CourtListener 10860186•People v. Rodriguez CA2/3
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Filed 5/15/26 P. v. Rodriguez CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B341918
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA087944)
v.
JOSE BENJAMIN RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Hilleri Merritt, Judge. Affirmed.
Levine, Flier & Flier and Andrew Flier for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
A jury found Jose Benjamin Rodriguez guilty of the murder
of Eloise Elizarraraz, his former girlfriend and the mother of his
child.1 The jury also found true a lying-in-wait special-
circumstance allegation and that he personally used a firearm in
the commission of the murder.
Rodriguez asserts the trial court erred in admitting
evidence of his uncharged domestic violence and committed other
evidentiary errors. He further contends the trial court erred in
failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter under a
heat of passion theory, and that there was insufficient evidence to
support the murder conviction and the lying-in-wait special-
circumstance finding. We reject these arguments. Rodriguez
also asks us to review the sealed transcript of an in camera
Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess)
hearing. We have done so and find no error. We affirm the
judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Murder of Elizarraraz
Rodriguez and Elizarraraz were in an on-and-off again
relationship for 12 years. They had a child together, Benjamin.
Several months before Elizarraraz’s death on January 7, 2017,
they separated.
Elizarraraz began communicating with a man in prison.
On December 26, 2016, she posted a photo of herself and this
1 Some of the relevant family members who testified at trial
share the same last names. We use first names for clarity and to
be consistent with the record on appeal and the parties’ briefs,
which refer to the family members only by first name and last
initial.
2
man on Facebook with hearts around it and the words: “With love
. . . Only for you.”
On January 6, 2017, Elizarraraz, Benjamin, and
Elizarraraz’s two other children spent the night at the home of
Elizarraraz’s sister, Monique. Elizarraraz’s mother, Connie, was
also there. That evening, Benjamin overheard Elizarraraz on the
phone with Rodriguez. He could not hear what his father was
saying, but he heard his voice. He knew it “wasn’t a good phone
call” because his mother had been “enjoying herself” and then
started yelling.
Around 9:00 p.m., Rodriguez texted Elizarraraz. They
argued by text message until approximately 10:15 p.m., when
Elizarraraz stopped responding.
Around 1:00 a.m., Elizarraraz’s brother, Robert, received a
voicemail from Rodriguez stating, “Hey, What’s up Bob? Just
wanted to see how you are doing. Hope everything is good.”
Although Robert and Rodriguez worked together and Robert had
received calls from Rodriguez, Robert found this voicemail
unusual. Rodriguez’s call came from his usual telephone number.
On January 7, around 7:00 or 8:00 a.m., Connie, Benjamin,
and Monique all saw Elizarraraz leave Monique’s house for work.
Shortly afterwards, Monique heard gunshots.
Around 8:45 or 9:00 a.m., Brittney I. was returning home
when she saw a black car on the sidewalk.2 The driver’s side
window was shattered, and a woman, later identified as
Elizarraraz, was in the driver’s seat, slumped over. Elizarraraz
was bleeding from her neck. Brittney checked for a pulse but did
2 At trial, the parties and the trial court agreed to refer to
Brittney I. by her first name and last initial only because she was
nervous about testifying.
3
not find one. Elizarraraz’s body was blue and warm. Brittney
asked bystanders to call 911 and started CPR, but she was
unable to revive Elizarraraz.
On January 13, 2017, a warrant was issued for Rodriguez’s
arrest. In May 2017, he was arrested in Mexico.
Charges and Trial
In 2018, the People charged Rodriguez with Elizarraraz’s
murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).)3 The information alleged
that Rodriguez used and discharged a handgun during the
commission of the crime, within the meaning of section 12022.53,
subdivisions (b), (c), and (d). It further alleged a lying-in-wait
special circumstance. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15).)
At trial, the prosecution called 10 witnesses.4 A deputy
medical examiner testified that Elizarraraz died from a gunshot
wound to her neck. A Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
homicide detective testified that he arrived at the crime scene
around 10:45 a.m. on January 7. A black car had crashed on the
sidewalk. There was a bullet hole in the driver’s side window.
The detective identified items found in the car, including a phone.
The phone belonged to Elizarraraz.
1. Texts and other phone evidence
Detectives obtained a search warrant for Elizarraraz’s
phone and a report of her text messages from the night of
January 6, 2017. At trial, the court admitted into evidence a text
exchange between Elizarraraz and the number Robert testified
Rodriguez used.
3 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
4 Rodriguez did not testify or put on any evidence.
4
Rodriguez wrote first: “I need to get at u ASAP.”
Elizarraraz responded, “What,” and Rodriguez wrote: “U know.”
After a similar exchange, Rodriguez wrote: “Why wouldn’t u tell
me u r with a bitch n***a in jail,” and “answer that n***a.”5
Elizarraraz responded that she did not “need to answer shit.”
