CourtListener 10858357•Ghost v. Wilson CA2/3
Full text
Filed 5/13/26 Ghost v. Wilson CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
AMANDA GHOST et al., B342756
Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24STCV17314)
v.
REBEL WILSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Thomas D. Long, Judge. Affirmed.
Liner Freedman Taitelman + Cooley, Bryan J. Freedman,
Brian Turnaeur, Jacob T. Bolan; Jassy Vick Carolan, Jean-Paul
Jassy, Nicholas Hartmann; Hart Kienle & Pentecost, and Allyson
K. Thompson, for Defendant and Appellant.
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Camille M.
Vasquez, Samuel A. Moniz, Valerie E. Alter, Honieh Udenka, and
Melissa Medhat Mikail, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Plaintiffs Amanda Ghost, Gregor Cameron, and Vince
Holden filed a defamation lawsuit against defendant Rebel
Wilson based on statements that Wilson made in an Instagram
video and in a demand letter that Wilson allegedly shared with
the press. Wilson now appeals from a trial court order denying
her special motion to strike the complaint under California’s anti-
SLAPP statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16).1 We affirm the
order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
I. The underlying dispute and plaintiffs’ lawsuit
Wilson is a prominent actress, director, and producer.
Plaintiffs are film producers, and Ghost is also “an award-
winning song writer and music executive . . . .”
1 All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to
the Code of Civil Procedure.
2 We take our facts from the operative first amended
complaint and the parties’ evidence in support of and opposition
to the special motion to strike. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2) [court “shall
consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits
stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based”].)
We deny Wilson’s July 2025 request for judicial notice of an
arbitration decision relating to Ghost and media coverage of the
order denying Wilson’s anti-SLAPP motion. We also deny
Wilson’s November 2025 request for judicial notice of a special
motion to strike Ghost’s cross-complaint and an appellate brief
filed by Ghost’s attorneys in a different matter pending before
this court. These documents do not affect our analysis in any
way. (Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 657, 687 [court may decline to take notice of
irrelevant materials].)
2
In 2023, plaintiffs and Wilson contracted to co-produce a
film called The Deb (the film). Wilson also directed and acted in
the film. The film’s announcement was covered in media outlets
including Variety and the Hollywood Reporter.
The film was selected to premiere on the closing night of
the Toronto International Film Festival (TIFF). According to
BBC News, the TIFF is “widely considered the onset of the
annual film awards season,” and Vox has described the festival as
“a bellwether for what will happen at the movies for the next six
months.” The film’s selection to premiere at the TIFF was covered
by AP News and other media outlets.
In late 2023, Wilson allegedly told “professionals and
individuals in the industry” that Ghost was a “sexual harasser.”
Ghost declared that Wilson “spread a rumor” to the cast and crew
of the film “that [Ghost] had sexually harassed or abused” the
lead actress in the film, Charlotte MacInnes.
In June 2024, Wilson’s counsel sent plaintiffs a demand
letter asserting that Wilson had been promised a writing credit
and certain rights to the music in the film. The letter demanded
a compromise on these claims and threatened legal action if no
resolution could be reached. The letter also claimed that Ghost
and Cameron embezzled money from the film’s budget, and that
they sexually harassed, coerced, and held captive MacInnes. It
further accused Cameron of bullying and wrongfully imprisoning
Wilson.
On July 10, 2024, Wilson posted a video on Instagram in
which she stated:
“ ‘So you might have noticed that I did a post a
couple, you know, like a week ago, about my film, the
first film that I’ve directed that I’m so proud of The
3
Deb, which is a little Australian original musical that
is so cute, and it’s awesome that it got selected for
closing night of the Toronto Film Festival, which is
like . . . just you know, the best platform, and to be a
first-time female director it’s just like, I mean, it’s
huge. It’s massive.
So to have the joy of the movie being selected is
one thing. But then to have the business partners
that are involved in that movie turn around and say
that no, the movie can’t premiere, is just beyond
devastating.
Why are they saying this? Why are they
stopping it from premiering at Toronto? Well, this
dates back to October of last year, where I discovered
bad behavior by these business partners. And let me
just, you know, I just tell it how it is, so I’m just going
to tell you who they are. They are so called producers
of the film — I use that phrase very lightly. Their
names are Amanda Ghost, and Gregory [sic]
Cameron, and an executive producer who works with
them called Vince Holden. So these are the people
involved.
