Gonzalez v. The Morning Star Institute CA3

CourtListener 10858328CalctappMay 13, 2026

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Filed 5/13/26 Gonzalez v. The Morning Star Institute CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)

SUJEI GONZALEZ, C102578
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 34-2019-
v. 00265189-CU-WT-GDS)

THE MORNING STAR INSTITUTE INC. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.

Appellants the Morning Star Institute, Inc. and the Morning Star Company
(together, Morning Star) appeal from a judgment entered after the trial court confirmed
an arbitration award in favor of respondent Sujei Gonzalez and denied Morning Star’s
petition to vacate the award. An arbitrator awarded Gonzalez over $8 million in damages
and attorneys’ fees on her claims of unlawful retaliation and wrongful termination against
Morning Star, her former employer. In denying Morning Star’s petition to vacate the
award, the trial court determined that the company had not substantiated its claim of
arbitrator bias. We agree that Morning Star has failed to show any reasonable impression
of possible bias by the arbitrator. We therefore affirm.

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BACKGROUND
I.
Gonzalez worked as a director for Morning Star, a large agricultural food
processing company. Part of Gonzalez’s role was to internally promote Morning Star’s
self-management organizational structure, under which employees managed themselves
and autonomously discharged their duties. According to the company’s founder and
owner, Chris Rufer, this organizational model was rooted in part in libertarian principles
of individual responsibility. Gonzalez claimed that, in the course of her duties, she
learned of or witnessed repeated acts of what she believed to be sexual harassment by
another employee. She reported the incidents to Rufer, who was designated as the sole
employee responsible for investigating allegations of sexual harassment. Gonzalez
claimed that Rufer declined to investigate, told her to work things out with the alleged
harasser, and terminated her soon thereafter.
In 2019, Gonzalez filed a complaint in the trial court against Morning Star,
alleging four causes of action under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)
(Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.): sexual harassment and hostile work environment (Gov.
Code, § 12940, subd. (j)), retaliation (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (h)), failure to prevent
sexual harassment and retaliation (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (k)), and wrongful
termination in violation of public policy. In February 2020, pursuant to an arbitration
agreement, the parties proceeded to arbitrate these claims and selected the Honorable
Robert C. Hight (Ret.) as the arbitrator. In 2021, witnesses testified and evidence was
presented at arbitration hearings, which were not transcribed or recorded.
Over the course of the four-year arbitration, the arbitrator issued several rulings
that collectively comprise the arbitration award. In an Interim Arbitration Award, issued
in August 2021, the arbitrator determined that Gonzalez had established each of her
claims except for her allegations of wrongful termination in violation of public policy, as

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to which further briefing was required. In addressing Gonzalez’s claim of a hostile work
environment, the arbitrator recognized the relevance of corporate culture and noted: “As
Claimant asserts, Respondents’ libertarian policies created a workplace where
enforcement of harassment, discrimination and retaliation protections was difficult to
provide, because it resulted in a workplace where ‘anything goes.’ ”
In a May 2022 Revised Interim Arbitration Award, the arbitrator amended his
determination to reflect that Gonzalez had dropped her claim for sexual harassment and
that, therefore, her hostile work environment and failure to prevent harassment claims
had likewise been dismissed. The arbitrator found that Gonzalez had established her
claim of wrongful termination in violation of public policy and reaffirmed his previous
finding that her claims for retaliation and failure to prevent retaliation were meritorious.
The 26-page ruling awarded Gonzalez compensatory damages of $405,599 for past
economic harm, $1,430,618 for future economic damages, and $750,000 for past
emotional distress. The arbitrator concluded that Gonzalez was not entitled to damages
for future emotional distress but should receive punitive damages in an amount to be
determined. In discussing Gonzalez’s entitlement to punitive damages, the arbitrator
found that Rufer’s behavior was “completely contrary to the utopian self-management
principles and environment he espoused in the Company handbook.” The arbitrator
further stated that an award of punitive damages was “appropriate to ensure that
Mr. Rufer realizes that his self-management world is flawed and that complaints by
employees of harassment and retaliation must be addressed seriously.”
After further hearings, in August 2023 the arbitrator issued an Interim Punitive
Damages Award. In that 16-page ruling, the arbitrator determined that all five
reprehensibility factors (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (2003) 538 U.S. 408,
419) were “present but were very low” and that, given the “substantial compensatory
award,” a one-to-one ratio was appropriate in setting punitive damages. Accordingly, the

