CourtListener 10858916•McCain v. Edwards CA3
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Filed 5/14/26 McCain v. Edwards CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)
KEVIN MCCAIN et al., C101256
Cross-complainants and Appellants,
(Super. Ct. No. 20CV01884)
v.
TYLER EDWARDS et al.,
Cross-defendants and Respondents.
After a disagreement arose over a home renovation, contractor Tyler Edwards, Inc.
(TEI) filed a lien foreclosure action against appellants Kevin and Sarah McCain. The
McCains filed a cross-complaint, asserting contract and tort claims against TEI and its
principals, respondents Tyler and James Edwards, whom the McCains alleged were
personally liable under an alter ego theory. At summary judgment, the trial court ruled
that Tyler Edwards was subject to alter ego liability, but it later reconsidered that decision
and the case proceeded to trial. After a bench trial, the court entered a judgment finding
TEI liable to the McCains on several of their cross-claims but declining to pierce the
corporate veil. Separately, the court awarded Tyler and James Edwards attorneys’ fees
1
under Civil Code section 1717 as the parties prevailing on the McCains’ alter ego
claims.1
On appeal, the McCains argue that the trial court’s alter ego findings are not
supported by sufficient evidence, the court should not have reconsidered its summary
judgment ruling, and Tyler and James Edwards are not prevailing parties entitled to
attorneys’ fees. Alternatively, the McCains contend that, even if respondents properly
prevailed on the alter ego claims, they cannot recover attorneys’ fees under section 1717
on any noncontract claim. We conclude that we lack jurisdiction to consider the
McCains’ appeal of the judgment because their notice of appeal was not timely. We
agree that Tyler and James Edwards were not entitled to attorneys’ fees on any
noncontract claim and therefore reverse the trial court’s post-judgment attorneys’ fees
award and remand for the court to consider whether and how to apportion the fees to limit
the award to the contract claims.
BACKGROUND
In September 2019, Kevin and Sarah McCain signed a contract with TEI to
remodel their home. The contract included an attorneys’ fee provision that read: “If any
legal action or other proceeding is brought to enforce this agreement, or because of an
alleged dispute, breach or misrepresentation in connection with any of the provisions of
this agreement, the successful or prevailing party or parties shall be entitled to recover
their reasonable attorney’s fees, and other costs incurred in that action or proceeding, in
addition to any other relief to which they may be entitled.” Tyler Edwards signed the
contract on behalf of TEI.
The parties disagreed about the quality of TEI’s work, and the McCains refused to
pay. TEI recorded a mechanics lien on the property and sued to foreclose the lien.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.
2
The McCains filed a cross-complaint against TEI as well as respondents Tyler and
James Edwards, alleging that the two men were the “sole members of” TEI and were
personally liable for TEI’s actions under an alter ego theory. The cross-complaint
asserted causes of action for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, breach of implied
warranty, breach of express warranty, negligence, fraudulent inducement to enter a
contract, and disgorgement. It requested compensatory and punitive damages as well as
attorneys’ fees.
The McCains filed two motions for summary judgment or, in the alternative,
adjudication, one addressing the TEI complaint and the other their own cross-complaint.
The trial court granted the motion as to TEI’s complaint on the ground that TEI’s license
was suspended as a matter of law. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7031, subd. (a) [generally
prohibiting unlicensed contractor from bringing action to collect compensation].) As to
the cross-complaint, the court held that the McCains were entitled to judgment against
TEI on their unjust enrichment and disgorgement causes of action, but it denied the
motion as to the remainder of the McCains’ claims. The court further ruled that the
McCains could pierce the corporate veil, reasoning that they had “met their initial burden
by demonstrating [TEI] is under capitalized[,] … that Mr. Edwards used corporate funds
for his personal use[,] … and failed to maintain corporate formalities.” It explained that
“the evidence shows due to the undercapitalization of the corporation, it has nowhere
near the funds to repay the McCains for compensation paid, much less any other damages
that may be obtained.”
In January 2023, TEI, James Edwards, and Tyler Edwards filed a motion for a new
trial on the ground of insufficient evidence to support piercing the corporate veil. The
trial court ordered the parties to submit further briefing on the issue.