And so I said, reported, I guess you would say,
their bad behavior when I found out not minor
things, big things, you know, inappropriate behavior
towards the lead actress of the film, embezzling funds
from the film’s budget, which we really needed
because we’re a small movie, you know? So kind of
really important things.
4
Since I reported that behavior, I have been met
with absolute viciousness and retaliatory behavior.
So I’m there on set. I’m trying to film my movie with
my gorgeous Australian cast and crew who are so
amazing — shout out to all of you guys.
And yet every step of the way, these people who
I complained about then tried to make my life hell. In
the meantime, though, I still finished the movie. I
made this great movie The Deb. And then now, you
know, almost at the finish line. They’re saying, you
know, it can’t come out. They might not release it,
they might bury it. This is work of hundreds of people
who have put their heart and soul into this. And this
behavior is absolutely vile and disgusting. Now these
people you know, Amanda Ghost in particular, has
has a history of doing this kind of thing, mainly to
music artists but also to people in the film business.
So, the thing is, these people are forced to sign NDAs
or, you know, otherwise threatened or bullied to not
speak out.
As you guys know, I’m not like that. I won’t be
threatened. I will speak the truth, and, you know,
warn people about these people in the industry. Who
are just not behaving ethically. Yeah, so that’s my
dilemma. If the movie doesn’t play at Toronto, it’s
because of these absolute fuckwits.’ ”
The statements in Wilson’s video were later described or
quoted in at least five media outlets, including Entertainment
Weekly. The headlines conveyed that Wilson had accused
plaintiffs of cancelling the film’s TIFF premiere.
5
Plaintiffs sued Wilson for defamation on July 12, 2024,
based on the statements in the Instagram video. The operative
complaint alleged that the video falsely stated or implied that the
plaintiffs sexually harassed the lead actress in the film,
embezzled funds from the film, and acted inappropriately toward
the lead actress in the film.
Shortly after plaintiffs’ original complaint was filed, Wilson
allegedly shared the demand letter with the press. Variety and
other publications printed articles that included descriptions of
the demand letter.
Plaintiffs amended the complaint to allege that Wilson
defamed them by leaking the demand letter. According to the
operative complaint, the letter falsely asserted that:
“1) Ms. Ghost and Mr. Cameron embezzled
900,000 Australian Dollars from the Film; 2) Ms.
Ghost and Mr. Cameron have a pattern and practice
of embezzlement, including on other projects; 3) Ms.
Ghost and Mr. Cameron sexually harassed a lead
actress of the Film; 4) Ms. Ghost and Mr. Cameron
maintained coercive control on a lead actress of the
Film and forced her to engage in depraved sexual
demands; 5) a lead actress of the Film is being held
captive by Ms. Ghost and Mr. Cameron, and is being
taken across state lines; 6) Mr. Cameron used
physical aggression to bully Rebel, and wrongfully
imprisoned her.”
II. Wilson’s special motion to strike
In October 2024, Wilson filed a special motion to strike the
complaint pursuant to section 425.16. The motion argued that
plaintiffs’ defamation claim arises from Wilson’s communications
6
about a matter of public interest made in a public forum, and also
from her conduct in furtherance of her free speech rights in
connection with an issue of public interest. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3)
& (4).) It specifically asserted that Wilson and all plaintiffs are
persons in the public eye; that the statements implicated issues
of public interest including the release of the film, the TIFF,
sexual harassment, embezzlement, and tax fraud; and that the
statements could affect a large number of people. In addition, the
motion contended that the allegations based on the demand letter
fell within section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), which encompasses
certain litigation activity. Finally, the motion argued that
plaintiffs could not demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on the
merits.
Plaintiffs’ opposition asserted that their defamation claim
was based on statements and conduct relating to a private
business dispute, not any public issue; and that plaintiffs were
not in the public eye. It also argued that leaking the demand
letter did not fall under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) because
it did not comment on any judicial proceeding. Further, the
opposition asserted that plaintiffs could establish a probability of
success on their defamation claim. Wilson’s reply reiterated the
points raised in her motion.
