CourtListener 10854297•People v. Hammons CA2/4
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Filed 5/6/26 P. v. Hammons CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B342068
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. ZM019607)
v.
BRIAN HAMMONS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Mark S. Arnold, Judge. Affirmed.
Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Noah
P. Hill and Eric J. Kohm, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Brian Hammons appeals after the trial court found he qualified as a
sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predators Act
(SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.)1 and ordered his indeterminate
commitment to the State Department of Mental Health.
On appeal, appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to
establish that he “presently represented a serious and well-founded risk of
reoffending in a sexually predatory manner.” We disagree and affirm the
judgment.
BACKGROUND
A. Qualifying Sexually Violent Offenses
In 1996, appellant was convicted of lewd acts on a child. (Pen. Code,
§ 288, subd. (a).) The victim was appellant’s six-year-old half-brother or
stepbrother.2 Appellant touched the victim’s penis three times and
sodomized him twice. On one occasion, while the victim was in bed, appellant
pulled down the victim’s pants and put his penis inside the victim’s anus.
In 1998, while still on probation for the 1996 offense, defendant was
convicted of forcible lewd acts on a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1)). The
victim was a six-year-old boy who was riding a bicycle. Appellant enticed the
victim into a garage. There, appellant told the victim, “Take your pants down
or I’ll rip your head off.” Appellant also ordered the victim to get down on the
ground. Appellant then got on top of the victim, who managed to flee by
throwing keys and causing a distraction.
In August 2012, the People filed a petition to commit appellant as an
SVP. (See § 6601.) A probable cause hearing was held in January 2013. (See
§ 6602.) Over the next 11 years, the matter was continued more than 40
times. While at the state hospital pending trial, appellant was convicted of
possessing child pornography, in violation of Penal Code section 311.11.3
In October 2024, appellant waived his right to a jury trial and the
matter proceeded to court trial.
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 We will refer to this victim as appellant’s half-brother.
3. Appellant was arrested for that offense in 2020 and convicted in 2022.
2
B. The People’s Experts
The People presented two experts who opined that appellant met the
requirements for commitment as an SVP.
Dr. Craig Teofilo, a licensed psychologist, had been performing SVP
evaluations since 2007. He was a “master trainer” on risk assessments such
as the Static-99. At the time of trial, he had performed SVP evaluations on
about 500 people. About 16 percent of his first-time evaluations resulted in a
finding that the person was an SVP.
Dr. Teofilo initially evaluated appellant in 2012, while appellant was
still in prison. He did updated evaluations in 2012, 2017, 2019, 2020, and
2024. Appellant declined to participate in interviews for the last three
evaluations.
During the 2012 evaluation, appellant was asked about the incident
with his half-brother. Appellant said that “somehow,” he had woken up “with
his penis in his brother’s anus.” In 2017, appellant acknowledged two other
sexual touchings of his half-brother. One involved pushing his half-brother’s
butt; the other occurred while they were wrestling.
Appellant also discussed the incident with the second victim during the
2012 evaluation. Appellant acknowledged that the victim was a stranger.
Appellant admitted placing his hand on the victim’s shoulder but denied
making any threats or any attempt to molest the victim. In 2017, appellant
changed his story: he admitted that he had asked to see the victim’s penis,
and he claimed he had been introduced to the victim two years earlier.
During both the 2012 and 2017 interviews, appellant denied looking at
child pornography. Appellant did acknowledge that he had a sexual interest
in six- to eight-year-old boys. Appellant admitted he had masturbated to
“deviant sexual fantasies” involving boys about twice a month between 1998
and 2005, as well as about eight times within the time period of 2012-2017.
In 2017, appellant was only participating in “pretreatment groups”; he
was not doing the sex offender treatment program (SOTP). Appellant was
opposed to participating in the SOTP because he believed he might be subject
to a polygraph test or a penial plethysmograph, which would assess his
deviant sexual interest.
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Dr. Teofilo diagnosed appellant with pedophilic disorder, which is
characterized by “a persistent pattern of urges, thoughts, fantasies, behaviors
involving prepubescent children,” which the person has acted on when over
the age of 16 and at least five years older than the victim. Pedophilic disorder
can be managed and controlled, but not cured.
Dr. Teofilo opined that appellant exhibited volitional impairment.
