Ranga v. Galan CA4/3

CourtListener 10859050CalctappMay 14, 2026

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Filed 5/14/25 Ranga v. Galan CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

MARIUS RANGA,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G065402

v. (Super. Ct. No. 25V000205)

JESSICA GALAN, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Cheri T. Pham, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Frances Prizzia and Frances Marie Prizzia for
Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
Jessica Galan appeals an order granting a domestic violence
restraining order (DVRO) against her. On the limited record before us, we
find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the restraining
order, and there is substantial evidence supporting its findings. We further
find the court did not deny Galan a meaningful opportunity to be heard and
therefore did not violate her due process rights. We affirm.1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Marius Ranga filed a petition for a DVRO against Galan in
January 2025. The petition was based on allegations Galan sent harassing
text messages to Ranga and his pregnant girlfriend and at least one e-mail to
his employer containing false allegations.
Ranga testified he began dating Galan in late 2021, but he broke
off the relationship in early 2022. He stated the trouble began in May 2024,
when he started getting messages every day, as did his friends, his girlfriend,
ex-girlfriends, and even his employer. Ranga added evidence at the hearing
on the petition of an e-mail sent by Galan to his employer stating she was in
a relationship with Ranga and they had a baby together, claiming that he
was cheating on Ranga with his current girlfriend. Ranga and Galan never
lived together, and they do not have a child together.
Ranga testified Galan was harassing him nonstop and
threatening him and his family. In one of the messages, Galan threatened to
run over his pregnant girlfriend. Ranga testified this caused him and his
family stress. They were scared to go to the park or the beach because one of

1 As Ranga did not file a respondent’s brief, we decide this case

based on the record on appeal and appellant’s opening brief. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.220(a).)

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the messages included a picture of his girlfriend at the beach. That incident
prompted him to get the police involved, and he filed a police report followed
by the petition for restraining order.
In response, Galan denied sending the messages. She testified
none of the phone numbers identified in Ranga’s evidence belonged to her.
The trial court noted the messages appeared to be from her, specifically
noting the e-mail to Ranga’s employer identifies the sender as “Jessica.” The
court asked who might impersonate Galan, and she offered three
possibilities: (1) Ranga was sending the messages himself because he had
some sort of fixation on her; (2) Ranga’s friend Mohammad might have sent
the messages as revenge because Galan had interfered with a romantic
relationship between her friend and Mohammad; or (3) it could be Ranga’s
current girlfriend.
Galan brought a folder of evidence to the hearing which the court
reviewed and marked for identification. The evidence included documents
from Galan’s employer showing when she was working from her home IP
address at relevant points in time, when she was in court on another matter,
or when she was texting with someone else at the same time as some of the
messages in Ranga’s evidence. Galan describes this as her “alibi evidence.”
Galan testified she contacted a private investigator and forensics
technologist to see if there was a way to trace the numbers from which the
messages had been sent, but she was told that was nearly impossible, and
even if it was possible, it was expensive. She opted not to spend the money.
The trial court observed that cell phones make it possible to send
messages from anywhere at any time. This is not a case which requires
Galan’s presence at any particular place, so evidence that she was working or
in court is not persuasive to establish she could not have sent the messages.

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The court also noted Galan could have multiple phones, or she could easily
create Google numbers and send messages from a computer or laptop.
The trial court found the text messages and e-mails sent to
Ranga’s employer included detailed descriptions and pictures of Ranga and
Galan together and the court found it difficult to believe a third party (or
Ranga himself) sent the messages. The court further found the idea that
someone else was sending the messages to be speculation, not evidence.
Before making its ruling, the trial court stated: “I need concrete
proof. What I do have is your denial of everything that he’s accused you
of . . . . Right?” And Galan answered, “Correct.” The court granted the DVRO
for a total of five years, finding “acts of domestic violence have occurred
between the parties and that the responding party is the perpetrator, the
moving party is the victim and that the violence did not occur in self-defense.”
The court found Ranga’s evidence to be more persuasive than Galan’s.
Galan timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court’s decision to grant or deny a restraining order under the
Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.) is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Navarro v. Cervera (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th
229, 236.) Abuse of discretion is found when the trial court exceeds the
bounds of reason. (In re Marriage of D.S. & A.S. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 926,
933 (D.S.).) Likewise, a court’s failure to consider evidence is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Davila and Mejia (2018)
29 Cal.App.5th 220, 226 (Davila).) A court’s factual findings are reviewed for
substantial evidence. (Ibid.)

