Norrenberg v. Indus Investments CA2/7

CourtListener 10859012CalctappMay 14, 2026

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Filed 5/14/26 Norrenberg v. Indus Investments CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

SVEN NORRENBERG et al., B345791

Cross-complainants and (Los Angeles County Super. Ct.
Appellants, No. 22STCV29165)

v.

INDUS INVESTMENTS, INC.
et al.,

Cross-defendants and
Appellants.

APPEALS from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Thomas D. Long, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
The Matevosyan Law Firm and Arman Matevosyan for
Cross-complainants and Appellants.
Timothy D. McGonigle; Greenberg Traurig and
Scott D. Bertzyk for Cross-defendants and Appellants.
_______________________________________

INTRODUCTION

Indus Investments, Inc., Royal Lush, LLC, and Tehmina
Adaya (collectively, Indus) filed this action against Armond
Khosrovyan, Sven Norrenberg, and Tetiana Demchak.
Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak filed a cross-complaint,
and Indus filed a special motion to strike under Code of Civil
Procedure section 425.16 (commonly known as an anti-SLAPP
motion).1 The trial court ruled five of the cross-complaint’s
nine causes of action arose from protected activity and were
barred by the litigation privilege. Indus argues the court should
have stricken the entire cross-complaint; Norrenberg and
Demchak argue the court should have denied Indus’s special
motion to strike entirely.2 We agree with Indus that all of
Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak’s causes of action arose
from protected activity and were barred by the litigation
privilege. Therefore, we reverse the order and direct the trial
court to enter a new order granting Indus’s special motion to
strike.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

2 Khosrovyan did not appeal from the order or file a
respondent’s brief.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Indus Sues Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak
Indus Investments operated a hotel in Santa Monica, and
Royal Lush operated the hotel’s food and beverage business.
Tehmina Adaya was Indus’s president and chief executive officer.
On April 2, 2021 Indus Investments and Royal Lush paid
Norrenberg, a former hotel employee, $450,000 to settle
Norrenberg’s “claims relating to his employment,” including
claims “he was slandered” by Adaya, as evidenced by a recording
of Adaya calling Norrenberg “‘Nazi boy.’” Indus Investments and
Royal Lush also paid Demchak, Norrenberg’s wife, $50,000 to
settle her claim she suffered a miscarriage. Khosrovyan, the
hotel’s general manager, signed the settlement agreement on
behalf of Indus Investments and Royal Lush.
On September 7, 2022 Indus filed this action against
Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak. Indus alleged
Khosrovyan “encouraged (and conspired with)” Norrenberg “to
fabricate evidence in order to bring fraudulent employment
claims against the Hotel and . . . obtained a portion of the
fraudulently obtained settlement proceeds.” Indus alleged
Khosrovyan created the “phony” “‘Nazi boy’” recording. Indus
alleged that Khosrovyan pretended to represent Indus’s interests
in negotiating with Norrenberg and Demchak, but that
Khosrovyan simultaneously advised Norrenberg and Demchak
“how to leverage their false claims to obtain the maximum
possible settlement.” Indus alleged that Khosrovyan
“intentionally sidelined” the hotel’s attorneys, that he “rushed
through a pre-litigation settlement,” and that he “obtained a
secret kickback” from Norrenberg and Demchak.

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Indus further alleged Khosrovyan “grossly abused his
position of trust as the Hotel’s General Manager by treating the
Hotel as his personal fiefdom and by engaging in a shocking
multi-year scheme of fraud and theft from the Hotel.” Indus
alleged Khosrovyan’s scheme included conspiring with another
hotel employee “to present fraudulent employment claims”;
paying “‘phantom’” employees; obtaining “secret kickbacks” from
contractors; stealing furniture, meals, and “expensive alcohol and
fine wines”; and charging personal expenses to the hotel.
Indus asserted causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty,
fraud, conversion, conspiracy to commit fraud, conspiracy to
commit conversion, restitution and unjust enrichment, violation
of Penal Code sections 496 and 502, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Indus sought damages, rescission of the
settlement agreement, “restitution of the proceeds,” and
“restitution of any kickbacks received by Khosrovyan.”

B. Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak File a
Cross-complaint
On October 31, 2024 Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and
Demchak filed a cross-complaint against Indus. They alleged:
“In consideration for the [settlement agreement] and pursuant to
[its] terms,” Norrenberg and Demchak “destroyed valuable
evidence.” Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak alleged that,
“[i]nstead of honoring the terms of” the April 2021 settlement
agreement, Indus “in September 2022 in bad faith fraudulently
and falsely claimed . . . Khosrovyan acted without [Indus’s]
knowledge and outside the scope of his employment in
negotiating and ultimately entering into” the settlement
agreement and “began claiming Mr. Khosrovyan conspired and

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colluded with Mr. Norrenberg and Ms. Demchak for them to
receive $500,000.00 . . . . ” Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and
Demchak alleged Indus was “attempting to void the valid and
enforceable Agreement through various illegitimate means” and
demanding they “cancel the Agreement and return the
$500,000.00 that secured settlement.” Khosrovyan, Norrenberg,
and Demchak asserted causes of action for breach of contract,
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
unjust enrichment and restitution, intentional
misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, promissory
fraud, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. They sought, among other things,
a “judicial determination” the settlement agreement was “valid
and enforceable.”

C. The Trial Court Grants in Part Indus’s Special
Motion To Strike Under Section 425.16
On March 5, 2025 Indus filed a special motion to strike
Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak’s cross-complaint. Indus
argued that the cross-complaint was based on Indus’s complaint
and that all of Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak’s causes of
action were barred by the litigation privilege.
The trial court granted Indus’s special motion to strike in
part. On the first step of the analysis under section 425.16, the
court ruled the causes of action for breach of contract, breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust
enrichment were based on Indus “making allegedly false
statements in the Complaint and attempting to void the
agreement through this action—litigation conduct that is
protected.” The court ruled the causes of action for injunctive

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and declaratory relief also arose from protected activity because
Indus disputed the settlement agreement’s validity and sought to
cancel it “by way of their Complaint.” On the second step of the
analysis, the court ruled Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak
did not meet their burden to show a probability of success on
their causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and
injunctive and declaratory relief because those causes of action
were barred by the litigation privilege.
The court ruled the remaining causes of action for
intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and
promissory fraud did not arise from protected activity. The court
ruled those causes of action arose “from the parties executing the
settlement agreement on April 2, 2021 and [Khosrovyan,
Norrenberg, and Demchak’s] reliance on the representations
made at that time,” not from Indus’s filing of the complaint. The
court ruled that, because the cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress “could include by incorporation the
alleged fraudulent inducement when entering into the settlement
agreement,” it did not arise from protected activity. The court
did not reach the second step of the analysis on those causes of
action. Indus, Norrenberg, and Demchak timely appealed from
the trial court’s order.

DISCUSSION

A. Section 425.16
Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1), states a “cause of action
against a person arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under

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the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion
to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the claim.” Section 425.16, subdivision (e), provides an
“‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech
under the United States or California Constitution in connection
with a public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral statement or
writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial
proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law”
and “(2) any written or oral statement or writing made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official
proceeding authorized by law.” “Section 425.16 ‘provides
a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims
arising from protected activity.’” (Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC
v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 4 Cal.5th 637, 642;
see Clapkin v. Levin (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 222, 231.)
Courts follow a two-step process in evaluating special
motions to strike under section 425.16. “First, ‘the moving
defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged
allegations or claims “aris[e] from” protected activity in which the
defendant has engaged.’ [Citation.] Second, for each claim that
does arise from protected activity, the plaintiff must show the
claim has ‘at least “minimal merit.”’ [Citation.] If the plaintiff
cannot make this showing, the court will strike the claim.”
(Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009;
see Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061.) We review de novo an order
granting or denying a special motion to strike under

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section 425.16. (Bonni, at p. 1009; Clapkin v. Levin, supra,
119 Cal.App.5th at p. 231.)

B. All of Khosrovyan, Norrenberg and Demchak’s
Causes of Action Arose from Protected Activity

1. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting
Indus’s Motion To Strike the Causes of Action
Arising from Indus’s Act of Filing the
Complaint
Section 425.16 protects “communicative conduct such as
the filing, funding, and prosecution of a civil action.” (Rusheen v.
Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056; see Bonni v. St. Joseph
Health System, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1024 [“filing of a lawsuit is
an exercise of the First Amendment right to petition the
government”]; Long Beach Unified School Dist. v. Margaret
Williams, LLC (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 87, 97 [“Protected activity
includes the filing and prosecution of lawsuits.”]; Takhar v.
People ex rel. Feather River Air Quality Management Dist. (2018)
27 Cal.App.5th 15, 27 [“‘“filing of lawsuits is an aspect of the
First Amendment right of petition” [citation], and thus is a
protected activity under’” section 425.16].) A cross-complaint
may be subject to a special motion to strike if it alleges “a cause
of action arising from the plaintiff’s act of filing the complaint
itself.” (Joslin v. Third Laguna Hills Mutual (2020)
49 Cal.App.5th 366, 371-372.)
The trial court correctly ruled the causes of action for
breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, and declaratory relief arose from Indus’s
conduct in filing the complaint against Khosrovyan, Norrenberg,