In March 2023, the trial court denied the motion for a new trial as procedurally
defective, reasoning that a new trial motion is not a proper vehicle for challenging an
order granting summary judgment or adjudication. In the interest of judicial economy,
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however, the court, on its own motion, reconsidered its ruling on alter ego liability and
struck the portions of the order on the issue. The court explained: “As both parties have
extensively briefed (and case law on the subject provides), alter ego liability involves an
analysis of multiple factors. However, adequate capitalization appears to be an especially
important factor. So much so that some cases suggest inadequate capitalization alone
may be grounds for holding shareholders personally liable. [¶] Both parties have
presented voluminous evidence on the issue of capitalization. Despite this, the [c]ourt
finds triable issues of fact exist as to the capitalization of the corporation relative to its
assets and liabilities. While both sides have made general arguments based on different
financial figures at different points in time, no evidence has been clearly presented setting
forth a comparison of capitalization with on-going financial obligations. There is no
expert evidence that analyzes and explains based on the financial records why the
corporation is, or is not, adequately capitalized. [¶] Further, there is no evidence
concerning the more recent financial condition of the corporation. Although this case
was filed in 2020, it appears to the [c]ourt more recent evidence would be relevant on this
particular issue.”
The case proceeded to a five-day bench trial, and on October 27, 2023, the trial
court issued a final statement of decision. As to TEI, the court found in favor of the
McCains on their breach of contract, negligence, and breach of warranty causes of action;
it rejected their claim of fraud in the inducement. The court awarded them damages. As
to respondents, the court found that the McCains had “not met their burden to show TEI
was undercapitalized” and thus “decline[d] to find alter ego liability for Tyler Edwards
and James Edwards.” It ordered the McCains to prepare a judgment.
On January 25, 2024, the trial court issued an order granting the McCains’ motion
for attorneys’ fees. The court characterized the motion as seeking “an award of
attorney’s fees against plaintiff and cross-defendants Tyler Edwards, Inc., Tyler Edwards,
and James Edwards.” The court awarded fees totaling $231,188 after reducing the award
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to account for an apportionment of the alter ego issue on which the McCains had not
prevailed.
On January 31, 2024, the trial court issued “Judgment in Favor of Sarah and Kevin
McCain and Against Tyler Edwards, Inc.” (Some capitalization omitted.) After setting
forth in numbered paragraphs the damages awards against TEI, the judgment read in
paragraph 11: “The [c]ourt finds that [the] McCains have not met their burden to show
TEI was undercapitalized and declines to find alter ego liability for Tyler Edwards and
James Edwards.” Paragraph 12 said: “The [c]ourt determines that Kevin and Sarah
McCain are the prevailing party pursuant to Civil Code section 1717, Code of Civil
Procedure section 1021, and Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, and are entitled to
their attorney’s fees against Tyler Edwards, Inc., Tyler Edwards, and James Edwards in
the amount of $231,188.00 as [previously ordered] and costs in the amount of $51,760.31
as set forth in the Memorandum of Costs filed December 4, 2023.” The McCains served
notice of entry of judgment on February 15, 2024.
Also on February 15, 2024, TEI and respondents filed a motion to modify the
judgment and attorneys’ fee order, arguing that both had incorrectly awarded fees against
Tyler and James Edwards, rather than only against TEI. The motion argued that the
McCains’ attorneys’ fee request had sought fees only as to TEI.
On March 6, 2024, the trial court issued a written order granting the motion to
modify the judgment and order. The court reasoned that “neither the notice of [the
McCains’ attorneys’ fee] motion, the body of the points and authorities, nor the
conclusion explicitly identifies Tyler Edwards and James Edwards as individuals.”
Consequently, neither had notice that he could be deemed responsible for attorneys’ fees.
The court modified the judgment to strike the award of fees as against the two men
individually.
On April 18, 2024, Tyler and James Edwards filed a motion for attorneys’ fees
against the McCains. They asserted that they were entitled to fees under section 1717
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after prevailing on the McCains’ claims of alter ego liability. The McCains opposed the
motion, arguing in part that the motion was untimely because it was filed more than
60 days after the February 15, 2024 service of notice of entry of judgment. They further
argued that the motion to modify the judgment had not reset the deadline because the
motion solely addressed the issue of attorneys’ fees, which did not “substantially change”
the judgment.
On May 22, 2024, the trial court granted respondents’ fee motion. The court first
concluded that the motion was timely because the judgment had been modified, making
the deadline 60 days after the March 6, 2024 modification. The court reasoned that Tyler
and James Edwards could not have filed their motion for fees until the January 31, 2024
judgment’s imposition of fees against them had been corrected. Alternatively, the court
concluded there was good cause to permit the untimely filing, observing that the question
whether the March 6 modification order tolled the deadline was “at least debatable.”