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II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING THE
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESTRAINING ORDER
A. The Appellate Record Is Inadequate
A “fundamental principle of appellate procedure [is] that a trial
court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an
appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the
appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal
of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609
(Jameson).) The appellate court will make “‘all presumptions in favor of the
trial court’s action’” unless there is a contrary showing in the record. (Id. at
p. 609.) “‘“A necessary corollary to this rule is that if the record is inadequate
for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial
court should be affirmed.”’” (Ibid.) “‘Failure to provide an adequate record on
an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the appellant].’” (Ibid.)
The record here is minimal. It consists of the trial court’s minute
order, the final restraining order issued after the hearing, and the reporter’s
transcript of the hearing itself. The record also includes a “case summary”
prepared by the trial court clerk which includes case information, party
information and case events, including filed documents. This summary
confirms the initial petition for a restraining order was filed, and the
reporter’s transcript confirms that exhibits and evidence were attached to the
petition. The petition, declaration, and supporting evidence are not part of
the appellate record. Additionally, Galan failed to include the documentary
evidence she produced to the court on the date of the hearing which the court
marked as Exhibit A. The documentary evidence considered by the trial court
is therefore completely absent from the record in this appeal.

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We have no way of knowing what was included in Ranga’s
petition, or on what specific grounds he brought his request for the DVRO.
We can somewhat determine the allegations from the reporter’s transcript,
but not the evidence or the exact allegations. Without a copy of the petition or
Ranga’s evidence, it is impossible to determine that his claims of abuse were
not credible or that they did not support the issuance of the DVRO. Similarly,
we cannot determine the usefulness of Galan’s presented evidence. Galan’s
failure to provide a sufficient appellate record has therefore made it
impossible to adequately review the court’s discretion in issuing the DVRO.
Based on the limited record before us, we find there is substantial
evidence to support the trial court’s findings and conclude the court did not
abuse its discretion in granting the order.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Reject or Fail to Consider Galan’s “Alibi
Evidence”
Under the DVPA, “‘abuse’” includes placing “a person in
reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or
to another.” (Fam. Code, § 6203, subd. (a)(3).) It also includes stalking and
threatening other named family or household members. (Id., §§ 6203,
subd. (a)(4), 6320, subd. (a).) A DVRO may be granted if the applicant
demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, there has been “a past act
or acts of abuse.” (Id., § 6300, subd. (a); Davila, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at
p. 226 [“The DVPA requires a showing of past abuse by a preponderance of
the evidence”].) The DVPA does not require corroboration or multiple sources
of proof before a court can grant a DVRO. A petitioner’s testimony alone, if
credible, may suffice. (Fam. Code, § 6300, subd. (a); In re Marriage of F.M. &
M.M. 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 118.)