The trial court denied Wilson’s motion. The court
recognized that sexual harassment, embezzlement, and tax fraud
might be issues of public concern. However, it reasoned that the
challenged statements in the Instagram video were not made in
the context of any public discussion about those issues, but
instead merely publicized a private business dispute. The court
also rejected Wilson’s assertion that the Instagram video affected
a large group of people because it might impact the cast and crew
7
of the film, reasoning that the video was not part of the
production process. The court recognized that the creation of the
demand letter was protected activity under section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(2). But it determined that transmission of the
letter to the media was not protected because that act was not in
furtherance of any contemplated litigation. The court therefore
concluded that Wilson failed to establish that plaintiffs’ claim
arises from protected activity within the meaning of the anti-
SLAPP statute. The court did not reach the second step of the
anti-SLAPP analysis.
Wilson timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal framework and standard of review
“To combat lawsuits designed to chill the exercise of free
speech and petition rights (typically known as strategic lawsuits
against public participation, or SLAPPs), the Legislature has
authorized a special motion to strike claims that are based on a
defendant’s engagement in such protected activity. (See Code
Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (a).)” (Park v. Board of Trustees of
California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1060 (Park).)
Section 425.16, subdivision (e), describes four categories of
conduct “ ‘ “in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free
speech under the United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue” ’ ” which are protected by the anti-
SLAPP statute. (Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6
Cal.5th 610, 620.) The categories relevant to this appeal
encompass “any written or oral statement or writing made in a
place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an
issue of public interest” and any conduct “in furtherance of the
8
exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the
constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public
issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3)–(4).)
The resolution of a special motion to strike involves two
steps. First, the court must determine “whether the plaintiff’s
claims arise from protected activity.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health
System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009.) At this stage, the defendant
has the burden “to identify what acts each challenged claim rests
on and to show how those acts are protected under a statutorily
defined category of protected activity.” (Ibid.) If the defendant
satisfies this burden, at the second step, “for each claim that does
arise from protected activity, the plaintiff must show the claim
has ‘at least “minimal merit.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Our review is de novo. (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067.)
“We exercise independent judgment in determining whether,
based on our own review of the record, the challenged claims
arise from protected activity.” (Ibid.) We “shall consider the
pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the
facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (§ 425.16,
subd. (b)(2).) We do not “weigh the evidence, but accept plaintiff’s
submissions as true and consider only whether any contrary
evidence from the defendant establishes its entitlement to prevail
as a matter of law.” (Park, at p. 1067.)
II. Plaintiffs’ defamation claim arises from protected
activity
Wilson argues that plaintiffs’ defamation claim arises from
a “written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to
the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public
interest,” and also from Wilson’s conduct “in furtherance of the
exercise of . . . the constitutional right of free speech in connection
9
with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16,
subd. (e)(3) & (4).) Plaintiffs do not dispute that the statements
posted to Instagram were made in a public forum. (Id., subd.
(e)(3); Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1252
[Facebook and Instagram posts were made on a public forum].)
They also do not contest that sharing the demand letter with the
press was an act in furtherance of Wilson’s free speech rights.
(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)
However, the parties disagree as to whether Wilson’s
statements and conduct were in connection with a public issue.
In assessing this question, “courts look to certain specific
considerations, such as whether the subject of the speech or
activity . . . ‘occur[red] in the context of an ongoing controversy,
dispute or discussion’ [citation] . . . .” (FilmOn.com Inc. v.
DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 145–146 (FilmOn).)3 We
use a two-step analysis. “First, we ask what ‘public issue
or . . . issue of public interest’ the speech in question implicates—
a question we answer by looking to the content of the speech.
[Citation.] Second, we ask what functional relationship exists
between the speech and the public conversation about some
matter of public interest.” (Id. at pp. 149–150.)
At the first part of the FilmOn analysis, “virtually always,
defendants succeed in drawing a line—however tenuous—
connecting their speech to an abstract issue of public interest.”
3 A statement is also connected to a public issue if it concerns
“ ‘a person or entity in the public eye’ . . . .” (FilmOn, supra, 7
Cal.5th at pp. 145–146.) Because we conclude that plaintiffs’
defamation claim relates to a public issue, we need not resolve
the parties’ dispute as to whether the claim also concerns persons
in the public eye.
10
(FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 150.) The Instagram video and
the demand letter both broadly relate to the creation and
production of the film. And Wilson provided evidence that the
film and its selection to premiere at the TIFF were covered in the
media, which establishes that both topics are of demonstrated
public interest. (Cf. Kronemyer v. Internet Movie Database Inc.