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arbitrator awarded Gonzalez $1,836,217 in punitive damages, the equivalent of her total
compensatory award, less the emotional distress damages.
In a February 2024 ruling not technically part of the arbitration award but
mentioned as part of Morning Star’s arguments on appeal, the arbitrator denied Morning
Star’s October 2023 motion for nonsuit and motion to dismiss the Morning Star
Company. The motion to dismiss was based on an argument that only the Morning Star
Institute, not the Morning Star Company, was Gonzalez’s employer during the relevant
time period. The arbitrator found the motion for nonsuit untimely and deemed the
motion to dismiss forfeited in light of the failure to seek dismissal for roughly a year-and-
a-half after Morning Star had expressly acknowledged the employer-entity issue.
In April 2024, the arbitrator issued a Corrected Final Award on Gonzalez’s motion
for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in the arbitration. Recognizing the four years of
“intense litigation” required to complete the arbitration, the interest in promoting the
public policies underlying FEHA through fully compensatory fee awards, and the high
level of success achieved despite the dismissal of the sexual harassment claims—which
the arbitrator found clearly related to proving the retaliation claim—the arbitrator
determined that Gonzalez’s counsel were entitled to compensation for all hours claimed.
The arbitrator also concluded that the hourly rates requested for each of Gonzalez’s
attorneys were substantiated by their personal and supporting declarations, which the
arbitrator found more compelling than Morning Star’s evidence in opposition. After
applying a lodestar multiplier of 1.35, the arbitrator awarded Gonzalez $3,891,419.88 for
her attorneys’ fees, plus $44,085.16 in costs. Altogether, the arbitration award totaled
$8,357,939.04.
II.
Returning to the trial court, Gonzalez filed a petition to confirm the arbitration
award, while Morning Star moved to vacate it under the California Arbitration Act (Code

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Civ. Proc., § 1280 et seq.).1 Morning Star sought to vacate the award pursuant to
section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(3), claiming that its rights were substantially prejudiced
by arbitrator misconduct that created a reasonable impression of possible bias against
Morning Star and its founder and owner, Rufer. Specifically, Morning Star’s petition
argued that the arbitrator’s language and rulings reflected animus toward Rufer’s
libertarian political affiliation and beliefs.
Morning Star attached to its petition a declaration by Rufer, averring that he has
been a major donor to libertarian candidates, political committees, and organizations; that
he has served on boards of organizations supporting libertarian ideals; and that he has
engaged in high-profile litigation against government regulations that he believes infringe
on personal liberty and economic freedom. Rufer’s declaration further explained
Morning Star’s self-management organizational model as follows: “Unlike a typical
hierarchical corporate structure (CEO, executive vice president, vice president, manager,
and so on down the chain), Defendants’ organizational model empowers all employees to
share responsibility for management functions. Simply stated, self-management
empowers individuals by entrusting them with the authority and autonomy to plan and
coordinate their work with other colleagues to pursue the mission of each enterprise.
[¶¶] Although self-management is not an exclusively libertarian management
philosophy, it stems from similar values and shares a foundational theme: the pursuit of a
common mission by elevating individual responsibility over traditional coercive
bureaucratic force.”
Morning Star also attached to its petition four of Gonzalez’s briefs submitted to
the arbitrator before the issuance of the Revised Interim Arbitration Award. Each of
these briefs contained express references to Rufer’s libertarian philosophy and Morning

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

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Star’s self-management structure, which Gonzalez argued was rooted in that philosophy
and created an environment where sexual harassment would not be addressed.
In opposition to the petition to vacate, Gonzalez likewise filed exhibits and
declarations, including a declaration from her lead counsel in which he stated that Rufer,
on direct examination at an arbitration hearing, “described, among other things, Morning
Star’s ‘self-management’ system’s foundation in libertarian philosophy or principles.”
Gonzalez’s counsel further averred that “[a]t the arbitration hearing, nobody made any
reference to political affiliation, political action, political party, or politics in any way.”
As one of her exhibits, Gonzalez attached excerpts of the Morning Star Institute’s
handbook of policies that was in effect during her employment. In at least two sections,
the handbook described the company’s organizational model, which it referred to as
“Mission-Focused ‘Self-Management.’ ” The handbook stated: “Mission-Focused ‘Self-
Management’ brings organizational structure to an enterprise spontaneously. Individual
Colleagues, directed by our Personal Commercial Mission, are principally responsible for
organizing their relationships. Their Personal Commercial Mission is our ‘boss.’ The
managerial functions of planning, organizing, staffing, directing and controlling are the
personal responsibility of each Colleague.”
In August 2024, after a hearing, the trial court issued an order denying Morning
Star’s petition to vacate and a separate order granting Gonzalez’s petition to confirm the
arbitration award. The court found that Morning Star “failed entirely to show any basis
for vacating the arbitration award.” As to Morning Star’s claim that language and
punctuation in the arbitrator’s written rulings evinced possible anti-libertarian bias, the
court found the arbitrator’s isolated references to “ ‘self-management,’ ” “ ‘libertarian
policies,’ ” and “ ‘utopian self-management principles’ ” did not show an appearance of
bias “in any manner.” These references, the court explained, came from Morning Star’s
own literature and Rufer’s own testimony, which described the company’s “ ‘self-