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and Demchak.3 In their cause of action for breach of contract
Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak alleged that, “[o]n or
about September 7, 2022, [Indus] materially breached” the
settlement agreement by falsely claiming Khosrovyan acted
without Indus’s knowledge and outside the scope of his
employment in negotiating and entering into the agreement and
by “claiming Mr. Khosrovyan conspired and colluded with
Mr. Norrenberg and Ms. Demchak for them to receive
$500,000.00 . . . .” Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak
further alleged Indus was “attempting to void the valid and
enforceable Agreement through various illegitimate means,”
“demanding [Norrenberg and Demchak] cancel the Agreement
and return the $500,000.00 that secured settlement,” and
refusing “to honor the terms of the Agreement.” Khosrovyan,
Norrenberg, and Demchak made nearly identical allegations in
their cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. Similarly, in their cause of action for
declaratory relief Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak sought
a judicial determination of their “rights and duties” under the

3 Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak also asserted
causes of action for unjust enrichment and injunctive relief.
Unjust enrichment, however, is not a cause of action, but
“‘[c]ommon law principles of restitution require a party to return
a benefit when the retention of such benefit would unjustly
enrich the recipient.’” (City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders
(2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 458, 477.) Similarly, injunctive relief is an
equitable remedy, not a cause of action. (Timothy W. v. Julie W.
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 648, 663; Wong v. Jing (2010)
189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1361.) “A remedy must have a cause of
action to support it.” (Timothy W., at p. 663.)

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settlement agreement and a declaration the agreement “is valid
and enforceable.”
The actions by Indus that supply the elements of
Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak’s causes of action are all
based on allegations from Indus’s complaint, where Indus alleged
Khosrovyan colluded with Norrenberg and Demchak to obtain a
fraudulent settlement, sought to rescind the settlement
agreement, and sought restitution of the $500,000. (See Rand
Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 621 [“the
protected activity must ‘supply elements of the challenged
claim’”].) Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak even alleged
Indus’s breach of the settlement agreement occurred on
September 7, 2022—the date Indus filed its complaint.
Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak did not allege Indus
sought to void the settlement agreement in any communication
other than the complaint, and Indus submitted declarations—
which Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak did not dispute—
stating no one from Indus communicated with Khosrovyan,
Norrenberg, or Demchak in September 2022. (See § 425.16,
subd. (b)(2) [in ruling on a special motion to strike under
section 425.16, “the court shall consider the pleadings, and
supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which
the liability or defense is based”]; Wilson v. Cable News Network,
Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 887 [on the first step on the analysis
under section 425.16 “courts must look beyond the pleadings to
consider any party evidentiary submissions as well”].) But for
Indus’s act of filing the complaint, there would be no basis for
Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak’s causes of action. (See
Meads v. Driggers (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 28, 37 [“‘but for’ the
[cross-defendants’] claim for judicial dissolution, there would be

10
no basis for the cross-complaint, and the cross-complaint
‘therefore falls squarely within the ambit of the anti-SLAPP
statute’s “arising from” prong’”]; see also Navellier v. Sletten
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 90 [“but for the federal lawsuit and [the
defendant’s] alleged actions taken in connection with that
litigation, plaintiffs’ present claims would have no basis”].)
Norrenberg and Demchak’s arguments their causes of
action did not arise from Indus’s complaint are meritless. First,
Norrenberg and Demchak argue the “sole basis” for the trial
court’s ruling some of their causes of action arose from protected
activity was that Indus filed its complaint on September 7, 2022,
the same date on which Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak
alleged Indus breached the contract. Norrenberg and Demchak
argue the “law and overwhelming evidence here demonstrate the
date itself that [Indus] filed their underlying complaint is not
protected activity under the Anti-SLAPP Statute.” But the trial
court did not rule the date was protected activity; it ruled what
happened on that date—Indus’s filing of the complaint—was
protected activity.
Second, Norrenberg and Demchak argue their cross-
complaint asserted “compulsory claims that arise out of the same
transactions and occurrences” as Indus’s causes of action for
breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Khosrovyan,
Norrenberg, and Demchak rely on Church of Scientology v.
Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, where the court stated a
“compulsory cross-complaint on a ‘related cause of action’ against
the plaintiff [citation] would rarely, if ever, qualify as a SLAPP
suit arising from petition activity.” (Id. at p. 651.) The court in
Church of Scientology, however, did not state a compulsory cross-
complaint never arises from protected activity. To the contrary,