In a series of messages that followed, Rodriguez accused
Elizarraraz of being with another man to hurt him and of not
caring for him; of not telling him she was with another man; and
of not answering his calls. He suggested people knew about the
other man, claiming: “I’m be[ing] real this time the homies I’m
with they r worry but I said its ok[.]” When Elizarraraz would
not agree to talk with Rodriguez on the phone, he threatened her
and made disparaging comments, such as “U will see,” “Answer
bitch,” “Watch it won’t stay like this at all u will see how,” “Watch
. . . u did me dirty hoe,” “Dirty ass bitch now I really hate u,” and,
“Don’t ever let me catch u around.”
Elizarraraz responded that she did not intentionally hurt
him; that she did not need to tell him her “business,” and she had
thought they would never talk again; she did not have to answer
to anyone and did not want to talk to him by phone; and,
ultimately, “Fuck u lame ass bitch.. I dont give a fuck.”
Susan Johnson, T-Mobile’s custodian of records, responded
to three search warrants for additional phone records. At trial,
she identified the numbers: one subscribed to Sonia Rodriguez
and Stephanie Sanchez, one subscribed to Santos Hernandez,
5 We quote the messages as they appeared in the original,
including spelling and capitalization, except for the repeated slur
which we have partially redacted. (See People v. Aguirre (2025)
18 Cal.5th 629, 654, fn. 11.)
5
and one for a prepaid number. Sonia is Rodriguez’s sister and
Santos Hernandez is his cousin.
An FBI special agent analyzed the phone records from
January 7, 2017. He testified that cell phone tower data showed
the prepaid number associated with Rodriguez was in an area
that included Monique’s residence and the crime scene from 8:21
to 8:50 a.m. The number went “off network” late in the morning.
However, it first made outgoing calls to the phones subscribed to
Hernandez, and to Sonia and Sanchez, which cell phone tower
data placed near Chatsworth and Balboa in the San Fernando
Valley at the time of the calls. Cell tower data placed the phones
near the Mexican border at 3:26 p.m.
2. Surveillance videos
The People played recordings from surveillance cameras
located at a house across the street from Monique’s home on the
morning of January 7, 2017, showing the street in front of the
house. At 6:13 a.m., while it was still dark, a car parked on the
street and turned its lights off. At 7:15 a.m., in the daylight, a
white car was parked in the same spot.
Monique identified Elizarraraz in one of the recordings.
The video showed that Elizarraraz left Monique’s house and got
into a black car at 8:22 a.m. She pulled out and turned her car
around. At 8:23 a.m., a white vehicle drove just past Monique’s
house and pulled alongside Elizarraraz’s vehicle. The cars drove
parallel to each other before they exited the camera’s frame.
Monique testified that it would take less than a minute to
drive from where Elizarraraz’s car was parked to where it was
later found crashed on the sidewalk.
Benjamin testified that the recording showed his mother’s
black car parked in front of Monique’s house. He identified his
6
mother in the video and testified it accurately reflected what she
was wearing the morning of January 7 when she left for work.
He further identified the white Jeep that came into the frame
and pulled up next to his mother’s car as his father’s, testifying
he was “100 percent sure” it was Rodriguez’s car.
A neighbor testified that the videos came from surveillance
cameras at her house. The time and date stamps in the footage
were accurate. She provided the recordings to detectives on
January 7.
Conviction and Sentencing
The jury found Rodriguez guilty of murder (§ 187, subd. (a))
and found true allegations that he personally used a handgun
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a))6 and committed the murder intentionally by
means of lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)). The trial court
denied a defense motion for a new trial. It sentenced Rodriguez
to life without the possibility of parole.
Rodriguez timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By
Admitting Evidence of Uncharged Past Acts
Rodriguez contends the trial court erred in admitting
evidence of his prior uncharged acts. He argues the alleged acts
were uncorroborated, many were remote in time, they were more
prejudicial than probative, and the trial was “overwhelmed” and
“hijacked” by the prior acts evidence. We find no abuse of
discretion.
6 During trial, the People moved to strike the
section 12022.53 allegations and to amend the information to add
a new section 12022.5, subdivision (a), allegation. The defense
did not object.
7
A. Background
Before trial, Rodriguez moved to exclude the prosecution’s
proposed past acts evidence on the ground that it violated
Evidence Code section 352. The trial court found most of the
evidence admissible under Evidence Code sections 1109 and 352.
At trial, four witnesses who testified about events on January 6
and 7, 2017, also testified about uncharged domestic violence
involving Rodriguez and Elizarraraz.
i. Connie
Connie testified that Rodriguez and Elizarraraz were in a
relationship for about 12 years. Connie estimated that Rodriguez
and Elizarraraz separated between four and five months, or
“maybe longer,” before Elizarraraz’s death.