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Based on the record before us, the trial court considered Galan’s
evidence, weighed it, and found it inadequate to overcome Ranga’s evidence.
That is the court’s use of discretion, not what Galan describes as
“disregard[ing] competent, relevant records.” Ranga’s petition was
accompanied by a declaration and evidence, including screenshots of various
text messages and e-mails, apparently from Galan, which Ranga claimed to
be harassing and abusive. The court found Ranga’s evidence sufficient to
establish abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. The court further found
that Galan’s evidence was less persuasive than Ranga’s.
The trial court was not rejecting Galan’s evidence or refusing “to
credit admissible evidence.” The evidence was considered. The court simply
found it did not prove what Galan thought it proved. The court said, “[o]ur
phones are kind of part of our anatomy. Just because we’re at work, . . . out of
state, or . . . out of the country doesn’t mean that we can’t send text messages
or e-mail.” The court was simply observing that Galan’s evidence was
insufficient to confirm she did not send text messages while she was logged in
at work, in a courthouse, or while she was texting with her boyfriend.
Galan testified her employment records showed her employer
tracked every keystroke, but she did not say she was making particular
keystrokes at the time messages were sent. She also did not have her
employer testify as to what the records show or what work she was doing at
any specific time that would have hindered her ability to send harassing text
messages. Galan’s failure to bring additional testimony or evidence does not
mean the court failed to consider her evidence. The trial court’s finding that
Galan’s evidence had little probative value is not equivalent to a rejection of
admissible evidence.

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C. The Trial Court Did Not Improperly Shift the Burden of Proof to Galan
In the case of Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1 (Curcio), the
trial court found that the plaintiff’s written Facebook statements “raised ‘a
presumption that something happened.’” (Id. at p. 14.) The court then
“shifted the burden to [the defendant] ‘to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that [the plaintiff’s] allegations are not true.’” (Ibid.) The Curcio
court found this was improper, stating “the law imposes no such burden on a
party opposing a restraining order.” (Id. at p. 14.)
Galan argues the trial court here did something similar. As part
of her defense, Galan offered possible third parties who might have been
responsible for sending the text and e-mail messages to Ranga and others,
including his employer. Galan offered her reasoning as to why each party was
likely to be the messenger, but she failed to provide any evidence to support
her position. The court found Galan’s suggestions to be speculative.
Galan argues the trial court “impl[ied] her denial was insufficient
unless she could produce the true culprit.” She claims this is improper burden
shifting, because the court should have required Ranga “to authenticate the
screenshots and establish [Galan] as the author.”
This is much different than the Curcio case, where the trial court
explicitly asked the party opposing the DVRO to disprove the allegations
without first finding the requesting party had established the allegations by
a preponderance of the evidence. (Curcio, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at pp. 14–
15.) Here, the trial court stated Ranga’s declaration and evidence were
sufficient to establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Because
the declaration and evidence are not part of the record on appeal, we cannot
review the trial court’s conclusion. We presume instead the trial court’s

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conclusion is correct and resolve the issue against the appellant. (Jameson,
supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608–609.)
On the record before us, the trial court did not ask Galan to prove
another’s guilt. It asked her to establish her defense by evidence, rather than
speculation. That is not burden shifting. Galan went so far as to inquire with
a private investigator or forensic analyst to try to prove she was not the
source of the phone numbers used to send the messages but elected not to
proceed due to the cost. She told the court “I almost spent that money to hire
[the investigator] to find out who it [was].” She did not say she could not
afford it. She did not ask the court for more time for such an analysis to be
completed. She elected not to gather evidence which might exonerate her.
Instead, she went to a hearing armed only with a denial and speculation.
Galan asserts Ranga’s “case consisted only of uncorroborated
screenshots and testimony, contradicted by Appellant’s sworn denial and
documentary alibi records.” This just means there is a question of fact to be
resolved by the trial court which has the discretion to weigh all evidence and
the credibility of the parties to come to a conclusion. The record establishes
the court weighed the evidence and concluded in favor of Ranga. That does
not mean the court failed to consider Galan’s evidence or forced Galan to
disprove something Ranga failed to prove in the first place.
D. The Trial Court Did Not Rely on Improper Character Evidence in
Issuing the DVRO
Information unrelated to the alleged abusive conduct may not be
used to support issuance of a restraining order. (Quintana v. Guijosa (2003)
107 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1079.) The use of character or propensity evidence to
prove conduct on a specified occasion is prohibited. (Evid. Code, § 1101,
subd. (a).) Even if minimally probative, such evidence must be excluded

