People v. Peake CA5

CourtListener 10856429CalctappMay 8, 2026

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Filed 5/8/26 P. v. Peake CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F088397
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. Nos. CRF72096,
v. CRF72558, CRM72762)

DOJON JAMES PEAKE,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tuolumne County. Laura
Leslie Krieg, Judge.
Richard Jay Moller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and
Justin Pedroso, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and Harrell, J.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Dojon James Peake (defendant) was convicted of bringing drug
paraphernalia into a jail, failing to appear while on bail, and obstructing a peace officer.
Defendant was granted probation for two years, which included the condition that
defendant “Cooperate with the [p]robation [o]fficer in a plan for
psychological/psychiatric and/or drug/alcohol treatment.”
On appeal, defendant claims the drug and alcohol treatment probation condition is
an unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority because it requires the probation
officer to identify the necessary treatment and decide between residential and outpatient
treatment. The People disagree noting the trial court identified the treatment options
probation could require while declining to delegate power to probation to decide between
residential and outpatient treatment. We agree with the People and affirm the judgment.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY1
On May 1, 2024, the Tuolumne County District Attorney filed a first amended
consolidated information charging defendant with bringing drug paraphernalia into a jail
(Pen. Code, § 4573;2 count 1), failing to appear while on bail (§ 1320.5; count 2), and
misdemeanor resisting, delaying or obstructing a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1);
count 3). It was alleged as to count 2 that defendant was released from custody on bail or
on his own recognizance (§ 12022.1).
A jury convicted defendant, finding him guilty on all counts and found the on bail
enhancement true. At sentencing, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and
granted defendant two years of probation under several terms and conditions. Defendant
waived having the court read all the terms and conditions of probation and did not object
to any of the terms or conditions imposed. One of the conditions of probation included,

1 The underlying facts related to defendant’s convictions are not relevant to the
issue raised on appeal and are, therefore, intentionally omitted.
2 Hereinafter, undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2.
“Cooperate with the [p]robation [o]fficer in a plan for psychological/psychiatric and/or
drug/alcohol treatment.”
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the probation condition requiring that he “Cooperate with the
[p]robation [o]fficer in a plan for psychological/psychiatric and/or drug/alcohol
treatment” is an unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority. Defendant contends
this probation condition is “ ‘entirely open-ended’ ” and violates the separation of powers
by delegating to the probation officer the power to determine the applicable treatment and
to decide between residential or outpatient treatment. The People disagree, arguing the
trial court was clear in its delegation of authority by identifying the nature of possible
treatments a probation officer could require and declining to delegate the authority of
choosing residential or outpatient treatment.
Standard of Review
We review facial constitutional challenges to probation conditions de novo.
(People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 723.)
Analysis
Although defendant did not object to the challenged condition of probation at the
time of sentencing, he raises a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the probation
condition, which comes within an exception to the forfeiture rule. (See In re Sheena K.
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 886–887 [constitutional challenges to a probation condition
presenting a pure question of law come within the exception to the forfeiture rule].)
Defendant’s challenge to his probation condition as unconstitutionally delegating the trial
court’s authority to probation in violation of the separation of powers clause presents a
pure question of law, easily remediable on appeal. (See id. at p. 888.) Therefore,
defendant’s claim is not forfeited.

3.
Under the separation of powers clause, “Persons charged with the exercise of
one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution.”
(Cal. Const., art. III, § 3.) However, while this “ ‘does not prohibit one branch from
taking action that might affect another, the doctrine is violated when the actions of one
branch defeat or materially impair the inherent functions of another.’ ” (In re D.N.
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 202, 212.) “ ‘Separation of powers does not mean an entire or
complete separation of powers or functions, which would be impracticable, if not
impossible.’ ” (Ibid.)
A trial court has broad discretion to impose probation conditions to foster
rehabilitation of the defendant and to protect public safety pursuant to section 1203.1.
(§ 1203.1, subd. (j); People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 624.) The court “has
authority to empower the probation department with authority to supervise the probation
conditions.” (People v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1240.) As explained in
O’Neil: “There are many understandable considerations of efficiency and practicality
that make it reasonable to leave to the probation department the amplification and
refinement of a [probation condition]. The trial court may leave to the discretion of the
probation officer the specification of the many details that invariably are necessary to
implement the terms of probation. However, the court’s order cannot be entirely
open-ended. It is for the court to determine the nature of the prohibition placed on a
defendant as a condition of probation.” (People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351,
1358–1359; see also People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902 (Smith).) Contrary
to defendant’s assertions, the probation condition was not “ ‘entirely open-ended’ ” since
it determined the nature of the treatment options for defendant by expressly identifying
categories of treatment ordered by the court: psychological, psychiatric, drug and/or
alcohol treatment. As is permitted, the court left the detail of determining which
particular type of treatment is more appropriate for defendant’s rehabilitation to the
discretion of the probation officer. (O’Neil, at p. 1359.)

