CourtListener 10851921•Sapir v. Pilot CA2/1
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Filed 5/1/26 Sapir v. Pilot CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
MICHAEL SAPIR, as Trustee, etc., B343325
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23SMCV01292)
v.
EDWARD W. PILOT et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Edward B. Moreton, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Gary Kurtz and Gary Kurtz for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Hinshaw & Culbertson, Jennifer K. Saunders and Tami
Kay Lee for Defendants and Respondents.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Representing himself, Michael Sapir (as trustee of the Ben
and Celia Sapir Family Trust) sued his former counsel Edward
W. Pilot and his professional corporation (Defendants) for legal
malpractice. Sapir failed to serve the summons and complaint,
and following an order to show cause hearing regarding failure to
prosecute at which Sapir did not appear, the trial court dismissed
the case without prejudice. Nearly six months later, Sapir
requested the court set aside the dismissal, which the court then
did based on Sapir’s representations.
After Sapir finally served the complaint and summons,
Defendants swiftly filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
vacating the dismissal of Sapir’s complaint. Defendants’ motion
included new facts suggesting some of the representations made
by Sapir to secure the set aside of the prior dismissal were
incomplete and/or false. The court granted Defendants’ motion
and restored its prior dismissal of Sapir’s complaint. Sapir then
asked the court to reconsider its grant of Defendants’
reconsideration motion, a request the court denied.
Sapir argues the court abused its discretion in granting
Defendants’ reconsideration motion. He asserts that Defendants
did not set forth proper grounds justifying reconsideration, that
the policy favoring disposition on the merits precluded the court
from granting the motion, that the court unfairly treated his and
Defendants’ motions for reconsideration differently, and that
because Defendants claimed to specially appear via their motion
for reconsideration, the court could not grant their motion. We
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirm.
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BACKGROUND
A. The Complaint
On March 24, 2023, Sapir, in propria persona, sued
Defendants for malpractice using a Judicial Council form
complaint. He asserted that as a result of Defendants’ alleged
negligence, “an adverse verdict was obtained against [Sapir],”
“additional damages . . . accrued” against him, and “the statute of
limitations” and “[Sapir]’s opportunity for relief passed.”
B. The Court Dismisses Sapir’s Complaint
1. Case Management Conference
Six months later, Sapir appeared at a September 20, 2023
case management conference (CMC). He had not yet served the
summons and complaint upon Defendants. At Sapir’s request,
the court continued the CMC to allow Sapir to retain counsel. It
set an order to show cause (OSC) for January 3, 2024, for failure
to file a proof of service along with the CMC.
2. January 3, 2024 CMC and OSC
Neither Sapir nor anyone acting on his behalf appeared at
the continued CMC or the OSC on January 3, 2024. There were
no new filings and no one advised the court why there was no
appearance. Finding Sapir had not shown cause why the case
should not be dismissed, the court dismissed the complaint
without prejudice that same day.
C. Sapir’s Motion to Vacate Dismissal
1. Sapir’s Motion and Evidence in Support
Nearly six months later, on July 1, 2024, Sapir (in propria
persona but using pleading paper from attorney Gary Kurtz’s
office) filed a motion to vacate the dismissal under Code of Civil
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Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). Further unspecified
statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
Sapir declared that he attempted to prosecute the matter
without counsel due to financial limitations resulting from
Defendants’ malpractice. Sapir spoke with attorney Randall Rich
prior to filing the lawsuit “and was ready to hire him a few
months later. After several months of Mr. Rich speaking with
[Sapir] and indicating he would represent [Sapir], and after
serval [sic] delays, Mr. Rich finally told [Sapir that Rich] would
not represent [him].” Sapir’s declaration did not indicate when
this conversation occurred.