Approximately five years before Elizarraraz’s death,
Rodriguez described his jealousy to Connie and told her he
wanted to kill Elizarraraz because of how much he loved her. At
one point, Elizarraraz told Connie that Rodriguez followed her
everywhere.
Rodriguez and Elizarraraz would argue. In the two years
before Elizarraraz’s murder, their arguments became more
frequent. Elizarraraz would call Connie to pick her up in the
middle of the night. On multiple occasions, Connie saw injuries
on Elizarraraz, including once when Rodriguez bit her on the lip
and nose. Several times, Connie personally witnessed
Rodriguez’s physical abuse of Elizarraraz. Close to the time of
Elizarraraz’s murder, Connie saw Rodriguez hit Elizarraraz.
On Halloween in 2016, after Rodriguez and Elizarraraz had
broken up, Rodriguez followed Connie, Elizarraraz, and
Elizarraraz’s children while they went trick-or-treating.
8
ii. Benjamin
Benjamin described his parents’ relationship as “very
abusive” and testified they “had a lot of fist fights.” During
arguments, Rodriguez “would also take it to a physical level with
[Elizarraraz] and she was just responding physical back.”
Rodriguez slapped, choked, bit, and punched Elizarraraz once or
twice a week.
About a year or a year and a half before Elizarraraz’s
death, Benjamin witnessed a particularly bad argument.
Elizarraraz was trying to get Rodriguez to leave her apartment
and told the children to call the police. Rodriguez took the phone
out of Elizarraraz’s daughter’s hand, which he “squeezed,”
hurting and bruising her. Rodriguez was “coming towards”
Benjamin and his sister and “pushing” Elizarraraz off, and they
slapped each other. Elizarraraz threw a golf club at Rodriguez,
and Rodriguez choked Elizarraraz against a wall. The
altercation lasted 35 to 40 minutes.
On January 2, 2017, Benjamin witnessed his father
“pleading” with his mother to let him inside her apartment. He
tried to force his way inside for 10 to 15 minutes, a video of which
was played for the jury. The video also showed Rodriguez pulling
into a parking spot at Elizarraraz’s apartment in a white Jeep.
iii. Robert
Robert testified that he and Rodriguez were “close” and had
a “good relationship.” Robert worked with Rodriguez. Rodriguez
told Robert that he was jealous when it came to Elizarraraz and
he “wouldn’t be able to be without [Elizarraraz].” Rodriguez also
told Robert he would not be able to “allow” Elizarraraz to be with
someone else.
9
Elizarraraz and Rodriguez had a “complicated”
relationship. On more than five occasions, Rodriguez called
Robert and threatened to “do something” to Elizarraraz if she did
something Rodriguez did not like, including spending time with
people other than Rodriguez. The most recent call was when the
couple last separated, three to six months before Elizarraraz’s
murder.
Robert once saw bite marks on Elizarraraz’s face and
bruises on her body, but he never witnessed any physical abuse.
iv. Monique
Monique testified that throughout Elizarraraz’s and
Rodriguez’s relationship, she observed Elizarraraz with bruises
and cuts. At some point during the last four months before
Elizarraraz’s death, when Elizarraraz and Rodriguez were still
seeing each other “on and off,” Elizarraraz arrived at Monique’s
house with a bruised lip and an injured finger. Rodriguez once
told Monique he could not be without Elizarraraz. Elizarraraz
told Monique that Rodriguez needed her by his side all the time.
v. Jury instruction
The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM
No. 852A, “Evidence of Uncharged Domestic Violence,” which, in
relevant part, stated: “You may consider this evidence only if the
People have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant in fact committed the uncharged domestic violence. . . .
[¶] If the People have not met this burden of proof, you must
disregard the evidence entirely. [¶] If you decide the defendant
committed the uncharged domestic violence, you may but are not
required to conclude from that evidence the defendant was
disposed or inclined to commit domestic violence, and based on
that decision also conclude [that] the defendant was likely to
10
[commit] and did commit the murder of [Elizarraraz], as charged
here. If you conclude the defendant committed the uncharged
domestic violence, that conclusion is only one factor to consider
along with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to
prove the defendant is guilty of the murder of [Elizarraraz]. The
people must still prove the charge and each allegation beyond a
reasonable doubt. [¶] Do not consider this evidence for any other
purpose.”
B. Evidence Code section 1109
Evidence of prior acts is inadmissible to prove a defendant’s
conduct on a specified occasion. (People v. Villatoro (2012) 54
Cal.4th 1152, 1159; Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) However,
when a defendant is charged with an offense involving domestic
violence, evidence of the defendant’s commission of prior domestic
violence is admissible to prove the defendant’s propensity to
commit the charged crime, if it is not inadmissible under
Evidence Code section 352. (Evid. Code, § 1109, subd. (a)(1);
People v. Merchant (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1179, 1192.) Evidence
Code section 1109 “reflects the Legislature’s determination that
in domestic violence cases, similar prior offenses are uniquely
probative of a defendant’s guilt on a later occasion.” (Merchant,
at p. 1192.) Evidence of a prior act of domestic violence must be
excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”
(Evid. Code, § 352.)