When he committed the second qualifying offense, appellant knew it was
wrong, was on probation for the first offense at the time, and had told himself
he “was never going to do it again,” yet he reoffended. Appellant’s possession
of child pornography while in the state hospital was also evidence of his
volitional impairment. Appellant also exhibited emotional impairment
during his offenses, in that he caused the first victim to suffer pain and he
caused the second victim to suffer distress.
To assess whether appellant was likely to reoffend in a sexually violent
and predatory manner without custodial treatment, Dr. Teofilo administered
a structured risk assessment using two instruments: the Static-99R and the
Static-2002R. Appellant’s age was a factor included on the instruments; he
was 48 years old at the time of his SVP trial.
Dr. Teofilo assessed appellant as an eight on the Static-99R.
Originally, he had assessed appellant as a six; the increase was due to
appellant’s subsequent conviction of possessing child pornography. An eight
is within the highest risk level, representing a “well above average risk.” On
the Static-2002R, appellant assessed as a nine, which also fell within the
“well above average” range. Appellant’s scores were in the 99th and 98th
percentiles, respectively. His score on the Static-99R corresponded with
reoffense rates of 31 percent within five years, 40.9 percent within 10 years,
and 50.3 percent within 20 years.
Dr. Teofilo also examined the dynamic risk factors present in
appellant’s case. Significant factors included appellant’s commission of
offenses while under supervision and his failure to complete sex offender
treatment.
Dr. Mark Patterson, another licensed psychologist, had been doing SVP
evaluations since 2008. At the time of trial, he had performed SVP
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evaluations on about 900 different people. About 20 percent of his first-time
evaluations resulted in a finding that the person was an SVP.
Dr. Patterson did a “replacement evaluation” of appellant in 2024
because the previous evaluator was not available. Appellant declined to be
interviewed for the evaluation.
Like Dr. Teofilo, Dr. Patterson diagnosed appellant with pedophilic
disorder, scored him as an eight on the Static-99R, and scored him as a nine
on the Static-2002R. Dr. Patterson also performed a dynamic risk
assessment, finding that appellant “got the highest score possible” on about
half of the 17 factors. Appellant’s total score was in the 95 percentile. The
dynamic risk factors included that appellant had been able to keep his
“deviant sexual interest” in young boys active by possessing child
pornography, and his decision not to participate in the SOTP.
C. Defense Evidence
Dr. Joseph Plaud, a licensed psychologist, had conducted hundreds of
evaluations as a court-appointed expert in federal court and other states. He
interviewed appellant as part of the evaluation he performed in 2024.
Dr. Plaud evaluated appellant using the SVR-20 risk instrument as
well as the Static-99R. For the Static-99R, Dr. Plaud gave appellant a six,
but acknowledged, “It could have realistically been a seven.” He further
acknowledged, “If you consider . . . the child pornography issue, it could even
reasonably be considered an eight.” Dr. Plaud only included the five-year
reoffense rate for a score of six in his report. He did not include any 10-year
or 20-year reoffense rates, calling those “dubious” and “ridiculous.”
Dr. Plaud agreed with the prosecution experts that appellant had a
diagnosis of pedophilic disorder. However, he did not believe that appellant
was likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior if
released from custody. Dr. Plaud noted that appellant was 48 years old and
had not manifested any risk factors in the 30 months since completing his
sentence for possession of child pornography.
Lorraine Halonski, a behavior specialist at the state hospital, co-
facilitated two groups that appellant participated in for about 16 months,
starting in 2016. Appellant first completed several 12-week sessions of the
Sexual Compulsivity Recovery group, which is not part of the SOTP but
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covers some of the same issues. Appellant participated “pretty consistently”
in the group. Appellant also did one or two 12-week sessions of a group called
Cycle of Abuse.
Halonski was asked her opinion of a patient who had completed her
groups but had subsequently possessed child pornography. She opined, “That
would indicate to me that the patient needed to develop more skills to
manage . . . their sexually deviant thinking and their sexually deviant acting
out on that thinking.”
Elifeo Garcia, another behavior specialist at the state hospital, also
facilitated two courses that appellant attended from 2013 to 2014. First,
appellant regularly attended Values in Action and was an “active
participant.” Next, appellant attended Self-Regulation, Problem Solving, and
Positive Decision-Making. He demonstrated progress in that group. Both
groups appellant attended are required for patients in the SOTP.
