CourtListener 10858359•Conservatorship of M.T. CA2/7
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Filed 5/13/26 Conservatorship of M.T. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
Conservatorship of the Person and B347762
Estate of M.T.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
25NWMH00263)
PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF
LOS ANGELES, as Conservator,
etc.,
Petitioner and Respondent,
v.
M.T.,
Objector and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Scott R. Herin, Judge. Reversed.
B. Jolene Lewis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Objector and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Laura Quiñonez,
Assistant County Counsel, William C. Sias, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, and Caitlin M. McCann, Deputy County Counsel
for Petitioner and Respondent.
_______________________________
INTRODUCTION
M.T. appeals from the judgment establishing a one-year
conservatorship over her and her estate under the Lanterman-
Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.) (LPS Act).1
She argues substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s
finding she was “gravely disabled” as a result of a mental health
disorder, within the meaning of section 5350. She also argues the
court violated the LPS Act and the due process clause of the
California Constitution by failing to advise her that she had a
right to a jury trial.
We agree with M.T.’s second argument, but not the first.
Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding M.T. was
gravely disabled within the meaning of the LPS Act. But the
LPS Act requires the court to advise a proposed conservatee of
the right to a jury trial on the issue of grave disability. The court
did not advise M.T. of her right to a jury trial, and there is no
evidence suggesting she knew, either independently or through
her counsel, she had such a right. Therefore, we reverse.
1 Undesignated section references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Public Guardian Petitions for a Conservatorship
Under the LPS Act, Alleging M.T. Is Gravely Disabled
as a Result of a Mental Disorder
In mid-March 2025 officers from the Los Angeles Police
Department responded to 911 calls regarding M.T. after she
acted violently toward other residents at a homeless shelter
where she had been staying. M.T. was placed on an involuntary
72-hour psychiatric hold under section 5150. The Los Angeles
County Department of Health Care Services determined M.T.
was a danger to others and gravely disabled within the meaning
of section 5008 and certified additional 14-day and 30-day holds
for M.T.
In late March 2025 M.T. was transferred to College Medical
Center in Long Beach. There, two doctors evaluated her,
determined she was gravely disabled as a result of a mental
disorder (unspecified schizophrenia spectrum), referred the
matter to the Office of the Public Guardian for the County of
Los Angeles, and recommended an LPS conservatorship.
In April 2025 the Public Guardian filed a petition for the
appointment of a conservator of the person and estate of M.T.
under the LPS Act (§ 5350). The Public Guardian conducted an
investigation and recommended conservatorship.
3
B. The Trial Court Sets the Petition for a Court Trial
On May 21, 2025 the trial court held a hearing on the
Public Guardian’s petition. M.T. was present. After counsel
made their appearances, the following discussion occurred:
“[Counsel for M.T.]: Your Honor, [M.T.] does not wish to be
on conservatorship. She would like to set a court trial, please.
“The Court: Is that correct, [M.T.]?
“M.T.: Yes.”
The court set the petition for a court trial on June 23, 2025.
C. The Court Finds M.T. Is Gravely Disabled as a Result
of a Mental Disorder, and M.T. Appeals from the
Judgment
At the trial Dr. Alete Arom, a forensic psychologist at
College Medical Center, testified M.T. was gravely disabled
within the meaning of the LPS Act. Dr. Arom stated M.T. had
“unspecified schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic
disorders” characterized by “paranoia and guardedness.”
Dr. Arom also stated that M.T. had “superficial insight into her
mental health condition” and that, as a result, Dr. Arom did “not
believe that [M.T. had] enough insight or understanding” to take
her antipsychotic medication voluntarily. Dr. Arom said M.T.
stopped taking her medication prior to her most recent
involuntary hospitalization. M.T. also testified at the trial.
The trial court found M.T. was gravely disabled as a result
of a mental disorder, within the meaning of the LPS Act. The
court granted the petition and appointed the Public Guardian
conservator over the person and estate of M.T., with the
conservatorship to terminate on June 23, 2026. M.T. timely
appealed.