Sapir further declared that at the time of the January 3,
2024 hearing, he was in New Mexico and had contracted Covid-
19. He knew he would not be able to attend the January 3, 2024
OSC and understood that “Rich would substitute in as [Sapir’s]
attorney and attend the hearing.” “At the last minute [Rich]
informed [Sapir] that he . . . did not feel comfortable representing
[Sapir] against [Defendants].” Sapir was unable to arrange for
someone else to represent him at the hearing. He asserted he did
not know that he could appear remotely. He called the court at
the time of the hearing but could not get through before the case
was called and dismissed. “After the dismissal [he] continued to
attempt to secure counsel, and [he was] in serious discussions
with a lawyer who may be available on a contingency or hybrid
basis. This effort has taken several months because [he] still
cannot hire a lawyer on an hourly fee basis, and there is no
certainty of even having a lawsuit to justify a contingency fee
arrangement. Finding an interested lawyer has been a
challenge.” Sapir noted, “One condition of representation is that
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the dismissal has to be vacated, as the statute of limitations
prevents the case from being re-filed.”
2. Hearing and Ruling
Kurtz substituted in as counsel for Sapir, and on
August 20, 2024, submitted on the tentative that granted Sapir’s
motion. Defendants did not file an opposition or appear as they
had yet to be served with the summons and complaint and were
not served with the motion to vacate.
The court granted discretionary relief under section 473,
subdivision (b), finding, “[Sapir] reasonably believed he would be
represented by counsel, and that counsel would appear at the
January 3, 2024 hearing on his behalf. . . . His mistake, surprise
and excusable neglect were reasonable under the circumstances,
given counsel’s assurances that he would represent [Sapir].”
D. Sapir Serves the Defendants with the Complaint
On September 10, 2024, Defendants were personally served
with the summons and complaint.
E. Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration
1. The Motion and Supporting Evidence
On September 20, 2024, Defendants, purportedly by a
special appearance, filed a motion for reconsideration of the
court’s order vacating the dismissal and to quash service of the
summons and complaint.
Defendants argued their motion for reconsideration was
“based upon the true and different facts.” They claimed Sapir
had made “false and misleading representations” in his motion to
vacate. Namely, Rich had represented Sapir in February 2023
through early June 2023, and had ceased representing Sapir long
before the January 2024 OSC.
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Defendants submitted three letters between Rich and Pilot
or Pilot’s counsel from February and June 2023. Further, Pilot’s
counsel declared that she spoke with Rich in May and June 2023
and had advised Rich that she represented Pilot. She further
declared that after early June 2023, Rich did not respond to her
correspondence, and she did not hear from him again.
Defendants argued that when Sapir represented in his
July 1, 2024 motion to vacate that he expected Rich to appear on
his behalf at the OSC, Rich had already been “long out of the
picture.” Defendants emphasized that Rich did not provide an
affidavit attesting to his purported neglect because he “would not
have supported [Sapir’s] assertions made in the moving papers.”
Defendants argued the new evidence they presented to the court
demonstrated that Sapir’s excuse for his failure to serve the
complaint and attend the OSC (on which the court had relied on
in granting the motion to vacate) was false.
Defendants also argued Sapir had been aware on
January 3, 2024 that the court had dismissed his matter as he
had declared that he had called the court clerk on that day. Yet
he waited until just two days shy of section 473, subdivision (b)’s
six-month outer limit to seek relief from that dismissal.
Defendants argued that under the circumstances, this failed to
meet the statutory requirement that a party apply for relief
“within a reasonable time.” (§ 473, subd. (b).) Defendants argued
Sapir had known even before the September 2023 CMC that Rich
would not represent him, suggesting Sapir had exaggerated his
tale of hardship and had been dilatory.
Defendants explained they did not contemporaneously
oppose Sapir’s motion to vacate the dismissal because they had
no notice of the motion. Sapir had not served the motion on
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them, nor had he served the summons and complaint until after
the court had granted Sapir’s motion.
2. Sapir’s Opposition
In his opposition, Sapir (represented by Kurtz) argued that
specially appearing defendants could not bring a motion to vacate
and that Defendants’ motion for reconsideration failed to raise
new or different facts, law, or circumstances. He further argued
the policy favoring a disposition on the merits outweighed the
competing policy favoring judicial efficiency. Sapir did not
dispute Defendants’ arguments or evidence that Sapir had
misleadingly suggested he had to restart his attorney search as
recently as January 2024, when Rich purportedly gave Sapir only
last-minute notice that he would not appear at the OSC.