D. Trial Court Findings
In finding that appellant met the SVP criteria, the trial court explained
that it had problems with Dr. Plaud’s credibility and found him “somewhat
biased.” The trial court found it significant that appellant had not engaged in
the SOTP but had demonstrated and admitted a “multi-decade desire for
sexual relations with prepubescent boys.”
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was an SVP. He specifically argues there
was insufficient evidence that he “presently represented a serious and well-
founded risk of reoffending in a sexually predatory manner.”
A. Legal Principles
An SVP is “a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent
offense against one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder
that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is
likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.”
(§ 6600, subd. (a)(1).) Under the SVPA, the People may seek to confine and
treat SVPs “until their dangerous disorders recede and they no longer pose a
societal threat.” (Moore v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 802, 815.)
6
To commit a defendant as an SVP, the People must prove four
conditions: (1) the person has previously been convicted of at least one
qualifying “sexually violent offense” listed in section 6600, subdivision (b)
(§ 6600, subd. (a)(1)); (2) the person has “a diagnosed mental disorder that
makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others” (ibid.); “(3) the
mental disorder makes it likely the person will engage in future acts of
sexually violent criminal behavior if released from custody (ibid.); and (4)
those acts will be predatory in nature [citation].” (Walker v. Superior
Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 177, 190.)
A person is likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior if,
“because of the person’s diagnosed mental disorder, he or she currently
presents a substantial danger—that is, a serious and well-founded risk—of
criminal sexual violence. . . .” (People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti) (2002) 27
Cal.4th 888, 895.) Evidence of sexually violent behavior occurring while the
offender is in custody is not required. (§ 6600, subd. (d); People v. McCloud
(2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1090.)
As with any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the
entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine
whether substantial evidence supports the SVP finding. (People v. Mercer
(1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 463, 466.) “[T]his court may not redetermine the
credibility of witnesses, nor reweigh any of the evidence, and must draw all
reasonable inferences, and resolve all conflicts, in favor of the judgment.”
(People v. Poe (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 826, 830.) In particular, we do not
reassess the credibility of experts or reweigh the relative strength of their
conclusions. (Ibid.) “Reversal for insufficiency of the evidence is warranted
only if it appears that ‘ “upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support [the judgment].”’” (People v. Orey (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 529, 561.)
“A single psychiatric opinion that a person is dangerous because of a
mental disorder constitutes substantial evidence to justify the extension of
commitment.” (People v. Williams (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 861, 872.) But
“ ‘expert medical opinion evidence that is based upon a “ ‘guess, surmise or
conjecture, rather than relevant, probative facts, cannot constitute
substantial evidence.’”’” (People v. Redus (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 998, 1011.)
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B. Analysis
Appellant argues that the People’s experts improperly relied primarily
on his diagnosis and the evidence of his predicate crimes, rather than
focusing on his “current mental status and behavior.” We disagree.
First of all, evidence of appellant’s past sexual offenses is highly
probative of whether he is “likely to engage in sexually violent behavior if
released.” (People v. Hubbart (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1234.) And here,
the prosecution experts based their assessment of appellant’s likelihood of
recidivism not just on the crimes themselves, but the fact that appellant
committed the second offense while on probation for the first offense,
demonstrating his inability to control his impulses or to learn from past
conduct. The People’s experts also based their risk assessments on evidence
that appellant continued to have, and act on, his sexual attraction to
prepubescent males. That evidence included appellant’s 2022 conviction for
possession of child pornography, which occurred while he was in the state
hospital, and his admission of continuing sexual attraction to prepubescent
males as recently as 2017.
We also find it critical that the experts used structured risk assessment
tools, including the Static-99R and Static 2002-R, which resulted in scores
placing appellant in the “well above average” category for reoffending. These
tools have been shown to reasonably predict a person’s risk of violence and
are “more reliable than unstructured clinical judgment.” (People v. Jenkins
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 142, 158 (Jenkins) (conc. opn. of Buchanan, J.).) The
results of these structured risk assessments, accompanied by thorough expert
testimony regarding how the scores informed their opinions, provided strong
evidence that appellant posed a substantial risk of sexual violence if released.