4
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“The LPS Act governs the involuntary detention,
evaluation, and treatment of persons who, as a result of mental
disorder, are dangerous or gravely disabled. [Citation.] The Act
authorizes the superior court to appoint a conservator of the
person for one who is determined to be gravely disabled [citation],
so that he or she may receive individualized treatment,
supervision, and placement.” (Conservatorship of John L. (2010)
48 Cal.4th 131, 142; accord, Public Guardian of Contra Costa
County v. Eric B. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1085, 1095; Conservatorship
of A.J. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 728; Enmark v. KF Community
Care, LLC (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 463, 470.) A person is “gravely
disabled” under the LPS Act if, “as a result of a mental health
disorder, a severe substance use disorder, or a co-occurring
mental health disorder and a severe substance use disorder, [the
person] is unable to provide for their basic personal needs for
food, clothing, shelter, personal safety, or necessary medical
care.” (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A); see Eric B., at p. 1095.) “The
LPS Act authorizes short-term involuntary detentions [citations]
and one-year conservatorships for those who are gravely disabled
due to a mental health disorder or chronic alcoholism.” (Eric B.,
at p. 1095; see §§ 5150, 5250, 5350.) “A conservatorship
terminates after one year but may be extended for additional
one-year terms upon petition.” (Eric. B., at p. 1096; see § 5361.)
5
B. Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s
Finding M.T. Is Gravely Disabled
M.T. argues substantial evidence did not support the trial
court’s finding she was gravely disabled within the meaning of
the LPS Act. Substantial evidence supported that finding.
“In the trial court, ‘to establish that a person is gravely
disabled, the evidence must support an objective finding that the
person, due to mental disorder, is incapacitated or rendered
unable to carry out the transactions necessary for survival or
otherwise provide for his or her basic needs of food, clothing, or
shelter,’ and the public guardian must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the proposed conservatee is gravely disabled.
[Citation.] On appeal, we apply the substantial evidence test to
determine whether the record supports the court’s finding of
grave disability. The testimony of one witness may be sufficient
to support such a finding.” (Conservatorship of Jesse G. (2016)
248 Cal.App.4th 453, 460-461; accord, Conservatorship of A.J.,
supra, 109 Cal.App.5th 728, 732; Conservatorship of Carol K.
(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 123, 134.)
Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding
M.T. was gravely disabled within the meaning of the LPS Act.
Dr. Arom stated M.T. had a mental disorder: “unspecified
schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders” that
required treatment with medication. Dr. Arom also stated that
M.T. did not believe she had a mental illness and that therefore
she lacked insight into her condition and the positive impact
medication had on that condition. Dr. Arom stated that, because
M.T. did not like some of the medication’s side effects and she did
not appreciate the essential role medication played in her
treatment, Dr. Arom was “very concerned” M.T. would not
6
continue to seek treatment voluntarily in the absence of a
conservatorship. According to Dr. Arom, if M.T. stopped taking
her prescribed medication, “she would significantly deteriorate,”
as she did after the court terminated her prior conservatorship.
Dr. Arom said that without medication M.T.’s planning skills
would be “quite limited” and that, as a result, M.T. would likely
“have nowhere to live” and be “back in danger.” Dr. Arom
emphasized that, when M.T. previously stopped taking her
medication, she was unable to provide for her basic necessities,
including food, clothing, and shelter, she was physically attacked,
and she was living on the street after she was kicked out of a
homeless shelter, all of which placed her in danger.
M.T. argues the trial court did not give sufficient weight to
her testimony that she was currently complying with her
treatment plan, that she was willing to continue treatment
voluntarily, and that she had formulated a detailed plan to
provide for her food, clothing, and shelter. The issue on appeal,
however, is whether substantial evidence supported the trial
court’s ruling—not whether substantial evidence would have
supported a different ruling. (See In re Caden C. (2021)
11 Cal.5th 614, 640 [determination of the trial court “should ‘be
upheld if . . . supported by substantial evidence, even though
substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court
might have reached a different result had it believed other
evidence’”]; K.F. v. Superior Court (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1369,
1383, fn. 7 [“where substantial evidence, including reasonable
inferences drawn from the evidence, supports the trial court’s
factual finding, an affirmance is appropriate”; that “contrary
evidence exists which could support a different finding is not the
test”]; see also Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989,
7
1011-1012 [in conducting substantial evidence review, the
appellate court “must view the record in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party below and give appropriate deference to
how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of
witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn
reasonable inferences from the evidence”].)
