People v. Fields CA5

CourtListener 10851396CalctappApr 30, 2026

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Filed 4/30/26 P. v. Fields CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F089224
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 08CM7005HTA)
v.

KEVIN ELLIOT FIELDS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kings County. Michael J.
Reinhart, Judge. (Retired judge of the Kings Sup. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
Patrick J. Hennessey, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Dina Petrushenko and
Carly Orozco, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Franson, J. and Snauffer, J.
Appellant Kevin Elliot Fields appeals from the judgment entered after a
resentencing hearing conducted pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.75 (formerly
§ 1171.1). He contends: (1) pursuant to section 1465.9, the $5,000 restitution fine
(§ 1202.4, subd. (b)) that appears on the amended abstract of judgment must be stricken
because it is more than 10 years old, and (2) the matter must be remanded for a
determination of custody credits.
Respondent agrees the abstract of judgment must be amended to reflect deletion of
the restitution fine, as well as the corresponding parole revocation fine (§ 1202.45,
subd. (a)) but contends remand for determination of custody credits is unnecessary.
We modify the judgment to reflect the $5,000 restitution fine imposed pursuant to
section 1202.4, subdivision (b) is vacated pursuant to section 1465.9, subdivision (d). As
so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2000, in San Joaquin County case No. SF077816B (the San Joaquin County
case), appellant was convicted of assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury
(§ 245; count 3), with true findings that he used a deadly or dangerous weapon (§ 12022,
subd. (b)) and a firearm (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and that he had suffered four prior prison
terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)). He
was sentenced pursuant to the “Three Strikes” law to a prison term of 25 years to life plus
13 years.
In 2009, while incarcerated in Kings County for the San Joaquin County case,
appellant was convicted by jury of two counts of battery upon a nonconfined person by a
confined person (§ 4501.5; counts 1 & 2). He thereafter admitted to suffering two prior
strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d))—a 1982 conviction

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2.
for forcible rape (former § 261, subd. (2), now § 261, subd. (a)(2))2 and a 1994
conviction for attempted robbery (§§ 664/211)—and three prior prison terms (§ 667.5,
subd. (b)).
As to each count, the trial court sentenced appellant to a prison term of 25 years to
life for the substantive offense, plus three years for the prior prison term enhancements,
and stayed the sentence on count 2 pursuant to section 654. The court ordered the
sentence to run consecutively to the term he was serving in the San Joaquin County case.
Appellant was awarded no time credits. The court also imposed a $5,000 restitution fine
pursuant to section 1202.4 and a corresponding parole revocation fine pursuant to section
1202.45.
In March 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing pursuant to section 1172.75.3
Appellant requested the court strike a strike prior pursuant to People v. Superior Court
(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. The court struck appellant’s section 667.5,
subdivision (b) enhancements but stated it was “not going to accept and take up
[appellant’s] invitation for resentencing.” The court directed the clerk to prepare an
amended abstract of judgment.
An amended abstract of judgment was filed on July 26, 2024. It deleted all section
667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements, including the three imposed in the Kings County
case and four imposed in the San Joaquin County case; reflected the $5,000 restitution
fine and $5,000 parole revocation fine; and indicated appellant had zero custody credits.
The amended abstract reflected that appellant was serving, as to the San Joaquin County

2 The charging document and the parties refer to appellant’s forcible rape conviction
as a “261.2,” which appears to be a reference to former section 261, subdivision (2), now
section 261, subdivision (a)(2). (See People v. Sledge (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1089, 1093
& fn 1.)
3 Section 1172.75 provides a resentencing procedure for defendants serving a
sentence for the recently declared invalid prior prison term enhancement under
section 667.5, subdivision (b).

