People v. Diaz CA5

CourtListener 10855945CalctappMay 7, 2026

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Filed 5/7/26 P. v. Diaz CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F089058
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. MF015111A)
v.

GREGORIO IDABET DIAZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Tiffany E.
Organ-Bowles, Judge.
Patrick J. Hennessey, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ian Whitney and Joseph
Penney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Hill, P. J., Peña, J. and DeSantos, J.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Gregorio Idabet Diaz (defendant) was convicted of driving under the
influence of alcohol and driving with a blood-alcohol content of 0.08 percent or more. In
a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true that defendant suffered a prior strike
conviction of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. The trial court sentenced
defendant to the middle term, doubled due to the strike. Defendant contends on appeal
the court erred by imposing the middle term rather than granting probation or imposing
the lower term. The People argue defendant was ineligible for probation and the court
did not abuse its discretion in imposing the middle term. We agree with the People and
affirm the judgment.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On May 3, 2024, the District Attorney of Kern County charged defendant with
driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a); count 1)
and driving a vehicle with blood-alcohol content of 0.08 percent or more (Veh. Code,
§ 23152, subd. (b); count 2), with an allegation under Vehicle Code section 23550.5,
subdivision (b) that defendant had previously been convicted of gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a))1 for both counts. It was
alleged defendant had served a prior prison term (see Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(b)(3)) and suffered one prior strike conviction within the meaning of the
Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (a)–(e), 1170.12).
A jury found defendant guilty of both counts. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial
court found the prior conviction allegation under Vehicle Code section 23550.5,
subdivision (b), the prior prison term allegation and the prior strike conviction allegation
true. Prior to sentencing, defendant filed a statement in mitigation, which included a

1 Hereinafter, undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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Romero2 motion inviting the court to strike the prior strike conviction. The prosecution
filed an opposition to the Romero motion along with a sentencing statement.
On December 11, 2024, the trial court denied defendant’s Romero motion. The
court sentenced defendant to the middle term of two years, doubled to four years due to
the prior strike, on count 1. The same term was imposed but stayed, pursuant to
section 654, on count 2.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
On July 29, 2022, at approximately 10:15 p.m., California Highway Patrol Officer
Ryan Perez was on duty in a marked patrol vehicle when he observed a white truck in the
“fast lane” drift into the center median and nearly hit a sign before swerving back into
their lane. The truck continued to swerve in a serpentine motion, from left to right,
crossing traffic lanes. Perez followed the truck for one or two miles, observing the driver
as he continued to swerve in a serpentine manner. Perez initiated a traffic stop and the
truck pulled over to the right shoulder. Perez approached the driver of the truck, who was
identified as defendant, and immediately smelled alcohol coming from the vehicle, noted
defendant was slow to react, and that defendant’s eyes were red and watery.
Perez asked defendant why he was “all over the road,” and defendant said nothing
was wrong and that he was on his way home after having dinner at a bar and grill.
Defendant said he ate pizza and wings around 9:00 p.m. or 9:30 p.m. and admitted to
consuming one large draft beer that day, starting at approximately 2:30 p.m. and finishing
at 8:00 p.m. During their conversation, Perez noted defendant had red and watery eyes, a
heavy odor of alcohol on his breath and person, and that defendant was slurring his
words. Perez administered field sobriety tests, during which defendant exhibited
numerous “clues” that he was under the influence of alcohol.

2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.