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management’ ” system and its foundation in libertarian philosophy. There was also no
basis to conclude that an objective, reasonable person would know that a reference to
“ ‘self-management’ ” was a reference to libertarianism, and there was no evidence that
the arbitrator was aware of Rufer’s libertarian political activity. And while Gonzalez’s
arbitration briefs may have included references to “ ‘libertarian philosophy’ ” and
Morning Star’s self-management style based on that philosophy, that had no tendency to
show bias on the arbitrator’s part.
The trial court also rejected Morning Star’s claim that the arbitrator’s consistently
adverse rulings supported its claim of bias. The court explained that, contrary to Morning
Star’s argument, the arbitrator ruled in Morning Star’s favor on a variety of issues; and in
any event, courts are not permitted to review the merits of an arbitrator’s award, even if
erroneous. The court entered judgment confirming the arbitration award.
Gonzalez moved to recover attorneys’ fees and costs incurred both at the end of
the arbitration proceedings and in litigating the post-arbitration cross-petitions to confirm
and to vacate. The trial court denied the motion as to the fees incurred during arbitration,
granted the motion as to the post-arbitration fees and costs, and entered judgment on the
fee award.
Morning Star timely appealed from both the judgment confirming the arbitration
award and the judgment awarding fees.
DISCUSSION
“When parties agree to private arbitration, they bargain for very limited judicial
review.” (FCM Investments, LLC v. Grove Pham, LLC (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 545, 549
(FCM).) Generally speaking, “parties to a private arbitration impliedly agree that the
arbitrator’s decision will be both binding and final.” (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992)
3 Cal.4th 1, 9.) Thus, “[m]ost legal errors in arbitration are not reviewable.”
(Heimlich v. Shivji (2019) 7 Cal.5th 350, 367.) Even “the existence of an error of law

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apparent on the face of [an] award that causes substantial injustice does not provide
grounds for judicial review.” (Moncharsh, at p. 33.)
These limits on judicial review, however, are subject to statutory exceptions that
“protect against error that is so egregious as to constitute misconduct or so profound as to
render the process unfair.” (Heimlich v. Shivji, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 368.) As relevant
here, a court “shall vacate” an award if it determines that the rights of a party “were
substantially prejudiced by misconduct of a neutral arbitrator.” (§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(3).)
“Misconduct includes circumstances creating a reasonable impression of possible
arbitrator bias.” (FCM, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 549; see id. at p. 555 [“While
arbitration awards are ‘nearly immune’ from attack, ‘one of the limited grounds for
challenge is bias on the part of the arbitrator’ ”].)
“Arbitrators are held to the same standard as judges—‘they should be disqualified
if a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the arbitrator would
be able to be impartial.’ ” (FCM, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 555; see § 170.1,
subd. (a)(6)(A)(iii).) “Given inherent challenges of proving bias and the importance of
maintaining public confidence in our justice system, a showing of actual bias is not
required.” (FCM, at p. 555.) “Instead, the test is whether a hypothetical reasonable
person (i.e., a disinterested, well-informed, thoughtful member of the public) would form
an impression of possible bias on the part of the arbitrator.” (Ibid.; Betz v. Pankow
(1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1503, 1507-1508; accord, Haworth v. Superior Court (2010)
50 Cal.4th 372, 389.)
“ ‘An impression of possible bias in the arbitration context means that one could
reasonably form a belief that an arbitrator was biased for or against a party for a
particular reason.’ ” (Haworth v. Superior Court, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 389, italics
omitted.) “The test is objective and fact-specific; there is no bright-line demarcation for
the impression of bias, and each case must be considered in light of the particular facts