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the court stated a cross-complaint is subject to a special motion to
strike if it “arises out of the litigation process itself,” including
“the plaintiff’s act of filing the complaint against the defendant
and the subsequent litigation.” (Ibid.; see Raining Data Corp. v.
Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1373 [“Some, but not
all, cross-complaints are subject to anti-SLAPP motions.”].)
Because the claims in Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak’s
cross-complaint arose out of Indus’s act of filing the complaint,
their causes of action were based on protected activity. (See
Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC v. Schneider (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th
980, 994 [cross-complaint alleging the cross-defendant “violated
the settlement agreement’s release of claims” by filing “several
additional lawsuits against” the cross-complainants arose from
protected activity]; Mundy v. Lenc (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1401,
1408 [cross-complaint alleging the cross-defendant “breached the
settlement agreement by filing a complaint against” cross-
complainant arose from protected activity].)
Third, Norrenberg and Demchak argue their cross-
complaint was “based on overwhelming evidence outside of the
Complaint,” such as text messages and the settlement
agreement. Norrenberg and Demchak argue the text messages in
the days leading up to the settlement on April 2, 2021 among
Adaya, Khosrovyan, and a lawyer regarding the terms of the
settlement with Norrenberg and Demchak “demonstrate[ ]
Adaya’s knowledge and ascent [sic] into the Subject Settlement
and Release Agreement.” Though the text messages and the
settlement agreement are evidence that in April 2021 Adaya
intended Indus Investments to be bound by the settlement
agreement (a fact Adaya and Indus Investments do not dispute),
Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak’s allegations Indus

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breached the settlement agreement by repudiating it and trying
to rescind it were based on Indus’s act of filing the complaint. In
other words, without relying on Indus’s protected activity of filing
the complaint, Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak cannot
establish the element of breach. (See Wilson v. Cable News
Network, Inc., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 892 [“If conduct that supplies
a necessary element of a claim is protected, the defendant’s
burden at the first step of the . . . analysis has been carried.”].)
Fourth, Norrenberg and Demchak summarize several cases
involving special motions to strike and assert, without analysis,
that “[u]nder the overwhelming legal authority above, the Cross-
Complaint is a straightforward and private business dispute for
[Indus’s] undisputable [sic] anticipatory breach of contract and
fraud (and related causes of action).” Some (but not all) of the
cases Norrenberg and Demchak cite involve claims a party
breached a settlement agreement, but that is where the
similarity ends. For example, Norrenberg and Demchak cite
Mundy v. Lenc, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th 1401, where the cross-
complainant alleged the cross-defendant breached a settlement
agreement by filing a complaint asserting a previously released
cause of action. (Id. at p. 1405.) Norrenberg and Demchak state
that in Mundy “the trial court properly denied appellant’s special
motion to strike respondent’s breach of contract claim,” but at
step one the court in Mundy held the breach of contract claim
arose from protected activity. (Id. at p. 1408.) Only at step two
did the court in Mundy conclude the cross-complainant was likely
to succeed on the merits because the cross-complainant
introduced evidence showing the cross-defendant could have
asserted the new claim in the previous action. (Id. at p. 1409.)

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Norrenberg and Demchak cite City of Alhambra v.
D’Ausilio (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1301, but that case does not
help them. In City of Alhambra a former city employee who was
president of the firefighters’ union settled a civil rights action
against the city. (Id. at p. 1304.) In the settlement agreement
the employee agreed that, for a five-year period, he would not
participate or represent city employees in matters involving the
city. (Ibid.) The city sued the employee after he participated in a
union meeting where “he advocated that [union] members join a
planned demonstration” against the city and, while wearing his
union shirt, participated in a protest by city employees against
the city. (Ibid.) The court in City of Alhambra affirmed the trial
court’s order denying the employee’s special motion to strike the
city’s cause of action for declaratory relief, holding that cause of
action did not arise from the employee’s protected activity: “The
City did not sue [the employee] because he engaged in protected
speech; the City sued him because it believed he breached a
contract which prevented him from engaging in certain speech-
related conduct and a dispute exists as to the scope and validity
of that contract.” (Id. at p. 1308.) Here, in contrast, Khosrovyan,
Norrenberg, and Demchak sued Indus for breaching the
settlement agreement by filing a complaint, which is indisputably
protected activity.
Norrenberg and Demchak also argue the “facts in the case
at bar here directly trace those in Applied Business Software, Inc.
v. Pacific Mortgage Exchange, Inc.” (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1108.
They do not. In Applied Business Software the parties to a
copyright infringement action entered into a settlement
agreement requiring the defendant to provide the plaintiff with a
certification stating the defendant had returned or destroyed all