3.
case, an “incomplete” sentence of 25 years to life plus nine years, plus, as to the Kings
County case, a consecutive term of 25 years to life.
Thereafter, the trial court set a hearing on appellant’s Romero motion.4
The hearing was continued a number of times and ultimately conducted on
November 18, 2024. The trial court confirmed that the record reflected the prison priors
had already been stricken, heard evidence and argument from the parties on the Romero
motion, and ultimately denied the request. The court ordered an amended abstract of
judgment be prepared reflecting the prison prior enhancements being struck, stating,
“Otherwise the judgments are affirmed.”5

4 The procedural background of this case is a little unclear and somewhat
convoluted. We know this case came before the trial court pursuant to section 1172.5.
As such, the court was required to “recall the sentence and resentence” appellant,
applying the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and any other changes in the law
that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion. Essentially, appellant was
entitled to a full resentencing hearing. (See People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th
393, 402.)
At the March 2024 hearing, the trial court did not conduct the required
resentencing and instead stated it was not “taking up [appellant’s] invitation for
resentencing.” This may be because, in conjunction with the section 1172.75
proceedings, appellant was seeking recall and resentencing pursuant to the Three Strikes
Reform Act of 2012 (Prop. 36, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012)).
Appellant’s request, however, was reliant on the court’s granting appellant’s unusual
request to “reduce” his forcible rape conviction to a felony sexual battery conviction.
Thus, at the March 2024 hearing, it appears the court intended to decline this request but
did not resentence appellant as provided in section 1172.75.
We surmise the trial court placed appellant’s Romero motion on calendar in order
to comply with its duty to resentence appellant under section 1172.75. By then, appellant
appeared to have abandoned his efforts to be resentenced under the Three Strikes Reform
Act of 2012 and was only requesting the forcible rape conviction be stricken pursuant to
Romero. As such, we treat the November 18, 2025 hearing as a section 1172.75
resentencing.
5 The record on appeal does not include an amended abstract of judgment dated
after the November 18, 2024 hearing. The operative abstract appears to be the amended
abstract filed on July 26, 2024, which reflects the section 667.5, subdivision (b)
enhancements being stricken.

4.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the orders made on November 18, 2024.
DISCUSSION
I. Restitution Fine
Appellant contends that the $5,000 restitution fine imposed pursuant to
section 1202.4, subdivision (b) must be vacated pursuant to section 1465.9. Respondent
agrees with regard to the restitution fine and, additionally, the corresponding parole
revocation fine. We agree the restitution fine must be vacated but conclude the parole
revocation fine should remain.
Effective January 1, 2025—less than two months after appellant’s
resentencing—subdivision (d) was added to section 1465.9 and provides, “Upon the
expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to
[s]ection 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and
uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.”
(§ 1465.9, subd. (d), enacted in Assem. Bill No. 1186 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.)
(Stats. 2024, ch. 805, § 1).)
As the court in the present case did not impose a new fine but rather “affirmed”
the original judgment with the exception of striking the section 667.5, subdivision (b)
enhancements,6 and the judgment following the resentencing is not yet final, we conclude

6 Respondent asserts the trial court did not impose the restitution fine nor parole
revocation fine at the time of resentencing and therefore it must be stricken for that
reason. Generally, respondent is correct. (See People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300,
303; People v. Frederickson (2020) 8 Cal.5th 963, 1027 [striking a restitution fine from
the record and the abstract of judgment where the court failed to orally impose the fine
during the sentencing hearing]; see also People v. Nilsson (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1, 34
[resentencing necessarily requires a court to impose a new sentence, including any fines,
fees, and assessments]; People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [the oral
pronouncement of judgment controls].)
However, here, the trial court did not repronounce appellant’s sentence, not even
appellant’s prison sentence. Rather, the court denied appellant’s Romero motion and
directed the clerk to prepare an amended abstract reflecting “the [c]ourt’s rulings, striking

5.
appellant is entitled to have the restitution fine stricken. (See People v. Salstrom (2025)
117 Cal.App.5th 596, 601, review granted on another issue Mar. 11, 2026, S295038; see
also In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744–745 [absent evidence to the contrary, we
presume ameliorative criminal statutes apply retroactively to all nonfinal judgments].)
As appellant’s restitution fine was first imposed approximately 17 years ago, it is now
unenforceable and uncollectible under section 1465.9, subdivision (d).
Although appellant does not raise the issue, respondent contends the $5,000 parole
revocation fine imposed pursuant to section 1202.45, subdivision (a) should also be
vacated. We disagree.
Respondent reasons that because a parole revocation fine amount must be
equivalent to that of the restitution fine (see § 1202.45, subd. (a)), vacating the restitution
fine would require that the parole revocation fine be vacated as well. To support this
contention, respondent cites People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1.
Kopp does not support respondent’s contention. Rather, in Kopp, the court
vacated any unpaid portion of the defendant’s restitution fine under section 1465.9,
subdivision (d), but nonetheless remanded the matter because a parole revocation fine is
still required and was to be set in the same amount as the restitution fine would have been
had the court properly considered the defendant’s ability to pay and stayed. (People v.
Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at pp. 12, 24, 30.)
Additionally, section 1465.9 makes no mention of the parole revocation restitution
fine under section 1202.45. We are not to insert a term that was not included in a statute
or omit a term that has been included. (People v. Massicot (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 920,
925.) Further, although a parole revocation fine is closely related to a restitution fine in

