
Singh filed a timely notice of appeal. (CT 163.)
II. DISCUSSION
We have independently reviewed the record under Wende and conclude
there are no issues that warrant further briefing. After reviewing the entire
record, we see no basis for arguing legal error. Further, the parties’ debates
over the evidence below are subject to deferential standards of review, under
which we see no arguable appellate issues.
The parties vigorously disputed the specifics of what had occurred. In
determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction, “ ‘we
review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
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determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] We
determine ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] This
determination ‘presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ” (People v.
Cardenas (2025) 18 Cal.5th 797, 821.) “We may not reweigh a judgment
‘supported by substantial evidence even if substantial evidence to the
contrary also exists.’ ” (City of San Buenaventura v. United Water
Conservation Dist. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 110, 120.)
Substantial evidence unquestionably supports Singh’s battery and
violation of a court order convictions. It can be found at the very least in the
neighbor’s testimony, S.S.’s recounting of Singh’s verbal abuse and threat on
the day of the incident, and the uncontested evidence of the existence of a
criminal protective order.
Singh also challenged below the admissibility of certain evidence of his
prior acts of domestic violence and the testimony of the prosecution’s expert
witness in the area of domestic violence and domestic violence victim
behavior.
“Except as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is
admissible.” (Evid. Code, § 351.) “ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence . . .
having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.)
Generally, we apply “the abuse of discretion standard of review to any
ruling by a trial court on the admissibility of evidence” (People v. Waidla
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(2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 717), including a court’s decision to admit or exclude
expert testimony (People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 627).
Further, subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, “in a
criminal action in which the defendant is accused of an offense involving
domestic violence, evidence of the defendant’s commission of other domestic
violence is not made inadmissible by Section 1101 if the evidence is not
inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.” (Evid. Code, § 1109, subd. (a)(1).)
Evidence Code section 352 provides, “The court in its discretion may
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time
or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.”
Under these standards, we see no arguable appellate issues regarding
any of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
STREETER, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOLDMAN, J.
SWEET, J.*
* Judge of the Marin Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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