C. The Trial Court Erred by Failing To Advise M.T. of
Her Right to a Jury Trial
M.T. argues the trial court violated her statutory and
constitutional rights to a jury trial because the court “did not
advise her as to her jury trial rights or obtain from her a personal
knowing and intelligent waiver of that right.” She is correct.
“Because of the important liberty interests at stake [in an
LPS conservatorship proceeding], correspondingly powerful
safeguards protect against erroneous findings. ‘The proposed
conservatee is entitled to demand a jury trial on the issue of his
or her grave disability, and has a right to counsel at trial,
appointed if necessary. (§§ 5350, 5365.) The party seeking
imposition of the conservatorship must prove the proposed
conservatee’s grave disability beyond a reasonable doubt[,] and
the verdict must be issued by a unanimous jury.’”
(Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 541; see § 5350,
subd. (d)(1) [“The person for whom conservatorship is sought
shall have the right to demand a court or jury trial on the issue of
whether the person is gravely disabled.”]; Conservatorship of
Joanne R. (2016) 72 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1016 [“A proposed
8
conservatee has a right to a jury trial upon demand at the
establishment and annual renewal of a conservatorship.”].)
The trial court must directly and personally advise a
proposed conservatee of the right to a jury trial.2 (See K.R. v.
Superior Court (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 133, 143 [“decisions are in
accord that a trial court must personally advise a person of the
statutory right to a jury trial in LPS proceedings”];
Conservatorship of C.O. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 894, 909 [trial
court’s failure to personally advise the proposed conservatee of
the right to a jury trial was “statutory error”]; Conservatorship of
Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378, 381 [“In conservatorship
proceedings pursuant to the LPS Act, the trial court must obtain
a personal waiver of a jury trial from the conservatee, even when
the conservatee expresses no preference for a jury trial.”].)
Probate Code section 1828, which is incorporated by reference
into section 5350, provides that “before the establishment of a
2 There is a split of authority on whether, where the trial
court failed to directly advise the proposed conservatee, counsel
may waive the right to a jury trial on behalf of the proposed
conservatee. (Compare Conservatorship of Joanne R., supra,
72 Cal.App.5th at p. 1016 [“‘LPS commitment proceedings
require the court to obtain a personal waiver of the right to a jury
trial from the proposed conservatee.’”] and Conservatorship of
Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378, 383-384 [jury trial
waiver by counsel is valid only if the proposed conservatee lacked
capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver] with
Conservatorship of C.O. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 894, 911 [jury trial
waiver by counsel is valid unless circumstances suggest that
counsel lacked actual authority from the proposed conservatee,
that counsel disregarded the proposed conservatee’s wishes, or
that the proposed conservatee was unaware of the right to a jury
trial].)
9
conservatorship of the person or estate, or both, the court shall
inform the proposed conservatee of . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . the right
. . . to have the matter of the establishment of the
conservatorship tried by jury . . . .” (Prob. Code, § 1828,
subd. (a)(6).)
The trial court erred by not advising M.T. she had the right
to a jury trial on the issue of grave disability. As stated, the court
asked M.T. whether she agreed with her attorney’s statements
she did not want to be subject to a conservatorship and wanted a
court trial, and M.T. said, “Yes.” The court did not inform M.T. of
her right to a jury trial, nor did the court explain the difference
between a court trial and a jury trial. (See People v. Sivongxxay
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 169-170 [before accepting a waiver of the
right to a jury trial in a criminal proceeding, the trial court
should advise the defendant “of the basic mechanics of a jury
trial” and that, if the defendant “waives the right to a jury trial,
the judge alone will decide his or her guilt or innocence”];
Conservatorship of Joanne R., supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1017-
1019 [applying Sivongxxay to LPS conservatorship proceedings].)
D. The Trial Court’s Error Was Not Harmless
“[U]nder article VI, section 13 of the California
Constitution, ‘[a] judgment may not be reversed on appeal . . .
unless “after an examination of the entire cause, including the
evidence,” it appears the error caused a “miscarriage of justice.’”
[Citation.] The constitutional constraint, which applies in civil as
well as criminal cases, ‘generally “prohibits a reviewing court
from setting aside a judgment due to trial court error unless it
finds the error prejudicial.’”” (TriCoast Builders, Inc. v. Fonnegra
(2024) 15 Cal.5th 766, 786.) Where, as here, the error is one of
10
state law, reviewing courts typically apply the harmless error
standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836:
“[A] ‘miscarriage of justice’ should be declared only when the
court, ‘after an examination of the entire cause, including the
evidence,’ is of the ‘opinion’ that it is reasonably probable that a
result more favorable to the appealing party would have been
reached in the absence of the error.” (See People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 973; People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 29.)