3. The Court’s Ruling and Dismissal Without Prejudice
On October 15, 2024, the court granted Defendants’ motion.
The court found that although the Defendants claimed to
specially appear in their motion, the nature of their motion
constituted a general appearance. The court also found
Defendants had “present[ed] different facts, circumstances or
law” and provided “a satisfactory explanation for [their] failure to
do so [earlier]—Defendants were never served with the motion to
vacate . . . .”
In light of the new information presented by Defendants,
the court found that Sapir did not bring his motion “within a
‘reasonable time’ because [Sapir] failed to explain why he waited
until two days shy of the six[-]month limit to file his motion to
vacate.” The court stated, “[G]iven the delay in bringing the
motion to vacate and the failure to show diligence, the [c]ourt
concludes [Sapir]’s motion to vacate was not made within a
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reasonable time, and the [c]ourt should, accordingly, have not
granted the motion.”
The court dismissed Sapir’s complaint without prejudice.
F. Sapir’s Motion for Reconsideration
1. The Motion and Supporting Evidence
On October 30, 2024, Sapir moved for reconsideration of the
order granting Defendants’ motion for reconsideration. Sapir
argued the court’s October 15, 2024 ruling depended in part on
Sapir’s lack of explanation for delay. Sapir claimed he previously
“did not present the reasons it took so long to file the [m]otion for
[r]elief,” but now provided an explanation, which constituted new
facts.
Sapir argued that he “was unable to afford counsel despite
trying. Essentially, the delay was because Mr. Pilot’s work
financially devastated him to the point [that] he was unable to
hire counsel until a chance meeting with current counsel.” Sapir
also argued that preexisting facts and law could provide the basis
for a motion for reconsideration if accompanied by a satisfactory
explanation for the failure to present the information earlier.
Sapir submitted a declaration averring that he paid
approximately $1 million to resolve a judgment against him and
pay attorney’s fees to Defendants. His resulting financial
difficulties hindered his ability to secure legal counsel. He was
able to enlist Rich’s assistance in drafting the complaint, “but
[he] could never afford to hire him to be [his] attorney.” Sapir
continued, “As the [c]ourt is aware, I was unable to keep up with
my responsibilities to the [c]ourt, which resulted in the dismissal
of the lawsuit when illness prevented me from appearing at the
hearing.” Sapir did not contend that he expected Rich to
represent him at the OSC or otherwise address that his new
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declaration saying he “could never afford to hire Rich”
contradicted his prior claim that he expected Rich to appear at
the OSC as his lawyer. Sapir also declared that after learning
his case was dismissed, he searched for counsel but they all
required retainer payments that he could not afford. He
eventually obtained assistance from Kurtz. He concluded his
financial situation “was the sole reason it took [him] so long to
bring a motion for relief from the dismissal.”
In support of the motion, Kurtz also submitted an attorney
declaration stating that it was a strategic choice to oppose
Defendants’ reconsideration motion solely on procedural grounds
and not to submit additional facts from Sapir to explain the
reasons for his delay in filing the motion to vacate. Kurtz later
argued that he took the court’s finding that “Sapir did not explain
the delay” as “an invitation to seek reconsideration with an
explanation [for] the delay.”
2. The Opposition
In opposition, Defendants argued Sapir’s motion did not
identify a change in law or new facts. Sapir had had
opportunities to raise the facts contained in his declaration at the
time he filed his opposition “and during the extensive oral
argument” on Defendants’ motion. In fact, defense counsel
declared, Sapir had raised some of those arguments before.
Defendants argued that section 1008 did not allow a party to
reargue what it already had an opportunity to argue.
3. The Court’s Ruling
On December 9, 2024, the trial court denied Sapir’s motion
for reconsideration. It found the motion was not based on new or
different facts, circumstances, or law. That Sapir had insufficient
9
funds to hire counsel had been known to him, “and there is no
explanation provided as to why it was not raised earlier.”
