Strategic Business Holdings v. Kamjula CA4/3

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Filed 5/7/26 Strategic Business Holdings v. Kamjula CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

STRATEGIC BUSINESS
HOLDINGS, INC.,
G065193
Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and
Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-
01327893)
v.
OPINION
SANDYA KAMJULA,

Defendant, Cross-complainant
and Appellant;

JEANETTE HASHEMI et al.,

Cross-defendants and
Respondents.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Andre De La Cruz, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Mousavi Law and Amy A. Mousavi; Cochran, Davis & Associates
and Lisa Kralik Hansen for Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant.
Hashemi Law Firm and Benjamin Martin for Respondents.
* * *
Defendant Sandya Kamjula challenges the trial court’s dismissal
of her cross-claims and its dismissal without prejudice of plaintiff Strategic
Business Holdings, Inc.’s claims against her. She contends some of her cross-
claims survived the court’s adverse summary adjudication ruling. And she
asserts the same ruling cut off Strategic’s right to voluntary dismissal.
We find no error in the dismissal of Kamjula’s cross-claims. The
trial court’s summary adjudication ruling disposed of all her cross-claims,
which relied on a personal guarantee she never signed. But we agree that the
summary adjudication terminated Strategic’s right to dismiss its claims,
which similarly relied on Kamjula’s nonexistent personal guarantee. We
therefore affirm in part and reverse in part.
FACTS
Kamjula’s company (the buyer) contracted with Strategic to
purchase Strategic’s assets.1 Kamjula signed on the buyer’s behalf and the
agreement provided that she would personally guarantee performance. The
parties later agreed the buyer would execute a secured promissory note, also
to be personally guaranteed by Kamjula. But neither a note nor a personal
guarantee was ever executed.
After the transaction closed, things went sour and this litigation
followed. Strategic sued Kamjula and the buyer for breach of the alleged
promissory note and Kamjula’s alleged personal guarantee.

1 Kamjula used two different entities in the transaction. For

convenience, we do not distinguish between them in this opinion.

2
Kamjula and the buyer cross-complained against Strategic and
others, jointly asserting fraud in the inducement and related claims.2 The
buyer asserted additional claims for itself only.3
Strategic moved for summary adjudication on the cross-
complaint.4 Among other things, it contended Kamjula’s claims failed because
“[t]he sole basis for Kamjula’s claim of injury under [the joint cross-claims] is
that she was induced to execute a personal guarantee,” which “Kamjula
‘never’ signed.”
In her opposition, Kamjula addressed this contention in a section
titled, “[Strategic’s] Admission That a Personal Guarantee Was Never Signed
. . . Requires Strategic to Dismiss Its [Claims].” (Cleaned up.) She did not
dispute the assertion that the personal guarantee was the sole basis for her
claims but asserted that if no guarantee existed, “Strategic ought to also
dismiss its breach of personal guarantee claim in its Complaint.”
Alternatively, she claimed Strategic’s complaint constituted a judicial
admission that she had executed a personal guarantee.
In reply, Strategic emphasized that Kamjula “does not dispute
that the sole basis for Kamjula’s claim of injury is that she was induced to
execute a personal guarantee . . . .”
The trial court granted summary adjudication against Kamjula
on the joint cross-claims: “[T]o the extent that these claims are brought by

2 For convenience, we refer only to Strategic.

3 Kamjula alone also claimed intentional infliction of emotional

distress.

4 Strategic’s summary adjudication motion did not challenge

Kamjula’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, as she had
indicated she would dismiss that claim, which she later did.

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[Kamjula] in her individual capacity based on [her] personal guaranty of [the]
$125,000 promissory note to Strategic, there is no evidence showing that
[she] can bring such claims in her personal capacity as there is no evidence
supporting that she executed the personal guaranty. Thus, the Court
GRANTS the motion for summary adjudication as to the [joint cross-claims]
to the extent they are brought by [Kamjula] . . . .” It denied the motion as it
pertained to the buyer, finding triable issues on the buyer’s claims.
Strategic then sought to dismiss its claims against Kamjula
without prejudice but the clerk rejected the filing for technical reasons. In an
e-mail to Strategic’s counsel, counsel for Kamjula and the buyer insisted that
Strategic must dismiss the entire complaint. Strategic corrected the technical
flaws in the form and refiled it without substantive change. The clerk entered
the dismissal without prejudice.
Strategic next applied ex parte for entry of judgment dismissing
Kamjula as both a defendant and cross-complainant. Opposing this
application, Kamjula asserted her cross-claims were not based solely on the
personal guarantee and therefore survived the summary adjudication ruling.
The court denied ex parte relief for lack of irreparable harm or immediate
danger but later entered judgment as requested.5