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Defendant initially agreed to submit to a preliminary alcohol screening breath test.
However, defendant would not adequately blow into the testing machine. Perez formed
the opinion that defendant was over the legal limit of alcohol and was unsafe to drive.
Perez arrested defendant and transported him to the hospital for a blood draw.
Criminalist Idolina Fuentes from the Kern County Regional Crime Lab tested
defendant’s blood sample, which yielded a 0.109 percent alcohol level at the time of the
draw. Supervising criminalist David Zimmerman testified that alcohol impairment for
safely operating a motor vehicle begins at 0.05 percent. Using retrograde analysis, he
estimated defendant’s blood-alcohol level at approximately 0.121 percent to
0.139 percent at the time of the stop, depending on variability in elimination rate between
0.01 percent and 0.025 percent per hour. Zimmerman opined that a person in identical
circumstances to defendant would be impaired for the purposes of safely operating a
motor vehicle.
DISCUSSION
Relevant Factual and Procedural Background
In 2009, defendant was convicted of two counts of gross vehicular manslaughter
while intoxicated (§ 191.5, subd. (a)) and, driving under the influence and causing bodily
injury to another person (Veh. Code § 23153, subds. (a), (b)). Defendant was sentenced
to six years in state prison. Defendant was paroled in April 2014, and discharged from
parole in April 2016.
In his statement in mitigation for sentencing, defendant noted that he had not
suffered any convictions since the 2009 offenses. Defendant asserted that during the
“interim time” between his criminality, he had become “a duly employed citizen and an
outstanding employee[,]” “active in his community through his church, and has had a
positive impact on numerous people around him[.]” Defendant participated in “alcohol
classes … in an attempt to address his alcohol issues.”

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In opposition, the prosecution noted that defendant’s drinking and driving in 2009
“killed two people and injured a third” and was “convicted of three separate strike
offenses.” The prosecution argued that taking the lives of two individuals and spending
time in prison as a result should have had a deterrent effect on defendant. But it did not
deter defendant, who chose to engage in the exact same conduct by drinking and driving
again.
The trial court imposed a four-year sentence offering the following explanation:

“Circumstances in mitigation are that [defendant] has a limited
record of criminal conduct and that [defendant’s] prior performance on
state parole was successful. Circumstances in aggravation are that
[defendant] served a prior prison term.

“[Defendant], here’s the thing. I think you know probably better
than anybody what happened several years ago was absolutely horrific. But
the problem, sir, is that you didn’t learn. You didn’t learn. You may think
you have, but you didn’t, because you went out and you drank and you
chose to drive. That’s why you are going to prison today and that’s—it’s
on you.

“Now, when you get out of prison, … what you should do is never
let another drink of alcohol pass your lips. And you better think long and
hard before you ever get behind the wheel of a car, particularly if you
choose to have something in your system. It’s a very bad idea, and it has
not served you well at all. I do wish you luck, and I hope this never
happens again.”
Applicable Law and Standard of Review
The trial court’s sentencing decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People
v. Sandoval (2001) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847, superseded by statute on another ground as
stated in People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 757.) In reviewing for abuse of
discretion, “ ‘ “[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the
sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a
showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing
objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be

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set aside on review.” ’ ” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376–377
(Carmony); see also People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977–978.)
“[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary
that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Carmony, at p. 377.)
“When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies
three possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a
sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in
paragraph (2).” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court shall order imposition of the
lower term if certain numerated circumstances are a contributing factor, “unless the court
finds aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of
the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) Such
contributing factors include if the defendant “has experienced psychological, physical, or
childhood trauma,” the defendant “is a youth or was a youth … at the time of the
commission of the offense,” or the defendant “is or was a victim of intimate partner
violence or human trafficking.” (See ibid.)
Analysis
Defendant contends the trial court should have granted him a “term of probation
with substantial local custody and court ordered counseling” or imposed the low term at
sentencing. (Unnecessary capitalization omitted.) In support of his position, defendant
claims: (1) there had been a “substantial period of time” between his prior offense and
his present offense; (2) “[d]uring that time, he had not been arrested or convicted of any
offense and was gainfully employed[; and]” (3) available programs to assist defendant are
“more likely to exist on the local level.” We conclude defendant fails to demonstrate the
court abused its discretion in imposing the middle term.
First, defendant was not eligible for probation because he had suffered a prior
strike conviction. (See § 667, subd. (c)(2); [probation shall not be granted if a defendant
has been convicted of a felony and has one or more prior strike convictions]; see also