4. Appeal
Sapir timely appealed the court’s October 15, 2024 order.
The December 9, 2024 order denying reconsideration is not itself
appealable (§ 1008, subd. (g)), and Sapir has not appealed it.
DISCUSSION
A. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review
1. The Trial Court’s Authority to Dismiss for Failure to
Prosecute
A trial court may dismiss a matter if the plaintiff has not
served the summons and complaint upon the defendants within
60 days after filing it. (Tliche v. Van Quathem (1998) 66
Cal.App.4th 1054, 1063; see Gov. Code, § 68600 et seq. [the Trial
Court Delay Reduction Act]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.110(b).)
“The management of the trial court’s delay reduction program is
an area within the court’s discretion and will not be disturbed
unless it appears that the exercise of that discretion was a clear
abuse or a miscarriage of justice.” (Youngworth v. Stark (1991)
232 Cal.App.3d 395, 401.)
2. Vacating an Order Due to Mistake, Inadvertence,
Surprise, or Excusable Negligent
Under the version of section 473, subdivision (b) that was
in effect at the time of the challenged proceedings, “The court
may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party . . . from a
judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against
him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect. Application for this relief . . . shall be made
within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after
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the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.” (§ 473,
former subd. (b) [effective through Dec. 31, 2025].) The party
seeking relief under section 473 must be diligent. (Zamora v.
Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 258.)
“ ‘A ruling on a motion for discretionary relief under section 473
shall not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of
abuse.’ ” (Id. at p. 257.)
3. Motions for Reconsideration
Section 1008, subdivision (a) states, “When an application
for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused
in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on
terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after
service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and
based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make
application to the same judge or court that made the order, to
reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior
order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit
what application was made before, when and to what judge, what
order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts,
circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.”
A court lacks jurisdiction to grant a motion for
reconsideration under section 1008 that does not set forth new or
different facts, circumstances, or law. (Gilberd v. AC Transit
(1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500; see also § 1008, subd. (e).)
“The party seeking reconsideration must provide not just new
evidence or different facts, but a satisfactory explanation for the
failure to produce it at an earlier time.” (Glade v. Glade (1995)
38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1457.)
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We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for
reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. (Glade v. Glade,
supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1457.)
B. Analysis
1. Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration Was Proper
Sapir first argues the trial court abused its discretion
because Defendants’ motion for reconsideration was not based on
new or different facts, circumstances, or law. Sapir argues that
the court was aware that his motion to vacate had been filed
within days of the six-month deadline at the time it granted his
motion, and Defendants only presented facts that already existed
at the time of the order. This ignores both Defendants’ absence
from the original proceedings and their presentation of additional
facts not before the court at the time of the motion to vacate.
Kollander Construction, Inc. v. Superior Court (2002) 98
Cal.App.4th 304, disapproved on other grounds in Le Francois v.
Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1107, footnote 5, and Kalivas v.
Barry Controls Corp. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1152 are instructive.
In Kollander, the plaintiff mistakenly dismissed a
defendant from the action with prejudice. (Kollander
Construction, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at
p. 308.) The plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the dismissal as a
mistake under section 473. (Kollander, at p. 308.) The defendant
submitted a lengthy sur-reply, on which the court relied in
denying the plaintiff’s section 473 motion. (Kollander, at p. 309.)
The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing she had
been denied the right to effectively rebut the new arguments and
evidence in the sur-reply. (Ibid.) The court granted
reconsideration, and the defendant appealed. The appellate court
affirmed, holding “new circumstances were presented which
12
supported the grant of the motion for reconsideration.” (Id. at
p. 314.) It explained, “Litigants have the right to a full and fair
hearing on ‘critical pretrial matters.’ ” (Ibid.) The plaintiff had
not been given an opportunity to respond to the defendant’s new
arguments and evidence, and reconsideration was therefore
appropriate. (Ibid.)
In Kalivas, a local courtroom rule conflicted with state law
and was, in the words of the appellate court, “procedurally
confusing and led [the plaintiff’s] counsel to believe the court had
taken [the defendant’s] summary judgment motion off calendar.”