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copies of the plaintiff’s software. (Id. at p. 1112.) The defendant
did not provide a satisfactory certification, and the plaintiff sued
the defendant for breach of the settlement agreement. (Id. at
pp. 1113-1114.) The court in Applied Business Software affirmed
the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s special motion to
strike, holding the plaintiff’s complaint was based on the
“defendant’s alleged failure to provide the certification called for
in the settlement agreement, and defendant’s alleged use of
plaintiff’s software after the time set out in the settlement
agreement for ceasing use of it. Neither of those alleged actions
by the defendant can reasonably be said to have been taken by
defendant in furtherance of its right of petition or free speech in
connection with a public issue. Therefore, it cannot reasonably
be said that plaintiff’s complaint arises from/is based on protected
activities undertaken by defendant.” (Id. at p. 1117.) Here,
however, Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak’s cross-
complaint was based on Indus’s act of filing a complaint
disavowing and seeking to rescind the settlement agreement, not
Indus’s failure to perform an obligation under the agreement,
such as Indus’s obligation to pay Norrenberg and Demchak
$500,000.4

4 Norrenberg and Demchak also argue that “Adaya never
attested to Adaya’s speech being ‘chilled’” and that “there is no
evidence that the Cross-Complaint was filed to prevent [Indus]
from pursuing protected activity.” Indus, however, did not have
to prove either that Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak
intended to chill its speech or that its (or Adaya’s) speech was in
fact chilled. (See City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69,
75 [section 425.16 does not include an “intent-to-chill proof
requirement” or a “chilling-effect proof requirement”]; Navellier v.
Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 88 [same].)

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2. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Indus’s
Motion To Strike the Causes of Action Arising
from Settlement Negotiations
The trial court ruled Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and
Demchak’s causes of action for intentional misrepresentation,
negligent misrepresentation, promissory fraud, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress did not arise from protected
activity. The court ruled those causes of action arose “from the
parties executing the settlement agreement on April 2, 2021 and
[Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak’s] reliance on the
representations made at that time,” not from Indus’s filing of its
complaint. Indus argues “settlement negotiations are protected
activity” under section 425.16. Indus is correct.
“Settlement negotiations while a suit is pending
are . . . protected; they involve communications in connection
with a matter pending before or under consideration by an official
body, and so fall within the scope of section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(2).” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 1024; see Seltzer v. Barnes (2010)
182 Cal.App.4th 953, 963-964 [“settlement negotiations are
within the scope of section 425.16”].) Settlement negotiations
“preceding the filing of any suit” are likewise protected activities
under section 425.16. (Bonni, at p. 1024; see Geragos v. Abelyan
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1005, 1023 [“communications sent in
anticipation of litigation . . . constitute legitimate speech or
petitioning activity protected under” section 425.16]; Stenehjem v.
Sareen (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1413 [“communications that
are preparatory to or in anticipation of litigation are protected
under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), even though they occur
before litigation is actually pending”].)

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In their causes of action for intentional misrepresentation,
negligent misrepresentation, and promissory fraud Khosrovyan,
Norrenberg, and Demchak alleged that Indus made false
representations to induce Norrenberg and Demchak to enter into
the settlement agreement, that in consideration for Indus’s
payment of $500,000 Norrenberg and Demchak “destroyed
valuable evidence in their favor,” and that “the true facts” at the
time of the agreement were that Indus intended to attempt to
recover the $500,000 later. Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and
Demchak alleged Indus made the false representations on
April 2, 2021, the day the parties signed the settlement
agreement. Because Indus’s misrepresentations occurred during
settlement negotiations in anticipation of litigation,5 Khosrovyan,
Norrenberg, and Demchak’s causes of action were based on
protected activity. (See Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1026 [allegations a hospital fraudulently
induced a physician to enter into a settlement agreement and
then breached the agreement were based on protected activity];
Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 90 [“negotiation,
execution, and repudiation” of a release were protected under
section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2)]; Suarez v. Trigg Laboratories,
Inc. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 118, 123 [“[c]ommunications in the
course of settlement negotiations are protected activity within
the scope of section 425.16,” even “against allegations of
fraudulent promises made during the settlement process”];

5 Though no litigation was pending on April 2, 2021, Indus
anticipated Norrenberg would soon file a lawsuit: In a text
message dated March 27, 2021, Khosrovyan told Indus’s lawyer
Norrenberg was threatening to file this action unless Indus paid
him $450,000.