On the merits, the trial court ruled that Tyler and James Edwards were entitled to
an award of fees. The court determined that respondents were prevailing parties because
they had succeeded on the only legal theories asserted against them: alter ego liability
and fraud. The court rejected the McCains’ argument that section 1717 did not authorize
fee-shifting for their tort claims, reasoning that the attorneys’ fee provision in the home
remodeling contract was broad and “not limited to disputes concerning the contract.”
Because “the attorney fee provision authorizes recovery of attorney fees for non-contract
based claims,” the court found that “no legal basis exist[ed] to apportion fees by limiting
fees to the contract claim alone.” The court awarded respondents $72,314.25 in fees.
On May 29, 2024, the trial court issued an amended judgment. The amended
judgment made minor edits to paragraph 11 of the original January 31, 2024 judgment,
replacing “TEI” with “Tyler Edwards, Inc. dba Edwards Construction” and specifying
that there was no alter ego liability against Tyler and James Edwards “as individuals.” It
edited paragraph 12 by replacing the phrase “Tyler Edwards, Inc., Tyler Edwards, and
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James Edwards,” with “Tyler Edwards, Inc., dba Edwards Construction only” when
describing who was responsible for paying the McCains’ attorneys’ fees. The amended
judgment also added four paragraphs (paragraphs 13 through 16) addressing costs and
attorneys’ fees. The paragraphs stated that the McCains could not recover their costs
against Tyler and James Edwards, noted that the two men were prevailing parties, and set
forth the amount of costs and fees owed to them. The court served the amended
judgment on May 30, 2024.
That same day, the McCains filed two notices of appeal. One stated it was
appealing from a judgment after a court trial entered on May 29, 2024. The second said
it was appealing from an order after judgment entered on May 22, 2024, pursuant to Code
of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2).
DISCUSSION
I.
The McCains’ first two contentions on appeal are that the trial court erred when it
declined to find Tyler and James Edwards personally liable under an alter ego theory.
The McCains argue that there was insufficient evidence supporting the court’s refusal to
pierce the corporate veil and that the court should not have reconsidered the issue after
finding in their favor at summary judgment. We do not address these contentions
because we lack jurisdiction to consider them. As respondents argue, the McCains’
notice of appeal from the judgment was not timely.
Under California Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1), a party must file a notice of
appeal no more than “(A) 60 days after the superior court clerk serves on the party filing
the notice of appeal a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-
endorsed copy of the judgment, showing the date either was served; [¶] (B) 60 days after
the party filing the notice of appeal serves or is served by a party with a document
entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment,
accompanied by proof of service; or [¶] (C) 180 days after entry of judgment.” “If a
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notice of appeal is filed late, the reviewing court must dismiss the appeal.” (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.104(b); see Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 46 Cal.4th 106,
113 [“the filing of a timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite”].)
The notice of entry of the original January 31, 2024 judgment, which included the
trial court’s finding of no alter ego liability, was served on February 15, 2024. The notice
of appeal from that judgment was therefore due by April 15, 2024. The McCains did not
file their notice of appeal until May 30, 2024.
The McCains maintain that the 60-day clock started to run not from the service of
notice of the original January 31, 2024 judgment but instead from the entry of the
amended judgment on May 29, 2024. An amended judgment supersedes “the original
judgment for purposes of computing the time in which to file a notice of appeal” when
the amended judgment “results in a substantial modification of a judgment.” (Dakota
Payphone, LLC v. Alcaraz (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 493, 504.) The question is “whether
there is a substantial change in the rights of the parties such that allowing an amendment
nunc pro tunc (relating back to the original judgment) would unfairly deprive them of the
right to contest the issue on appeal or otherwise.” (Id. at pp. 506-507.) “[A] separately
appealable order after final judgment does not substantially modify the judgment itself
for purposes of computing the time in which to file a notice of appeal. Any problem the
parties might have with the amendment can be pursued through a separate appeal of the
postjudgment order.” (Id. at p. 505; see also Ellis v. Ellis (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 837,
842-843.)