(Kalivas v. Barry Controls Corp., supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1154.) The court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant. (Id. at p. 1157.) The plaintiff filed a motion for
reconsideration, arguing that her counsel believed the court had
taken the motion off calendar pursuant to the local rule. The
court disagreed and denied reconsideration. (Ibid.)
The appellate court held that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.
The motion both presented new or different facts and a
satisfactory explanation for not producing the evidence at an
earlier time. (Kalivas v. Barry Controls Corp., supra, 49
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1160-1161.) The appellate court stated, “The
courtroom local rule misled [the plaintiff’s] counsel, so that he
filed no opposition and separate statement and did not appear at
the hearing on the summary judgment motion. Thus the trial
court never received [the plaintiff’s] evidence or considered her
arguments on the merits. This constitutes an adequate showing
of new or different facts. The flawed courtroom local rule also
provides a satisfactory explanation why [the plaintiff] did not
13
produce evidence at an earlier time. [The plaintiff’s] counsel
reasonably believed the hearing was canceled.” (Id. at p. 1161.)
Here, Defendants, through no fault of their own, had no
notice that Sapir sought to vacate the dismissal or that he made
arguments in support of that motion for which they possessed
contrary evidence. Thus, like the plaintiffs in Kollander and
Kalivas, Defendants had no occasion to oppose Sapir’s motion or
present rebuttal evidence.
The evidence Defendants submitted with their motion for
reconsideration (which was not previously before the court)
indicated Sapir’s declaration had misled the court in suggesting
(1) that Sapir reasonably expected that Rich would appear on his
behalf at the January 3, 2024 OSC, (2) that Rich deserted Sapir
“[a]t the last minute,” and, relatedly, (3) that Sapir had been
diligent in searching for counsel since the time he knew Rich
would not represent him. Defendants’ evidence suggested that
Sapir knew as early as June 2023 that Rich would not represent
him, meaning Sapir had a year’s notice prior to bringing his
motion to vacate that he needed to identify new counsel—not just
the nearly six months between the court’s dismissal and the filing
of his motion. This evidence therefore cast Sapir’s diligence in
finding counsel, who would assist in bringing the motion to
vacate, in a different light and tended to show that Sapir’s motion
to vacate was not made within a reasonable time.1
1 During oral argument, Sapir argued any inference that
the Defendants’ evidence influenced the court’s finding that he
did not bring the motion to vacate within a reasonable time was
speculative. “However, it is settled that: ‘A judgment or order of
the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and
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2. The Policy Favoring a Disposition on the Merits Does
Not Support Reversal Here
Citing Oliveros v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 120
Cal.App.4th 1389, Sapir argues that the policy favoring a
disposition on the merits “outweighs the competing policy
favoring judicial efficiency.” That may be true in some cases, but
the Legislature and Judicial Council have propounded statutes of
limitations or other laws and rules permitting or even mandating
that a dilatory plaintiff’s case be dismissed. (See, e.g., §§ 583.210,
583.310, 583.420; Gov. Code, § 68600 et seq.; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 3.110(b); Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 2.2(f).) These enactments
indicate the policy of deciding cases on the merits must give way
under certain circumstances to other considerations.
Oliveros v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th
1389 is not to the contrary. In Oliveros, a defense counsel who
had devoted significant time to the matter twice requested a trial
continuance because of other trials, one of which had priority and
he reasonably thought would not go forward as scheduled. (Id. at
pp. 1392-1393.) The court denied the second continuance
request, and the trial went forward without any counsel
representing the defendant, resulting in a directed verdict in the
plaintiff’s favor. (Id. at p. 1394.) The appellate court reversed,
explaining, “the [trial] court must look beyond the limited facts
which cause a litigant to request a last-minute continuance and
consider the degree of diligence in his or her efforts to bring the
presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which
the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.’ ”
(Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564, italics
omitted.)