We review the trial court’s admission of evidence of prior
acts of domestic violence for an abuse of discretion. (People v.
Johnson (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 520, 531.)
11
C. The evidence was more probative than
prejudicial
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
prior acts evidence under Evidence Code sections 1109 and 352.
The trial court reasonably concluded the evidence was
highly probative. It was relevant to the People’s theory that
Rodriguez intentionally killed Elizarraraz out of jealousy.
(People v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 256, 275 (Cage) [prior acts
“supported the evidence of defendant’s identity as the killer” and
were “important indirect evidence of defendant’s intent” and thus
premeditation].) Indeed, Rodriguez’s past acts showed a pattern
of violence and threats of violence against Elizarraraz. This
“fairly unbroken pattern of domestic abuse,” showed a
“propensity to commit the act[]” on Elizarraraz. (People v.
Cabrera (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 695, 706 (Cabrera).) The prior
acts of physical abuse, threats, and attempts to control
Elizarraraz were additionally relevant to establish identity,
intent, and motive. (People v. Zack (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 409,
415 [defendant’s prior assaults on victim were admissible as to
identity, intent, and motive].)
The past acts were not remote. (Cabrera, supra, 152
Cal.App.4th at p. 706 [with a “pattern” of abuse, “that the first of
the five incidents was almost 10 years old did not render it
unduly remote”].) The violence and threats were ongoing
throughout Rodriguez’s and Elizarraraz’s relationship, including
in the months and days before Elizarraraz’s death.
The evidence of uncharged past acts did not create a
substantial danger of undue prejudice. There is no evidence of
any grave injury during the prior incidents or use of a firearm.
(People v. Rucker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1120 [prior act
12
“not inflammatory compared to the charged offense” because
unlike charged offense, defendant never previously fired a gun or
attempted to kill].) Thus, the trial court properly concluded that
the prior acts were less inflammatory than the murder charge,
“reducing the possibility the jury’s passions would be inflamed by
the uncharged conduct.” (People v. Wang (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th
1055, 1078.)
The evidence of past acts also did not consume an undue
amount of time. The evidence came from four individuals who
also testified about the events the night before and the morning
of the murder. (People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 371
[no undue consumption of time when testimony of prior acts
“supplied almost exclusively by defendant’s mother and brother,
who also testified as to the charged offenses”]; People v. Caparaz
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 669, 685 [abuse of discretion to exclude
testimony where witness was already testifying about other
topics and could have testified to excluded evidence during
allotted time].) The evidence also did not overwhelm the trial;
four of the ten witnesses testified about Rodriguez’s prior
conduct. (Cf. People v. Winkler (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1162
[high probability of undue consumption of time when 13
witnesses testified, at least in part, to prior acts evidence, over 8
days of 12-day trial].) Any cumulative testimony was minimal
and served to corroborate the accounts of other witnesses.
Finally, there is no indication of a significant possibility of
confusion. The evidence established that Rodriguez engaged in a
pattern of abuse against Elizarraraz. The past acts did not
involve violence against other victims, which might confuse a
jury. The record also fails to support Rodriguez’s argument that
the evidence of past acts overwhelmed the evidence of the
13
murder. The past acts were factually distinct from the drive-by
shooting that killed Elizarraraz. Confusion was therefore
unlikely. Further, the jury was instructed pursuant to
CALCRIM No. 852A. We presume the jury followed this
instruction. (People v. Reyes (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 62, 78.)
II. Other Evidentiary Issues
A. Standard of review
“[A]n appellate court applies the abuse of discretion
standard of review to any ruling by a trial court on the
admissibility of evidence.” (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th
690, 717.) Under this standard, “ ‘a trial court’s ruling will not be
disturbed, and reversal of the judgment is not required, unless
the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious,
or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest
miscarriage of justice.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44
Cal.4th 983, 1004.)
B. Bench warrant
Rodriguez contends the trial court erred in excluding
evidence that, at the time of the murder, there was an
outstanding bench warrant for his arrest in a different case. We
find no abuse of discretion.
Rodriguez asked the court to take judicial notice of a court
docket reflecting the issuance of a December 23, 2016 bench
warrant in the amount of $80,000 for his arrest in a different
matter. He asserted the warrant would provide an alternative
explanation for why he was in Mexico three weeks after
Elizarraraz’s murder. The People objected, arguing the theory
would require the jury to speculate that Rodriguez knew of the
bench warrant. The trial court agreed and declined to admit it.