17
Navarro v. IHOP Properties, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 834, 842
[defendant’s “allegedly fraudulent statements within the context
of negotiating the stipulated judgment” were protected activity].)6

C. Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak Did Not
Show a Probability of Success Because Their Causes
of Action Are Barred by the Litigation Privilege
At the second step of the analysis under section 425.16 “the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the
claim by establishing a probability of success.” (Baral v. Schnitt
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.) Indus argues Khosrovyan,
Norrenberg, and Demchak did not show a probability of success
because the litigation privilege bars all of their causes of action.
Indus is correct again.
“The litigation privilege is ‘relevant to the second step in
the [section 425.16] analysis in that it may present a substantive
defense a plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of
prevailing.’” (Contreras v. Dowling (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 394,
415; see Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 323.)
“‘“‘A plaintiff cannot establish a probability of prevailing if the

6 In their cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak
incorporated these allegations and alleged that the “conduct set
forth hereinabove was extreme and outrageous” and that Indus
“abused the employment discretion provided, and engaged in
conduct intended to cause extreme embarrassment to”
Norrenberg and Demchak. Because the intentional infliction of
emotional distress cause of action was derivative of the previous
causes of action, it too was based on the complaint, the
settlement negotiations, or both, all of which were protected
activity.

18
litigation privilege precludes a defendant’s liability on the
claims.’”’” (Osborne v. Pleasanton Automotive Co., LP (2024)
106 Cal.App.5th 361, 382; see Optional Capital, Inc. v. Akin
Gump Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 95,
115.) Under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), a “privileged
publication or broadcast is one made” in any “judicial
proceeding.” The litigation privilege applies “‘to any
communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings;
(2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to
achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that [has] some
connection or logical relation to the action.’” (Action Apartment
Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241;
accord, Geragos v. Abelyan, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1031.)
The privilege “is not limited to statements made during a trial or
other proceedings, but may extend to steps taken prior thereto, or
afterwards.” (Rusheen v. Cohen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1057; see
Flatley, at p. 322 [the “privilege has also been held to apply to
‘statements made prior to the filing of a lawsuit’”].) The litigation
privilege “is ‘an “absolute” privilege, and it bars all tort causes of
action except a claim of malicious prosecution.’” (Flatley, at
p. 322; see Rusheen, at p. 1063.)
Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak’s causes of action
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
and declaratory relief were based on Indus’s act of filing the
complaint. The trial court correctly ruled the litigation privilege
bars those causes of action. (See Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v.
City of Santa Monica, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1249
[“We contemplate no communication that is more clearly
protected by the litigation privilege than the filing of a legal
action.”]; Rubin v. Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187, 1195 [“we can

19
imagine few communicative acts more clearly within the scope of
the [litigation] privilege than . . . filing the complaint and
subsequent pleadings in the litigation”]; see also Rusheen v.
Cohen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1058 [the “‘[p]leadings and process
in a case are generally viewed as privileged communications’”];
Herterich v. Peltner (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1132, 1139 [same].)
The trial court also correctly ruled the litigation privilege
bars Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak’s cause of action for
breach of contract. “‘[W]hether the litigation privilege applies to
an action for breach of contract turns on whether its application
furthers the policies underlying the privilege.’” (McNair v. City
and County of San Francisco (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1154, 1169;
see Wentland v. Wass (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1492.) Those
policies are to “‘ensure free access to the courts, promote complete
and truthful testimony, encourage zealous advocacy, give finality
to judgments, and avoid unending litigation.’” (McNair, at
p. 1169; see Wentland, at p. 1492.) Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and
Demchak’s breach of contract cause of action was based on
Indus’s filing of the complaint—the same communicative conduct
on which Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak based their
causes of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing and declaratory relief. Applying the litigation
privilege to the breach of contract cause of action “furthers the
policy of allowing access to the courts without fear of harassing
derivative actions.” (Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates
(2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1498; see id. at p. 1497 [litigation
privilege barred a breach of contract cause of action where the
“same communicative conduct formed the basis for the tort and
breach of contract causes of action”].)