But the Watson harmless error standard does not always
apply. In People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, for
example, the Supreme Court considered whether to apply the
Watson standard where a mentally disordered offender did not
personally waive the right to a jury trial. (Id. at pp. 1130, 1132-
1138.) Like LPS Act proceedings, mentally disordered offender
proceedings are civil in nature and may involve involuntary
commitment of the offender. (Id. at p. 1122.) In concluding the
Watson standard should not apply, the Supreme Court stated:
“The failure to obtain a valid jury trial waiver defies ordinary
harmless error analysis. To speculate about whether a defendant
would have chosen a jury trial if he or she had been in a position
to make a personal choice would pose insurmountable difficulties,
as would an inquiry into what effect, if any, that choice would
have had on the outcome of the trial. . . . Accordingly, we treat a
trial court’s failure to obtain a required personal jury trial waiver
as tantamount to the denial of a jury trial, and as such, it
constitutes a “miscarriage of justice” under article VI, section 13.”
(Id. at p. 1134; see K.R. v. Superior Court, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th
at p. 143 [ “An error resulting in a complete denial of a person’s
right to a jury trial on the entire cause in a commitment
proceeding is not susceptible to ordinary harmless error analysis
11
and automatically requires reversal.”]; Conservatorship of
Joanne R., supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1016-1017 [“with respect
to civil commitments, the failure of a court to obtain a valid jury
trial waiver where required by statute ‘denies the defendant his
or her statutory right to a jury trial,’ and is a “‘miscarriage of
justice” within the meaning of California Constitution, article VI,
section 13 [that] requires reversal without inquiry into the
strength of the evidence in a particular case’”]; Conservatorship of
Heather W., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 385 [trial court’s error
in accepting counsel’s waiver was not subject to ordinary
harmless error analysis and required reversal, unless the record
showed the proposed conservatee lacked the capacity to make a
knowing and voluntary waiver at the time of counsel’s waiver].)
The Supreme Court in Blackburn adopted a modified
harmless error standard: “The concept of harmless error does
have applicability in this context in the following limited
sense. . . . [A] trial court’s failure to properly advise [a mentally
disordered offender] of the right to a jury trial does not by itself
warrant automatic reversal. Instead, a trial court’s acceptance of
a defendant’s personal waiver without an express advisement
may be deemed harmless if the record affirmatively shows, based
on the totality of the circumstances, that the defendant’s waiver
was knowing and voluntary.” (People v. Blackburn, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 1136; see People v. Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th
at p. 166 [“‘[w]hether or not there is an intelligent, competent,
self-protecting waiver of jury trial by an accused must depend
upon the unique circumstances of each case’”].)
Under the modified harmless error standard of People v.
Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at page 1136 the trial court’s failure
to advise M.T. of her right to a jury trial was not harmless.
12
There is no evidence M.T. made a knowing and voluntary waiver
of her right to a jury trial. Unlike Conservatorship of C.O., supra,
71 Cal.App.5th 894, for example, there was no evidence that
counsel for M.T. advised M.T. of her right to a jury trial, that
counsel discussed with M.T. the difference between a court trial
and a jury trial, or that M.T. knew she had the right to a jury
trial and chose a court trial. (See id. at p. 915.)
The Public Guardian argues that, because M.T. was
present during the trial and did not object to the absence of a
jury, she knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to a jury
trial. The Public Guardian also argues M.T. “had multiple
opportunities to express disagreement with her counsel’s
representation that she was electing to proceed with a court trial,
including during her direct exchanges with the court on both her
initial hearing date and her court trial date . . . .” But as
discussed, the record must affirmatively show a valid waiver.
(See People v. Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.5th at pp. 1136-1137
[“the requirement of an affirmative showing means that no valid
waiver may be presumed from a silent record”].) The record does
not affirmatively show waiver here. In addition, M.T. could not
“express disagreement” with having a court trial if no one told
her that she had the option of a jury trial. We cannot infer from
M.T.’s silence she knowingly waived her right to a jury trial.
13
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
FEUER, J.
14
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