5 After entering judgment, the court denied Kamjula leave to

amend the cross-complaint, reasoning that it had already entered judgment
against her.

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DISCUSSION
I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED KAMJULA’S CROSS-CLAIMS
BASED ON ITS SUMMARY ADJUDICATION RULING
We find no error in the dismissal of Kamjula’s claims because the
summary adjudication ruling disposed of them. We review the ruling de novo.
(Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1471.) The
court granted summary adjudication on the joint cross-claims “to the extent
they [we]re brought by [Kamjula].”6 In other words, it granted summary
adjudication on all her cross-claims.
The court’s preceding statement—that the claims failed to the
extent they were “brought by [Kamjula] in her individual capacity based on
[her] personal guaranty of [the] $125,000 promissory note”—does not change
this conclusion. In opposing summary adjudication, Kamjula did not dispute
Strategic’s assertion that her cross-claims were based solely on the personal
guarantee. Instead, the relevant section of her opposition was dedicated to
contending that if there was no guarantee, “Strategic ought to also dismiss its
[claim].” Her alternative contention was that there was a personal guarantee.
At no point did she assert that her claims survived regardless of the personal
guarantee. Strategic’s reply highlighted that there was no dispute that
Kamjula’s claims rested solely on the personal guarantee.
Given that posture, the trial court had no reason to distinguish
between cross-claims based on the personal guarantee and any other theory.

6 Kamjula’s briefs omit this language in the court’s order, even

after Strategic’s brief notes the omission and charges Kamjula with
“misleadingly quot[ing] only part of the [ruling] to mischaracterize its scope
. . . .”

5
Kamjula identified no alternative basis for relief and the court’s ruling
contained no such limitation.
Kamjula’s failure to assert any alternative theory also defeats
any challenge to the summary adjudication ruling itself. Because she did not
raise the issue in her opposition, we will not entertain it now.7 (Miller v.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1161, 1170 [an appellate
court will not consider issues that were not presented to the trial court].)
Kamjula’s counsel asserted at oral argument that a summary adjudication
motion may address “separate and distinct wrongful acts even though
combined with other wrongful acts alleged in the same cause of action.”
(Lilienthal & Fowler v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1854–
1855.) But Strategic contended that it was addressing the only wrongful act
Kamjula had alleged in her causes of action. As noted, Kamjula did not
dispute this in her opposition. We see no reason why the trial court would
have been required to identify and articulate on its own any other theory
Kamjula might have asserted. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
dismissing Kamjula’s cross-claims.

7 Although we do not decide the issue, we question whether

Kamjula’s cross-complaint actually alleged any claims independent of the
alleged personal guarantee. To the extent Kamjula seeks to challenge the
denial of her motion for leave to amend the cross-complaint, she cannot show
any potential prejudice from the ruling because she does not contend her
proposed amended complaint was meaningfully different. Instead, she says
that through the proposed amended complaint, she sought to “continue” with
her remaining claims. We therefore need not address the court’s ruling. (J.R.
v. Electronic Arts Inc. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1107, 1115, fn. 2 [appellant must
show both error and prejudice].)