14
Defense counsel then stated that his understanding from
Rodriguez’s prior counsel was that Rodriguez was in court and
discovered the warrant, and he left upon learning that the bail
amount would be increased from $10,000 to $80,000. The trial
court replied this was hearsay and also noted there was evidence
that Rodriguez remained in the country for some time after the
bench warrant was issued. The court cited the video footage that
showed Rodriguez trying to enter Elizarraraz’s home on January
2, 2017.
On appeal, Rodriguez argues the trial court erred because
the bench warrant was subject to judicial notice. He also asserts
that the warrant was highly relevant, not speculative, and not
hearsay. However, he does not address the reason for the trial
court’s ruling: the lack of evidence that he had any knowledge of
the bench warrant.
Without admissible evidence that Rodriguez was even
aware of the bench warrant, there was no evidence from which
the jury could reasonably infer that he fled to Mexico because of
it. (See Evid. Code, §§ 401, 403 [when the relevance of evidence
is dependent on the existence of a preliminary fact, the evidence
is inadmissible unless the court finds there is evidence sufficient
to sustain a finding of the existence of the preliminary fact].)
Rodriguez has offered no argument or legal authority to establish
any trial court error based on its finding of a lack of “nexus” or
relevance. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 679, 694
[burden on appellant affirmatively to show trial court error, and
trial court order presumed correct].) We find no abuse of
discretion.
15
C. Phone records
The trial court admitted phone records for the cell phones
associated with Rodriguez, his cousin, and his sister. Rodriguez
argues that the People failed to establish all elements of Evidence
Code section 1271, the business records exception to the hearsay
rule. We again find no error.
A hearsay writing is admissible if it was “made in the
regular course of a business”; “at or near the time of the act,
condition, or event”; a custodian “testifies to its identity and the
mode of its preparation”; and, in relevant part here, “[t]he sources
of information and method and time of preparation were such as
to indicate its trustworthiness.” (Evid. Code, § 1271, subds. (a)–
(d).)
T-Mobile representative Johnson testified that she was a
manager with T-Mobile’s law enforcement relations group and
the custodian of records. She responded to the search warrants
for Rodriguez, his sister, and his cousin. Johnson was familiar
with the mode of preparation for the records, and she testified
they were prepared electronically, for purposes of billing, in the
regular course of business, at or near the time of the act,
condition, or event. She explained that the records consisted of
“subscriber information” and “call detail records” showing
incoming and outgoing calls and messages, and “cell file
information” showing the location of the cell towers.
Rodriguez objected based on hearsay and foundation under
Evidence Code section 1271. He argued there was a lack of
foundation because one of the numbers had two listed
subscribers: Sonia and Sanchez. The trial court overruled the
objections.
16
For the first time on appeal, Rodriguez asserts that the
requirements of Evidence Code section 1271, subdivision (d),
were not met. He relies on People v. Zavala (2013) 216
Cal.App.4th 242, 248, in which the court held that “a printed
compilation of call data produced by human query for use at trial
falls under the business records exception where the underlying
data is automatically recorded and stored by a reliable computer
program in the regular course of business.” Rodriguez argues the
People failed to present evidence showing how the cell phone data
was recorded or stored and, therefore, there was insufficient
evidence of the records’ trustworthiness.
We agree with the People that this claim is forfeited.
Rodriguez’s objection in the trial court concerned only the two
subscribers affiliated with the telephone number. His failure to
contend below that the evidence was inadmissible under
Evidence Code section 1271, subdivision (d), precludes him from
raising the issue for the first time on appeal. (People v. Fuiava
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 689; see also People v. Williams (2008) 43
Cal.4th 584, 620 [objection necessary in criminal trial because
contrary rule would deprive People of opportunity to cure defect
at trial].)
D. Text messages
Rodriguez next contends the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting the text message exchange from the night
of January 6, 2017. We disagree. The court overruled
Rodriguez’s hearsay objection because of the uncontroverted
evidence that the text exchange was between Elizarraraz and
Rodriguez. Robert testified that Rodriguez had called him from
the same number, including only a few hours after the text
exchange.
17
The texts from Rodriguez were admissible as party
admissions. (Evid. Code, § 1220; People v. Gonzalez (2021) 12
Cal.5th 367, 409; People v. Flinner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 686, 735
[party admission is an exception to hearsay].) Rodriguez does not
contest that he sent the texts to Elizarraraz or present any
argument that the party admission exception does not apply. To
the extent Rodriguez is also raising an issue with the texts from
Elizarraraz, they were not offered for their truth and therefore
were not hearsay. (Evid. Code, § 1200.)
Regarding foundation, defense counsel objected because the
text message report showed “6-1-2017.” He asserted this
suggested the messages were sent in June 2017. However, a
homicide detective testified that the month and the day are often
transposed in cell phone records. Further, Elizarraraz died
before June 2017, and the texts were found on her phone. The
trial court properly overruled defense counsel’s objection based on
the transposed numbers.