(2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 941, 949 [successful film My Big Fat
Greek Wedding was of public interest].) The fact that the video
and the demand letter also described a private dispute between
Wilson and plaintiffs does not alter this conclusion, because
“FilmOn’s first step is satisfied so long as the challenged speech
or conduct, considered in light of its context, may reasonably be
understood to implicate a public issue, even if it also implicates a
private dispute.” (Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238, 1253
(Geiser).)
At the second part of the FilmOn analysis, we consider both
“the content of the challenged statements” and “the broader
context” in which the statements were made to assess whether
the statements “further[ed] [the] public conversation on an issue
of public interest.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 152–153.)
We assess the second part of the analysis through the lens of the
public issues identified in the first part. (Geiser, supra, 13
Cal.5th at p. 1250.)
Wilson’s statements in the Instagram video contributed to
the public discourse on the film and its planned premiere at the
TIFF. As we have noted, the film was discussed by major media
outlets, as was its selection to premiere at the TIFF. The
Instagram video focused primarily on these topics. Wilson began
the video by stating that she had directed a film. She noted that
the film was chosen to premiere at the TIFF, an honor that she
11
described as “huge” and “massive.” Wilson then disclosed that
plaintiffs told her that “the movie can’t premiere.” And she
explained why: Wilson discovered and reported certain
misconduct, and plaintiffs retaliated against her by threatening
to “bury” the movie. Wilson concluded the video by stating, “[i]f
the movie doesn’t play at Toronto, it’s because of” plaintiffs. In
short, the primary purpose of the video was to announce a
significant development, and further public discourse, about the
release of the film—that it might not premiere at the TIFF.
The leaked demand letter also contributed to the public
discourse on this issue. Wilson posted the Instagram video on
July 10, 2024, and just two days later, Variety reported that it
had obtained the demand letter. The accusations in the letter
align with, and provide additional detail about, the accusations in
the Instagram video. Thus, considering “the broader context” of
the Instagram video and the leaked demand letter, we conclude
that all of the challenged statements “further[ed] [the] public
conversation on an issue of public interest.” (FilmOn, supra, 7
Cal.5th at pp. 152–153.)
The media coverage of the Instagram video and the demand
letter further supports our conclusion. According to the
complaint, five articles covered the Instagram video, and the
headlines highlighted Wilson’s assertion that plaintiffs had
threatened to stop the film from premiering at the TIFF. And
Variety published an article covering both the demand letter and
the earlier Instagram video, and describing both as accusing
plaintiffs of misconduct. “[W]hen the conduct that gives rise to a
lawsuit attracts such media attention, it can be an indicator that
12
such conduct was undertaken ‘in connection with’ a public
issue.” (Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1255.)4
Plaintiffs argue that the statements in the Instagram video
and the demand letter are disconnected from any matter of public
concern because the public had previously expressed no interest
in the film’s finances or its producers. By focusing on one aspect
of the video, plaintiffs improperly ignore the larger context. As
we have explained, Wilson began and ended her video by
announcing that the film might not premiere at the TIFF. And
the demand letter provided further context for the dispute that
led to this potential cancellation. It is true that Wilson’s
statements also described a private dispute between Wilson and
the producers of the film, which in part related to the film’s
finances. But considering “the broader context,” including
subsequent media coverage focusing on the public consequences
of the parties’ private dispute, we conclude that Wilson’s
statements “further[ed] [the] public conversation on an issue of
public interest.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 152–153.)5 In
sum, all of the conduct underlying plaintiffs’ defamation claim is
protected activity within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute.
4 Because we conclude that the leaked demand letter is
protected activity with the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision
(e)(3), we need not consider whether it is also protected litigation
activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2).
5 Because we conclude that Wilson’s statements furthered
public discourse about the film and the TIFF premiere, we need
not address whether they also contributed to a public
conversation on sexual harassment, embezzlement, or fraud.
13
III. Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success
Although the trial court did not reach the second step of the
special motion to strike analysis, the parties have fully briefed
the issue, and we may address it de novo. (Hecimovich v. Encinal
School Parent Teacher Organization (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 450,
468.) We elect to do so here. We conclude that plaintiffs have
demonstrated a likelihood of success on their defamation claim.6
A. Applicable law and standard of review
At the second step of the special motion to strike analysis,
plaintiffs “ ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally
sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of
facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by
the plaintiff is credited.’ ” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert
Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291 (Soukup).) The court must
“ ‘accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff . . . .’