Here, the May 29, 2024 amended judgment did not substantially change the trial
court’s original judgment. The amended judgment made only minor edits to
paragraph 11, replacing the abbreviation “TEI” with the full name of the company
(“Tyler Edwards, Inc. dba Edwards Construction”) and adding the phrase “as
individuals” to the end of the sentence. Thus, the final version of the paragraph read,
“The [c]ourt finds that [the] McCains have not met their burden to show Tyler Edwards,
8
Inc., dba Edwards Construction was undercapitalized and declines to find alter ego
liability against Tyler J. Edwards and James B. Edwards as individuals.” These edits did
not change the court’s findings of fact or conclusions of law, nor did they alter the rights
of any party as to the alter ego issue. The modification in paragraph 12, which was made
primarily to bring the McCains’ fee award into conformance with the court’s alter ego
finding, likewise did not affect or alter the court’s conclusion that Tyler and James
Edwards were not personally liable to the McCains. That conclusion, expressed in the
original January 31, 2024 judgment, “remained valid and could have been challenged by
appeal” at that time. (Dakota Payphone, LLC v. Alcaraz, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at
p. 509.) Moreover, the substance of the change in paragraph 12 specifying that only TEI
(and not respondents) was responsible for paying the McCains’ attorneys’ fees was made
by the court’s modification order, which was served on March 6, 2024, not the May 29,
2024 amended judgment that the McCains now argue provided the first opportunity for
appealing the court’s alter ego determination. The McCains could have pursued an
appeal of that determination by filing a timely notice of appeal from service of notice of
the January 31, 2024 judgment, and the May 29, 2024 amendment did not give the
McCains a second chance to appeal the court’s conclusion because it did not change
anything about the appealable issue. (Cf. Sanchez v. Strickland (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th
758, 765 [modification substantial where judgment reflected a new legal ground
materially affecting parties’ rights].)
We are also unpersuaded that the addition of paragraphs 13 through 16 in the
May 29, 2024 amended judgment was a substantial modification of the original
judgment, as the McCains assert. Those paragraphs addressed the separate postjudgment
issue of fees and costs and do not restart the deadline for filing a notice of appeal.
(Dakota Payphone, LLC v. Alcaraz, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at pp. 505-506.)
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Because the McCains’ notice of appeal was not timely, we must dismiss their
appeal of the judgment.2
II.
The McCains additionally challenge the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees to
Tyler and James Edwards. The McCains concede that, if we leave the trial court’s alter
ego determination intact, respondents were entitled to fees under section 1717, but they
maintain the award must be apportioned to limit fees to those incurred in defending
against the contract claims. Alternatively, the McCains argue in their reply brief that
respondents’ motion for attorneys’ fees was untimely. We reject the timeliness argument,
but agree that the matter must be remanded for the trial court to consider apportionment
of the fees.
“A party may not recover attorney fees unless expressly authorized by statute or
contract. [Citations.] In the absence of a statute authorizing the recovery of attorney
fees, the parties may agree on whether and how to allocate attorney fees. [Citation.]
They may agree the prevailing party will be awarded all the attorney fees incurred in any
litigation between them, limit the recovery of fees only to claims arising from certain
transactions or events, or award them only on certain types of claims. The parties may
agree to award attorney fees on claims sounding in both contract and tort.” (Brown
Bark III, L.P. v. Haver (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 809, 818 (Brown Bark).)
When a party seeks to enforce an attorneys’ fee provision in litigation “on a
contract,” section 1717, subdivision (a) requires fees to be awarded to the prevailing
party, “whether he [or she] is the party specified in the contract or not.” (Reynolds
Metals Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, 128.) “Section 1717 was enacted to
2 In light of this conclusion, we deny as irrelevant the McCains’ request for judicial
notice of a bankruptcy filing by TEI that they assert bears on the issue of alter ego
liability. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 544, fn. 4.)
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establish mutuality of remedy where [a] contractual provision makes recovery of
attorney’s fees available for only one party.” (Ibid.)
“Because section 1717 only applies to an action ‘on a contract,’ the statute and its
reciprocity rules do not apply to claims for fees for tort or other noncontract claims.
[Citation.] For such claims, ‘the question of whether to award attorney’s fees turns on
the language of the contractual attorney’s fee provision, i.e., whether the party seeking
fees has ‘prevailed’ within the meaning of the provision and whether the type of claim is
within the scope of the provision.’ [Citation.] Because there is no requirement of
reciprocity for noncontract claims, a provision that awards fees for such claims to only
one party will be enforced according to its terms, regardless of any apparent unfairness.”