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involved.” (FCM, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 555; Betz v. Pankow, supra,
31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1508.) “A party challenging an arbitration award and trial court
judgment confirming that award bears the burden of establishing entitlement to relief.”
(FCM, at p. 552; see id. at p. 555 [party seeking to vacate arbitration award bears “burden
to establish a reasonable impression of possible bias”].)
Where, as here, the material facts are undisputed, we review de novo a trial court’s
order denying a petition to vacate an arbitrator’s award. (Valencia v. Mendoza (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 427, 442; Bassett Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 273, 287; see Haworth v. Superior Court, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 383-
388.)
In this case, Morning Star argues that the trial court erred in refusing to vacate the
arbitration award because the record establishes an impression of the arbitrator’s possible
bias against Rufer’s political affiliation and beliefs. In Morning Star’s view, language
and punctuation in some of the arbitrator’s written rulings, as well as the arbitrator’s
“unremittingly one-sided” decisions favoring Gonzalez, demonstrate the arbitrator’s lack
of impartiality. We agree with the trial court that the record fails to support this claim.
With respect to the wording of the arbitrator’s rulings, Morning Star points to
three phrases and six punctuation choices appearing in the more than 70 pages of rulings
the arbitrator issued in this case. Morning Star initially takes issue with one reference by
the arbitrator to the company’s “libertarian policies” in the Interim Arbitration Award.
As noted above, in finding Gonzalez’s (later-dismissed) hostile work environment claims
meritorious, the arbitrator stated: “As Claimant asserts, Respondents’ libertarian policies
created a workplace where enforcement of harassment, discrimination and retaliation
protections was difficult to provide, because it resulted in a workplace where ‘anything
goes.’ ” Morning Star argues that this was a gratuitous reference to its corporate officer’s
political affiliation, raising the same impression of potential bias that would come from a

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reference to a hypothetical officer’s “ ‘progressive’ or ‘conservative’ ” or “ ‘Democrat’ or
‘Republican’ policies.” While this very well may be so in a case where the nature of the
company’s policies was irrelevant to the claims at issue, here both parties agree that
Morning Star’s management policies were centrally relevant to Gonzalez’s claims, and
the undisputed evidence before the trial court was that the company itself described its
policies as rooted in libertarian philosophy. On direct examination during the arbitration,
Rufer described Morning Star’s self-management system’s “foundation in libertarian
philosophy or principles.” Rufer’s trial court declaration likewise described self-
management as “stem[ming] from similar values and shar[ing] a foundational theme”
with libertarian management philosophy. Morning Star’s appellate reply brief also states
that Rufer’s “political beliefs influenced the organization of the Morning Star-affiliated
companies in a self-management model.” Given all that, a “disinterested, well-informed,
thoughtful member of the public” (FCM, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 555) would not see
a lone reference by the arbitrator to the libertarian foundations of Morning Star’s policies
as gratuitous or indicative of animus toward libertarianism.
It is also relevant that the arbitrator mentioned Morning Star’s “libertarian
policies” in the portion of the Interim Arbitration Award analyzing the merits of
Gonzalez’s sexual harassment and hostile work environment claims. As those claims
turned on the nature of Gonzalez’s work environment, a fully informed observer would
have understood the arbitrator’s reference as nothing more than a way to describe the lack
of hierarchical management structure that, the arbitrator found, supported Gonzalez’s
claims that sexual harassment went unaddressed at Morning Star. (See FCM, supra,
96 Cal.App.5th at p. 558 [“In evaluating arbitrator bias, we consider all relevant
contextual facts”].) Notably, in the Revised Interim Arbitration Award—following the
recognition that Gonzalez had dismissed her sexual harassment and hostile work

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environment claims—the arbitrator did not retain any reference to Morning Star’s
“libertarian policies.”
Morning Star additionally directs our attention to the arbitrator’s reference to
“utopian self-management principles” and Rufer’s “self-management world” in the
Revised Interim Arbitration Award. Here, too, a fully informed, rational observer would
not suspect political bias from the arbitrator’s conclusion that, in failing to investigate
Gonzalez’s reports of sexual harassment, Rufer had acted “completely contrary to the
utopian self-management principles and environment he espoused in the Company
handbook.” Nor would such an observer perceive political bias from the arbitrator’s
determination that an award of punitive damages would “ensure[] that Mr. Rufer
realize[d] that his self-management world is flawed.” We agree with the trial court that
there is no reason to believe a disinterested observer would connect the phrases “self-
management principles” or “self-management world” with libertarian politics, as the
Revised Interim Arbitration Award includes no reference to libertarianism and the
connection is not self-evident.
Finally, Morning Star cites two locations in the Interim Arbitration Award and
four locations in the Revised Interim Arbitration Award where the arbitrator placed
quotation marks around the term “self-management” so as to, in Morning Star’s view,
mock the company’s organizational structure. Morning Star is correct that, in the Interim
Arbitration Award, the arbitrator used quotation marks around his first two references to
Morning Star’s self-management organizational structure and style—but none of the
ruling’s 10 subsequent references does the same. And while the Revised Interim
Arbitration Award contains four instances in which “self-management” appears in
quotation marks, it also includes 20 unadorned references to that term. Reading these
rulings as a whole, we see no basis for concluding that the arbitrator’s intermittent use of
quotation marks was for any purpose other than to indicate the use of a term to which a