[Citation.] The plaintiff need only establish that his or her claim
has ‘minimal merit’ [citation] to avoid being stricken as a
SLAPP.” (Ibid.)
Plaintiffs’ complaint included a single claim for defamation.
“The tort of defamation ‘involves (a) a publication that is (b) false,
(c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural
tendency to injure or that causes special damage.’ [Citation.]”
(Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720.) Additionally, “[t]o
prevail on a cause of action for defamation, a plaintiff who is a
public figure must prove the defendant intentionally published a
false statement of fact with actual malice,” i.e., with knowledge or
6 Accordingly, we need not address plaintiffs’ request that we
remand for reconsideration of plaintiffs’ discovery motion, which
is contingent on this court reversing at prong two.
14
reckless disregard of falsity. (OneTaste Inc. v. Netflix, Inc. (2025)
116 Cal.App.5th 174, 188 (OneTaste).)
Plaintiffs argue, and Wilson does not dispute, that the
statements at issue were published. Wilson also does not contest
that the statements were defamatory and had a natural tendency
to injure plaintiffs. But the parties dispute whether the
statements in the Instagram video constitute nonactionable
opinion, whether leaking the demand letter to the press was a
privileged act, and whether plaintiffs submitted sufficient
evidence of falsity. Additionally, the parties dispute whether
plaintiffs are public figures and, if they are, whether they
established that Wilson acted with actual malice. We address
each issue in turn.
B. Wilson’s statements in the Instagram video are
provably false
Wilson first argues that the statements in the Instagram
video are not actionable because they are not provably false.
Indeed, “ ‘[t]he sine qua non of recovery for defamation . . . is the
existence of a falsehood.’ ” (Baker v. Los Angeles Herald
Examiner (1986) 42 Cal.3d 254, 259 (Baker).) Thus, statements
of opinion are generally not actionable, unless such statements
imply a false assertion of fact. (Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209
Cal.App.4th 256, 289 (Hawran).) Relatedly, statements “that are
no more than ‘ “rhetorical hyperbole,” “vigorous epithet[s],” “lusty
and imaginative expression[s] of . . . contempt,” and language
used “in a loose, figurative sense” have all been accorded
constitutional protection. [Citations.]’ ” (Summit Bank v. Rogers
(2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 669, 699 (Summit Bank).)
“We apply a ‘ “totality of the circumstances’ ” test to
determine both whether (a) a statement is fact or opinion, and (b)
15
a statement declares or implies a provably false factual assertion;
that is, courts look to the words of the statement itself and the
context in which the statement was made.” (Hawran, supra, 209
Cal.App.4th at p. 289.) We first examine the language of the
statement, then the context in which it was made. (Ibid.)
“[W]hether the statement at issue was a statement of fact or a
statement of opinion . . . is a question of law to be decided by the
court.” (Baker, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 260.)
In the Instagram video, Wilson stated that she discovered
plaintiffs’ “inappropriate behavior towards the lead actress of the
film.” Wilson argues that this phrase is not provably false. She
also contends that it does not fairly imply, as the complaint
alleged, that plaintiffs sexually harassed that actress. In a
vacuum, the phrase “inappropriate behavior” is subjective—
conduct that one person finds inappropriate might be perfectly
acceptable to another person. (Cf. McGarry v. University of San
Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 97, 117 (McGarry) [“immoral
behavior” not provably false].) But we agree with plaintiffs that
this phrase, considered in context, implies sexual harassment.
Specifically, Ghost declared that before Wilson posted the
Instagram video, Wilson “spread a rumor” to the cast and crew of
the film that Ghost had sexually harassed MacInnes. And just
two days after the Instagram video was posted, Wilson allegedly
shared with the media a demand letter that also accused Ghost of
sexually harassing MacInnes. Therefore, at least some people
who viewed the Instagram video would have had prior knowledge
that Wilson had accused Ghost of sexual harassment.
Additionally, Wilson’s own briefing cites a Hollywood Reporter
article describing a survey finding that sexual harassment is
pervasive in the film industry as of September 2024, just three
16
months after Wilson posted the Instagram video. Those familiar
with or inside the industry would understand an accusation of
inappropriate behavior toward an actress to connote such
harassment. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we
conclude that the term inappropriate behavior implied that
plaintiffs engaged in sexual harassment, which is provably false.