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People v. Johnson (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 284, 302, fn. 12.) In order to be eligible for
probation, the trial court would have had to grant defendant’s Romero motion and strike
his prior strike conviction. However, the court denied defendant’s Romero motion and,
as the People point out, defendant does not challenge the court’s denial of his Romero
motion. Defendant’s failure to raise this claim in his opening brief waives it. (People v.
Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 550, fn. 9.) In his reply brief, defendant suggests his claim
that the court should have imposed probation assumes a scenario where “the court agreed
with [defendant’s] request to strike the prior conviction” and that “the decision to grant
probation would necessarily follow the court’s favorable ruling on the Romero motion.”
“As a general rule, [courts] do not issue advisory opinions indicating ‘ “what the law
would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.” ’ ” (People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal.4th
1076, 1084.) Here, the court declined to strike defendant’s prior strike conviction and
defendant waived his challenge to the court’s denial of his Romero motion. We will not
consider whether probation might have been appropriate in an assumed or hypothetical
scenario. Given defendant’s prior strike conviction, the court did not abuse its discretion
when it denied probation.
Next, defendant fails to demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion in
imposing the middle term. Under section 1170, subdivision (b)(1), the middle term is the
presumptive term unless aggravating factors, proven beyond a reasonable doubt or
stipulated to by the defendant, justify imposition of the upper term. (People v. Flores
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1038.) Where mitigating and aggravating factors are
balanced, the court must impose the middle term. (See People v. Leung (1992) 5
Cal.App.4th 482, 508.) Here, the court considered mitigating factors such as defendant’s
limited criminal record and his successful performance on parole. The court also
considered defendant’s aggravating circumstances, such as the prior conviction for a
similar alcohol-related offense with a prison term, which was “absolutely horrific” and
that defendant showed he did not learn his lesson when he chose to endanger the public

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by choosing to drink and drive again. The court considered both mitigating and
aggravating circumstances and determined the factors were balanced enough to warrant
the middle term. Therefore, the court’s decision to impose the middle term was not
irrational or arbitrary and within the bounds of reason. (See Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th
at p. 377.)
Defendant’s argument that the trial court should have imposed the lower term is
without support. Although defendant discusses the lower term presumption under
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), he fails to assert that any of the relevant contributing
factors apply. Under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), the lower term is presumptive if
any of the following was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense: “(A)
The person has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but
not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence. (B) The person is a youth
or was a youth as defined under subdivision (b) of [s]ection 1016.7 at the time of the
commission of the offense. (C) Prior to the instant offense, or at the time of the
commission of the offense, the person is or was a victim of intimate partner violence or
human trafficking.” There is no evidence in the record that defendant experienced either
of these as a contributing factor that would trigger the lower term presumption.
Instead, defendant relitigates mitigating factors relied on by the probation
department in recommending the lower term: that there was a substantial period of time
between his prior strike conviction in 2009 and the current offense, that he had not been
previously arrested during that time, that he was gainfully employed, and the availability
of programs to assist defendant are at the local level. The record shows the parties
discussed these factors and the probation officer’s recommendation at the sentencing
hearing. Therefore, the court was aware of these factors when it reached its sentencing
decision. (See § 1203, subd. (b); People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234 [courts must
take the probation officer’s report and recommendation into consideration]; see also
People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114 [“ ‘a trial court is presumed to have been

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aware of and followed the applicable law’ ”].) However, “[c]ourts are not bound to
accept recommendations in the probation report.” (Welch, at p. 234.) Defense counsel
relied on the probation report to argue for the lower term, but the court was more
concerned with the fact that even though defendant’s drinking and driving previously
took two people’s lives, he still had not learned his lesson. The court’s decision to
impose the middle term was rational and within the bounds of reason and “will not be
reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree.” (Carmony, supra, 33
Cal.4th at p. 377.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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