Finally, Rodriguez argues the text messages were
improperly authenticated. Rodriguez forfeited this argument by
failing to object on this ground in the trial court. (People v.
Derello (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 414, 428, citing Lorenzana v.
Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 626, 640.) Moreover, Rodriguez
provides no specific claim of error, aside from asserting that
“[o]ther than the implication that these were written by appellant
to [Elizarraraz] the proof was insufficient to allow admittance
and therefore the texts should have been excluded.” The trial
court could reasonably credit Robert’s uncontroverted testimony
that the number was Rodriguez’s. The phone records also
showed that this number called Rodriguez’s sister and cousin the
morning of the murder, further tying the messages to Rodriguez.
18
E. Video
Rodriguez additionally contends the trial court erred in
admitting the video of Elizarraraz getting into her car and a
white vehicle pulling up next to it. He asserts the video was
inadmissible due to insufficient foundation and authentication as
to its time and date stamp. We again find no error.
“Authentication of a writing is required before it may be
received in evidence.” (Evid. Code, § 1401, subd. (a).) Proper
foundation requires “sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to find
that the writing is what it purports to be, i.e., that it is genuine
for the purpose offered.” (People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th
258, 267.)
Rodriguez again asserts that because the dates on the video
were transposed, the video may have been from “July, not
January.” The evidence is to the contrary. Monique’s neighbor
testified that when law enforcement requested video from the
morning of January 7, she was able to verify the date and time
based on the time stamps on the video. She also testified that
her cameras were working properly. Critically, she provided the
video to the detectives on January 7, and she testified that her
cameras only save video for 15 days. Thus, the video could not be
from July 2017. The trial court did not err in admitting the
video.
III. There Was Sufficient Evidence for the Jury’s Lying-
in-Wait Special-Circumstance Finding and Murder
Conviction
Rodriguez contends there was insufficient evidence to
support the lying-in-wait special-circumstance finding and the
murder conviction. We disagree.
19
A. Standard of review
“ ‘The test for evaluating a sufficiency of evidence claim is
deferential.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Pierce (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th
508, 522.) “[W]e review the entire record in the light most
favorable to the judgment of the trial court. We evaluate whether
substantial evidence, defined as reasonable and credible evidence
of solid value, has been disclosed, permitting the trier of fact to
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Vargas (2020) 9
Cal.5th 793, 820.) We must “ ‘ “presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the [jury] could reasonably
deduce from the evidence,” ’ ” and we accept logical inferences the
jury might have drawn from circumstantial evidence. (People v.
Baker (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044, 1103.) We do not reverse unless it
appears “ ‘ “ ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support’ ” the jury’s verdict.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142.)
B. Lying-in-wait
The jury found Rodriguez “intentionally killed the victim by
means of lying in wait.” (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15).) The jury was
instructed with CALCRIM No. 728, which required the jury to
find: (1) Rodriguez “concealed [his] purpose from the person
killed”; (2) he “waited and watched for an opportunity to act”;
(3) he “made a surprise attack on the person killed from a
position of advantage”; and (4) he “intended to kill the person by
taking the person by surprise.” The instruction further explained
that the “lying in wait” also needed to be of a duration that is
“substantial and must show a state of mind equivalent to
deliberation or premeditation,” and “[t]he concealment can be
accomplished by ambush or some other secret plan.”
20
There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find the
allegation true. Video footage showed a white vehicle parked
near Monique’s house for approximately two hours. After
Elizarraraz entered her car, a white Jeep, identified as
Rodriguez’s, pulled up next to hers. The jury could reasonably
infer that Rodriguez went to Monique’s house to wait for
Elizarraraz. He knew where Monique lived, having been there
before. He concealed himself by parking nearby, but not in front
of the house. He then watched and waited for an opportunity to
shoot Elizarraraz. He carried out a surprise attack from a
position of advantage, shooting her through her driver’s side
window. (People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12
Cal.5th 719, 786 [concealment of purpose, watchful waiting, and
a surprise attack established where victims were unaware of
shooters hidden in bushes, who jumped out and then fired]; Cage,
supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 279–280 [defendant went to victim’s door
with shotgun hidden in laundry basket and conversed with the
victim before shooting her].) The two hours Rodriguez waited
and his prior threats further demonstrated his intent to kill.
While Rodriguez argues that his car pulling up at the same
time as Elizarraraz was leaving could be “happenstance,” the
evidence that he waited for two hours belies this contention. The
jury could reasonably conclude that Rodriguez waited until
Elizarraraz left so that he could shoot her by surprise. (See
People v. Wright (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1496, 1464,
(Wright) [defendant knew the victim’s work schedule, waited for
him to return from work, and “sneaked up on him unaware and
shot him while he was in his car”].)
21
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the
verdict, substantial evidence supports the jury’s true finding on
the lying-in-wait special-circumstance allegation.