(Hawran, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 289.)
Wilson cites several decisions to support her argument that
an accusation of inappropriate behavior is non-actionable
opinion. (Hoang v. Tran (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 513, 533
[“ ‘inappropriately “used” a girl . . . to promote his businesses’ ”
was mere opinion]; McGarry, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 106
[“implied accusation that [plaintiff] had committed unspecified
immoral acts” not provably false]; James v. San Jose Mercury
News, Inc. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1, 14 [“ ‘sleazy’ ” was mere
opinion]; Terry v. Davis Community Church (2005) 131
Cal.App.4th 1534, 1540–1542, 1553 [describing hand holding and
thigh touching as inappropriate did not imply sexual
relationship].) Yet, none of these cases involved prior accusations
of sexual harassment that contextualize the meaning of an
otherwise ambiguous statement. Nor did any of the cases involve
the film industry, which Wilson asserts is pervaded by sexual
harassment. As we have discussed, these circumstances are part
of the overall context that we must consider.
Wilson’s statement that she discovered plaintiffs
“embezzling funds from the film’s budget” is also sufficiently
factual. The statement conveys that plaintiffs improperly took
money that did not belong to them. The video also specified that
plaintiffs took the funds from the film’s budget. Whether
plaintiffs improperly took money from that source can be
17
objectively proven or disproven. And, Wilson asserted in the
video that she directed the film. A reasonable viewer would infer
that Wilson, as the director, had access to financial records that
could support her accusation. Thus, even if the assertion that
plaintiffs embezzled funds was not provably false, the statement
at least implies a provably false factual assertion. (Hawran,
supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 289.)
The cases Wilson cites on this point are distinguishable. In
Chaker v. Mateo (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1138, the defendant
posted comments on a website accusing the plaintiff of fraud and
deceit. (Id. at p. 1142.) The reviewing court found that the
statements were not actionable, in part because they were
“generalized in that they lack any specificity as to the time or
place” of those acts. (Id. at p. 1149.) While Wilson did not
identify the time or place of any act, she accused plaintiffs of
embezzling from a specific source—the film’s budget. And since
the video identified plaintiffs as the film’s producers, a
reasonable viewer could infer that plaintiffs would have the
opportunity to siphon money from the budget. These specifics
differentiate this case from Chaker.
Summit Bank is also distinguishable. There, a bank sued
its former employee for posting derogatory statements on the
“ ‘Rants and Raves’ ” section of Craigslist.org. (Summit Bank,
supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at pp. 696–697.) Among other things, the
employee said that “depositors should move their accounts
immediately, ‘before its [sic] too late,’ ” and that “the Bank’s
depositors should leave ‘before they close.’ ” (Id. at p. 697.) The
appellate court concluded that the statements were not
actionable, reasoning that the audience for the “ ‘Rants and
Raves’ ” posts “should be predisposed to view [such posts] with a
18
certain amount of skepticism, and with an understanding that
they will likely present one-sided viewpoints rather than
assertions of provable facts.” (Id. at pp. 696, 700.) Unlike in
Summit Bank, Wilson’s video was not posted to a forum
specifically designed to host hyperbolic rants, and Wilson has not
identified anything about the Instagram platform that would lead
viewers to treat her statements with skepticism.
For this same reason, we also find distinguishable Obsidian
Finance Group, LLC v. Cox (9th Cir. 2014) 740 F.3d 1284. There,
a blogger posted messages online accusing plaintiff Obsidian of
“ ‘illegal activity,’ including ‘corruption,’ ‘fraud,’ ‘deceit on the
government,’ ‘money laundering,’ ‘defamation,’ ‘harassment,’ ‘tax
crimes,’ and ‘fraud against the government.’ ” (Id. at p. 1293.)
The messages were posted on “obsidianfinancesucks.com,” which
the court reasoned would convey to readers that the statements
should be viewed with skepticism. (Ibid.) As we have discussed,
Wilson’s statement was posted to Instagram, a neutral platform,
and there is no indication that viewers should have viewed
Wilson’s statements with caution.