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party had ascribed a unique meaning. Indeed, Morning Star’s own handbook repeatedly
used quotation marks around the term, for precisely the same reason.
Morning Star further claims that the arbitrator’s written rulings should be
understood as growing out of and reflecting an environment of anti-libertarian bias
created by Gonzalez’s counsel’s use of inflammatory and denigrating language in their
briefs. Morning Star, however, offers no persuasive reason for why counsel’s words or
beliefs could reasonably be imputed to the arbitrator.
Beyond its brief discussion of the arbitrator’s language and punctuation, Morning
Star devotes the bulk of its appellate briefs to criticizing the arbitrator’s adverse rulings,
arguing that their one-sided nature “corroborate[s]” the impression of possible bias.
Morning Star acknowledges that an “arbitrator’s decision is not generally reviewable for
errors of fact or law” (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 6), but
maintains that “at some point, an arbitrator’s rulings collectively become so egregious
that they provide corroborating evidence of bias.” Morning Star cites no authority for the
latter proposition, which would seem to require an analysis of the merits that would
contravene the former. Moreover, given that we have found no support for Morning
Star’s claim of potential political bias based on the language used in the rulings, there is
nothing here to “corroborate.” Thus, adopting Morning Star’s argument would require
accepting that the arbitrator’s adverse rulings, alone, created an appearance of bias—a
proposition that has been firmly rejected by the courts. (People v. Baker (2021)
10 Cal.5th 1044, 1088 [“a court may be wrong, even repeatedly, without revealing any
partiality”]; Andrews v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 781, 795-796
[“numerous and continuous rulings against a litigant, even when erroneous, form no
ground for a charge of bias or prejudice”]; Severson & Werson, P.C. v. Sepehry-Fard
(2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 938, 952 [“A trial court’s rulings against a party, even if
erroneous, do not, by themselves, support a charge of bias”]; Blakemore v. Superior

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Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 36, 59-60 [“While we conclude the court erred in several
respects, the leap from erroneous rulings to the appearance of bias is one we decline to
make”].) In addition, allowing Morning Star to recast its claims of arbitrator error as a
claim of bias would permit the evasion of the limited judicial review established by
statute and agreed to as part of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate. (Moncharsh, at p. 33;
see id. at p. 28 [rejecting claim that arbitrator exceeded his powers under former
§ 1286.2, subd. (d) based on erroneous ruling because “[a] contrary holding would permit
the exception to swallow the rule of limited judicial review; a litigant could always
contend the arbitrator erred and thus exceeded his powers”].)
Even accepting Morning Star’s argument that the cumulative effect of an
arbitrator’s adverse rulings may evidence bias against a party, nothing in the record
would allow us to reach such a conclusion here. While Morning Star argues that any
neutral observer would be shocked by various aspects of the arbitrator’s rulings—most
prominently, the amounts awarded—its arguments fail to explain how those rulings
amounted to legal error, let alone error egregious and persistent enough to convey an
impression of arbitrator partiality, when understood in their full context.
Morning Star has failed to carry its burden to establish a reasonable impression of
possible bias. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order declining to vacate the
arbitration award on that ground. (See FCM, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 555.) In light
of this conclusion, we need not address Gonzalez’s argument that Morning Star forfeited
its bias challenge by failing to raise it before the arbitrator. And because we affirm the
judgment confirming the arbitration award, we necessarily reject Morning Star’s
challenge to the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees and costs, as that challenge is
premised solely on Morning Star’s claim that the court erred in failing to vacate the
arbitration award.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Gonzalez shall recover her costs on appeal. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)

/s/
FEINBERG, J.

We concur:

/s/
EARL, P. J.

/s/
HULL, J.

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