the prison priors, the [section] 667.5[, subdivision] (b) priors. Otherwise the judgments
are affirmed.” (Bold added.) It appears the court intended to reimpose the same
sentence with the exception of the section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements, which
included the restitution fine and parole revocation fine.

6.
that they must be imposed at the same time and in the same amounts, a parole revocation
fine serves a different purpose, i.e., to deter a prisoner from violating parole, to
incentivize a prisoner’s rehabilitation while on parole, and to recoup costs if parole is
violated. (People v. Preston (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 415, 427, 429.) That purpose is still
relevant where, as here, an inmate might one day be paroled. No principle or authority
supports vacating the parole revocation fine.
We therefore reject respondent’s argument that we must strike the parole
revocation fine.
Accordingly, we partially accept respondent’s concession and modify the
judgment to vacate any remaining balance on appellant’s restitution fine under
section 1202.4, subdivision (b). The $5,000 parole revocation fine imposed pursuant to
section 1202.45 must remain intact.
II. Custody Credits
Appellant contends the court erred by failing to calculate his custody credits up to
the time of resentencing. He asserts the matter must be remanded for such a calculation.
Appellant is mistaken.
As respondent points out, because the sentence on the Kings County case was
ordered to run consecutively to the sentence in the San Joaquin County case, at the time
of his resentencing on November 18, 2024, appellant appeared to have been still serving
his sentence on the San Joaquin County case. Appellant does not dispute this or contend
he had served any time on his sentence for the Kings County case. He therefore has not
established he was entitled to any custody credits on the Kings County case.
Appellant has also not cited any authority that supports his apparent position that
the Kings County court was required to calculate his custody credits for the sentence in
his San Joaquin County case. He only cites general authority that when a case is
remanded to the trial court for resentencing, the court is required to update calculation of
actual time served. (See People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 23–24.) But this

7.
precept applies where “a prison term already in progress is modified” “during the term of
imprisonment.” (See id., at pp. 23, 29; see also § 2900.1.) Here appellant was only
before the court with regard to the Kings County case, (see § 1172.75, subd. (b)
[correctional department must inform “the sentencing court that imposed the
enhancement” of a defendant’s potential eligibility for resentencing]), and as we have
stated, his term of imprisonment for that case had not yet begun.
We acknowledge that under other circumstances, a court may be required to
calculate custody credits on a sentence imposed by another county. (See People v.
Phoenix (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1126 [in a determinate sentence case, sentencing
court’s imposition of a consecutive sentence “replaced” another county’s sentence; the
second county became the sentencing court].) Appellant has not, however, established
that the present case presents such a circumstance.
Notably, it appears appellant has appeared before the San Joaquin County court
for resentencing in the San Joaquin County case pursuant to section 1172.75. He
appealed from the judgment following the hearing, and the Third District Court of Appeal
reversed and remanded the matter for full resentencing on the ground that he had not
been present. (People v. Fields (Feb. 28, 2025, C100699) [nonpub. opn.].)7 The
existence of these proceedings illustrate that the San Joaquin County case and the Kings
County case are separate from one another, and the San Joaquin County court retains
jurisdiction over matters pertaining to the San Joaquin County case.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to reflect the $5,000 restitution fine imposed pursuant to
section 1202.4, subdivision (b) is vacated pursuant to section 1465.9, subdivision (d).
The trial court is directed to cause an amended abstract of judgment to be prepared

7 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the unpublished opinion in this
case. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d)(1), 459, subd. (a).)

8.
reflecting this modification and forward it to the appropriate authorities. As so modified,
the judgment is affirmed.

9.

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