20
The litigation privilege also bars Khosrovyan, Norrenberg,
and Demchak’s causes of action for intentional
misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, promissory
fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress because
those causes of action were based on Indus’s alleged false
representations that induced Norrenberg and Demchak to settle
their threatened lawsuit and destroy evidence. Statements
“relating to settlements also fall within the privilege, including
those made during settlement negotiations.” (Navarro v. IHOP
Properties, Inc., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 843; see Seltzer v.
Barnes, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 970 [litigation privilege
“‘applies to statements made by counsel during settlement
negotiations’”]; Home Ins. Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co. (2002)
96 Cal.App.4th 17, 24 [“the alleged misrepresentation was made
during a lawsuit to induce settlement and therefore falls within
the litigation privilege”]; Dowling v. Zimmerman (2001)
85 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1422 [statements by counsel while
negotiating a settlement were protected by the litigation
privilege].)
The privilege protects Indus’s statements during
settlement negotiations because, though Norrenberg had not yet
sued Indus, he had threatened to do so. Prelitigation
communications are privileged if they “relate[ ] to litigation that
is contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration.”
(Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, supra,
41 Cal.4th at p. 1251; accord, Medallion Film LLC v. Loeb & Loeb
LLP (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1272, 1290; see Bonni v. St. Joseph
Health System, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1024 [“‘“communications
preparatory to or in anticipation of the bringing of an action or
other official proceeding are within the protection of the litigation

21
privilege”’”].) Six days before Indus allegedly made the
misrepresentations, Khosrovyan sent a text message to Indus’s
attorney stating Norrenberg “wants 450 k nothing less or he files
the lawsuits Monday.”
Norrenberg and Demchak rely on an exception to the
litigation privilege for “any communication made in furtherance
of an act of intentional destruction or alteration of physical
evidence undertaken for the purpose of depriving a party to
litigation of the use of that evidence.” (Civ. Code, § 47,
subd. (b)(2).) Norrenberg and Demchak argue that, under this
exception, “the substance of [Indus’s] correspondence are [sic] not
privileged.” There are several problems with Norrenberg and
Demchak’s argument. First, even if Indus’s correspondence (text
messages) are not protected by the litigation privilege, they do
not supply the elements of any of Norrenberg and Demchak’s
causes of action. Second, the text messages do not say anything
about destroying or altering evidence. Norrenberg and Demchak
cite to 20 pages of text messages between Khosrovyan, Adaya,
and a lawyer discussing whether the settlement agreement
required Norrenberg to keep the agreement confidential, whether
the payment should be by check or money order, who should be
named in the release, and whether the hotel’s insurer had agreed
to pay the settlement amount less the deductible. Nothing about
destroying evidence.7

7 Norrenberg and Demchak also argue the trial court
“impermissibly weighed the evidence.” It did not. Norrenberg
and Demchak quote a portion of the trial court’s order where the
court rejected their argument, made at the hearing on Indus’s
special motion to strike, that “evidence in the form of the
settlement agreement and non-privileged text messages” showed
Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak would prevail on the

22
Third, to the extent Norrenberg and Demchak argue that
the text messages show Adaya participated in negotiating the
settlement and that Norrenberg and Demchak destroyed the
“‘Nazi boy’ recording” in “consideration for the [settlement
agreement and release] and pursuant to its terms,” Norrenberg
and Demchak do not identify anything in the “terms” of the
settlement agreement about destroying evidence. Instead,
Norrenberg and Demchak cite only their cross-complaint (and the
trial court’s order citing Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak’s
cross-complaint). Nor do Norrenberg and Demchak identify any
other evidence Indus asked, let alone required, Norrenberg and
Demchak to destroy the recording.8
Norrenberg and Demchak argue the litigation privilege
does not apply because their causes of action were based, not on
Indus’s privileged communications, but on Indus’s “underlying
course of conduct evidenced by the communication.” “It is true
that [the litigation privilege] does not apply to noncommunicative
conduct and does not bar the evidentiary use of privileged
communications in otherwise allowable actions.” (Doctors’ Co.
Ins. Services v. Superior Court (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1284,
1298.) But Norrenberg and Demchak admit their causes of
action were based on “Adaya’s inducement of” the “destruction of

merits. The court stated the settlement agreement and the text
messages were “irrelevant to whether the litigation privilege
applies.”