Finally, Wilson asserts that the court in Nicosia v. De Rooy
(N.D. Cal. 1999) 72 F.Supp.2d 1093 found that accusations of
embezzlement were protected under circumstances similar to this
case. Not so. The court concluded that an embezzlement
accusation was not actionable because the speaker also disclosed
the underlying facts. (Id. at p. 1103 [“Accusations of criminal
activity, like other statements, are not actionable if the
underlying facts are disclosed.”].) Wilson’s video did not include
any similar disclosure.
19
C. There is a triable fact dispute as to the source of
the demand letter leak
Wilson also argues that she did not leak the demand letter
to the press, and therefore she cannot be held liable for any
defamatory statements therein. Wilson and her counsel filed
declarations averring that they did not leak the letter. But
plaintiffs also declared that they did not share the letter with the
press. Because the source of the leak is disputed, we credit
plaintiffs’ declarations and defer resolution of this question to the
factfinder. (Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 291 [court must
“ ‘accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff’ ”]; Litinsky
v. Kaplan (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 970, 982 [court may not resolve
disputed fact issues in resolving anti-SLAPP motion].)
D. The demand letter is not protected by the fair
report privilege
Next, Wilson contends that plaintiffs cannot state a claim
for defamation based on the allegedly leaked demand letter
because of the fair report privilege. (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (d).)
We do not agree.
“The fair report privilege ‘confers an absolute privilege on
any fair and true report in, or a communication to, a public
journal of a judicial proceeding, or anything said in the course
thereof.’ ” (Healthsmart Pacific, Inc. v. Kabateck (2016)
7 Cal.App.5th 416, 431.) Whether the privilege applies is a
question of law for the court to decide. (Ibid.) “Although the fair
report privilege is typically invoked by news media defendants, it
also protects those who communicate information to the media.”
(Ibid., italics omitted.) However, even for communications to the
media, the privilege protects only descriptions or statements
20
made in the course of judicial proceedings, commencing with the
filing of a complaint. (Id. at p. 432.) Here, the demand letter was
prepared and sent to plaintiffs one month before plaintiffs filed
suit against Wilson. Because the letter was created before any
litigation had commenced, it does not describe any judicial
proceeding or anything said in the course of such a proceeding.
(Cf. Rothman v. Jackson (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1144, fn. 3
[in dicta, reasoning that Civil Code section 47, subdivision (d)
does not apply to statements made in anticipation of litigation].)
Wilson correctly notes that the litigation privilege found in
Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) protects prelitigation
activity. (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1251.) In the context of this case,
Wilson’s act of sending the demand letter to plaintiffs was very
likely protected by the litigation privilege. But Wilson has
identified no legal authority or reasoned argument supporting
the proposition that the fair and true report privilege protects the
disclosure of that letter to the press.
E. Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case of
falsity
Having concluded that all of the statements at issue are
actionable and not privileged, we next consider whether plaintiffs
have made a prima facie showing that the statements were false.
(Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 291.) We conclude that plaintiffs
met this burden.
In the Instagram video, Wilson asserted that plaintiffs
acted inappropriately toward MacInnes and embezzled from the
film’s budget. And in the demand letter, Wilson accused Ghost
and Cameron of embezzling from the film’s budget and from past
projects; and of sexually harassing, coercively controlling, and
21
holding captive MacInnes. The demand letter also asserted that
Cameron physically bullied and wrongfully imprisoned Wilson.
Plaintiffs submitted declarations averring that these accusations
are all false. MacInnes also declared that the statements relating
to her are untrue. We must credit these declarations, and we
conclude that they are sufficient to establish a prima facie case of
falsity. (Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 291 [court must “ ‘accept
as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff’ ”]; Mitchell v. Twin
Galaxies, LLC (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 207, 219 [plaintiff’s
declarations supported prima facie showing of falsity].)
Wilson argues that there is insufficient evidence that the
statements relating to MacInnes were false, citing an email from
MacInnes’s agent describing an interaction between Ghost and
MacInnes that Wilson believed to be inappropriate. But as we
have discussed, MacInnes herself declared that Wilson’s
accusations are not true. At this stage, we credit that
declaration. (Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 291.)
Wilson also asserts that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate
that they did not actually embezzle funds from the film. She
focuses on a single email in which Cameron asked another
producer to make certain adjustments to the film’s budget.