Finally, it is significant that appellant failed to participate in the SOTP
during his many years at the state hospital. While alone insufficient to
establish a substantial risk, it was properly considered by the prosecution
experts as a factor strongly weighing in favor of their conclusion that
appellant met the criteria for an SVP. “A patient’s refusal to cooperate in any
phase of treatment may . . . support a finding that he ‘is not prepared to
control his untreated dangerousness by voluntary means if released
unconditionally to the community.’” (People v. Sumahit (2005) 128
8
Cal.App.4th 347, 354-355.) Appellant’s brief participation in two groups and
general good behavior at the state hospital does not detract from the import
of his refusal to participate in the treatment program that was specifically
geared toward helping lower his risk of sexual reoffense.
Appellant argues his case is similar to several recent cases in which
appellate courts reversed Mentally Disordered Offender commitment orders4
after concluding the dangerousness finding was based solely on violence
occurring decades earlier, People v. Johnson (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 96
(Johnson), People v. Cheatham (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 782 (Cheatham), and
Jenkins, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th 142. Appellant’s reliance on these cases is
misplaced.
In Johnson, the appellate court found substantial evidence did not
support the trial court’s conclusion that Johnson, who was 69 years old and
diagnosed with schizophrenia that was partially in remission, represented a
substantial risk of harm to others. (Johnson, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at pp.
108-109.) The court found the record was devoid of evidence that Johnson’s
decompensation in an unsupervised setting would lead to violence. To the
contrary, the evidence showed that Johnson had spent 11 years in the
community under conditional release, and had stopped taking his medication
for several months, with “no evidence of a single violent—or even
aggressive—incident” despite an increase in his symptoms of schizophrenia.
(Id. at p. 109.)
In Cheatham, the charges that led to the commitment involved
Cheatham’s escape from criminal custody after he heard voices that led him
to believe the police planned to shoot him. (Cheatham, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th
at p. 786.) Cheatham was eventually placed on supervised release, but then
returned to a state hospital commitment four years later, after “a number of
rule violations.” (Ibid.) He was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder and a
separate substance use disorder and began taking a medication in the
hospital that largely stabilized his symptoms. (Ibid.) At trial, the
prosecution presented testimony from two psychologists who acknowledged
4 Commitment of a mentally disordered offender requires a finding the
person poses “a substantial danger of physical harm to others” because of his
or her mental disorder. (Pen. Code §§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(1), 2972, subd. (c).)
9
that they had never seen Cheatham hurt or threaten anyone. The record was
devoid of any evidence that Cheatham had ever engaged in behavior
dangerous to others because of his mental disorder, even during a period of
supervised release. (Id. at p. 790.) Thus, the appellate court found that the
experts’ speculation that he might be unable to control such dangerous
behavior in the future was not supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at pp.
790-791.)
In Jenkins, the defendant was convicted of attacking her landlord with
a hammer, fracturing his skull, and imprisoning him on her apartment floor
for six hours. (Jenkins, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 145-146.) She was
subsequently transferred from prison to a state hospital for treatment and
diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder (bipolar type). (Id. at p. 146.) The
trial court granted a petition to extend her commitment as a mentally
disordered offender, finding that Jenkins represented a substantial danger of
physical harm to others because of her severe mental disorder. (Id. at p.
149.) The appellate court reversed, finding no evidence in the record that
Jenkins had ever been violent or dangerous other than her commitment
offense 23 years earlier. (Id. at p. 153.) The court also noted that the
People’s experts failed to address Jenkins’ age or declining health, even
though at the time of the hearing she was almost 70 years old, her health was
“‘starting to go downhill,’” and she had recently begun using a wheelchair due
to decreased mobility. (Id. at p. 153.) On those facts, the court found that the
experts’ belief that Jenkins should not be released because of her lack of
insight as to her mental illness and the violence of her offense of conviction
was insufficient and their opinion that she posed a continued risk of violence
was conclusory speculation. (Id. at pp. 155-156.)
Unlike these cases, appellant was not physically limited in his ability to
potentially commit further sexual offense, nor had he demonstrated that he
could function on release without incident. Moreover, none of the trial courts
in those cases relied upon the professional judgment of a qualified expert who
applied a structured risk assessment instrument. (See Jenkins, supra, 95
Cal.App.5th at pp. 155–156; Cheatham, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 794;
Johnson, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 109.) As such, the appellate courts’
10
rejection of expert opinions based only on past crimes or on speculative
assertions of future risk is inapplicable here.
We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion
that appellant met the statutory criteria of an SVP.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COGLIATI, J.*
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
TAMZARIAN, J.
* Judge of the Santa Cruz Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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