C. Murder conviction
Rodriguez also asserts the evidence was insufficient to
convict him of murder. His argument is limited to a single
paragraph: “The problem here is that the People did not prove
that Appellant caused the death. No one saw Appellant shoot
[Elizarraraz]; no weapon was found; and no DNA was present. A
car that appeared similar to one allegedly owned by Appellant
was partially captured in a video. That is not enough. The 1109
evidence merely sullied Appellant’s reputation, but did not prove
anything.”
We disagree. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to
conclude Rodriguez killed Elizarraraz. His son identified
Rodriguez’s white Jeep in the video. Rodriguez and Elizarraraz
argued the night before. Cell phone evidence placed him near the
crime scene around the time of the murder and indicated he
called his sister and cousin shortly afterwards. The sister’s and
cousin’s phones were in Los Angeles at that time, but later near
Mexico. Rodriguez was arrested in Mexico three weeks later,
suggesting he fled after the murder, showing consciousness of
guilt. Rodriguez had previously been violent with Elizarraraz
and had threatened to kill her. He told others that he could not
allow Elizarraraz to be in a relationship with someone else and,
the night before the murder when the two argued about her
relationship with another man, Rodriguez said she had done him
“dirty.” He warned, “don’t ever let me catch [you] around.” This
was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Rodriguez
shot Elizarraraz.
22
IV. Failure to Instruct on Voluntary Manslaughter
Rodriguez contends the trial court erred by denying his
request for a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter on a
heat-of-passion theory. We disagree.
“[A] trial court must instruct the jury on a lesser included
offense, whether or not the defendant so requests, whenever
evidence that the defendant is guilty of only the lesser offense is
substantial enough to merit consideration by the jury.” (People v.
Choyce (2025) 18 Cal.5th 86, 104 (Choyce).) “Substantial
evidence in this context is that which a reasonable jury could find
persuasive. [Citation.] In deciding whether there exists
sufficient evidence to support a requested instruction, trial courts
should resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. [Citation.]
However, speculation is not evidence and will not warrant the
giving of an instruction on a lesser included offense.” (Ibid.)
“ ‘Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being
without malice.’ (§ 192.) Voluntary manslaughter is that
committed ‘upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.’ (§ 192,
subd. (a).) Voluntary manslaughter is considered a lesser,
necessarily included, offense of intentional murder.” (Choyce,
supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 104.)
The heat of passion theory of manslaughter has an
objective and a subjective component. (Choyce, supra, 18 Cal.5th
at p. 104.) “ ‘The defendant must actually, subjectively, kill
under the heat of passion.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)7 Additionally,
“ ‘ “this heat of passion must be such a passion as would naturally
be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person under
7 Because, like the trial court, we conclude that the objective
component is not met, we need not and do not address the
subjective component.
23
the given facts and circumstances.” ’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 105.)
It must also be based on sufficient provocation “caused by the
victim or by conduct reasonably believed by the defendant to have
been engaged in by the victim.” (Ibid.)
The trial court refused the instruction after finding no
evidence that Elizarraraz provoked Rodriguez. The court also
observed that the time between the texts and the murder would
have allowed a person of average disposition to regain judgment
and reasoning. Rodriguez asserts this was error. He cites his
“long tumultuous relationship” with Elizarraraz, that he recently
learned she was involved with someone else, his resulting
embarrassment, and the culminating heated text message
exchange the night before the murder. He thus argues that
despite the absence of provoking conduct immediately before the
murder, there was still evidence of provocation warranting a
voluntary manslaughter instruction.
“[P]rovocation sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter
need not occur instantaneously, but may occur over a period of
time.” (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 569; accord,
People v. McShane (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 245, 256 [“provocation
‘may comprise a single incident or numerous incidents over a
period of time’ ”].) Still, “ ‘ “if sufficient time has elapsed between
the provocation and the fatal blow for passion to subside and
reason to return, the killing is not voluntary manslaughter . . . .”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537,
550 (Moye).)
Here, there was insufficient evidence that Rodriguez’s
killing of Elizarraraz was the result of provocation, given the
length of time that passed between their text exchange, which
Rodriguez claims was the culminating provocative conduct, and
24
the shooting. Rodriguez’s last text was at 10:16 p.m., and
Elizarraraz did not respond. Elizarraraz was shot at
approximately 8:23 a.m. the next morning. For the provocation
to be sufficient, it must “eclipse[] reflection,” such that the person
“simply reacts from emotion due to the provocation, without
deliberation or judgment.” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th
935, 950.) “Accordingly, it is not sufficient that a person ‘is
provoked and [then] later kills.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Nelson
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 539.)