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II.
STRATEGIC WAS NOT ENTITLED TO VOLUNTARILY DISMISS ITS CLAIMS
We conclude Strategic was not entitled to dismiss its claims
against Kamjula after the trial court ruled on the summary adjudication
motion. An action or complaint may be dismissed, with or without prejudice,
“before the actual commencement of trial.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd.
(b)(1), (c).)
But “trial” is construed broadly to include dispositive pretrial
procedures. (Lewis C. Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. Lynx Iron Corp. (2009) 174
Cal.App.4th 67, 76.) A plaintiff’s right to voluntarily dismiss terminates when
the trial court makes a “public and formal indication” of the merits of the
case. (Franklin Capital Corp. v. Wilson (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 187, 200.)
Even a tentative ruling adverse to the plaintiff can be enough. (Mary Morgan,
Inc. v. Melzark (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 765, 768–769.)
This rule reflects a practical concern: once the court has indicated
an adverse determination, allowing dismissal without prejudice would permit
the plaintiff to avoid that ruling and “begin anew,” resulting in “annoying
and continuous litigation” and a waste of judicial resources. (Wells v. Marina
City Properties, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 781, 785–786 (cleaned up).)
The same principle governs here. Strategic’s claims and
Kamjula’s cross-claims had a common basis—Kamjula’s execution of a
personal guarantee. Yet Strategic itself successfully asserted that “Kamjula
‘never’ signed” it.
We do not decide how the voluntary dismissal rule might apply
where a cross-defendant’s summary adjudication motion relies only on the
other party’s absence of evidence. But at the very least, a cross-defendant
who defeats a cross-claim by affirmatively asserting that a certain fact is

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untrue, as Strategic did here, cannot later claim in support of its own claim
that the fact is true. (See Owens v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 220
Cal.App.4th 107, 121 [discussing elements of judicial estoppel].) By accepting
Strategic’s affirmative contention, the trial court made a “public and formal
indication” that necessarily doomed Strategic’s claims as well. (Franklin
Capital Corp. v. Wilson, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 200.) In these
circumstances, permitting Strategic to dismiss without prejudice would allow
it to evade that determination and potentially relitigate the same claims,
contrary to the policy our Supreme Court articulated.
Strategic misconstrues language in some cases stating that only a
determination of the entire case terminated the right to voluntary dismissal.
In those cases, the trial court’s ruling had disposed of some—but not all—of
the claims the plaintiff or cross-complainant sought to dismiss, so trial on the
remaining claims had not yet commenced. (Gogri v. Jack in the Box Inc.
(2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 255, 262, 269; Cal-Vada Aircraft, Inc. v. Superior
Court (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 435, 447.) As Cal-Vada explains, in that
situation, “the rights of the parties have not been determined . . . , and the
matter must proceed to trial for that to occur.” (Cal-Vada, at p. 447.)
By contrast, the summary adjudication ruling here resolved all
claims between Strategic and Kamjula—there was no personal guarantee for
anyone to sue over. Nothing remained for trial between those parties. That
other claims remained pending between Strategic and the buyer is
immaterial to this analysis.
We reject Strategic’s conclusory assertion that some of its claims
against Kamjula were independent of the personal guarantee. The complaint
alleges only breach of the promissory note and the personal guarantee.

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Finally, we are unpersuaded by Strategic’s claim that Kamjula
lost any right to complain of the voluntary dismissal because she had
demanded it herself. After Strategic’s initial request to dismiss—rejected for
technical reasons—Kamjula’s counsel merely e-mailed Strategic’s counsel to
demand the buyer’s dismissal as well. Strategic apparently ignored that
demand and simply refiled a corrected request for dismissal of Kamjula
alone. Under these circumstances, neither invited error nor equitable
estoppel applies. (Diaz v. Professional Community Management, Inc. (2017)
16 Cal.App.5th 1190, 1204 [invited error applies where appellant misled trial
court]; Migliore v. Mid-Century Ins. Co. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 592, 606 [party
asserting equitable estoppel must have relied on opponent’s conduct].)
Because the trial court’s ruling effectively disposed of Strategic’s
claims, and as Strategic continues to assert on appeal that Kamjula never
signed the guarantee on which Strategic’s claims relied, we direct the court to
vacate the voluntary dismissal of those claims and enter judgment dismissing
them with prejudice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 906 [appellate court may direct
proper judgment or order to be entered].)
DISPOSITION
The summary adjudication order dismissing all of Kamjula’s
cross-claims is affirmed, the judgment is reversed, and the matter is
remanded for the trial court to enter judgment dismissing all claims by and

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against Kamjula with prejudice. The parties shall bear their own costs on
appeal.

SCOTT, J.

WE CONCUR:

GOODING, ACTING P. J.

SCHWARM, J.*

*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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