(Hom v. Petrou (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 459, 465.) Thus, for a non-signatory to recover
under such a provision, the contract language must establish that the non-signatory is
entitled to the benefit of the provision. (Brown Bark, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at pp. 828-
829.) We review “ ‘the legal basis for an award of attorney fees de novo as a question of
law.’ ” (Id. at p. 821.)
As an initial matter, the McCains argue that, if the amended judgment did not
restart the clock to file a notice of appeal, as we concluded above, respondents’ April 18,
2024 motion for attorneys’ fees was untimely because it was filed more than 60 days
after the February 15, 2024 service of notice of the original judgment. The McCains did
not make this argument until their reply brief, however, and we need not consider it.
(Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 482, fn. 10.) In any event, the trial court
was free to extend the deadline for filing a motion for attorneys’ fees, as it did as an
alternative ground for deeming respondents’ fee motion timely, and the McCains offer no
argument why this ruling was outside the court’s discretion. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 3.1702(d) [allowing time extensions based on good cause].)
As to the McCains’ substantive arguments, the parties agree that Tyler and James
Edwards were not signatories to the home remodeling contract between TEI and the
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McCains, which contains the relevant attorneys’ fee provision. There is also no dispute
that, even as non-signatories, respondents were entitled to recover their fees incurred in
defending against the McCains’ contract claims. (§ 1717, subd. (a); Reynolds
Metals Co. v. Alperson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 128.) As for the noncontract claims, we
agree with the McCains that the contractual attorneys’ fee provision does not authorize
fee-shifting in favor of respondents. As noted above, the fees provision in the contract
says: “If any legal action or other proceeding is brought to enforce this agreement, or
because of an alleged dispute, breach or misrepresentation in connection with any of the
provisions of this agreement, the successful or prevailing party or parties shall be entitled
to recover their reasonable attorney’s fees, and other costs incurred in that action or
proceeding, in addition to any other relief to which they may be entitled.” This language
does not suggest that non-signatories Tyler and James Edwards were intended to be
covered by the provision. Respondents point to no language in the contract suggesting
otherwise, and our review of the agreement as a whole reveals no intention to grant any
rights or obligations to the Edwardses as individuals. (Sessions Payroll
Management, Inc. v. Noble Construction Co., Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 671, 680 [to
receive the benefits of a contract, “the contracting parties must have intended to benefit”
the non-signatory and the agreement must “reflect[] that intent”].) Thus, Tyler and James
Edwards were not entitled to recover attorneys’ fees for any noncontract claims, and the
trial court erred to the extent it awarded fees for those claims. (See Moallem v. Coldwell
Banker Com. Group, Inc. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1827, 1830; Brown Bark, supra,
219 Cal.App.4th at pp. 828-829.)
Where fees are authorized for some causes of action in a complaint but not for
others, the trial court has discretion to allocate the attorneys’ fees among the claims and
award fees only for authorized claims. (Brown Bark, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at pp. 829-
830.) “Attorney’s fees need not be apportioned when incurred for representation on an
12
issue common to both a cause of action in which fees are proper and one in which they
are not allowed.” (Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 129-130.)
In this case, the McCains do not dispute that Tyler and James Edwards are entitled
to fees for litigating the breach of contract and breach of warranty claims, but maintain
that respondents cannot collect fees on the unjust enrichment, negligence, fraudulent
inducement, and disgorgement claims. The McCains also argue that a specific reduction
in the awarded fees is appropriate, based on the trial court’s apportionment of the fees
awarded to them as against TEI.
We reject the latter argument but find that remand is warranted on the former. As
respondents note, the situation between the McCains and TEI is different than that
between the McCains and respondents, because Tyler and James Edwards prevailed on
all the issues alleged against them, while the McCains did not prevail on all claims as
against TEI. On the allocation of fees among the contract and noncontract claims,
“ ‘[t]he trial court … is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in its
court …’ [citation] and allocation of attorney fees ‘is a matter within the trial court’s
discretion.’ ” (Brown Bark, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 830.) Accordingly, we will
remand the matter for the trial court to exercise its discretion to determine whether and
how to apportion the attorneys’ fees award.
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DISPOSITION
The appeal of the judgment is dismissed. The order awarding attorneys’ fees to
Tyler and James Edwards is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings to determine the amount of fees Tyler and James Edwards may
recover. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.278(a)(3) & (5).)
/s/
FEINBERG, J.
We concur:
/s/
RENNER, Acting P. J.
/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
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