4.
An example of a similar permissible delegation of discretion to probation can be
seen in People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298. In Penoli, the defendant challenged
a probation condition requiring the defendant to enter a residential drug treatment
program “ ‘as approved by the [p]robation [o]fficer,’ ” and that she “ ‘remain there until
she has successfully completed that program.’ ” (Id. at p. 301.) The defendant contended
the probation condition constituted an unlawful delegation of judicial authority because
it “granted authority to the probation department to unilaterally select a residential drug
rehabilitation program and determine whether [the] defendant successfully completed
that program.” (Id. at p. 307.) The Penoli court noted there was no statute that required
the court to make a determination as to which program to order the defendant and “any
attempt to specify a particular program at or prior to sentencing would pose serious
practical difficulties.” (Id. at p. 308.) If a specific program was ordered by the court, the
program may decline to accept the defendant or the program may lack the space. (Ibid.)
Thus, the court concluded that the delegation of judicial authority to probation to select a
program for the defendant and to determine whether the defendant successfully
completed that program was proper. (Id. at pp. 307–309.) The court stated that any
concern from a defendant about a particular program may be brought to the court’s
attention at sentencing, or subsequently, by judicial intervention by moving to modify the
probation order. (Id. at p. 308.)
Here, the trial court imposed a probation condition that defendant obtain
treatment, specifying four different treatment options, but left the determination as to the
appropriate treatment to the probation officer. Defendant was ordered to cooperate with
probation in a plan for treatment but, as in Penoli, he retained the ability to ask the court
to modify any aspect of the specific treatment program probation selected among the
options specified by the court. Therefore, by establishing the rehabilitative framework,
the court’s delegation of judicial authority to probation to select the appropriate program
for defendant was proper.

5.
Defendant contends the task of deciding between his treatment options is more
profound than the task of selecting a particular residential drug program in Penoli.
Defendant adds that assessment of future treatment, services, testing or counseling was
unclear. However, granting probation the role of determining whether defendant has
successfully completed a program is a proper delegation of judicial authority. (See
People v. Penoli, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at pp. 307–309.) Any concern about a particular
treatment, service, testing or counseling may be brought to the court’s attention by
moving to modify the probation order. (See id. at p. 308.)
Defendant relies on Smith to voice his concern that the probation condition
impermissibly permits the probation officer to determine whether defendant must attend a
residential program, as opposed to an outpatient program. Defendant’s concern is
unsubstantiated as Smith is readily distinguished. In Smith, the defendant challenged a
probation condition ordering the “ ‘[d]efendant to participate in any
treatment/therapy/counseling program, including residential, as directed by the probation
officer.’ ” (Smith, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 902.) The defendant claimed the probation
condition was “an improper delegation of authority because it allows the probation
officer to decide whether she will be required to attend any treatment, counseling, or
therapy program and it fails to provide her with notice of the nature of the treatment,
counseling, or therapy required.” (Ibid.) The trial court found the probation condition
violated the separation of powers clause by delegating its authority to the probation
officer to decide whether the defendant had to attend a residential program, as opposed to
an outpatient program. (Id. at p. 903.) The Smith court recognized that the parties
negotiated a disposition that would allow the defendant to remain out of custody because
she had a young daughter. The court did not specifically require the defendant to attend a
residential treatment program, yet the probation condition gave the probation officer the
discretion to decide whether to require the defendant to attend a residential or outpatient
program. Since residential programs can require that one be confined to the treatment

6.
facility, Smith reversed and remanded for the trial court to decide if it intended to
mandate residential treatment or not. (Ibid.)
In contrast, here, the challenged probation condition does not include express
language delegating to the probation officer the authority to choose between outpatient
and residential treatment programs. Therefore, defendant’s probation condition does not
include the language in Smith that was determined to be an unlawful delegation of
authority.
We reject defendant’s argument that because the probation condition does not
expressly exclude a residential program the probation department had authority to impose
it. Without the trial court’s express authorization of residential treatment, the probation
department is without authority to direct defendant into a residential program. In Smith,
where the probation condition had expressly included residential treatment as an option,
the matter was remanded for the court to either order residential treatment or strike the
words from the probation condition. Thus, the Smith court acknowledged that if the trial
court struck the option of a residential program from the probation condition, the
condition would be proper and not unconstitutionally delegate judicial authority to the
probation officer. (Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 905.) As such, the wording of the
probation condition deemed proper in Smith, omitting the language expressly permitting
residential treatment as an option, is similar to the wording in defendant’s probation
condition.
Therefore, we cannot conclude that the probation condition that defendant
“Cooperate with the [p]robation [o]fficr in a plan for psychological/psychiatric and/or
drug/alcohol treatment” is an unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority to the
probation officer.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

7.

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