Estate of Jones CA2/8

CourtListener 10858358CalctappMay 13, 2026

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Filed 5/13/26 Estate of Jones CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

Estate of VESSA JONES, Deceased. B349481

(Los Angeles County
BRIER OAK ON SUNSET, LLC, Super. Ct. No.
24STPB00160)
Petitioner and Respondent,

v.

ARTEENA RUBENSTEIN,

Objector and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Brenda Penny, Judge. Affirmed.
Arteena Rubenstein, in pro. per, for Objector and
Appellant.
FBT Gibbons and Mark A. Ross for Petitioner and
Respondent.
___________________________________
Arteena L. Rubenstein appeals from an order confirming
the sale of real property. As she has not met her burden as an
appellant to show reversible error, we affirm.
In late 2024, the trial court quieted title to real property
with the address of 1643 Leighton Avenue in Los Angeles, CA. It
transferred title from Rubenstein to Megan Gooing,
administrator of the Estate of Vessa Jones. It declared void a
prior deed granting the property to Rubenstein. The allegation
was that Rubenstein had “fraudulently and in bad faith prepared
a grant deed in her own handwriting and signed it as the
decedent’s attorney-in-fact, at a time when [she] knew . . .
creditors were seeking to collect money due for the decedent’s
stay at residential care facilities.” One such facility, Brier Oak on
Sunset, LLC, participated in the quieting of title as a judgment
creditor of the decedent.
On August 13, 2025, the trial court entered an order
confirming sale of the Leighton Avenue property.
On August 28, 2025, Rubenstein filed a notice of appeal
from the August 13 order. The notice of appeal lists Megan
Gooing, administrator of the Estate of Vessa Jones, and Brier
Oak as respondents, and the proof of service indicates mailing of
the notice to Gooing. Rubenstein filed an opening brief on appeal
and a reply. Brier Oak filed a respondent’s brief. No other party
filed a brief. In a previous appeal, Case No. B343194, concerning
the same trial court matter, Rubenstein purportedly sought
review of an order on behalf of Vessa Jones’s estate. We
dismissed that appeal when Rubenstein did not contest she was
unauthorized to act for the estate, but we did so “without
prejudice” to any appeal she “may have the right to file arising
from an order or judgment affecting her individual rights.”

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Rubenstein brings this appeal in her own name. She seeks
reversal of the order confirming sale because it was unsupported
by credible evidence, derived from the trial court’s bias,
seemingly ignored a court order from two years earlier, and did
not follow a trial.
On appeal, a challenged judgment or order is presumed
correct and an appellant bears the burden of affirmatively
demonstrating error. (Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron (2009) 177
Cal.App.4th 771, 799.) To meet this burden, an appellant must,
among other things, provide an adequate record (Maria P. v.
Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295–1296; Hotels Nevada, LLC v.
L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348);
address the standard of review applicable to the challenged
ruling (Sonic Mfg. Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011)
196 Cal.App.4th 456, 465); support each claim of error with
“reasoned argument and citations to authority” and with
citations to pertinent facts in the record (Dietz, at p. 799; Nwosu
v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246); and, if contesting the
sufficiency of the evidence behind a ruling, set forth, discuss, and
analyze all the evidence, both favorable and unfavorable to the
appellant’s position (Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cashel
& Emly (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 209, 218). An appellant’s failure
to comply with any of these requirements may result in a
forfeiture of the appellant’s claims. (See Hotels Nevada, at p.
348; Sonic Mfg. Technologies, at p. 465; Dietz, at p. 799; Nwosu,
at p. 1246; Roman Catholic Archbishop, at p. 218; see generally
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a).) An “appellant’s burden to
affirmatively demonstrate error remains the same whether or not
respondent files a brief.” (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide:
Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2025) ¶ 8:17.3, p. 7;

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see County of San Diego Dept. of Child Support Services v. C.P.
(2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 1, 7, fn. 7.) And contentions not
appropriately raised in the opening brief are forfeited; the reply
brief is too late, as the respondent’s sole opportunity to address
the court has passed. (Ables v. A. Ghazale Brothers, Inc. (2022)
74 Cal.App.5th 823, 828.) These appellate burdens apply to self-
represented litigants. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th
975, 985; Nwosu, at p. 1246.)
Rubenstein’s briefing does not meet her burden as
appellant. The opening brief does not identify the standard of
review applicable to the court’s order confirming sale. The
slender record provided does not contain a transcript of the
proceedings below or a substitute, nor does it contain moving or
opposing papers or evidentiary submissions that led to the order
confirming sale. The opening brief’s broad arguments are
unsupported by citation to legal authority or to particular pages
of the record, except in one instance where the opening brief cites
the order appealed from and another where it makes an
unexplained reference to a “section 2 article VIII Prop 19.” It
seems Article VIII of the California Constitution was repealed in
1966. Furthermore, to the extent Rubenstein appears to raise a
substantial evidence challenge, she has not summarized the
competing evidence for and against the order she challenges. She
claims the trial court “ignored” various matters, but she does not
show that these matters appear in the record or that she
presented them to the court for its consideration.
On the state of the record and the briefing, Rubenstein has
not met her burden to show reversible error.

4
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment. Respondent to recover costs.

SCHERB. J.

We Concur:

WILEY, Acting P. J.

VIRAMONTES, J.

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