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where its prejudicial impact substantially outweighs its value. (Evid. Code,
§ 352.)
Galan takes issue with the trial court’s questioning about her
prior criminal history. She argues the court erred by using this information to
assess her “credibility and discredit her testimony,” but the record does not
support that conclusion.
Galan argues evidence related to her prior arrests and legal
issues has “no probative value on the question of whether [she] authored the
disputed communications,” and the trial court erred by “ground[ing] its
decision in inadmissible character evidence rather than competent proof of
abuse.” The record confirms an inquiry by the court into her criminal history,
but not reliance on it. The court asked if Galan ever went by another name
and inquired if she was arrested in 2016 for spousal abuse and in 2021 for
vandalism; however, the record noted Galan stated the charges for both
instances were dismissed. The court also asked about a driving under the
influence charge in 2023, which Galan confirmed. The court made no further
comment about Galan’s criminal history and did not list it as a reason it was
issuing the DVRO.
The trial court based its ruling “on [its] review of the evidence
and testimony” presented by the parties. The minute order includes Galan’s
criminal history as part of what was considered by the court prior to making
its ruling, but does not state what influence, if any, her criminal history had
on the court’s final determination. The court specified the reason it was
issuing the DVRO was because Ranga established abuse by a preponderance
of the evidence. Galan denied sending the messages but offered only proof of
where she was when certain messages were sent, not proof she could not have
sent the messages using another device while she was working or texting

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with someone else. The court therefore found Ranga’s evidence more
persuasive than Galan’s and granted the DVRO on that basis.
E. The Trial Court Provided a Meaningful Opportunity for Galan to be
Heard
“Although the court may issue a DVRO based solely on the
affidavit or testimony of the person requesting the order, it may do [so] only
‘after notice and a hearing.’” (D.S., supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 934.) Due
process requires “the right to be heard in a meaningful manner.” (In re James
Q. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 255, 265.) “A meaningful hearing requires an
opportunity to examine evidence and cross-examine witnesses.” (In re Crystal
J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 413.) Due process claims are reviewed
independently because “‘“ultimate determination of procedural fairness”’” is a
question of law. (D.S., supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 933.)
Galan argues the trial court denied her “‘right to be heard in a
meaningful manner’” because it refused “to consider competent defense
evidence” and “shift[ed] the burden to the respondent.” Her argument relies
on D.S., supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pages 935–936, in which the trial court
issued “a restraining order based solely on the written declarations of the
parties with no further inquiry.” (Id. at p. 935.) The D.S. court found that the
appellant’s “written response should have alerted the trial court that it had
an obligation to ask questions designed to ascertain the truth of the
allegations and the admissibility of the evidence” in support of the petition.
(Id. at p. 936.)
The same is not true here. Galan did not file a written response
at all. The trial court still set a hearing, listened to Galan’s arguments,
reviewed the evidence she brought to the hearing, and issued a ruling based
on everything presented.

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Having established the trial court did not shift the burden to
Galan and it did not fail to consider any of her presented evidence, there is no
support for the argument it did not give Galan a meaningful opportunity to
be heard. Galan does not assert there was other evidence to be presented,
that she needed more time to gather evidence, or that the court cut her off
and failed to listen to her. To the contrary, she told the court she decided not
to move forward with the private investigator. She did not call any other
witnesses (her employer, her attorney, her boyfriend) to testify she was with
them at the time she is alleged to have sent harassing text messages to
Ranga. The court therefore gave Galan a meaningful opportunity to respond
to Ranga’s allegations, and her due process rights were not violated.
DISPOSITION
The domestic violence restraining order is affirmed. Because
Ranga did not respond to this appeal, no costs are awarded.

BANCROFT, J.*

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.

DELANEY, J.

*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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