According to Wilson, these adjustments “diverted AU$900,000
from the film’s budget” to plaintiffs. But the email is merely a
request, and Wilson has not cited any evidence that the proposed
changes were ever implemented. And even assuming that the
adjustments were made, Wilson has not established that the
changes were improper or not permitted under the relevant
contracts. Moreover, Wilson’s briefing completely ignores
plaintiffs’ declarations, which expressly aver that no
embezzlement occurred. As we have discussed, at this stage of
22
the proceedings, those declarations are sufficient to support a
prima facie showing of falsity. The parties may explore the
nuances of the film’s budget as the case proceeds.
F. Plaintiffs have provided sufficient evidence of
actual malice
In a defamation case, a plaintiff who is a public figure must
plead and provide evidence that the defendant acted with actual
malice. (OneTaste, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 188.) Wilson
argues that plaintiffs are public figures; plaintiffs assert that
they are not. We need not resolve this dispute. Even assuming
that plaintiffs are public figures, we conclude that they pleaded
and made a prima facie showing of actual malice.
“ ‘Actual malice . . . requires at a minimum that the
statements were made with a reckless disregard for the truth.
And although the concept of “reckless disregard” “cannot be fully
encompassed in one infallible definition,” [citation], we have
made clear that the defendant must have made the false
publication with a “high degree of awareness of . . . probable
falsity,” [citation], or must have “entertained serious doubts as to
the truth of his publication,” [citation].’ ” (Young v. CBS
Broadcasting, Inc. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 551, 562–563 (Young).)
Malice cannot be inferred from ill will alone, but “anger and
hostility toward the plaintiff [citation], . . . may, in an appropriate
case, indicate that the publisher himself had serious doubts
regarding the truth of his publication.” (Reader’s Digest Assn. v.
Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 244, 258 (Reader’s Digest).)
Actual malice must be established by clear and convincing
evidence. “Accordingly, to defeat a special motion to strike a
defamation claim, a public figure plaintiff must demonstrate a
23
probability that it can produce clear and convincing evidence of
actual malice.” (OneTaste, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 188.)
Here, Wilson accused plaintiffs of acting inappropriately
towards, sexually harassing, coercing, and imprisoning
MacInnes. MacInnes submitted a declaration averring that these
statements are not true. More importantly, MacInnes declared
that she told Wilson twice in late 2023—several months before
the Instagram video was posted—that MacInnes did not feel
harassed by Ghost, and that she felt “completely comfortable”
around Ghost “at all times.” This evidence supports that Wilson
knew, or had reason to believe, that her statements about
MacInnes were likely untrue. (Young, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at
p. 563.)
Wilson also accused plaintiffs of embezzlement, and
specifically accused them of taking $900,000 from the film’s
budget. As noted ante, Wilson points to email in which Cameron
asked another producer to make certain adjustments to the film’s
budget. But plaintiffs submitted evidence that Wilson was
involved in contract and fee negotiations relating to the film.
Therefore, assuming plaintiffs can prove that any changes to the
budget were consistent with the relevant contracts, Wilson would
have known that her statement was false. And even if Wilson
was uncertain, at minimum, she had the ability to confirm
whether any changes to the budget were consistent with the
contracts and, in turn, whether her statements were false.
(Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton (1989) 491
U.S. 657, 683–684, 692 [“purposeful avoidance of the truth” by
failing to listen to available tapes that would have disproved
defamatory statement supported finding of actual malice].)
24
In the demand letter, Wilson also accused Cameron of
bullying and wrongfully imprisoning her. Cameron declared that
this is “categorically false.” If Cameron is correct—and we must
accept his declaration as true—then Wilson knows that this
accusation is untrue.
Finally, Wilson’s statements appear to be at least partially
motivated by hostility toward plaintiffs. In the Instagram video,
Wilson accused plaintiffs of “vicious[]” and “vile and disgusting”
behavior, and called them “absolute fuckwits.” The demand
letter similarly describes plaintiffs’ conduct as “vile” and “selfish.”
While not dispositive, this “anger and hostility” further supports
that Wilson may have had “serious doubts regarding the truth” of
her statements. (Reader’s Digest, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 258.)
Overall, plaintiffs have established a probability they can prove
by clear and convincing evidence that Wilson made the
statements at issue with actual malice. (OneTaste, supra, 116
Cal.App.5th at p. 188.)
25
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order denying Wilson’s special motion to
strike. Plaintiffs are awarded their appellate costs.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
HANASONO, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
EGERTON, J.
26
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.