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case to trial.” “[T]he worthy goal of disposing of cases
expeditiously would not be met by ‘imposing the ultimate
sanction of termination on diligent litigants who, due to
unforeseen circumstances and reasonable excuse, fail to appear
when ordered to do so.’ ” (Id. at p. 1396.)
Here, Sapir did not demonstrate diligence or a reasonable
excuse for his failures to act. He did not serve his complaint on
Defendants until 18 months after he filed it. He asserted a single
claim for malpractice against his former counsel, whose address
was publicly available. He failed to appear at the January 3,
2024 OSC or advise the court in any manner that he would not be
there, and then nearly six months after dismissal, misled the
court as to why he did not appear at the OSC.
3. The Court’s Ruling on Sapir’s Motion for
Reconsideration Does Not Justify Reversal
Sapir next argues (without citation to any authority) that
the court inconsistently treated Defendants’ and Sapir’s motions
for reconsideration and that this “justifies reversal” of the order
granting Defendants’ motion. He contends that his motion, like
Defendants’ motion, was based on facts that existed at the time of
the original motion but were not presented to the court at that
time.
As explained above, Defendants’ appearance constituted a
different circumstance because they did not have an opportunity
to present their own evidence regardless of whether that evidence
preexisted Sapir’s motion to vacate. This differs from Sapir’s
motion for reconsideration, which sought to provide information
about the purported reasons for his delay that Sapir had an
opportunity to present when the court considered Defendants’
motion but instead strategically withheld. That is not a valid
16
explanation for purposes of reconsideration. (See Hennigan v.
White (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 395, 405-406 [holding the trial
court properly denied a motion for reconsideration based on
“new” evidence that could have been introduced at the time of the
original motion]; Foothills Townhome Assn. v. Christiansen
(1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 688, 692 [the plaintiff’s belief that certain
evidence was not necessary at hearing on summary judgment
motion insufficient to justify reconsideration], disapproved on
another ground in Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc.
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 68, fn. 5.)
4. The Court Did Not Err in Finding Defendants Made a
General Appearance
Sapir lastly argues that we should reverse the court’s order
granting reconsideration because a general appearance was
necessary to seek such relief and Defendants did not make one.
Without any citation to authority, Sapir argues the court
“exceeded [its] authority” by deeming Defendants to have made a
general appearance. Sapir’s argument is without merit.
Defendants did not have the last word on whether their
appearance was general or specific; that decision was for the
court. “ ‘The determination of special appearance versus general
appearance is based on the “character of the relief sought,” not by
statements of intention of the party. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]
‘ “ ‘What is determinative is whether [the] defendant takes a part
in the particular action which in some manner recognizes the
authority of the court to proceed.’ ” [Citations.] “ ‘[I]f an
appearance is for any purpose other than to question the
jurisdiction of the court[,] it is general.’ ” ’ ” (Humphrey v. Bewley
(2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 571, 579-580.) Because Defendants’
motion for reconsideration challenged the court’s order vacating
17
dismissal on grounds other than jurisdiction, the court properly
deemed Defendants to have made a general appearance.
Sapir suggests reversal is necessary to give him an
opportunity to oppose Defendants’ motion for reconsideration on
the merits. He contends he “relied, in significant part, on the
special appearance status” in his opposition and therefore focused
on arguing Defendants’ motion should be summarily denied as
improper. However, Sapir’s opposition also acknowledged the
truth that in deciding the motion the trial court could deem
Defendants to have made a general appearance, meaning the
court could proceed to decide the motion on the merits. Thus,
Sapir knew of the likelihood that the court would do just that,
and despite that risk made a strategic choice not to oppose
Defendants’ motion on the merits. Further, Sapir cites no
authority indicating that a summary denial due to Defendants’
representation that they were specially appearing would have
been the proper course. Indeed, that the character of the relief
sought is controlling suggests the opposite. (See Humphrey v.
Bewley, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at pp. 579-580.)
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DISPOSITION
We affirm the court’s order granting Defendants’ motion for
reconsideration and reinstating the court’s dismissal of Sapir’s
complaint. Defendants are awarded their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
M. KIM, J.
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