8 Similarly, Norrenberg and Demchak assert Indus admitted
it “enacted a course of conduct to destroy that vital evidence to
prevent its use by” Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak. In
support of this accusation Norrenberg and Demchak cite only
their own discovery responses.

23
valuable evidence,” which occurred during privileged settlement
negotiations. Norrenberg and Demchak do not identify any
actionable non-privileged misrepresentations or conduct by
Indus. (See Bergstein v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (2015)
236 Cal.App.4th 793, 815 [litigation privileged barred causes of
action where the plaintiffs did “not identify any of defendants’
conduct that was not a communication made in a judicial
proceeding (or prior thereto) to achieve the objects of the
litigation”]; Seltzer v. Barnes, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 971
[litigation privilege applied where the plaintiff’s causes of action
against the defendant were “based on his communications . . .
regarding settlement of the cross-complaint,” and that was “the
nature of his alleged participation in the fraudulent scheme”];
Doctors’ Co. Ins. Services, at p. 1299 [“[c]haracterizing [the
defendant’s] conduct as ‘destruction’ of evidence [did] not alter
the fact that the ‘destruction’ was accomplished entirely by
statements made in the litigation,” which brought the plaintiffs’
action “within the bounds of the privilege”].)
Norrenberg and Demchak argue the litigation privilege
does not apply because “there was no imminent litigation.”
Though their argument is a difficult to follow, Norrenberg and
Demchak appear to argue that in April 2021, when Indus settled
Norrenberg’s threatened employment action, Indus did not
anticipate Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak would file
their cross-complaint several years later. Norrenberg and
Demchak argue “it is impossible for correspondence that
pre-dates the [April 2021 settlement agreement] to be for the
subsequent breach of that yet-to-be-entered agreement.”
Norrenberg and Demchak do not dispute Indus’s text messages
and settlement negotiations regarding Norrenberg’s employment

24
claims related to litigation that, as far as Indus could tell,
Norrenberg and Demchak contemplated in good faith and
seriously considered filing within days. Therefore, Indus’s
communications were protected by the litigation privilege. (See
Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, supra,
41 Cal.4th at p. 1251.) Norrenberg and Demchak do not cite any
authority for a rule that would limit the litigation privilege to
communications regarding the current litigation.
Finally, Norrenberg and Demchak argue the trial court
should have denied Indus’s special motion to strike based on
“public policy.” Citing the goal of section 425.16 to eliminate
“‘meritless or retaliatory litigation at an early stage of the
proceedings,’” Norrenberg and Demchak state the “metaphorical
ship has sailed for ‘early’ termination of this case.” Norrenberg
and Demchak recap the four-year history of their dispute with
Indus, beginning in August 2020, when Norrenberg threatened
employment litigation, and ending in October 2024, when
Khosrovyan, Norrenberg, and Demchak filed their cross-
complaint. Norrenberg and Demchak misconstrue “early stage of
the proceedings” to mean an early stage in any dispute between
the parties, rather than an early stage in the proceedings on the
pleading targeted by the motion to strike.9

9 Throughout their reply brief Norrenberg and Demchak
accuse Indus and its counsel of being untruthful, without citing
any evidence supporting their accusation. Nine times
Norrenberg and Demchak state “the truth matters,” or “the truth
matters, but apparently not to [Indus].” Norrenberg and
Demchak also state: “Repeating a lie does not make the lie true,
it simply makes one a liar.” And Norrenberg and Demchak
assert Indus “initiated this lawsuit by lying to the Superior
Court” by alleging in its complaint the settlement agreement

25
DISPOSITION

The order is reversed. The trial court is directed to vacate
its order and enter a new order granting the special motion to
strike under section 425.16. Indus Investments, Royal Lush, and
Adaya are to recover their costs on appeal.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

FEUER, J.

“was entered into without Ms. Adaya’s consent or knowledge”
(which Indus did not allege). Norrenberg and Demchak’s “[a]d
hominem attacks and other invective detract from counsel’s legal
arguments, signal inappropriate personal embroilment in the
dispute, and indicate an inability to engage in the reasoned
analysis the courts need and counsel’s clients deserve.”
(WasteXperts, Inc. v. Arakelian Enterprises, Inc. (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 652, 667; see In re Marriage of Davenport (2011)
194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1537 [“Zeal and vigor in the
representation of clients are commendable. So are civility,
courtesy, and cooperation. They are not mutually exclusive.”].)

26

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