Rodriguez and Elizarraraz separated months before the
murder. There was no evidence of an ongoing or escalating series
of provocative acts. This case is therefore unlike People v. Berry
(1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 512–514, in which the victim engaged in
two weeks of sexual taunting of the defendant before he killed
her, and People v. Borchers (1958) 50 Cal.2d 321, 328–329, which
involved a victim who urged the defendant to shoot her and
accused the defendant of cowardice immediately before he shot
her. Instead, the evidence here established only that at an
unspecified time, Rodriguez learned of Elizarraraz’s relationship
with someone else and he angrily confronted her by text message.
Over 10 hours later, he killed her in a surprise attack. This
evidence was insufficient for the jury to find Rodriguez’s reason
“ ‘ “was obscured or disturbed by passion to such an extent as
would cause the ordinarily reasonable person of average
disposition to act rashly and without deliberation and reflection,
and from such passion rather than from judgment.” [Citations.]’
[Citation.]” (Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 550.) The trial court
properly rejected a voluntary manslaughter instruction.
Moreover, even assuming the trial court erred in failing to
instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, any error was
25
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman); Choyce, supra, 18 Cal.5th at
p. 106 [applying Chapman to the failure to instruct on lesser
included offense of voluntary manslaughter], citing People v.
Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 243.) “ ‘Error in failing to
instruct the jury on a lesser included offense is harmless when
the jury necessarily decides the factual questions posed by the
omitted instructions adversely to defendant under other properly
given instructions.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Horning (2004) 34
Cal.4th 871, 906.)
The jury found true the lying-in-wait special circumstance.
The instruction stated that the duration of the wait must “show a
state of mind equivalent to deliberation or premeditation.” The
instruction went on: “Deliberation means carefully weighing the
considerations for and against a choice and knowing the
consequences deciding to act,” and “[a]n act is done with
premeditation if the decision to commit the act is made before the
act is done.”
Given these requirements, “our Supreme Court has found
that a lying-in-wait special-circumstance finding renders the
failure to instruct on provocation/heat of passion manslaughter
harmless error.” (Wright, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1498,
citing People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 665 (Cruz).) In
Wright, the court observed that any error in failing to instruct on
heat of passion was harmless because the jury’s true finding on
the lying-in-wait special circumstance established it “must have
believed the evidence showed defendant shot [the victim] with ‘a
state of mind equivalent to deliberation or premeditation’ in
order to return a true finding on the lying-in-wait special-
circumstance finding.” (Wright, at p. 1497.) In Cruz, the jury
26
also found true a lying-in-wait special circumstance, and our high
court reasoned that this and other “special circumstance findings
themselves negate any possibility that defendant was prejudiced
from the failure to instruct on provocation/heat of passion . . .
theories of manslaughter.” (Cruz, at p. 665.)
Similarly, here, any failure to instruct on voluntary
manslaughter was harmless. Although Wright and Cruz
analyzed prejudice under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818,
836, the underlying reasoning of those decisions indicates that,
under the circumstances of this case, any error was harmless
under Chapman’s stricter “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard
(Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24). Rodriguez drove to
Monique’s house and waited for Elizarraraz for approximately
two hours. (Cf. Cruz, supra, 44 Cal. 4th at pp. 648, 680
[defendant was lying in wait for 15 minutes].) The jury
necessarily determined this established that Rodriguez
committed murder with a state of mind equivalent to deliberation
or premeditation when it found true the lying-in-wait allegation.
(See People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 416 [“ ‘Lying in
wait is the functional equivalent of proof of premeditation,
deliberation, and intent to kill.’ [Citation.] Proof of lying in wait
‘ “distinguish[es] those cases in which a defendant acts
insidiously from those in which he acts out of rash impulse.” ’ ”].)
There is therefore no possibility that the jury would also have
concluded that Rodriguez acted without deliberation or judgment
sufficient to convict him only of voluntary manslaughter under a
heat of passion theory.
Rodriguez has not shown prejudicial error.
27
V. Pitchess Review
Before trial, Rodriguez filed a motion under Pitchess, supra,
11 Cal.3d 531, as to Detective James Fillmore, who investigated
the case. Defense counsel filed a declaration stating that a
prosecutor had advised him of evidence in Fillmore’s personnel
file that might potentially be exculpatory or could be used for
impeachment. The LAPD conceded on the motion and produced
records. On September 9, 2022, the trial court reviewed the
records in camera and found discoverable information. The court
ordered the police department to produce the information to the
defense.
Rodriguez now requests our independent review of the in
camera portion of the trial court’s Pitchess proceeding to
determine whether the trial court properly evaluated
discoverability or abused its discretion. (See People v. Mooc
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216.) The People do not object. We have
reviewed the sealed record and conclude the court fulfilled its
obligations under Pitchess.8
8 We have not found multiple errors. We therefore need not
address Rodriguez’s cumulative error argument. (People v.
Midell (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1083 [no cumulative error if
no errors to cumulate].)
28
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
EGERTON, J.
29
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